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ABSTRACT
This inquiry into India's strategic and international posture seeks 
to understand and explain why India is an aspirant to great power status. 
Demonstrations of India's power during the 1970s and 1980s led regional 
and extra-regional states to become concerned about India's aspirations in 
the region. This concern, and a lack of defence policy pronouncem ents by 
the Government of India, created an atmosphere of uncertainty. In such 
an environm ent of suspicion relations between India and its neighbours 
have been strained. Cross border assistance to internal separatist groups 
continues to exacerbate intranational and international conflict in the 
region. It is hoped that analysis of the causal factors behind India's 
external posture will increase understanding  and thereby lessen the 
possibility of future conflict in the region.
A fter review ing In d ia ’s expanding  m ilitary capabilities and 
increasing assertiveness, the d isse rta tio n  iden tifies the dom estic, 
geographic and economic issues areas that define the param eters of 
India's foreign and defence policy decision-making. The prim ary utility 
of the decision making perspective is to highlight that it is through the 
assessments of the ruling elite w ithin the strategic and in ternational 
affairs structures that India's external relations are established. The 
country serves as the im portant backdrop against which policy is created. 
The determinants set the boundaries and the elites chart a course within 
these parameters. In this there is a direct linkage between internal socio­
political developm ents and India's external posture. The process is 
further influenced by the very external environm ent which its policies 
are designed to affect.
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1CHAPTER ONE
I w onder if we can rem ain free from the fever of pow er 
politics or the bid for power, which afflicts the political world 
in the East and the West.
-M ahatma G andhi1
Introduction
The above thoughts were expressed by Mahatma Gandhi a few days 
before his assassination. Today we ask similar questions about the Indian 
state. As India has expanded  bo th  its capability and its evident 
willingness to become involved in the affairs of its South Asian and 
Indian Ocean neighbours, it has increasingly become the focus of debate 
by concerned intra- and extra-regional actors. Despite the attention paid 
to the change in the correlates of power, the underlying causes for India's 
evolving position rem ain  elusive. M any existing inquiries into the 
reasons for this build-up have formed an incomplete explanation of the 
causal factors that contribute to the form ation of India’s evolving role in 
the world arena. One explanation of the deficiencies of W estern analysis 
on India as a strategic and international entity is that such analysis fails to 
adequately integrate knowledge of Indian culture, society and statecraft. 
Indeed , Indian  analysts have rem arked  th a t there  is "alm ost a 
com pulsion to m ake India think like someone else" w hen discussing 
issues of national security .2 Further, em phasis on the state level of 
analysis has left unanswered the multi-faceted question as to why India is 
seeking a more preponderant ro le .3 A more comprehensive explanation 
requires an exploration of the internal dynam ics of India's external 
posture and this is one of the prime aims of this thesis.
There is of course, a distinct tendency to project value systems and 
understandings onto other cultures w hen analysing them .4 This is
1 As quoted in Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, 
(London: Concord Grove Press, 1983), p. 53.
2 Manoj Joshi, Seminar on Nuclear and Missile Capabilities given at the Australian 
National University, 12/92.
3 The assertion that India is seeking a more preponderant role will be discussed in Chapter 
Two.
4 For a discussion of American ethnocentrism in its foreign policy outlook see Howard J. 
Wiarda, Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World, 
(Washington: The American Enterprise Institute, 1985).
2especially the case w ith India where the institutional and ideological 
legacy inherited from the British colonial period lulls the W estern 
observer into a false perception that India is approachable in W estern 
terms. While it is a necessary first step to understand that inheritance, a 
more comprehensive grasp emerges with a knowledge of the indigenous 
traditions and cultures. The former explains how India functions while 
the later explains why.
Though set in terms of the inadequacies of W estern understanding 
of Soviet ideology, the following captures this dynamic:
... the need to recognise that just as the essence of knowledge 
is not as split up into academic disciplines as it is in our 
academic universe, so can intelligence not be set apart from 
statecraft and society or subdivided into elements ... rather ... 
intelligence is a scheme of things entire. And since it 
perm eates thought and life throughout society, W estern 
scholars m ust understand all aspects of a state’s culture 
before they can assess statecraft and intelligence.5
Accordingly, this inquiry takes as its raison d 'etre the need to develop 
more fully a comprehensive understanding of India's multifaceted social, 
economic, political and strategic cultures in the belief that it is only from 
this base that an analysis of India's international behaviour can proceed.
This dissertation will examine the interrelationships among the 
causal factors of India's strategic and international relations in an attem pt 
to explain the nature and progression of Ind ia’s international posture. 
The inquiry is primarily concerned with the last decade. To understand 
events as they have transpired during this period the study will briefly 
trace the development of India's international and strategic posture since 
independence in 1947. Emphasis will be placed on the contem porary 
period of transition. This, it will be argued, will bring into focus Ind ia ’s 
relations w ith the states of South Asia,6 and, to a lesser extent, other 
Indian Ocean littoral states and those extra regional states w ith interests
5 Adda B. Bozeman, "Statecraft and Intelligence in the Non-Western World," Conflict: 
All Warfare Short of War, vol. 6 no. 1,1985, p. 33.
6 This paper considers South Asia to consist of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. Afghanistan and Burma are thought of as states in 
transition zones between the South Asian region and Southwest Asia, in the case of 
Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia, in the case of Burma.
3in the region. The need to incorporate a sense of historical progression 
justifies the period under consideration.
This study is a new look at an old question. In the past three 
decades there have been a number of studies that have examined various 
aspects of India as an emerging power. There are also many studies of 
India's internal political situation, and its bilateral and regional relations. 
The value of th is study  is that it takes a new, in teg rative  and 
multivariable approach to a problem which has changed significantly in 
the last five years. These changes in India’s international and domestic 
situation necessitate such a review. The end of the bi-polar world, the 
dim inished salience of the Non-Aligned M ovem ent (NAM), the Gulf 
War, economic liberalisation and social transform ation in India, the rise 
of H indu  fundam entalism , inter-caste strife and the escalation of 
secessionist and autonom ous movements have redefined the context of 
Indian external policy.
This study has purposefully cast its net broadly. The coherence of 
the study stems from the common objective of the chapters to explain the 
central question as to why India has been expanding its strategic posture. 
To set this in context Chapter Two provides both an overview of the 
expanded capabilities and a chronological in te rp re ta tion  of India's 
external posture since 1947.
A fter establishing the nature and progression of the m odern 
Indian sta te ’s strategic and in ternational relations, four converging 
explanatory perspectives, or determinants, will be applied to develop a 
more holistic conception, and, in turn, an overall framework of analysis 
of the causal factors influencing Ind ia’s general posture w ith in  the 
region. The four explanatory perspectives used encompass; domestic 
com ponents, geopolitical factors, economic aspects and the decision­
making process.
Since the evolution of India's security position is inextricably 
intertw ined with its internal affairs the latter m ust be analyzed w ith a 
view to recent political and sociological developm ents in the Indian 
dom estic milieu. By identifying the determ inants of India's external 
relations an understanding of the country’s direction, as it emerges from 
its current state of internal turm oil and transition, will be developed. 
The role of intra- and extra- regional actors in this process will be
4considered largely from the perspective of their influence on India’s 
security posture.
10. India as an emerging power
India's external posture7 has undergone three key periods of 
growth. Each of these has been preceded by a transitional period during 
which the pre-existing Indian paradigm underwent a fundamental 
restructuring which was necessary for India to redefine its international 
posture. Presently, India is in yet another transitional phase which is also 
likely to be followed by a period of growth. At each of these junctures the 
way India perceives its external environment has changed significantly. 
The 1962 War with China impressed upon India the need to augment its 
security forces. The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War of 1991 
similarly acted as a catalyst for transition.
The events of 1947 left an indelible scar on the national psyche. 
Millions found themselves refugees in the land they had considered 
home. Mass slaughter based on religious identity took a savage toll. As a 
result, deep-seated animosities became entrenched. In this way, Pakistan 
became a threat in more than a geopolitical sense. The conflict became a 
blood feud which was further infused with religious animosity. The 
events of 1947, reinforced by the historical legacy of the Islamic Mughal 
and Afghan invasions from the northwest, made a significant impact on 
the way in which India was to perceive the threat from Pakistan. In this 
way India's suspicions of Pakistan stem from its emotive interpretations 
as well as from security dilemma considerations.8
Gandhian non-violent political behaviour, while effective in 
mobilizing the nation to realize szvaraj, has been less effective in coping 
with the conflict of values and identities that became India's reality after
7 The term posture is used because it implies a broader meaning than specific governmental 
action or purely strategic consideration of the states of the region. Posture encompasses 
notions of position in that where a person stands or sits is itself located, (an attitude of the 
body, the way a person etc. stands or sits or walks) which is a spatial concept and also the 
idea that the agent is being perceived (to assume a posture especially for effect) which 
thereby involves the perception of others which is so central to the understanding of the 
question. These common definitions are drawn from Joyce M. Hawkin, The Oxford 
Paperback Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
8 For a discussion of the security dilemma in South Asia see Barry Buzan and Gowher 
Rizvi eds. South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1986).
5independence from Britain. The "Quit India M ovement" had been 
effectively vitalized by M ahatma Gandhi and his active policy of non­
violent protest. His battle, waged with moral force, was effective against a 
colonial pow er which no longer believed in its sense of mission. The 
satyagraha m ovem ent drew  its strength  from  one source w ithin the 
Indian socio-cultural tradition.
Since independence this has increasingly been challenged by 
alternative  notions of the state. These notions are m ore readily 
associated with a realist conception of power politics. W ithin the Indian 
tradition realism is identified with the ancient treatise of Chanakya who 
is also known as Kautilya .9 Throughout India's history its nature as a 
state has undergone periods of integration and disintegration, of idealism 
and realism. This study is cognizant of these cycles as setting the larger 
context within which the limited period under consideration is part.
10.1 A comprehensive framework and heuristic model of India's strategic 
and international posture
W hile covering the progression of the external relations of the 
m odern Indian state and identifying the determ inants of India's strategic 
and international relations, an overall framework to unify the study will 
be developed in an effort to establish the interrelationships betw een the 
determ inants, the decision-making process and India's external posture. 
Through this, a com prehensive explication of India's strategic and 
international relations and its quest for great pow er status within the 
region will emerge. It is within this context that India's quest for great 
power status will be presented.
The three chapters following Chapter Two survey and examine the 
domestic, geopolitical and economic perspectives which are viewed as 
constraints or param eters for setting the context of the Indian decision 
m aking process .10 C hapters Five and Six deal w ith  the im pact of 
economics on India's defence posture and the m anner in which the
9 Chanakya is also known as Kautilya. see V. K. Subramanian, Maxims of Chanakya: The 
Crystalised Wisdom of the Indian Machiavelli, (Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1980).
10 I would like to acknowledge the influence of J. Bandyopadhyaya author of The Making 
of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers prvt. Ltd., 1979). This seminal, 
and relatively unacknowledged work, deserves wider recognition for its attempt to 
explain the underlying causal factors of Indian foreign policy. For a more historical 
approach to Indian foreign policy see A. Appadorai’s works.
6decision-making process functions. The trade off between developm ent 
and security expenditures, the relationship betw een GNP grow th and 
defence expenditure and the impact of indigenous arms production on 
the econom y will be discussed. The w ay these param eters and 
determ inants influence Indian external relations is explained through a 
structural and perceptual exploration of the decision-making organs of 
the Indian governm ent in Chapter Six. The decision making process is 
seen as having to operate  w ithin  param eters set by the dom estic, 
geopolitical and economic issue areas. Despite the constraints that these 
three issue areas exert on the decision making process there exists a fair 
degree of la titude w ithin  w hich the decision m akers may operate. 
Further, the nature and composition of the decision-making elite will be 
exam ined as a determ ining factor on the outcom es of the decision 
m aking process. Chapter Seven will draw  conclusions based on the 
preceding chapters.
While these factor groupings set the param eters, they, in and of 
themselves, do not directly determ ine policy direction. Specific policy 
direction is the product of those individuals and groups who staff the 
decision making structure. The psycho-perceptual profiles of those in the 
structure are key to gaining an understanding of the decision making 
process. This is in addition to the nature of the organisational structure 
of decision making and the regional and global factors that impinge on 
the process.11
Three levels of analysis of Third World decision-making
1. The "great man" or psychological perspective
2. The national - societal level
3. The global level12
11 There are few attempts to apply decision-making theory to the Third World context. 
Bahgat Korany describes Third World foreign policy studies as being in a "barren state." 
He also suggests that this demonstrates the "limited help that established foreign policy 
theory can offer." While there are a few Indian foreign policy studies which integrate 
decision-making theory, which are discussed in Chapter Six, the author's research 
generally confirms this problem as pointed out by Korany. Those attempts that have been 
made usually apply what Bahgat Korany has described as the "great man," or 
psychological, approach to analysis of Third World decision-making. In his work How 
Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 39.
12 By setting out three levels of decision-making Korany expands on the two tiered 
approach of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, that emphasised the psychological and 
bureaucratic levels of analysis. Korany deemphasised the psychological perspective for 
its "personalistic and simplistic view." p.xii. While the earlier seminal work of Snyder,
7Despite the generally high levels of consensus among the decision 
making elite there are emerging alternative perspectives. There are those 
who favour a more assertive India, and expressions of Indian national 
will, through coercive diplomacy supported, w hen necessary, by overt 
dem onstrations of power. There is also an alternative voice which is 
increasingly aw are of the in te rre la tionsh ip  betw een security  and 
dev elo p m en t, and the necessity  to focus on in te rn a l national 
developm ent considerations. The perspective which shall em erge as 
dom inan t w ill be determ ined  by the on-going in terp lay  betw een 
economic reform s, the transition from  Congress politics to coalition 
politics, the rise of H indu fundam entalism  and the shifting regional and 
global geopolitical correlates of power in the post cold war world.
In asking the question why India has been pursuing an assertive 
policy d irection  it becom es necessary to seek to establish Ind ia ’s 
objectives. Before developing an understanding of the com ponents of 
Indian external posture this inquiry will establish the pace and direction 
of India’s increasingly assertive stance. The defence and foreign policy 
decision m aking elite w ield  a d isp ro p o rtio n a te  influence on the 
form ation of India’s external policy and posture to those groups which 
challenge their policy direction. In addition to exploring this level of 
decision-making, the societal, regional and global inputs to the decision­
making process will also be considered. The effect of secessionist and 
autonom ous groups on the centre, through their linkage to the external 
environm ent, is crucial in attem pting  to extrapolate India's fu ture 
direction from it's past course.
Bruck and Sapin may have been guilty of such emphasis, in the Indian context, due to the 
centralization of decision-making within the Gandhi-Nehru dynasty, it’s emphasis is not 
entirely misplaced. Korany is correct in his stress on societal and global factors. This 
study proceeds under a perspective that integrates Korany's work with that of Snyder, 
Bruck and Sapin.
8A heuristic model of the parameters of India’s strategic and international 
relations and the decision making process as determinants of India's 
external posture
Domestic ComponentsGeopolitical Realities
Circumscribed Parameters 
of Decision Making
Economic Factors
The above diagram highlights the param eters of decision-making. 
It does not seek to assert that the decision-making process itself is the 
totality of a country's external relations. While Chapter Six focuses on 
the bureaucratic and psychological aspects of decision-making, Chapters 
Three, Four and Five concentrate on the societal, regional and global 
factors tha t make up the "am orphous w hole"13 of In d ia ’s external 
relations. Through analysis of the decision-making process, and the 
larger setting w ithin which it operates, a com prehensive picture of 
India's external posture emerges.
System dom inant states’ concern over India's grow ing defence 
posture is causing them to pay more attention to India and its aspirations. 
They are seeking ways, through both  incentives and  the spectre of 
sanctions, to bring India w ithin the international fold. This is to keep 
India from becoming an outside actor. This is m ost noticeable through 
in ternational efforts to effect a reo rien ta tion  of Ind ia 's N ehruv ian  
socialist inspired economy. Am erican attem pts, such as super 301
13 B. Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World, p. 39.
9sanctions,14 were unsuccessful as long as India felt that it had options. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War India had little 
choice but to come to terms with the West. This was facilitated by the 
distancing of the American relationship with Pakistan.15 Attempts will 
continue to be made by the West to link aid, technology sharing or 
defence cooperation with reduced defence expenditures and compliance 
with nuclear non-proliferation and missile technology control. These 
initiatives will seek to keep India from rising as an independent power in 
opposition to the existing international order. Despite these efforts India 
will emerge as a major global actor when it realises the achievements of 
its present course of economic reform. The process of economic reform is 
viewed as giving India the potential to significantly expand its posture in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
The year 1989 marked a period of significant change on numerous 
levels. This is true not only for the political realities of the Indian state 
but also for the global correlation of forces and the conceptualization of 
the major debates of the world affairs. The ideological imperatives of the 
Cold War have given way as ethno-nationalist and politico-economic 
concerns take a more prominent position in the international relations of 
states. The fracture of the multi-ethnic states of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia may set the precedent for the expansion of ethno-nationalist 
and ethno-religious conflict across a shatter belt from Eastern Europe to 
Korea. India will not be immune from the expansion of such conflicts.lt 
is also recognised that India has dealt with such issues for some time.16 
As the ideological prism of the Cold War is removed the world will once 
again become cognizant of ethnic divisions that threaten the peace.
Not surprisingly, the state of international relations as a study is 
continuing to undergo transition as competing paradigms spar in their 
attempts to provide the most illuminating explanatory frameworks. This
14 In May of 1989 the United States identified India, along with Japan and Brazil, as an 
unfair trading partner. This was done under the special 301 provision of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See "Indo-US Economic Relations," Spotlight on 
Regional Affairs, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, February 1990, p. 11.
15 Pakistan received 3.2$ billion in assistance from the United States between 1981 and 
1986. This relationship was a marriage of convenience.
16 Some have gone so far as to compare India with Lebanon, and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire as well as Yugoslavia. See Ved Mehta, 'The Mosque and the Temple: The Rise of 
Fundamentalism," Foreign Affairs, spring 1993, p.16.
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is more than an academic debate since the way in which the w orld is 
conceived will have an impact on its outcom e, the biases of various 
perspectives being internalized by practitioners and thinkers alike. The 
perspective which the practitioners, analysts and observers of global 
affairs use as their filters for inquiry and analysis is therefore im portant 
for its input in the definition of the parameters of debate.
This study, while conscious of the potential impact of the on-going 
theoretical debate, is theoretically located largely within the mainstream. 
As such, it does not challenge the basic thrust of International Relations 
theory but seeks primarily to apply itself to a perplexing and understudied 
phenomenon. The study's objective is to analyse India's position within 
its region .17 The work therefore has a som ewhat eclectic theoretical 
approach. This is justified through a pragmatic argum ent that in order to 
gain a comprehensive and holistic view of the anatomy of India as an 
emerging regional power, a multi-perspective approach m ust be adopted 
due to the multifaceted composition of the Indian political milieu. This 
is not the first study to take the position that no "single model draw n 
from history or from the experience of the contemporary world is wholly 
applicable to South Asia today ."18
The w ork shares the pluralists' view that the state should be 
considered as one unit of analysis among many. While the state will 
remain the predom inant level of analysis w ithin the foreseeable future, 
in te rn a tio n a l re la tions will benefit from  m ulti-level and  m u lti­
perspective approaches. State and non-state centric levels of analysis, 
such as the individual, group and global, are reflected throughout the 
study.
Along with a change in the units of analysis we have no choice but 
to recognise a shift in the set of values under study. In the state-centric 
approach the values of the state are primary. If we are to broaden our 
levels of analysis to include other units we m ust also exam ine their 
particular value interests. W ithin the subcontinent, the sub-national 
loyalties and values are the mobilizing forces.
17 The issue of India's sense of region will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
^  Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, 
(New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1984), p. 274.
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The recognition of the value of the m ulti-perspective and m ulti­
level approach rests on the continuing relevance of the state as the single 
m ost identifiable level of analysis for the study  of in ternational 
relations .19 The perspective brought to bear under this study seeks to 
ad just the trad itiona l em phasis of sta te  level analysis w ith  the 
multiplicity of factors operating at other levels of political interaction, 
w hich u ltim ately  express them selves on bo th  the dom estic and 
in te rna tiona l stage. D espite the m ulti-leveled  approach  of the 
framework, the objective is geared to understanding a state’s actions. The 
state rem ains the most salient unit of analysis despite the increasing 
im portance of non-state actors. The m ulti-perspective approach is 
employed for the purpose of understanding the motives of the state along 
w ith  those of its influential com ponents w hich w ould otherw ise be 
excluded, dim inished or disproportionately  underem phasised  in a 
discussion of India's political evolution which placed more emphasis on 
the state level of analysis.
If there is a place within the current theoretical debate in the field 
for this study, it is somewhere betw een post-behaviourist and pluralist 
perspectives. Michael Banks discusses the post behaviourist and W orld 
Society perspectives’ search for solutions to international conflict in the 
following terms
The world society perspective, therefore, was forced to go 
beyond the standard talking points of the post behavioural 
phase-interdependence, the extreme complexity of decision 
making, the activities of transnational actors - to consider 
also the linkages betw een dom estic and in ternational 
conflict, the successful record of conflict m anagem ent in 
domestic contexts, and the academic literature on problems 
of dev ian t behaviour, percep tion , hum an  needs and 
political socialization .20
19 As Christopher Emsden has pointed out there remains a certain logical fallacy in this 
in that by "continuing to rely on the most identifiable level of analysis" the study ignores 
that which its method doesn't open out a priori. While this study attempts to push 
method somewhat by utilizing non-state levels of analysis it is not primarily concerned 
with these methodological questions.
20 Michael Banks, The Evolution of International Relations Theory," in Michael Banks 
ed. Conflict in World Society: A Neu> Perspective on International Relations, (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf,1984), p. 20.
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Patrick McGowan and H.B. Shapiro put forward a fram ework for 
the study of foreign policy. Based upon their survey of the literature, they 
proposed a unifying m odel for the establishm ent of m ore specific 
param eters for scientific study, in the hope that this w ould lead to 
increased standardisation w ithin the fie ld .21 The question regarding 
w hether foreign policy fram ew orks which seek to standard ise  the 
discipline are or are not the optim al m odel for all foreign policy 
assessments is far from clear. W hat is indirectly relevant about their 
study for the assessment of India's strategic and international relations is 
the appropriateness of the general concepts of the feedback loop between 
the foreign policy patterns of a state and those external inputs into the 
decision making process which involve intrinsic attributes of the actor in 
question. Indeed it follows that, having culled the literature, they would 
establish this relationship. The definition of the dependent variable, as 
solely the acts of official rep resen ta tives of the country  under 
consideration, and the handling of the relationship between the decision­
making process and the independent variables are significant deficiencies 
for the purposes of a broader study which is not strictly analyzing foreign 
policy but which is assessing the overall strategic and in ternational 
relations posture of a state. An exclusively foreign policy oriented 
framework omits non-official outputs which are a significant com ponent 
of the international posture of a state. Those actions of a state that are the 
result of policy and decision are but a fraction of w hat constitutes its 
external relations.
The international environm ent formulates its impression of India, 
or indeed any state, based upon perceptions which include, but are not 
lim ited to, the foreign policy representations of official representatives. 
Pakistani perceptions of India certainly take into account perceptions of 
India as a largely Hindu state. India's H induness is articulated primarily 
at the sub-national level. This perception is not the creation of explicit
21 Patrick McGowan and H. B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A 
Survey of Scientific Findings, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973). The model was 
used in a study of foreign policy by DeHaven. See Mark DeHaven, "Internal and External 
Determinants of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, March, 1991, pp. 87-108. 
This study explicitly limits its purview to an assessment of how the foreign policy acts of 
one nation could affect policy making in another, specifically, how the Soviet Union 
influenced policy making in the United Kingdom and West Germany by appealing to 
public attitudes in the wake of the dual track policy.
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government policy. It stems rather, from a complex socio-cultural 
exchange of information. The interpenetration of the various agendas of 
states is one aspect of the formulation of foreign policy which may be the 
result of explicit state policy. The degree to which a state is successful in 
projecting its agenda externally is commensurate to the state's power and 
desire to do so; or in other terms, its capabilities and assertiveness. 
India's place in the global hierarchy is rising from a regional power to a 
global actor because of its new capabilities and its increasing assertiveness.
The inputs into the formulation of India’s posture are a 
conglomeration of state and non-state actions and effects. The structure 
of the world order, international economic realities (as a result of both 
governmental policy and market forces), regional and global security 
networks and nexuses, and the actions of other state and non-state actors 
all figure into the totality of inputs into India's position. In effect, inputs 
can be thought of as any policy or non-policy action or perceived thing 
that has an impact on either the determinants of India's posture or more 
directly on the decision making process itself.
The study of the decision making process is useful, not only for its 
illumination of the process of foreign policy formation, but also because it 
helps to break down the notion of the state as a monolithic entity. By 
focussing on the process, in addition to the state as actor, the analysis will 
be more fully developed and may have greater predictive power. All too 
often, when discussing foreign policy, there is a tendency by policy 
makers and analysts to conceptualise all the inner workings of the 
various forces and components in reified terms. When we speak of 
Indian foreign policy or Indian strategic and international relations, we 
are really incorporating a host of contending and converging facets that 
are components of what is considered as Indian external policy and 
behaviour.
Foreign policy is the product of the complex intersection of the 
determinants of India’s strategic and international relations and the 
decision-making process. Before policy is formulated it is subject to 
external influences, converging domestic forces and organizational 
interests within the decision making process. From these dynamic 
exchanges emerges policy. Richard Snyder, FI. W. Bruck and Burton
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Sapin's fram ework for the study of foreign policy decision making was 
outlined in four key subdivisions.22
Foreign policy decision-making
1. perceptions of decision makers and the definition of the situation
2. the decisional context as a set of intervening variables
3. the interrelations of structure and process and decisional outcomes and
4. the combination of psychological and sociological levels of analysis.
Chapter Six proceeds from these four perspectives and Korany's three 
levels of analysis of Third W orld decision-m aking in its effort to 
understand strategic and international decision making in the Indian 
context.
C onstructing a cognitive m ap of the indiv iduals and groups 
comprising a decision-making structure is a difficult and problem atic 
project.
to combine in a single conceptual scheme two levels of 
analysis- the individual (psychological variables) and the 
group or organization (sociological variables) -.... is still felt 
by m any to be logically  im possib le  or em pirically  
unfeasible.23
There are, undeniably, difficulties in gaining inform ation on those 
involved w ith security policy decision m aking. This difficulty in 
obtaining data does not however, discount the explanatory value of the 
perspective.
If a framework for analysing foreign policy decision-making 
can embrace both the psychological and sociological levels, 
then we can ask the following questions: w hat rules for 
rational behaviour are prescribed by the organization? are
22 Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision Making as an Approach to the 
Study of International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University organizational behaviour 
section, 1954).
23 While much work within the decision-making perspective has been done since 1962 it is 
by and large based on First World situations. Asummary 0f findings of this earlier 
study, an empirical application, a critical review and a linkage with other international 
relations analysis is provided in the 1962 reprint Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton 
Sapin, eds. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International 
Relations, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 5.
these rules a ttached to roles, or do they resu lt from
socialization of the individual policy m aker?24
If we add to these psychological and sociological levels of analysis 
regional and global inputs into the process we approach the stage where 
we can comprehend the decision-making process as a whole. The overall 
framework is one which integrates evaluation of the individual decision 
m akers w ith the organizational structure and the defining param eters 
w ithin w hich they m ust function. These param eters are them selves 
influenced by the regional and global context.
Decision-making as an analytical perspective commonly concerns 
itself with the people who make decisions and carry out actions. It also 
focuses on "the part of the process that deals w ith choosing among 
alternative courses of action ."25 Defence and foreign policy decisions are 
concluded and implemented within some sort of a sociological, regional 
or global context. Those who would be affected by a decision will seek to 
influence its outcom e. The natu re  of the struc tu re  w ith in  w hich 
decisions take place similarly influences their outcome.
India's decision-m aking system  draw s extensively, though not 
exclusively, on Western, and particularly British, organizational models. 
The key difference in the decision m aking process stem s not from 
structural factors but from the attitudes and perceptions of the people 
who compose the governm ent. This defines the Indian quality of the 
decision-making process. Much was m ade in the Indian press of the 
technocrats which characterised the Rajiv coterie. In contrast to this style 
of leadership, with its Western educated elite, there is a rising num ber of 
Indian educated local politicians who draw  their support from more 
traditional areas. This can be seen as a growing division betw een the 
m odern elite and more traditional leaders. Decision making is a complex 
and convoluted process. W ith the presence of so m any com peting 
influences any decision certainly can not be seen as the result of a 
m onolith ic  ra tional actor. D espite this, there  is a tendency  to
15
24 Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, pp. 8- 
9.
25 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, (San Francisco: 
W. H. Freeman and Co., 1981), p. 267.
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conceptualize India as such. India, in its complexity and confusion, has, 
like any nation, its own definition of politically rational behaviour.
10.2 Levels of analysis
W hen discussing questions ranging across individuals, groups, 
organizations, and more broadly defined structures, ranging up to the 
national and international, it is essential that we address the issue of the 
levels of analysis under consideration and explore the potential problem 
areas which may extend from such a perspective. The extent to which the 
various levels of inquiry m aintain their coherence is related to their 
relationship  to the central question of w here Indian  strategic and 
international relations are headed and why.
India’s posture is largely the product of a process which is subject to 
prisms or filters which cluster around three of five levels of analysis. The 
primary level of analysis is the national. Here the basic determ inants of 
India's strategic and international relations are brought to bear on the 
decision-making process. The rem aining key levels of analysis are the 
group and individual levels. At these two levels, identity and values are 
formed. Their relationship to the national level is bi-directional. To an 
extent their values and aspirations are articulated by the national level. 
More often the group acts to coalesce individuals into shared identity 
units which then compete for influence w ith other groups at the sub­
national, national and international levels. As the centre has lost its 
ability to maintain a national identity subnational groups have grown in 
strength. The competing identity groupings will be discussed in Chapter 
Three while the dom estic roots of India's external relations will be 
explored in Chapter Four.
The output of the decision-making structure, is determ ined by the 
interplay of the bureaucratic and organizational processes, influenced at 
the national level by sub-national and governm ental groups. These 
groups seek to influence the cognitive m aps of indiv idual decision 
makers. The extent to which actors outside the pow er structure of the 
state have an impact on the process is determ ined by their ability to 
orchestrate sub-national groups .26 The influence of individuals inside
26 The Gandhi-Nehru dynasty seemed to be able to escape this more than other political 
actors as their power base was associated with the nation itself. They were allowed to
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the decision-making structure similarly incorporates a myriad of factors. 
The power of the individual, their formal position in the structure of 
decision making, their informal position, the extent to which there is an 
organisational ethos, the degree of a broad decision making elite mind set 
etc. all influence those within the structure.
Hence research on belief systems must ultimately be 
embedded in a broad context, and the problems of linking 
and interrelating theories and concepts that are oriented to 
the individual decision maker .... to the behaviour of groups 
and organizations need to be addressed directly.27
It is this interrelationship between national foreign policy and a 
holistic conception of the context from which it emerges that is lacking in 
most assessments of Indian foreign policy7. To study a state only on the 
level of the interface of the national with the international level is to 
focus on only that part of the equation. To be more fully informed other 
levels which influence the process must also be brought in.
operate above the sub-national level more than other politicians. With the assassination 
of Rajiv Gandhi all significant political actors once again must build on a sub-national 
power base.
27 Ole Holsti, The Analysis of Cognitive Maps," in Robert Axelrod, Structure of Decision: 
The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 57.
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Frameworks of analysis and levels of analysis
Global Region National Group Indiv.
I. Geo- X
politics
X X
II. Domestic 
Factors
A.Conflict
Analysis
X X X
B. Ethnicity X X
C.Indian
Political
Traditions
X X X
D.Internal/ 
External
X X X
III. Economics X X X X X
IV. Decision Making
A. Psychological X X X
B. National- 
societal
X X X
C. Global X X
Note: The above chart identifies the primary levels of analysis that particular aspects of 
the study’s framework of analysis operates on. The use of differing levels of analysis is 
necessitated by the inextricable link between the domestic, national and international 
affairs of India.
The study will now  proceed w ith  its d iscussion  of India 's 
expanding capabilities and increasing assertiveness w ithin the South 
Asian and Indian Ocean regions.
19
Source: Sudhir Dar, The Illustrated Weekly of India, 7/8/90, O.V. Vijayan, The Illustrated 
Weekly of India, 11/22/87, R.K. Laxman, Illustrated Weekly of India, 2/16-17/91. For an 
overview of the role of political cartoons see R.K. Laxman, "Freedom to Cartoon, Freedom 
to Speak," Daedalus, Fall 1989, pp. 69-91.
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CHAPTER TWO
It is recognised by all that India is in a state of transition. She 
finds herself in the period which links the past, lived through 
and left behind, with the dawning future of new activities, new 
hopes and new aspirations.
-M.N. Roy1 India in Transition, 1922
India as an emerging power 1947-92: expanding capabilities and assertiveness
A considerable body of literature has been dedicated to the debate over 
the proposition that India is an emerging power. India has many assets and 
liabilities that influence its power position. This chapter demonstrates that 
India has been significantly expanding its military capabilities and is 
becoming increasingly assertive. This trend is likely to continue, moreover, 
despite recent reductions in defence spending.
Before m oving to present an explanatory framework for 
understanding the driving force behind India's expanding posture, this 
chapter will examine the growth of India’s military and paramilitary 
capabilities, defence budget, and nuclear posture. Following this discussion 
of capabilities, an assessment of India's increasing assertiveness will be 
undertaken. Through such an analysis this chapter conceptualizes India’s 
external posture as evolving through a progression of periods of transition 
and growth. These periods have altered India's external paradigm. To be 
sure, in the early 1990s India has found itself in the midst of significant 
reorientation. It is hoped that a better understanding of the historical 
progression of these periods of growth and transition will produce a better 
understanding of India's present and future position. The primary objective 
of the chronological interpretation is to demonstrate the general trend. The 
specific dates which delineate the periods of growth and transition are not to 
be interpreted rigidly but as general demarcations of shifts in India’s posture.
1 M.N. Roy, India in Transition 1922 as quoted in L. Gordon and P. Oldenburg eds. India 
Briefing, 1992, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 1. Though over seventy years old this 
statement remains true today.
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India's periods of transition and growth are today part of a general 
trend in it's external orientation from a mixed idealist/realist2 posture to 
one that is nationalist/realist in its outlook. These idealist/realist, or Lok- 
niti/Raj-niti,3 tensions of Indian state-craft have existed to greater and lesser 
extents throughout Indian history. The rise of the Indira-Rajiv dynasty put 
these forces out of balance. It is the excessive reliance on the Raj-niti model 
that has led India to embrace policies that have created internal dissent and 
external suspicion. Further, these forces are conceptualized as moving in 
cycles rather than in uni-directional modes. As such, while the Raj- 
niti/realist viewpoint is presently dominant in Indian decision-making 
circles, it is not interpreted as the inevitable path along which India will 
proceed.
20. Expanding capabilities
As India has sought to extend its hegemony over South Asia, it has 
similarly sought increased international recognition of it's growing status. 
This search for status has itself been a factor fueling the arms build-up. A 
West European diplomat has characterised this desire for the status that 
comes with power in the following way: "More than anything else, India 
wants to be taken seriously. It wants to be viewed as a world power. That is 
an end in itself."4
The arms build-up that India has been engaged in is proactive as well 
as reactive. Prior to the 1971 war India was primarily reacting to threats. The 
Indian arms build-up is part of a desire to acquire the necessary arms to gain 
a level of superiority over Pakistan that will achieve that country's 
subordination without recourse to war. It also stems from a desire to extend 
India's influence beyond the subcontinent to be able to meet China as an
2 J. Bandyopadhyaya identified these aspects of the Indian political tradition in The Making 
of India's Foreign Policy, pp. 69-73.
3 The concepts of Raj-niti and Lok-niti are borrowed from Ashok Kapur, "Indian Security and 
Defence Policies Under Indira Gandhi," in Y. Malik and D. Vajpeyi, eds. India: The Years of 
Indira Gandhi, (Leiden: E.J. Brill and Co., 1988), p. 43.
4 Ross H. Munroe, "India: The Awakening of an Asian Power," Time, 4/3/89. Concern in the 
West reached a high point in 1989.
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equal within the Asia-Pacific region .5 Perceptions affected by the acquisition 
of certain weapons systems give India status and power in the international 
arena. India's decision to lease a Soviet nuclear-pow ered subm arine, 
renam ed the INS Chakra, is partially explicable in this way. One submarine 
did not, in itself, give India a militarily significant system. W hat it d id 
provide was operational knowledge and recognition. The move had the 
desired effect of attracting widespread international attention. This type of 
arm s acquisition, in conjunction w ith other events, m ade the world take 
notice of India as a rising regional power. India sought to have the world 
acknowledge its right to alter its global status. M uch of India’s frustration, 
however, stems from the reluctance of established powers to recognise and 
acknowledge India's new position .6 Indeed, it is interesting to consider 
w hether the forces pushing for larger defence budgets and increased 
assertiveness might subside if India was given a higher profile among the 
significant states of the Indian Ocean region and the w orld .7
This chap ter w ill in itia te  its d iscussion  of Ind ia 's  expanding  
capabilities with an analysis of the armed forces, and then proceed to discuss 
nuclear issues and the defence budget.
20.1 Expansion of military and paramilitary forces
India has embarked on a program m e aimed at significantly expanding 
its military strength. An overview of the composition and structure of the 
Indian  navy, army, air force, param ilitary  forces, nuclear and missile
5 For an excellent account of China’s relations and objectives in the region see Y. Vertxberer, 
China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement, (New York: Prager 
Publishers, 1985).
6 This effort to increase India's diplomatic weight through arms acquisition is not without 
precedent. Germany's decision to build a fleet in 1898 in hindsight seems to have been inspired 
by a desire to take on the accoutrements of the major actors at the time. Perceiving Germany to 
be a land power, the British viewed the naval build up with suspicion and felt threatened by 
Germany. A similar reaction has greeted India’s build up of naval and ballistic missile forces 
during the 1980s. The Australian media in particular, and the ASEAN states in a more 
diplomatic and less vocal fashion, have expressed their concerns about the potential of 
further increase in the qualitative and quantitative growth of India’s navy during the 1980s. 
David Ziegler, War Peace and International Politics, (London: Foresman and Co., 1990), p. 255.
7 For a later more reasoned Australian viewpoint see Sandy Gordon, "India and South Asia: 
Australia’s Other Asia." Current Affairs Bulletin, 1992.
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capabilities illustrates the growth of India's strategic posture.8 Emphasis will 
be placed on naval development and the paramilitary forces. This emphasis 
is justified, as these two areas witnessed dramatic increases in force structure 
and resource allocation beyond that of the overall trend during the 1980s. 
Further, they reflect the changes in India's security environment. India has 
found itself increasingly beset by internal strife at a point in its history when 
it has been seeking to extend its influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
The following chart of the Indian armed forces' strengths portrays the 
nature of their progression in the post-1962 period. The initial phase of 
growth levelled off in 1970-72, and was increased again in the period 1976-78. 
The numbers of personnel remained at this plateau until the 1984-89 
expansion. Since 1989 there have been reductions, but the force strengths 
remain at a higher level than the force structure of the period 1978-85. Many 
of the troops released from the army were absorbed into the para-military 
forces. The dramatic increase of the paramilitary forces will be discussed 
below.
8 The bifurcation of the country, with the division of resources between India and Pakistan, 
and the departure of the colonial power of Britain at independence reduced India's strategic 
standing within the region considerably. India’s strategic posture was negleted until after the 
1962 border war with China.
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Armed Forces Strengths
Source: The Internationa! Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (London: 
Brassey’s Publishers, various years).
The chapter will now proceed to discuss the service branches, defence 
expenditure and Indian nuclear and missile programmes.
20.11 The navy
The grow th of the Indian  navy has figured prom inently  am ong 
studies concerned with the correlation of pow er among in tra-and extra- 
regional powers in the Indian Ocean Region .9 In fact the expansion of the 
navy was itself the single m ost notable factor attracting international
9 For example see: Robert Bruce, ed. The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, (Perth: 
Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1989), Robert Bruce, ed. Australia and the Indian 
Ocean, (Perth: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1988), Robert Bruce, ed. Prospects for 
Peace: Changes in the Indian Ocean Region, (Perth: Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, 
1991), W. Dowdy and R. Trood, The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), Selig Harrison, India and the Indian Ocean: New 
Changes afor American Policy, (Washington: Washington Institute for Values in Public 
Policy, 1986), Brian Cloughley, "Regional Superpower Flexes its Muscle," Pacific Defence 
Reporter, February 1989, pp. 43-44 , Larry Bowman and Ian Clark, The Indian Ocean in Global 
Politics, (Boulder: Westview Special Studies in International Relations, 1981), Patrick Wall 
ed. The Indian Ocean and the West, (London: Stacey International Publishers, 1975) and Kim 
Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion, (Sydney: Alternative Publishing 
Cooperative, 1979).
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attention and concern in the late-1970s and the early-to mid-1980s.10 The 
Indian Navy has evolved from a coastal navy into a force that can project 
itself into the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea, and the 
northern reaches of the Indian Ocean.* 11 The expanding zone of operations 
and fleet composition of the Indian Navy further indicates that its eventual 
operational objective is the Indian Ocean at large.12
In the absence of an Indian Defence white paper, there is a strong case 
to be made for analysis based on the procurement strategies of the armed 
forces. From this perspective, the growth of the navy is particularly 
interesting. The aircraft carriers, the nuclear submarine, base construction, 
the land based naval air arm, and the beginnings of an amphibious force 
have all extended the reach of India's defensive perimeter and its power 
projection capabilities. The ends to which these capabilities will be applied 
in the future may have already been foreshadowed by the Maldives 
operation and the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) deployment to Sri 
Lanka in 1987. Future Indian intervention in such places as the Seychelles, 
the Comoros, or Mauritius, should not be discounted. Coup attempts, and 
the presence of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in countries such as Mauritius 
are potential openings for such intervention, as was demonstrated by the 
Maldives affair. The substantial ethnic Indian population living in several 
Indian Ocean littoral states could be the basis of future Indian involvement. 
If India had the capabilities to assist ethnic Indians in strife, as they have
10 The new item of concern on the Indian agenda is its progress with its nuclear and missile 
programs. These will be discussed below.
11 Indian power projection capabilities were at times in the past considerable. In 603 AD the 
King of Gujarat sent his son and 5,000 followers to establish a Kingdom in Java. This 100 ship 
fleet established a colony and a trade route back to India. Alan Villiers, Monsoon Seas: The 
Story of the Indian Ocean, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952), p. 108. In 1014-25 King Rajendra 
Chola conquered Sri lanka, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra 
and lower Burma. Lieutenent S.J. Singh, "The Indian Navy is No Threat," Proceedings of the 
United States Naval Institute, March 1991, p. 76.
12 For a sampling of writing on the Indian Ocean from the Indian and Soviet perspectives see: 
A. Krutskikh, US Policies in the Indian Ocean, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), I. Redko 
and N. Shaskolasky, The Indian Ocean: A Sphere of Tensions or a Zone of Peace? (Moscow: 
Nauka Publishers, 1983), P.K.S. Nambodiripad, J.P. Anand and Sreedhar, Intervention in the 
Indian Ocean, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), Satish Chandra, The Indian Ocean: 
Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics, (New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 1987) and C.R. 
Mohan et. al. Indian Ocean and US-Soviet Detente, (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991).
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been in Uganda and Fiji13 in the past, they would probably be more inclined 
to do something to support them.
Over the centuries, the Indian Ocean has periodically been viewed as a 
power vacuum into which external naval powers have expanded.(see routes 
of invasion map)14 With the close of the 15th century came the Portuguese 
explorer Vasco de Gama and the Viceroy d’ Albuquerque. Their efforts 
opened the way to one hundred years of Portuguese naval supremacy in the 
Indian Ocean.15 This was subsequently contested by the Dutch (1624-1670), 
French (1666-1784), and British (1640-1968). While the French, under the 
command of Admiral Suffren, defeated the British fleet at Cuddalore in  
1783,16 The Battle of the Nile, in 1798, and Trafalgar, in 1805, firmly 
established British maritime supremacy.17 Britain’s naval power in the 
region began to wain during the Second World War, though it would not be 
until the announcement of the East of Suez policy in 1968 that Britain would 
be displaced as the key regional actor.18
13 The possibility of Indian support for the ethnic Indian population in Fiji will be discussed 
at greater length in Chapter Six. See also section 40.231 for a discussion of NRIs.
14 The Panikkar invasion route map seems to be drawn from a map drawn by Stephen Voorhies 
which appears inside the jacket cover to Allen Villiers, Monsoon Seas, which was published 
in 1952 three years prior to the publication to Geographical Factors in Indian History. In this 
work Panikkar points out the deficiencies of Indian cartographers. "While the Arabs and the 
Chinese produced most interesting maps from very early times, India has been extremely 
backward in this respect." In this way Panikkar draws on Western geopolitical culture to in 
part define an Indian one.
‘5 In 1508 Gujarat formed an alliance with Egypt to oppose the Portuguese. They attacked the 
Portuguese naval squadron off Chaul in the battle of Dabul which was inconclusive. In 
response the Portuguese Viceroy, Almedia, crushed the allied fleet at the battle of Diu in 
1509. Subsequent alliances between the Ottomans and the Gujaratis (1536-37) and the western 
Indian Kingdoms and the Ottomans (1546) were similarly unsucessful in resisting European 
naval power. See Alan Villiers, Monsoon Seas, chapters 9, 10 and 11, Admiral G.A. Ballard, 
Rulers of the Indian Ocean, (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1928) and Ernest and Trvor 
Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, (New York: Harpers and Row Co., 1977), pp. 
508-10.
16 Though distance had prevented the news from reaching the combatants peace between 
Britain and France had been settled five months before the battle at Cuddalore. As a result 
the French withdrew their fleet, despite their victory at Cuddalore, thereby opening the way 
for British supremacy. Admiral Ballard, Rulers of the Indian Ocean, (London: Duckworth 
Publishers, 1927), pp. 283-87.
17 M.L. Bhargava, Indian Ocean Strategies: Through the Ages, (Delhi: Reliance Publishing 
House, 1990), p. 63.
18 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, (London: Allan and Unwin Publishers, 1962).
27
By the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union were beginning 
to manoeuvre for position to fill the perceived vacuum left by the British in 
the Indian Ocean region. The South East Asian Treaty Organisation of 1954, 
the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty, the Baghdad Pact 
of 1955, and the Central Treaty Organisation of 1959 were all American 
efforts to secure areas on the littoral of the Indian Ocean from Soviet 
influence. Soviet regional initiatives and responses to these efforts to 
contain its influence included counter naval deployments, the Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship with India of 1971, and, most notably, the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979.19 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end 
of the Cold War, bipolar geopolitical rivalry abated with the Soviet Navy 
withdrawing from the Indian Ocean after a thirty-year presence.20
The next round of naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean may be between 
America, the weakened global power, and India, the emerging regional 
power. In the post-cold war world, the major naval power in the Indian 
Ocean remains the United States. Despite India's immediate preoccupation 
with Pakistan, India will remain apprehensive of American naval 
capabilities and presence in the Persian Gulf, and at Diego Garcia in the 
Chagos Archipelago. Naval planners long-term goals are to be able to deter 
American (or any other) naval power within the Indian Ocean.
Even if we are to be confronted by a superpower fleet, our 
naval strength should be such as to command due respect and 
in any case should be able to raise the threshold sufficiently 
against any interference from a foreign power attempting to 
violate our territorial waters, usurp our EEZ or threaten our 
sea-borne trade.21
The relationship between India and the United States Navy has been further 
discussed by Ashley Tellis, as told in the following.
19 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is here interpreted as being directed at gaining access to 
a warm water port and as part of the Breshnev doctrine.
20GwynneDyer, "India Changes Sides and Cosies Up To US,” The Canberra Times, 3/23/92. 
See also Bruce Vaughn, Bipolar Geopolitical Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, (Ottawa: Carleton 
University, unpublished MA Thesis, 1987).
21 Former Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral S. Parkash, "Background paper," 
Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Proceedings of a Seminar Held at USI, (New Delhi: 
United Services Institution of India, 1984).
28
The focus of these operations, though vaguely defined as foreign 
powers operating in India's vicinity and often cloaked by invoking 
a parallelism between Soviet and American intervention in the 
Ocean, are generally associated with the latter - which is often 
perceived by both authoritative civilian and service spokesman as 
the primary threat.22
Despite the economic liberalisation and joint naval manoeuvres undertaken 
in 1992, the Indo-US relationship will continue to be a somewhat distant 
one, as India will continue to pursue an independent position with regard to 
the American Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and non­
proliferation issues. This distance in the relationship will continue to act as 
an impetus for continued Indian naval expansion as economic conditions 
allow.
The four-fold mission of, and rationalisation for, the Indian Navy has 
been defined by Vice Admiral, M.P. Awati, in the following ways:
1. To safeguard the Indian coastline and vital installations in 
the vicinity of the coastline against both surface and submarine 
threats.
2. To safeguard the flow of trade into and out of Indian ports 
during limited war situations.
3. To restrict the naval activities of the potential adversary-in 
this case Pakistan-during limited war.
4. And to be in a position to assist island republics of the Indian 
Ocean-notably Mauritius, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka-in case they 
seek Indian assistance, particularly against threats of 
subversion. The Sri Lankan intervention beginning in 1987 
illustrates this mission and the Seychelles has been subject to 
two coup attempts since 1982 23
22 Ashley Tellis, "Naval Technology in the Indian Ocean Region: Present Capabilities and 
Future Prospects," (Chicago: University of Chicago, unpublished paper), p. 34.
23 v jce Admiral Awati retired in 1983. He served as both Flag Officer and Commander of the 
Western Fleet and Commander of the Eastern Fleet. M.P. Awati, "Emerging Security Issues in 
the Indian Ocean," in Selig Harrison and K. Subramanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian 
Ocean, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 104. This fourth role is more directly 
described as power projection by Capt. (of the INS Viraat) Arun Prakash, "A Carrier Force for 
the Indian Navy," US Naval War College Review, Autumn, 1990, p. 63. Vice Admiral 
Parkash has outlined the rationale for naval power to 1. Defend the homeland, 2. Build a 
capability to project power across the ocean to secure India's lines of communication and defend 
its Island territories and 3. Intervene where ever our national interests are threatened in the 
region. Vice Admiral Parkash, Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean, p. 4.
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Though articulated differently by various analysts, these four points are 
generally agreed to be the rationales for the Indian Navy.24 They will be 
redefined as trade and commerce interests, sea denial, naval superiority 
objectives, and power projection 25
India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), its off-shore islands, oil and 
deep seabed mining interests, long coastline, and maritime trade, all give 
India a legitimate rationale for a navy of substantial size. Fifty percent of 
India’s oil and eighty percent of its gas requirements come from the EEZ. 
Another thirty percent of its oil is sea borne, for the most part from the 
Persian Gulf. Some 97 percent of India's trade is shipped by sea. This totals 
$50 billion annually 26 The merchant marine has over 400 ships. India has 
10 key ports, in addition to 20 of intermediate size and some 150 minor ones. 
India’s coastline extends over 7,562 kilometres, with 351 islands.27 India is 
not alone among Indian Ocean littoral states in only recently realizing the 
extent of it's Indian Ocean interests. Until recently, Australia undervalued 
it's own status as an Indian Ocean littoral state 28
24 Robin Jeffrey adds the intersting observation that "Politically astute Admirals, 
capitalising on the desire of a nationalistic middle class for symbols of power, have been able 
-until India's financial crisis of 1991- to press for a substantial, highly visible navy." These 
issues, and the issue of a East/West split inside the Indian Navy will be taken up in the 
decision-making chapter. Robin Jeffrey, "Political Admirals: A Neglected Aspect of the 
Growth of the Indian Navy," Melbourne: La Trobe Univeristy, unpublished paper, p.l. 
Another list of four interests can be found in Gary Sojka, 'The Mission of the Indian Navy," 
Naval War College Review, Jan.-Feb. 1983. pp. 4-5.
2 5 Economic limitations have put on hold plans to build at Cochin Shipyards a third Indian 
Carrier. Initially the 35,000 tonne French designed ship was to be launched in 1998. "New 
Aircraft Carrier to be Launched at Cochin Shipyards," Aerospace and Defence Markets and 
Technology, 7/91, p. 228 from Reuters News Service.
26 "Interview with Admiral Ramdas," The Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 31.
27 Lieutenent S.J. Singh, "The Indian Navy is No Threat," p. 75.
28 For an overview of the Australian position see Michael McKinley, "Australia and the 
Indian Ocean,” in F.A. Mediansky and A.C. Palfreeman, In Pursuit of the National Interest, 
(Sydney: Pegammon Press, 1988). During the late 1980s the Australian Govememnt explored 
India's changing posture through a number of hearings and Senate reports see; Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Enquiry into Reations with India (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, June
1989) . Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia India 
Relations, Trade and Security, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, July
1990) . Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Reference: 
Australia-India Relations, (Canberra: Official Flansard Reports of Hearings and Submissions 
on4/27/89,5/12/89,5/16/89,6/22/89.7/25/89,7/26/89,9/6/89. During the period funding for 
an Indian Ocean centre for peace Studies was approved. Further in 1992-3 there was a
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Various segments of the subcontinent have throughout history been 
conquered, subjugated and/or colonised by the Arabs, Chinese, Portuguese, 
Dutch, French, British and Japanese imperial powers from across the seas.29 
This is in part explained by the lack of a deep water naval tradition of the 
Aryan peoples who migrated from Central Asia to the north of India. 
Evidence of limited Indian seafaring is mentioned as early as 1500 BC in the 
Vedas. Further, the Codes of Manu provide for shipping and port dues, 
while Kautilya's Arthasatra, of the fourth century BC, "lays down the 
function of the port commissioner."30 Arab and Persian Muslims had 
established their control over Indian Ocean trade, with settlements at the 
mouth of the Indus, by 800 AD. The Portuguese later established settlements 
at Goa, Diu and and Daman, the Dutch in Cylon, and the French in 
Pondicherry. The British eventually controlled virtually all of the 
subcontinent, either directly or indirectly, from their initial beachheads at 
Bombay, Madras and Bengal. During World War II, both Burma and the 
Andaman and Nicobar Island Group fell to the Japanese.31 India was spared 
Japanese occupation only by reverses in the Pacific theatre after the Battle of 
the Coral Sea.
India has been in the process of reinterpreting, re-emphasising and 
revising its history to create a maritime tradition that can validate and justify
submission by the Melbourne South Asian Studies Association for the establishment of a centre 
for South Asian Studies.
29 China launced its first expeditionary force into the Indian Ocean under Zheng He in 1405. It 
consisted of 27,000 men in 3017 ships. During the third of seven voyages they fought the local 
King near Colombo in Cylon and forced him to pay tribute to the Ming empire. These Chinese 
voyages had little impact on the Subcontinent. A subsequent expedition under Cheng Ho (1416- 
24) is thought to have extracted tribute from virtually all the major Kingdoms of the Indian 
Ocean. E. &T. Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 442. Inland warfare and canal 
construction in China brought the expeditions to a halt in 1436. Bruce Watson, Eighth Voyage 
of the Dragon: A History of China's Quest for Seapower. (Annapolis: US Naval Institute 
Press, 1982), pp. 33-41.
30 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, pp. 29-30.
31 In 1942, 5 Japanese carriers and four fast battleships sailed into the Indian Ocean to crush 
British naval power based out of Trincomalee and Colombo. They also seized the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands to protect their supply routes to Rangoon. The Germans had also 
challenged British supremacy in the Indian Ocean with the raiders Konisberg and Emden in 
1914 and the Graf Spee in 1939.
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recent efforts to develop a blue water navy .32 These maritime traditions 
have been highlighted, and somewhat embellished, by K.M. Panikkar.
The idea that Hindus had some sort of ceremonial objection to 
the seas, while perhaps true of the people of North India, was 
never true with respect of the people of the south.
From at least the fifth Century BC to the sixth Century AD this 
naval supremacy [from the east coast of India across the Bay of 
Bengal to Southeast Asia] rested with the continental powers in 
India.33
The Hindu and Buddhist character of the kingdoms of Southeast Asia were 
the result of Indian maritime activity in the Bay of Bengal, which was based 
on the Sri Vijaya Empire, though the extent to which this was the result of 
naval supremacy is debatable.
The Navy foundation of India funded a documentary, The Maritime 
Heritage of India, "commissioned with the sole aim of making the public at 
large aware of India's great maritime past."34 This rewriting of history is 
certainly aimed at enlarging the constituent base for further naval
32 Citing the "Lords of the Eastern Seas" titles of both the Mauryan (322BC - 185BC) and the 
Andhra (230 AD - 225 AD) empires Admiral Kohli further discusses India's maritime 
tradition in the folowing. "As regards the people's tendency for seafaring, India is not only 
populated by born sailors' along her coast but, as we know today, even those from inland areas 
have proven to be equally good seafarers during peace and war." Admiral S.N. Kohli, The 
Indian Ocean and India's Maritime Security, (New Delhi: Printed for the United Services 
Institute by Statesman Press, 1981), p. 5. The most destabilising scenario is one where this 
reinterpretation of India's maritime tradition is merged with a militant reinterpretation of 
Hinduism.
33 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, pp. 29 & 32. Other sources are more 
conservative in their estimate of the beginings of Indian contact and trade with Southeast 
Asia. "While Indian vessels almost certainly reached Southeastern Asia before the end of the 
first millennium BC it is probable that interest in the area intensified after the emperor 
Vespasian, who succeded in 69AD." Charles Higham, The Archaeology of Mainland 
Southeast Asia, (Cambridge: Cambrigge University Press, 1989), p. 244. This descrepancy 
demonstrates the reinterpretive liberty that is being taken by Panikkar as he seems to have 
drawn his research from Indian sacred and historical texts as opposed to archaeological data. 
This finding is echoed in R. Smith and W. Watson, Early Southeast Asia: Essays in 
Archaeology, History and Historical Geography, (Kuala Lampur: Oxford University Press, 
1979), p. 354. "The Indian Literature is of little help beyond establishing that the voyages did 
take place. The writers are story tellers rather than the keepers of records ..."
34 Yogendra Bali, "When India Ruled the Waves," The Times of India, 10/15/90.
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expansion.35 Modem India can only be considered a significant naval power 
from the late 1960s onwards. If one were to review Indian history to find an 
Indian navy that could similarly challenge Western navies' ability to operate 
in Indian waters, one would have to go back as far as the Zamorin of Calicut, 
or the Maratha Navy, under Admirals Manik Bhandari and Kanogi Angre.36
The objective of denying the Indian Ocean to India’s enemies, (at 
present primarily Pakistan), is seen as a way to prevent future foreign 
influences from once again gaining power over India. The continuing 
presence of the American facilities at Diego Garcia, and the American ability 
to deploy over a half million troops into the northwest quadrant of the 
Indian Ocean, is disturbing to many in India. India will continue to develop 
its navy out of fear of maritime subordination, despite the signs of 
improvements in the Indo-US relationship:
... it is vital that her naval force levels should be so determined 
as to provide a credible threshold of deterrence to any 
belligerent country. In arriving at these force levels it must be 
remembered that a threshold can not be built on vintage ships 
and equipment that can not match that of an aggressor.37
These sentiments are echoed by the following excerpts from a speech 
by Indira Gandhi to the opening session of Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting. Though spoken in 1980, they remain relevant from 
the Indian perspective:
The ocean has brought conquerors to India in the past. Today 
we find it churning with danger. Even the Pacific hardly lives 
up to its name. The frantically increasing pace of militarisation 
in the Indian Ocean makes the 3,500 miles of our coast more
35 For a more objective analysis of the naval performance of Indian Kingdoms and empires 
throughout history see, Abhijit Bhattacharyya, "The Indain Navy- Victim of History and 
Legend," United Services Journal, July-Sept. 1984.
36 S.N. Kohli, The Indian Ocean and India's Maritime Security, p .ll. and CDR Sureshwer D. 
Singh, "Role and Buildup of the Indian Navy," in Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean, p. 18. 
Evidence that the Indian Navy is also coming to be a force for the Western navies to contend 
with is evident in a recent review of Third World submarine threats. According to Director of 
US Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Third World navies such as India's are 
not necessarily third rate. India was reportedly the focus of a United States navy ASW effort. 
J.J. Lok, "USA Revises Third World Threat," Janes Defence Weekly, 3/23/91, p. 431.
37 S.N. Kohli, The Indian Ocean and India's Maritime Security, p. 65.
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vulnerable. How can we acquiesce in any theory that tries to 
justify the threat to our security environm ent or condone the 
existence of foreign bases and cruising fleets? Independence  
implies the responsibility of deciding what is good and safe fo r  
ourselves and of charting our own course.38(italics added)
The base construction under way in the Andam an and Nicobar island 
group is the Indian equivalent of Portuguese Malacca or British Singapore in 
that it is an effort to control the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean. 
Instead of Aden, Socotra, H orm uz and M uscat to control the w estern  
approaches, India will have to rely on deploym ents out of Bombay, Goa, 
Karwar and Cochin to the south .39
The decision to add a new base at Karwar is a welcome one. It 
acquires compelling logic from the increased activities of extra- 
regional navies in the Arabian sea as well as from the potential 
Pakistani threat .40
Indian naval developm ents are now aiming beyond the im m ediate 
reaches of the Northern Indian Ocean, and are targeted at countering what is 
interm ittently seen as the neocolonial influence by the United States. The 
perception in India during the Gulf War was characterised by the phrase "if 
Baghdad today then Bombay tom orrow ." Ind ia ’s sense of its lack of 
capabilities and influence bu ild s su p p o rt for augm en ting  m ilitary  
capabilities.
India has already found, as have previous m asters of the Indian 
Ocean, that sea denial and control will involve an expanding security 
perim eter that will lead India to project its pow er farther from its shores 
than present.41 The Portuguese, British and Americans have been successful 
in establishing their naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The spice trade,
38 Extract from the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's address at the opening session of CHOGM 
4 September 1980 as reprinted in India's Views on the Indian Ocean, (Delhi: External Publicity 
division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Statesman Press, 1981), p. 1.
39 Indian Naval commands are as follows, Bombay (Western Fleet HQ), Goa (HQ Naval Air), 
Karwar; Cochin (Southern Comand HQ), Viskakhapatnam (HQ Eastern Comand and 
submarines). International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1991-2, p. 161.
40 M.P. Awati, "Emerging Security Issues in the Indian Ocean," p. 103.
41 In May of 1988 Defence Minister K.C. Pant remarked, "We will constantly build our navy so 
that persuasion is not only in words." Appan Menon, "Why a Blue Water Navy," The Hindu, 
5/14/88.
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colonial ties, and Persian Gulf oil have led these countries to seek a 
dominant naval position in the region. India, it would seem, would 
similarly like to exert its influence within the Indian Ocean region. But why 
does India seek this influence?
On the surface it would seem that India lacks the obvious commercial 
interests that led previous powers to seek naval supremacy over the Indian 
Ocean. Current Indian aspirations to exert a preponderant influence in the 
Indian Ocean beyond the shores of the subcontinent are motivated more by a 
desire to be free from external pressure than from a desire to exert control 
over the littoral states. The question for the future is this: will Indian 
motives/objectives change once it more clearly establishes its position in the 
Indian Ocean? The evolution of American influence in the Western 
Hemisphere under the Monroe doctrine is an interesting analogy of how 
India's position may evolve in the Indian Ocean region.
The geography of the Indian Ocean is such that it is largely a closed 
ocean. It is only in the southern reaches of the ocean that the transit routes 
are difficult to interdict. By controlling the strategic choke points a power 
can control access to the region and thereby deny it to potentially hostile 
powers. This logic of geography is almost as true for the Indians as it was for 
the Portuguese. Even if India can not directly control these points, if it can 
deploy force to the choke points,42 then it is in a position to raise the 
potential costs of intervention into the region. India's submarine fleet and 
naval air arm (stationed in Tamil Nadu, Goa, Cochin, the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands, and off the carriers), already potentially constrain the United 
States from being able to deploy naval assets in the region as it did with the 
Enterprise Carrier Battle group in 1971.
One of the most disturbing aspects of power projection capabilities is 
an amphibious capability. When asked about India's plans to establish an 
amphibious warfare school near Vishakhapatnam, Chief of Naval Staff, 
A dm iral Ramdas, responded that, "We now want to properly
42 The strategic choke points from which a naval power can control the sea lines of 
communication (SLOC) are the Horn of Africa, the Mozambique Channel, the Bab el Mandeb, 
the Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok.
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institutionalise it [the amphibious capability] by setting up a joint 
amphibious warfare school."43 Retired Vice Admiral Awati has pointed out 
the "gaucherie in amphibious operations" at Cox's Bazaar during the 1971 
War.44 He further described India's amphibious capability in 1987 as the 
"most glaring gap" in the navy's capabilities. Between 1980 and 1989, Indian 
amphibious capacity doubled. While this force is not substantial it could 
easily be augmented by India's merchant marine and airlift capabilities 45 
The Falklands War is a recent example of the former, while India’s 
deployments to Sri Lanka and the Maldives demonstrate the latter.
The Indian Naval build-up went through a number of key watersheds 
in the 1970s and the 1980s. The single most influential event was the 1971 
war. The navy’s success in blockading East Pakistan, its victory at Karachi 
harbour, and the limits to its actions imposed by the United States Carrier 
Battle group Enterprise, all triggered the perception that the navy must be 
significantly augmented. India acquired its first submarine in 1971. By 1973 
the navy was receiving 49 percent of defence capital expenditures. Between 
1975-76 and 1982-83 total expenditure on the Navy tripled.46 In 1986, India 
bought its second aircraft carrier. In 1988, it took delivery from the USSR of 
the first Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance and ASW planes.47 These planes 
have a range of 11,000 kms. The year 1989 witnessed the launching of the 
first indigenously built submarine.
India’s aircraft carriers, its land based naval air arm and submarines 
have considerably extended India's naval reach into the Indian Ocean. The 
"Bear" Tu-142s, the INS Vikrant and Virat, with Sea Harrier and Sea King
43 Hamish McDonald, "Interview with Admiral L. Ramdas: Credible Force," The Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 12/19/91, p. 19.
44 M.P. Awati, "Emerging Security Issues in the Indian Ocean," p. 102. For a detailed analysis 
of the naval operations of the 1971 War see, Commodore Donahue, RAN, "Maritime Lessons of 
the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War,” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working 
Paper 192,1989)
45 India's amphibious forces do not present the region with a destabilising power projection 
capability at this time. If they continue to expand beyond present levels they will be viewed 
as such.
46 Robin Jeffrey, "Political Admirals," p. 12.
47 See Appa Menon, "Why a Blue Water Navy?" The Hindu, 5/14/88 and also Adam 
Kelliher, "India Acquires Ocean Eyes," The Australian^! 11/88.
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aircraft, and other systems allow India to deploy force farther away from its 
shores.
If India’s navy aspires to exercise sea control or to project power, 
an essential prerequisite would be the domination of the 
airspace above and the capability to sanitize the depths below 
any part of the ocean which may be of interest at a given time.48
Given that the present strength of the carrier force is insufficient for a 
forward strategy against Pakistan, as was employed by the Vikrant against 
Pakistani airfields at Cox Bazaar and Chittagong in 1971,49 the question then 
arises as to what the carriers primary purpose is. The carrier's serve three 
purposes:
1. They are visual signs of Indian naval power even if they are 
operationally weak;
2. They would prove effective in projecting Indian power 
against an adversary that did not have the ASM capabilities that 
Pakistan has; and,
3. They would be effective in interdicting shipping and in ASW 
roles outside the Pakistani air cover.
In light of the poor cost effectiveness of using the carriers to fulfil roles one 
and three, the second role is the most attractive explanation as to the 
purpose for which the carriers are intended. The implication of the carriers’ 
ineffectiveness against Pakistan is that they are concerned both with 
protecting Indian off-shore Islands and assets, and in projecting Indian 
power in lesser-armed regions of the Indian Ocean littoral.
In February of 1991, India returned to the Soviet Union the Charlie I 
Class nuclear powered submarine, which it had leased in January of 1988. 
India did not renounce the nuclear submarine option when it returned the 
INS Chakra. This foreshadowed India's SSGN programme. It seems as
48 Capt. Arun Prakash, "A Carrier Force for the Indian Navy," US Naval War College 
Review, Fall, 1990, p. 63.
49 The carriers Harrier aircraft are subsonic interceptors that are unable to maintain a cap 
against the Mirage/Harpoon combination that Pakistan would send against the carriers 
should they venture within the 400 nm range of ASM armed Mirages. Therefore, with a 
loaded strike range of only 250 nms they are of little threat to Pakistan. Ashley Tellis, 
"Aircraft Carriers and the Indain Navy: Assessing the Present, Discerning the Future," The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1987, p. 146.
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though India is pressing ahead with its own nuclear powered submarine 
under the Advanced Technology Vessel Programme.50 The Indians were 
reportedly not allowed the degree of access to the reactor room on the Chakra 
that they had expected. Further, it appears as though the decision not to 
renew the lease was a Soviet one.51 Pakistan has also explored the possibility 
of purchasing a nuclear powered Han Class submarine from China.52
Power is essentially a relative concept. To discuss the growth of the 
Indian Navy without having a sense of developments in the larger 
geostrategic context is insufficient for a measured assessment of India's 
position. The Pakistan Navy expanded from eight major surface combatants 
in 1987 to sixteen in 1989.53 Pakistan has also been qualitatively upgrading 
from the old Gearing Class destroyers to Brooke, Leander and Garcia classes. 
The P-3 Orion Reconnaissance and ASW patrol planes, and Sea Sprite and 
Sea King ASW Helicopters are further qualitative upgrades. The Orions 
have a range of 7,500 kms. The Pakistani acquisition reflects the greater 
threat posed by India's subsurface fleet than its surface fleet. Moreover, the 
Pakistan Navy is armed with the effective Harpoon and Exocet missiles. 
Given the relative forces, Pakistan has sufficient assets to mount a credible 
citadel defence within its coastal waters and under cover of its land based 
naval air arm. However, Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to naval 
blockade, with only an estimated three to four weeks store of key 
stockpiles.54 Its ability to operate outside this limited sphere is doubtful. In 
the event of war, the Indian Navy would find it difficult to challenge 
Pakistan in their immediate waters, but would be able to interdict Pakistan 
bound shipping farther out in the Arabian Sea.55 What is more, if Pakistan
50 Rozalina Mohd Radzi, "Advanced Technology Vessel Programme," Asian Defence Journal, 
3/92, pp. 91-2. Rahul Bedi, "India Returns Soviet SSGN," Janes Defence Weekly, 2/23/91, p. 
254. The possibility of an Indian nuclear powered submarine project is hinted at in Manoj Joshi, 
"Indian Navy: Unsteady Course," Frontline, 1/19-2/1/91, p. 93.
51 Hamish McDonald, "Slow Speed Ahead," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10/10/91, p. 22.
52 "Nuclear Deal on Han," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 /6 /90, p. 20.
53 C.U. Bhaskar, "Asymmetry in Indo-Pak Navies," Business and Political Observer, 
12/23/89.
54 Pakistan imports 120,000 barrels of oil each day across the seas. CDR. S.A. Nadeem, 
"Blockade as Maritime Strategy," Globe (Karachi) Oct. 1990, p. 55.
55 Ashley Tellis, "New Aquisition in the Subcontinent," Naval Forces, Vol. XI No.II, pp. 64- 
70. It should be noted that if the Pakistani air cover collapses so too would its navy.
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is able to build its submarine fleet it may attain the capability of being able to 
break out to attack the Indian rear. Relative assessment of India's present 
capabilities, compared to its situation in 1971, suggests that despite the 
significant increase in its fighting power, it is less than certain that India has 
established a larger margin of superiority. Viewed against the situation in 
1965, however, it certainly has.
The creation of the Coast Guard in August 1978 can be understood as 
part of the transition from a brown water to a blue water navy. The Coast 
Guard's primary function is to patrol the immediate off shore maritime 
zone. This assignment entails such responsibilities as, "preventing poaching 
and smuggling; ... protection of maritime environment; search and rescue 
missions; ... and replenishment of vessels in the seas."56 According to Coast 
Guard Chief, Vice Admiral S.W. Lakhkar, the Coast Guard was also 
involved with the interdiction of LTTE militants who were operating across 
the Palk strait between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka.57 By assuming these 
functions, the Coast Guard frees naval assets for other duties farther from 
shore. Virtually all the ships deployed by the Coast Guard are built in India.
Arguments have been put forward for the creation of a third fleet in 
the south. At present, the Eastern Command and the Western Command 
"are responsible for all operational functions ... The Flag Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval Command is responsible for the 
entire training functions of the Navy."58 A third fleet would be responsible 
for the protection of the Lakshadweep Island group, and the projection of 
Indian naval power into the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean. Former 
Chief of Naval Staff has made the case for a third fleet in the following way:
56 Institute of Regional Studies, "Indian Navy in the 1980s," (Islamabad: IRS Spotlight on 
Regional Affairs Series, December 1988), p. 16.
57 "Coast Guard Comes of Age," Times of India, 2/1/91.
58 S. Baranwal, Military Yearbook, 1987-88, p. 275.
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Current development indicates the need for a third fleet based 
at Tuticorin or Cochin ... A southern based fleet would be able 
to cover our southern approaches, better protect our 
Lakshadweep group of Islands and quickly reinforce the other 
two fleets.59
In the present climate of economic reform capital outlays will not be 
forthcoming for the dramatic expansion of the Indian Navy that was 
envisaged in the late 1980s. In time, economic reforms will once again create 
an atmosphere that will enable future expansion of the navy. The manner 
in which this is undertaken will be a key indicator not only of the direction 
in which the Indian Navy is headed, but indeed of the nation itself.
Indian Naval Forces: 1992
Personnel Principal surface Patrol, coastal combatants 
combatants and minesweepers
Naval 49,000 Carriers 2 Corvettes 13
Naval Air 5,000 Destroyers 5 Missile craft 9
Marines 1,000 Frigates 21 Patrol Craft 18
total 55,000 28
Mine-sweepers 22
52
Submarines Amphibious & Naval Air force
Landing craft
Sindhughosh 8 LST 1 Combat aircraft 46
(Soviet Kilo) LSM 8 Helicopters 75
Shishumar 2 LCU 7
(GE T-209/1500)) 
Kursura 7
(Soviet Foxtrot) 
total 17 16 121
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1991-2, (London: 
Brassey's Publishers, 1992), pp. 162-3.
59 Admiral S.J. Kholi, as quoted in R. Tomar, "Development of the Indian Navy: An 
Overstated Case?" (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 26, 
1980), p. 22.
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Indian Naval Bases: Locations and key purposes
A rakkonam
Bombay
Calcutta
Cochin
Delhi
Ezhim ala
Goa
Karanja
Karwar
Lakshadweep 
Madras 
Port Blair
R am anathapuram  
V ij ay araghar apuram  
V ishakapatnam
Naval Air Station, Tu-142s
Commander in Chief W estern Command, 2
carrier berths, Mazagon docks, sub pens under
construction
Shipyards
Com mander in Chief Southern Command, 
Naval Air Station, repair yard, training station 
Naval Headquarters 
Naval Academy
HQ Flag Officer, Naval Air Station, Shipyards 
Naval Warfare College
Under construction, carrier berths and Naval Air 
Station
Patrol craft base 
Shipyards
Floating docks, Naval Air Station under 
construction
Naval Air Station, Tu-142s 
Very low frequency W /T  station 
Commander in Chief of Eastern Command, sub 
base and school, dockyards, new entry training
Sources: Capt. Richard Sharpe ed, Janes Fighting Ships 1991-2. (London: Butler and Tanner 
Printers, 1992), Sandy Gordon, "India's Strategic Posture: Look East-Look West," (Canberra: 
SDSC Working Paper No. 225, 1991), and Hamesh McDonald, "Slow Speed Ahead," The Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 10/10/91, p. 20.
As mentioned, India’s naval assets are divided primarily between the 
W estern and Eastern Commands. Of these, the W estern is recognised to be 
the more im portant. This indicates the continuing im portance of Pakistan 
and Indian interests to the West. Pakistan remains the primary contingency 
for naval planners.60 The naval assets are primarily dispersed among the 
four major ports of Bombay, Goa, Cochin, and Vishakhapatnam. The first 
three of these, located on the West and South of the Indian peninsula, are 
hom e to a majority of the Navy 61 On the east coast, V ishakhapatnam
60 Chinese defence arangements with Burma may increase the importance of the Eastern naval 
sphere of operations.
61 Evidently the major surface combatants are rotated frequently between commands, see 
Sandy Gordon, "India's Strategic Posture Look East' or Look’ West?" Working Paper No.225, 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1991), p. 7.
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serves as the repair and maintenance facility for Soviet constructed or 
designed ships.
The expansion of the navy has left the key naval ports congested. 
Construction of an additional port facility south of Goa at Karwar began in 
1986. The completion of the majority of the complex was to be achieved 
within ten years. This date has been put back due to limited resources and 
the higher priority of projects at the Bombay and Vishakhapatnam 
facilities.62
Naval development projects in the east are of secondary importance. 
While Karwar has taken a back seat to upgrading port facilities in Bombay 
and Vishakhapatnam, the plans to significantly expand Port Blair, in the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, have been allocated a lower priority to that of 
Karwar. Despite this, there have been a number of measures to upgrade the 
facilities on the islands. A new naval airfield and a dry dock have been 
installed. Reportedly there were plans initiated in 1986 to construct a large 
airfield on Great Nicobar Island, which were cancelled at the behest of the 
Indonesians.63
Another recent development is the establishment of a very low 
frequency (VLF) site, code named Project Skylark, in the Tirunelvelli District 
of Tamil Nadu. This facility will give the Eastern Command expanded 
communications capabilities, as well as enable India to communicate with its 
submarines across the Indian Ocean 64 A further naval air station, capable of 
handling Bear Maritime Reconnaissance planes, has been constructed near 
Madras at Arakkonam 65 Evidently, Bear aircraft were moved to Tamil 
Nadu after the facilities were completed.
There are also reports that India approached Vietnam concerning the 
use of Cam Ranh Bay facilities when the Soviets began to withdraw from the
62 S. Gordon, "India's Strategic Posture ," p. 8.
63 S. Gordon, "India's Strategic Posture," p. 8. Indonesia reportedly offered to assist Pakistan 
in its conflict with India by annexing the islands.
64 "India," The Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1990, p. 25.
65 Ashley Tellis, "Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and Objectives of India's Naval 
Expansion" in Robert Bruce ed. The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, (Perth: Centre 
for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1989), p. 35.
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former American base. If this w as/is  true, Indian naval planners w ould 
seem to be heeding the advice of K.M. Panikkar:
The position of Vietnam should also not be forgotten in this 
connection. Strategically this new state is of great im portance 
since its position enables it to control the South China Seas ... it 
w ill have far reaching effects on the defence of the Indian 
Ocean.66
China's uneasy relations with Southeast Asia may give India an opportunity 
to engage China in a non-South Asian context. The potential for large oil 
and natural gas discoveries in the South China Sea, and the opportunity to 
develop a relationship w ith Vietnam, another traditional rival w ith China, 
could make such a future scenario attractive to India. This w ould be a 
possible counter to increasing Chinese influence in Burma. Despite this, the 
likely scenario in the near term is a continued western focus for the Indian 
Navy. Substantial augm entation of the Eastern and Southern commands, 
while remaining a long term goal, will in the imm ediate future rem ain a 
secondary priority. These goals will m ost probably be resum ed w hen 
economic conditions permit. Following from this discussion of the Indian 
navy the chapter will now turn to focus on the evolution of India's army.
20.12 The army
The Indian army has undergone a num ber of transform ations since 
independence. Its association as an adjunct of the Raj, and the fear of 
pretorian rule has led independent India to curtail severely the army's status 
and pow er since independence. Its b ifurcation  at independence into 
Pakistani and Ind ian  arm ies also u n d erm in ed  the arm y 's streng th . 
M oreover, the im peratives of economic grow th diverted resources away 
from  the defence forces u n til the hum ilia tion  of the 1962 W ar. 
Consequently, the Indian Army had been neglected. W ith the v irtual 
doubling of the army after 1963, a num ber of changes have taken place.
The character of the Indian Officer Corps has been changing from one 
of an aristocratic British tradition to a more m iddle class, Indian one. In
66 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 86.
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seeking to move the army away from loyalty to the regiment, to loyalty to 
the nation, Defence Minister Chavan pu t forw ard the notion that Indians 
were "all Kashatriyas now."67 While formerly, officers' sons would follow 
their fathers into the service, they are now more likely to go into private 
sector jobs.
The role of the arm y in aid ing  civil au tho rity  has also been 
changing.68 Its use by the political au thorities of the Raj was quite 
w idespread. Independent India has unsuccessfully sought to avoid this. In 
the years immediately following independence India was more successful in 
keeping the military out of civil disturbances than it has been in the last 
decade. In an effort to insulate the army from such a quasi-political role, 
India's paramilitary forces were greatly expanded during the 1980s. Despite 
this, the arm y has been increasingly utilised in counter insurgency and 
internal security roles in support of centre rule in disturbed areas.
Another interesting developm ent is the shift in recruitm ent patterns. 
Stephen Cohen has described this developm ent in his book, The Indian 
Army, as the trend away from "pure" units to "mixed" ones. Pure units are 
those, such as the Sikh and Gorkha and M ahar (ex-untouchables) regiments, 
that recruit only a specific comm unal group into a particular unit. The 
second type is the mixed company regim ent. Examples of these types of 
units are the H indu and Sikh companies of Punjab Regiment, or the Jat and 
M uslim  com panies of the Rajputana Rifles, or the Bengali and Rajput 
companies of the Rajput Rifles. Finally, there are the all mixed units, such 
as the parachute units and the Madras Regiment. The particularly northern- 
Indian bias of the army is a continuation of recruitm ent patterns established 
by the British. The revolt of some Sikh units, as a result of the storming of
67 S. Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 190.Kashatriyas are the most marshal caste of Hinduism. 
The other three Hindu castes are Brahmins, Vaishas and Sudras. Untouchables are without 
caste.
68 For a comprehensive listing of Indian army deployments in aid of the civil authorities for 
the period 1973 to 1984 see Stephen Cohen, The Military and Indian Democracy," pp. 125-7. A 
similar listing for the period 1979 to 1980 is provided by J. Elkin and W. Ritezel, "Military 
Role Expansion in India," p. 492.
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the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984, added impetus to the trend to move 
away from pure unit recruitment strategies.69
The army’s involvement in Sri Lanka and in counter-insurgency 
operations in Assam and Kashmir have highlighted the deficiencies of 
military intelligence. It is likely that it will seek to address this problem in 
the early to mid 1990s. The army had inadequate intelligence on the strength 
and morale of the Tamil forces it was confronting in Sri Lanka during the 
Indian Peace Keeping Forces deployment. In addition, the army feels that its 
national image is undermined when it can not counter the image of its 
forces as "rapists and plunderers."
This is because no military intelligence, which includes gauging 
terrorist morale, quantum of support and sympathy for them  
among the locals, their religious and ethnic gradation, is 
available to the security forces to meet the challenge on the 
psychological front.70
The primary problem limiting the effectiveness of the army today is its 
involvement in internal counter insurgency operations.71 Even if the figure 
is inflated, it is enough to reduce training and undermine morale to a 
significant degree. It also opens the prospect of the creeping politicisation of 
the army. While these developments threaten the army’s integrity, it 
appears to be the single most loyal institution to the foundation ideology of 
the Indian state. The corruption and malaise found in the bureaucracy and 
amongst politicians is largely absent from the military. These issues, and the 
problem of the changing background of recruits, are taken up in greater 
detail in the civil military section of Chapter Six.
Two additional problems which presently limit the effectiveness of 
the Indian Army are the "teeth to tail" ratio and the average age of both 
officers and ja wans. In 1991 India had 8,829 soldiers per division in non­
combat roles, as opposed to 2,307 for Pakistan and 1,274 for China. This ratio 
highlights the inefficiency of the Indian Army's operations relative to its
69 S. Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 190.
70 Pravin Sawhney, "Low Intensity War new Ball Game for the Army," The Business and 
Political Observer, 1/16/91.
71 It has been speculated that up to half of the Indian Army is involved in internal operations.
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most likely opponents. The average age of Indian officers is closer to 45 than 
35. Already there are many jawans in their thirties.72 Plans to retire jawans 
after one seven-year term have been opposed for fear of annually releasing 
large numbers of trained soldiers into the ranks of the unemployed. This 
problem seems to have been overcome by inducting many of them into the 
paramilitary forces. Once the paramilitary forces are brought up to full 
strength the problem of an aging army may again resurface. The chapter will 
now proceed to assess the role of the air force.
20.13 The air force
Air power will be crucial in any future conflict between India and 
Pakistan. The success of both the army and the navy in accomplishing their 
missions is in large part dependent on the control of the skies under which 
they operate. This is reflected in the importance that both sides have given 
to the procurement of state of the art aircraft. India has made significant 
progress in the indigenous production under licence of Soviet designed 
aircraft. India’s designs for an indigenously developed combat aircraft have 
encountered many difficulties, but should eventually prove fruitful. The 
decline in the American-Pakistani relationship will lead Pakistan to seek an 
alternative source for its combat aircraft. Without American military 
assistance Pakistan will not be able to purchase as effective an air force as it 
has been able to in the past.
The Indian Air Force was slow to evolve into an effective fighting 
force. At independence India received six and a half squadrons to Pakistan’s 
three. During the first Indo-Pakistani war, their role was largely confined to 
air supply of the army in Kashmir. The Indian Air Force's role in the 1962 
conflict was similarly minimal. In that war there were only two poor 
runways in proximity to sectors of the border where the fighting was taking 
place. India was reluctant to introduce the air force into the conflict for fear 
that China could more than counter the move with its air force. By the 1965 
War with Pakistan, India had in its inventory Hunter fighters and Canberra 
bombers, as well as indigenously produced under license Gnat aircraft. In
72 Shekhar Gupta, "Defence Forces Heading for a Crisis," India Today, 2/28/89, pp. 90-4.
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this w ar, the m inim al role of the air force was a ttribu ted  to poor 
coordination betw een the air force and the army. The air force saw its 
prim ary role as the attainm ent of air superiority. Close air support was a 
secondary consideration. C oordination betw een the services was m uch  
im proved during the 1971 War. After the initial unsuccessful attem pt by the 
Pakistani Air Force (PAF) to make a pre-emptive strike, the Indian Air Force 
(IAF) was successful, especially in the East, in suppressing the PAF. The IAF 
was also coordinated som ewhat w ith the navy in the attack on Karachi 
harbour.73
The margin of superiority that India has m aintained over Pakistan in 
quantitative term s has rem ained fairly constant over the years. Such 
quantitative analysis does not take into account such factors as Pakistan's 
lack of territorial depth, or the qualitative aspects of the differing airframes, 
ordinance or electronic counterm easure (ECM) packages that these planes 
carry.74 The deterioration of the US-Pakistani relationship will eventually 
lead to a qualitative edge of the IAF over the PAF.
73 Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 144-51.
74 For more information and analysis on the relative air balance from a quantitative and 
qualitative perspective see Ashley Tellis, "The Air Balance in the Indian Subcontinent: 
Trends, Constants and Contexts," Defence Analysis, v.2, # 4, pp. 263-89.
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PAF cbt ac
Source: The Military Balance, (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, various
years)
The deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan 
over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme has cast doubt on whether 
Pakistan will receive the 60 additional F-16 aircraft that it purchased from the 
United States. In light of this doubt, Pakistan has begun to search for an 
alternative source of top line aircraft. Pakistani Defence production 
Minister, Mir Hazar Khan Bijrani, has stated that "Owing to the delay of the 
delivery of the F-16s, Pakistan has to look for other options.'75 Pakistan was 
considering the Su-27, MiG-29, Mirage 2000, and the Rafale in September of 
1992. If Pakistan orders a significant number in the near future India may 
also seek an interim fighter to augment its inventory while it develops the 
Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). Currently, India has in its inventory Jaguars, 
Mirage 2000s, MiG-21s, 23s, 27s,and 29s, while Pakistan has F-16s, Mirage IIs 
and J-6s and J-7s.
75 "Pakistan Seeking New Suppliers to Update Airforce," Reuters News Service,9/6/92. How 
Pakistan will pay for a new airforce is a significant barrier to further purchases. If the Indian 
economy achieves its target growth rates India will be in a position to outspend Pakistan in an 
arms race.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union has led India to seek to diversify its 
sources of arm s procurem ent and technology. In June of 1992, India 
announced its intention to seal a $1.8 billion deal w ith British aerospace to 
purchase 100 Hawk trainers for the air force.76 There is also evidence that 
Rolls Royce will be sharing with H industan Aeronautics the A dour engine 
for the Goshawk aircraft.77 H ow ever tentatively, cooperation w ith  the 
United States on the LCA project has been moving forward. India has been 
aiming to have two prototypes ready for flight trials by 1995-6.78 W ith 
discussion of the navy, army and air force complete the chapter now turns to 
focus on India's paramilitary forces.
20.14 Para-military forces
In addition to its military forces, India has a sizable paramilitary force. 
These paramilitary forces are divided into a num ber of organisations, which 
are engaged in law and order activities in support of the civil adm inistration 
as well as border operations. In the event of war, these forces have been 
utilised in support of the regular military. The para-m ilitary forces were 
created to insulate the regular military from having to deal w ith internal 
disturbances, and thereby become politicised. Former Chief of Army Staff, 
General Rodrigues, has taken the view that India's main threat had become 
"the siege within."79 Despite the rapid grow th of param ilitary formations, 
these organisations have no t been  able to hand le  Ind ia 's  in te rnal 
insurgencies on their own. This has m eant that the arm y has not been 
spared the job of internal security as planned. At present, up to fifty percent 
of the armed forces are occupied in counter insurgency roles.80
76 ' India to Buy British Aerospace Hawk Jet Trainer," Reuters News Service, 6/3/92.
77 "Rolls-Royce Offers Knowhow to HAL," The Ecotiomic Times, 5/1/92.
78 "Military Affairs India," Air International, 9/91.
79 Samina Ahmed, "Civil-Military Relations in India," Regional Studies, (Islamabad) 
summer 1992, p.40. General Rodrigues also evoked the wrath of Parliament for breaking 
standing orders by publicaly speaking out against the way in which the military was used in 
domestic situations.
80 This costs India $6.4 million per day. Some of the forces are in dual roles such as the 200,000 
troops deployed along the line of control in Kashmir. There they act to stop the cross border 
flow of assistance to the insurgents as well as act in the role of border defence. "Where 
Politicians Fear to Tread," Asia Week, 6/19/92, p. 28.
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Indian para-military forces
1. Coast Guard Organization
2. Defence Security Force
3. Border Security Force
4. Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF reserves)
5. Assam Rifles
6. Ladakh Scouts
7. Indo-Tibetan Border Police
8. Special Frontier Force
9. Central Industrial Security Force
10. National Security Guards
11. Railway Protection Force
12 Provincial Armed Constabulary 
13. Rashtriya Rifles (formed in 1991 )81
2,500
30.000
140.000
100.000
250.000
15.000
5.000
22.000 
10,000
55.000
5.000
60.000
250.000
10.000
total 954,50082
The jurisdiction of these forces falls into different categories. The 
Ministry of Defence retains control over the Coast Guard, the Ladakh Scouts 
and the Defence Security Force. The Provincial Arm ed Constabulary is 
adm inistered at the state level of governm ent, as are the Flome G uards 
which have been excluded from the above list.83 The National Security 
G uards (NSG) have been described as an "anti-terrorist contingency 
deploym ent force," whose actual control may reside in the organizations 
from which the forces are draw n.84 The M inster of the Railways has 
jurisdiction over the Railway Security Forces, and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs overseas the balance of the forces mentioned above.85
81 "Join the Rashtriya Rifles," The Employment News, 12/15-21/90, p.26. Up to 75% of the 
new force is to be drawn from ex-servicemen. Rajan Nayar, "Security Forces Stretched to the 
Limit," Sunday Mail, 11/11/90.
82 Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1991-92 (London: Brassey's Publishers, 
1990), p. 163.
83 The strength of the Home Guards is 448,081. This force has been excluded because only a 
small part of its forces are engaged in paramilitary style activities, such as Home Guard 
assistance to Border Security Forces (BSF). The Home Guards have been likened to the 
Peoples Liberation Army of China. Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy, (Princeton: Princeton 
University press, 1986), p. 76.
84 Sukhdeo Prasad Baranwal, ed. Military Yearbook, p. 392.
85 "The Ministry of Home Affairs, however, overseas matters relating to internal security of 
the country and also the trends and developments in the law and order situation and communal 
matters and provides guidance and assistance to the states as necessary. The Union Territories
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The Border Security Force and the C entral Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF) are the two most significant bodies of para-military force in India. 
Elem ents of both these forces have been used in India's operations in  
Jammu and Kashmir,86 as well as in other politically sensitive operations. 
In addition  to seeing action on India 's borders, the BSF took part in 
Operation Bluestar to suppress Sikh extrem ists ensconced around the 
Golden Temple of Amritsar in Punjab.87 The BSF has also been deployed in 
counter-insurgency operation in Tripura and Mizoram. The BSF continued 
in its border security role in the coastal areas Tamil N adu in 1990, and in 
Rajasthan.88 The CRPF has seen action against both the Pakistanis and the 
Chinese, as well as against insurgents in Punjab, Kashmir, M anipur and 
Mizoram. In 1965, in the Ran of Kutch, and again in 1971 in Bangladesh, the 
CRPF saw action against Pakistani regulars.89
Based on the data and reports, it appears that a decision was taken in  
1987 to expand the paramilitary forces significantly. It was also in 1987 that 
the situation  in Kashm ir de te rio ra ted . The decision to expand the 
percentage of paramilitary forces of the total security force structure reflects 
the centre's response to the increased threat posed by internal dissent. The 
operational distinction between paramilitary and regular military forces has 
become blurred, as regulars have been deployed in param ilitary roles as 
needed. Furtherm ore, the m ost recent param ilitary  organisation, the
are also the reponsibility of this Ministry. It is also assigned the work of keeping a watch 
that the administration in the States is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and the relations between the Centre and the States develop as envisaged in the 
Constitution.” From The Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 1990-91, (New Delhi: 
Annual Report, 1991), p. 1.
86 For a detailed inquiry into human rights abuse in Kashmir see Asia Watch, Kashmir Under 
Siege: Human Rights in India, (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1991) and Bruce Vaughn, 
'The Coercive Arm of the State in India," The Indian Ocean Review, Dec. 1992.
87 The NSG was established as a special anti-terrorist commando force which has 
subsequently been diverted to the protection of VVIPs. They have been deployed in such 
operations as Operation Black Thunder at the Golden Temple in Amritsar. See Mark Tully, 
No Full Stops in India, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 153-180. The SPG is delegated 
the responsibility of protecting the Prime Minister and was based on the American Secret 
Intelligence Service.
88 Ajay Bharadwaj, "BSF Plan to Beef-up Border Security," The Times of India, 3/1/91. "BSF 
for TN Coastal Districts," The Hindu, 12/18/90.
89 Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 72-85.
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Rashtriya Rifles, was initially formed by six army battalions on secondment. 
The force is eventually to be draw n largely from ex-servicemen.90
150000th Paramilitary and Regular Armed Forces Compared
1000000 -
Paramilitary Formations
Armed Forces
500000-
Source: international institute of Strategic Studies, i he Military Balance, 
(London: IISS Publishers, various years)
The dram atic increase in the numbers of troops in param ilitary form ations 
has sim ilarly been reflected in the num ber of battalions and in budget 
allocations. Between 1986 and 1991, the Border Security Force was planned 
to increase from 90 to 139 battalions, the Central Reserve Police Force from 
80 to 116, the Assam rifles from 20 to 39, and other groups from 116 to 183 
battalions. During the same period, the budget for all param ilitary groups 
was to increase from 956 crore Rs to 1922 crores. Further, some of the costs 
have been defrayed to the states by the centre. For each CRPF battalion 
deployed to a state, the state must pay Rs two lakh per month.91
Constant deploym ent to m ultiple locations, a lack of training for the 
roles in which they are deployed, and a lack of success in their operations 
have underm ined the morale of many of the military and param ilitary units
90 "Special Force to Combat Internal Strife," The Business and Political Observer,9/15/90.
91 Shekhar Gupta, "Paramilitary Forces: The Tired Trouble Shooters," India Today, 2/15/88, 
p. 146. It was during this same period that India significantly augmented its internal security 
forces, apparently as a consequence of a survey of paramilitary forces conducted by the Home 
Ministry in 1987.
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engaged in counter-insurgency roles. One CRPF unit had 64 deployments in 
two years. Many of the paramilitary formations were established to fulfil 
specific specialised duties; few are now involved in activities other than 
internal security.92
There are differences between fighting international wars and internal 
insurgencies. India’s international wars have been short, its insurgencies 
protracted. Also one BSF officer described the role of paramilitary forces: 
"ours is a war to which one can foresee no end."93 This perception 
undermines morale and leads to the abuse of power by forces who see no 
way out. Given that India has been countering the mounting insurgency 
with escalating levels of armed force, and that the situation has nonetheless 
continued to deteriorate, the question then arises; how long can the centre 
sustain its efforts. Undoubtedly, the resource drain and detrimental effect to 
national security of these conflicts detracts from India's relative power 
position within the region. As such, insurgency movements cut into India's 
aspirations to great power status.
The situation in Kashmir began to deteriorate significantly in 1987, 
when India was intent to extend its influence in the South Asian region. 
The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Maldives intervention, Operation Brass 
Tacks and Operation Checkerboard, and continuing conflict on the Siachen 
Glacier, were all taking place in 1987 and 1988. It is difficult to establish a 
firm causal relationship between Indian external policy and the rising levels 
of internal dissent. Nevertheless, it appears as though India's more assertive 
external policy in the years 1987-89 led Pakistan to incite and abet Kashmiri 
and Punjabi militants.
92 The Assam Rifles were established in 1835 to protect the British tea gardens of Assam. 
Many of the formations were designed to patrol India’s borders. Now they are tied down in 
internal security roles. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police were created after 1962 to patrol the 
border with China; now they are also guarding banks in Kashmir, and are deployed as far 
away from the Himalayas as Rajasthan. The National Security Guards were created to 
operate as an elite anti-terrorist commando force; now they guard VIPs. An additional 2,500 
members of the CRPF are also occupied in VIP protection in Delhi. The nature of 
counterinsurgency work necessitate multiple deployments of small units. This then places in 
the field decision-making in the hands of relatively untrained NCO commanders. K.R.K 
Prasad, "Police in Combat," The Statesman,7123/92.
93 Shekhar Gupta, "Paramilitary Forces," pp. 146-7.
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Thus, Pakistan’s indirect opposition to India's efforts to increase its 
regional influence in the 1980s differs from its more open confrontational 
approach in 1965. This reflects Pakistan's realization that it can no longer 
hope to confront India successfully in an open conventional war. The fact 
that war was averted in 1987, and again in the spring of 1990, supports this 
interpretation of Pakistani perceptions of the security equation. In this way, 
internal strife and abuse are a corollary of India's attem pts to expand its 
regional influence. While Pakistan and the insurgents continue to defy 
India, Indian aspirations for a greater international role will be hampered.
The danger of future w ar now hinges on Indian frustrations w ith 
Pakistani meddlings in Kashmir and Punjab. The reactive policies employed 
and reliance on paramilitary and regular military forces have not only failed 
to suppress the militants, but have served to further polarise the conflict. A 
senior Home Ministry official stated that, "The pity is that even after so 
m uch money and men are committed, [to internal security operations] we 
would hardly be living in a more secure environment."94 As existing efforts 
are increasingly seen as ineffectual, India will seek to address the problem at 
w hat it sees as its source. Rather than perceiving these secessionist and 
autonom ous m ovem ents as groups that are seeking their ow n sense of 
identity', they are perceived as being the pawns of Pakistan. It is through 
such a scenario that India and Pakistan will go to war unless a way is found 
to defuse the situation.
Communalist violence, H indu fundam entalism, centre-state tensions, 
inter-caste disharm ony, economic reform , secessionist and autonom ous 
m ovem ents and threats em anating from  beyond India's borders are all 
underm ining India's security by pulling apart India's social cohesion. The 
practice of using police intelligence organs to buttress the state against 
challenges to its au thority  dates back to the colonial Raj. Political 
surveillance developed originally as a special branch of the police forces. In 
1887, the Thugi and Dakaiti Departm ent was created to collect information 
on political and social movements. The departm ent's role was eventually 
assumed by the Central Intelligence Departm ent (CID). This trend towards a
94 Shekhar Gupta, "Paramilitary Forces," p. 147.
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political intelligence role for the police was m irrored at the provincial level, 
where similar special branches were established. In 1907, the CID in Simla 
was renamed the Intelligence Bureau (IB).95 The role and importance of the 
police grew during the civil disobedience campaigns of the 1930s, as the state 
came to rely on them to maintain its position. The transfer of power to the 
Congress ironically did not result in the reform of the role of the police. 
Instead they came to use the same m ethods in support of the new regime. 
As a result, "the equation of force with authority and opposition w ith crime" 
has become entrenched. In addition, the frequent resort to violence by the 
state has "bred a surprising degree of complacency in the general public and 
among politicians." Counter-intuitively, the police did not become more 
accountable to the rule of law after independence. Instead, the police "have 
fallen increasingly under the politicians sway. The politicians are the new 
masters to whom the police show deference and obey."96 During elections, 
police are used to capture polling booths in some areas. The view that the 
police are corrupt is w idely held. One survey found that 33.2% of 
respondents thought that there was a great deal of corruption among police, 
while only 3.5% said that there was none 97 This chapter will now move on 
from a service based analysis of India's expanding capabilities to consider 
nuclear and missile programmes.
20.2 Indian nuclear and missile programmes
India's nuclear and missile program m es are closely linked w ith its 
desire to change the w orld 's perception of India's position, to prevent 
Pakistan from gaining a nuclear advantage, and to counter the nuclear 
strength of China. India has undoubtedly been influenced by the dynamics 
of competition in the bi-polar age. During this period the role of nuclear 
weapons and missiles in the correlations of pow er was param ount. Within 
this context, it is not surprising that India, in seeking to be perceived as a 
force to be reckoned with, would seek to develop a nuclear capability. India
95 The role of the intelligence agencies will be discussed in greater detail in Chater Six.
96 This and the previous two quotes are drawn from, David Arnold, Police Power and Colonial 
Rule: Madras 1859-1947, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 186-7
97 David Bayley, The Police and Political Development in India, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), p. 284.
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has invested much into such an effort. It has been estimated that nuclear 
program m es consum e 25 percent of Ind ia’s research and developm ent 
funds.98
20.21 The Nuclear environment
There are several avenues of nuclear proliferation which are likely to 
rem ain open to South Asia. In the first instance, the extension of nuclear 
programmes in the region can be seen as related to the China-India-Pakistan 
security nexus. India and the United States signed an agreem ent over the 
Tarapur atomic station in 1963. The 1964 Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor 
confirm ed India’s move to develop a nuclear option. Former Defence 
M inister K. C. Pant m ade the case for opening the "option strategy" of a 
nuclear deterrent.99 By 1974, India was able to conduct its ow n nuclear 
explosion at Pokhran as part of this option policy. Pakistan undoubtedly felt 
that it had no choice but to respond to the Indian programme. The result is a 
situation where both India and Pakistan are on the brink of openly deploying 
nuclear weapons. Neither side has, as of yet, crossed the deployed weapons 
threshold, though India and Pakistan are, should they choose, both thought 
to be within weeks of some level of capability. In this way there is a subtle 
d ifference betw een Ind ia 's "substantial technological option" and  a 
capability.100 The lack of a deep targeting doctrine for nuclear or missile 
program m es in either India or Pakistan is another indication of their level of 
nuclear war fighting capability.
The existing Sino-Indian border disputes, and the rivalry betw een 
India and China, will also predispose India to acquire a capability to offset the
98 Given this and the fact that nuclear power accounts for only 2% of power output in India, 
India "must have some alterior motive [or a] hidden agenda ... to produce nuclear weapons." 
Dhirendra Sharma, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi as interviewed on "Nuclear 
India," Yorkshire Television. It is estimated that India has between 40 and 60 nuclear 
weapons. Some estimates run as high as 203 weapons. See Michael McKinley, "Indian Naval 
Developments and Australian Naval Strategy, in the Indian Ocean," in Robert Bruce ed. The 
Modem Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, (Perth: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Sudies, 
1989), p. 150.
99 Stephen Phillip Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms 
Control, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 7.
100 Manoj Joshi, Seminar on Nuclear and Missile Capabilities given at the Australian 
National University, 12/92.
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present Chinese advantage. A Sino-Soviet sum m it in 1989 lead to a joint 
com m unique, w hich now  places Ind ia  ou tside  the Soviet nuclear 
um brella.101 This makes India more reliant on its own nuclear deterrent to 
deter future Chinese pressure.102 A measure of good will between India and 
China has been created by the visit of Prime Minister Li Peng to Delhi on 11 
Decem ber 1991.103 This m arks the con tinu ing  positive tone of the 
relationship in the public eye, and can be viewed as a response to the Rajiv 
Gandhi visit of 1988, which did m uch to diffuse tensions betw een the two 
countries. The Rajiv Gandhi visit was the first at the Prime Ministerial level 
since the border clash of 1962. The previous visit by a Chinese Prime 
Minister to India was m ade by Chou en-Lai in 1960. Relations w ith China 
seem to be at least in a holding pattern, if not cordial. Prime Minister Rao's 
Defence Minister, Sharad Pawar, was the first Indian Defence M inister to 
visit China. His visit, in July of 1992, was believed to be aimed at adding 
im petus to the Joint W orking Group on Border Disputes between the two 
countries, and was seen as a further confidence building measure.104 Despite 
these a ttem pts to im prove the a tm osphere  of re la tions substan tia l 
differences and rivalry remain between the two countries.
India has refused to bow to W estern pressure to join the MTCR, the 
NPT, or other regional non-proliferation arrangem ents.105 To do so would 
be to lock it into an inferior position relative to China, and the West. India's 
nuclear program m e is in the first instance aim ed at countering Chinese 
capabilities.106 China has chosen to signal India w ith actions rather than 
words as its means of expressing its displeasure over India's advances w ith 
missile technology. India successfully launched a Rohini class satellite on
101 This was provided by article nine of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971.
102 S. Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, p. 8.
103 Christopher Thomas, "Li’s Visit First in 31 Years," Sydney Morning Herald, 11/27/91.
104 "Xalks with China Useful: Pawar," The Sunday Statesman, 7/ 26/92.
105 There are reports that India is seeking uranium in Central Asia as a way to avoid Western 
controls. It has similarly been reported that Iran has purchased uranium and burilium dioxide 
pellets from Kazakhstan. Frontline television programme, 4/13/93.
106 United States intelligence reports indicated that in early 1993 China shipped components 
of the nuclear capable, 300 mile range M -ll missile to Pakistan. This was done despite 
Chinese pledges in 1992 that it would not transfer such technology. This is further evidence of 
a continuing China-Pakistan axis in South Asia. Douglas Lehl, "China Breaking Missile 
Pledge," The New York Times, 5/6/93.
57
board an indigenously produced Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle on 20 
May 1992. The next day, while the Indian President was still in China, China 
detonated  its largest ever nuclear device. This m anner of conveying 
international signals has been employed by China before. China timed the 
launching of a punitive border war against Vietnam to coincide with a visit 
by India’s Foreign Secretary, Vajpayee. The sim ilarities betw een the 1979 
Sino-Vietnamese border war and the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war sent a 
signal that demonstrated China’s contiuing resolve on border issues. The 21 
May nuclear explosion, and increasing Chinese nuclear relations w ith 
Southw est Asia, are similarly a signal of C hina’s resolve against Indian 
nuclear and missile programmes.
India's continuing efforts to develop its missile program m e indicates 
its intentions to continue to seek a deterrent to Chinese capabilities despite 
the im proved tenor of their relationship. India and China seem to have 
agreed, at least for the moment, that neither of them are at present interested 
in com pounding internal unrest by opening up border disputes with cross 
border implications.
A second likely avenue of proliferation is the Pakistani response to 
India's increased conventional capability. Pakistan could come to the 
perception that Indian capabilities had reached a level that threatened 
Pakistan's ability to adequately defend itself w ith conventional systems. If 
Pakistan were to openly deploy nuclear weapons to deter India, India would 
feel compelled to respond similarly. This second avenue is overshadow ed 
by India's rivalry with China.
United Nations inspections in Iraq in 1991 uncovered inform ation 
indicating a nuclear relationship betw een Iraq and Pakistan. The UN 
inspector's report believed that Pakistan was used as a transhipm ent country 
for Iraq's uranium  which was supplied by China. The report fu rther 
concluded that Iraq's A1 Furat centrifuge production facility was established 
w ith  "substantial help from outside Iraq ... the centrifuge enrichm ent
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program m e was definitely not an indigenous developm ent effort."107 
Centrifuges are needed for the enrichment of uranium  to be used for nuclear 
weapons. The centrifuges were found to "bear a striking resemblance to 
those ... sold to Pakistan." It was further asserted that there was a "clear 
technological link betw een nuclear program m es in Pakistan and Iraq."108 
Though India had been exploring a nuclear link with Iran, it was to China 
that Iran turned to establish its nuclear programme in September of 1992.
It has been argued that the border tensions in the spring of 1990 were 
dangerously close to escalating to nuclear w ar. Form er W hite House 
N ational Security Adviser Robert Gates w ho was sent to Islamabad and 
Delhi to diffuse tensions at the time has stated that "Pakistan and India 
seemed to be caught in a cycle that they could not break out of. I was 
convinced that if a war started it would go nuclear."109 The Seymour Hersh 
article makes the case that Pakistani nuclear program m es were allowed to 
proceed with tacit approval by the Reagan/Bush Adm inistrations and that 
this information was w ithheld from Congress for fear that the Solarz and 
Pressler A m endm ents w ould be invoked. This was view ed by those 
involved as the necessary price for continued Pakistani support against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.
The implications of the breakup of the Soviet U nion could have a 
significant impact on nuclear proliferation in South and Southwest Asia. 
The Iranian opposition has stated that Iran successfully purchased four 
nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan.110 On 23 May 1992, Kazakhstan joined 
Belorussia, the Ukraine and Russia in signing a protocol on the previously 
negotiated Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreem ent. By so 
doing, P residen t N ursu ltan  N azarbayev  of K azakhstan affirm ed his 
intentions to dispose of all strategic nuclear weapons and to join the non­
proliferation regime. W hether K azakhstan will follow through on this
107 Excerpt drawn from the United Nations Inspector's Report to the Security Council on 
Nuclear Weapons Programmes in Iraq as quoted in Douglas Davis, "Proof of Nuclear Market 
Found in Iraq," The Australian, 11 /27/91.
108 Douglas Davis, "Proof of Nuclear Market Found in Iraq,"
109 Robert Gates as quoted in Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, 
3/29/93, pp. 56-73.
110 Frontline television programme, 4/13/93.
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pledge remains to be seen. Strategic nuclear weapons give Kazakhstan a 
strong bargaining position. To relinquish this w ith no quid pro quo seems 
unlikely. The shorter range nuclear system s on K azakhstan soil had 
previously  been w ithdraw n. In January of 1992 it was thought that 
Kazakhstan retained 1,400 strategic nuclear weapons, or five percent of the 
previous Soviet total.111 Kazakhstan has on its soil silo-based missiles at 
D erzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobzhur, a missile test range at Tyuratam , a 
nuclear test site and a heavy bom ber base at Semipalatinsk and an anti 
ballistic missile test site and an early warning radar site at Sary Shagan.112 
The 38% ethnic Russian composition of Kazakhstan is employed in many of 
the more technical positions within the economy and military.
The alternative path of proliferation from the former Soviet Union is 
through a brain drain. The Central Intelligence Agency has estimated that
900.000 people had clearances to work with Soviet nuclear projects. Of this 
num ber, some 2,000 would have knowledge of weapons design, while 3,000 
to 5,000 would have experience w ith u ranium  enrichm ent or plutonium  
production.113 Soviet scientists average wage in early 1992 was reportedly
1.000 rubles, or $10 a month. Reports have already emerged of some 60 or 
more former Soviet nuclear scientists working for India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan 
and Brazil were they can earn $36,000-75,000 annually.114 Such an outflow of 
expertise will greatly enhance Pakistan’s and India's ability to develop and 
deploy nuclear weapons systems.
A further potential opening for nuclear proliferation stems from the 
Indian dom estic milieu. There are those w ith in  India w ho espouse a 
nuclear path for India on the grounds that India, as a significant power, 
should have nuclear weapons in order for it to be taken seriously on the 
international arena. Such sentim ent is a reaction of India to the overall 
environm ent rather than in response to a specific threat. The BJP advocates
111 Robert Norris, "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," Arms Control Today, Jan./Feb. 1992. p. 
25.
112 Robert Norris, The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," pp. 28-9.
113 Elaine Sciolino, "US Report Warns of Risk of Spread of Nuclear Skills," The Nero York 
Times, 1/1/92, as referenced in Robert Norris, The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," p. 26.
114 Dunbar Lockwood, "US Seeks to Avert Ex-Soviet Brain Drain," Arms Control Today, 
Jan./Feb., 1992, p. 40.
60
a policy of giving the arm ed forces "nuclear teeth." This is inspired by a 
psychological need to acquire a nuclear potential to make India a force to be 
considered and to be taken seriously. Nuclear arms w ould allow India to 
deal w ith the world's major powers on more equal footing. This status­
seeking need for India to take its self-perceived rightful place among the 
significant states of the world, and to no longer be in the position of having 
to bow to the dictates of others, will continue to increase as India continues 
to develop its military and economic potential.
There has been m uch debate over the question of just how far off 
India and Pakistan are from deploying nuclear w eapons. One study 
concluded that India could produce enough fissile m aterial for up to 53 
nuclear warheads per year. In 1990 Pakistan’s potential has similarly been 
estimated to be 21 warheads per year.115
20.22 Delivery systems
India and Pakistan both have nuclear capable aircraft and missiles. 
India's MiG 23, 25, 27, Jaguar and Mirage 2000 aircraft, and Pakistan's Mirage 
III, V and F-16 aircraft, are all nuclear capable.116 It has been reported that 
Pakistan prepared a nuclear weapon to drop on India in 1990.117 Reportedly 
Pakistan d istribu ted  its nuclear w eapons from  a sto rage  facility in 
Baluchistan to airbases arround the country durring the 1990 crisis.118
India and Pakistan have both m ade significant progress w ith missile 
systems that will eventually be nuclear capable - India most recently in 1989 
w ith the Prithvi, and in 1992 with the Agni, and Pakistan in 1990 with the 
Haft-1 and 2.119 In addition to trying to limit the spread of nuclear weapons
115 S. Rashid Naim, "Aadhi Raat Ke Baad (After Midnight), in S. Cohen, Nuclear 
Proliferation in South Asia, p. 32.
116 It appears that Pakistan had configured a bomb that would fit onto their F-16s by the 
time of the spring 1990 crisis. See Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge,"
117 "Bhutto Tells of Plan for N-Bomb Attack," The Sydney Morning Herald, 12/4/92. In this 
account the deployment aircraft at that time was to have been a C-130 cargo plane.
118 Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," p. 64.
119 The Haft-1 has a 80 km range. The Haft-2 is thought to be able to carry a 500 kg warhead 
over 300 km. Roy Braybrook, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation Causes Concern," Pacific Defence 
Reporter, 1990 Annual edition, p.72. Reportedly Pakistan has extended the range of theHaft-
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through the NPT, the US and the West have sought to limit the spread of 
ballistic missile technology through the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
The efforts of the MTCR will be less successful than the NPT, as an estimated 
nine additional countries will soon join the existing six to seven states 
which already possess their own missile production capability.120 China has 
undermined the MTCR efforts through its sales of missiles to Pakistan, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia.121 The regime has been viewed in the Indian press as a 
"stick" to maintain a first world "techopoly" as part of the "West's deliberate 
resistance to the [third world's] efforts at development."122 The MTCR, 
Super 301, the IMF and the NPT are all seen from the Indian perspective as 
neocolonial efforts to maintain the subordination of the third world.
Ballistic missile technology and deep strike nuclear capable aircraft 
have been acquired by the Indian armed forces as a means of dealing with its 
on-going security concerns with Pakistan and China, as well as for dealing 
with potentialities which could arise in the Indian Ocean region. By 
acquiring and developing nuclear capable systems, India is in a position to 
deploy nuclear armed forces in a very short time.
In addition to the missile’s potential military value, it becomes part of 
the psychology of India’s reconceptualisation of itself. One of the key aspects 
of the Agni test flight, as portrayed in the Indian press, was how through the 
test India had joined the exclusive club of the US, Russia, France, China and 
Israel in possessing an indigenously developed intermediate range ballistic 
missile (IRBM). This is indicative of the Indian need to be accepted as one of 
the significant players on the international arena. Abdul Kalam, director of 
Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) which oversaw the 
Agni programme, when queried as to why India needed the missile 
commented that "It is a technological strength. Strength respects strength.
2 . Mazida Kamaruddin, "Delhi Rests Its Case," Asian Defence Journal, 7/89, p. 100. See also 
Manoj joshi, "The Significance of Agni," The Hindu,5/19/89.
120 Aabha Dixit, "Missiles: India Might Come Under Pressure," The Hindustan Times, 
7/18/90.
121 Douglas Jehl, "China Breaking Missile Pledge," The Nev> York Times,5/5/93.
122 D. Sen, "Missile Proliferation: Third World Bogey," The Hindustan Times, 7/19/92.
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Weaklings are not honoured. So we should be strong."123 In regard to the 
Agni  K. Subramanyam has described its "role as a weapon as the least of its 
roles. It is a confidence builder and a symbol of India's assertion of self 
reliance, not merely in defence, but in the broader international political 
arena as well."124 Rajiv G andhi’s com m ents on the Agni  acknowledged 
both the psychological and potential military utility of the weapon system for 
India. He stated that "we m ust rem ember that technological backwardness 
leads to subjugation [and that] the technologies proved in Agni  are deeply 
significant for evolving national security options."125
The greatest gains in Indian theatre forces and indigenously produced 
arm aments in the last decade have been in its missile technology. India is a 
leader in indigenous ballistic missile technology in the Third W orld w here 
some 13 to 20 states have similarly acquired, or are acquiring, missile 
systems. The Gulf W ar has clearly established that in the face of a 
concentrated advanced air force, Third W orld countries have little option for 
striking the enemy by air other than missiles.126 The ability to strike core 
areas of the enemy, while not necessarily m ilitarily significant, is at a 
m inim um  of importance in symbolic terms, as was made evident by Iraqi 
Scud missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. An 
Indian capability to threaten US facilities on Diego Garcia w ould certainly 
figure into any equation if the two nations were to come into conflict with 
one another.
Indian advances in the missile production area are part of India's 
overall drive for arms independence. This is itself part of the larger goals of 
self sufficiency and non-alignm ent. In 1958, the Defence Science 
O rgan isa tion  and the Technical D evelopm en t E stablishm ent, w ere 
am algam ated into the Defence Research and Developm ent O rganisation
123 Interview with Abdul Kalam in Dilip Bobb and A. K. Menon, "Agni: Chariot of Fire," 
India Today, 6/15/89, p. 31.
124 K. Subramanyam as quoted in Andrew Hull, "The Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third 
World Defence Strategies,” Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1991, p. 465.
125 Dilip Bobb and A. K. Menon, "Agni: Chariot of Fire," India Today, 6/15/89, p. 29.
126 This had earlier been established by a study conducted on the performance of the Syrian 
Airforce in operations in the 1982 Lebanon War where it experienced a 30% loss rate. Andrew 
Hull, "The Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third World Defence Strategies "Jane's Intelligence 
Review, October 1991, pp. 464-70.
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(DRDO). The DRDO is administered by the Department of Defence Research 
and Development (DDRD).127 Credit for India's missile programme goes to 
the DRDO and the DRDL. It is the DRDL in Hyderabad and the Imaraat 
Research Centre which form the core of the guided missile development 
programme.128 An Indian designed and built satellite, the Aryabhata, was 
launched for India by the Soviets in 1975.129 By 1980, India had advanced to 
become the Third Worlds largest arms manufacturer with 31 percent of 
Third World production between 1950 and 1984.130 Further, in 1980 India 
became the sixth state to place a satellite into orbit, with the launch of the 
Augmented Space Launcher Vehicle (ASLV).131 In 1983, India initiated the 
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme as part of its on-going 
efforts to develop indigenous arms. It was funded at a rate of $1.3 billion for 
a ten year period and developed the Agni, Akash, Trishul, Prithvi, Nag, and 
Astra missiles.132 The Prithvi was successfully test fired in 1988. The Agni, 
which attracted widespread international attention, was test fired in May of 
1989. The Agni is generally considered to carry a one tonne payload a 
distance of 2,500 km. It has been speculated that the relative success of the 
missile programmes over the space launcher programme reflects the 
precedence of defence uses over civilian in the development of rocket 
technology.133
127 The DRDO has also been overseeing the LCA and MBT. S. Baranawal, The Military 
Yearbook 1978, pp. 235-50.
128 Pravin Sawhney, "Indigenous Missile Plan Increases Firepower," The Business and 
Political Observer, 12/12/90.
129 Surjit Mansingh, India and the Superpowers: 1966-84," in Y. Malik and D. Vajpeyi, "India: 
The Years of Indira Gandhi," p. 140.
130 Dr S. Bilveer, "India Fires into the Missile Age," Asian Defence Review, 9/89, p. 71. 
Despite this India is a small exporter of weapons. This may have been related to its NAM 
posture. India is now seeking to increase its arms exports.
131 On May 20 1992 India was successful in launching 3301b Rohini Class satalite into orbit. 
The programme while largely successful has had its set backs. ASLV launches in 1987 and 
1988 ended in failure. "India Launches Space Satilite," Reuters News Service, 5/20/92.
132 The Agni is a 1500-3000 km surface to surface IRBM. The Akash  is a 27 km surface to air 
missile. The Trishul, a 25 km truck mounted surface to air missile was first test fired in 1987. 
The Prithvi, a surface to surface missile, has an estimated range of 250 km and has a tactical 
battlefield role. The Nag  is guided anti tank missile while the Astra is a air to air missile 
currently under design. Dr S. Bilveer, "India Fires into the Missile Age," Asian Defence 
Review, 9/89, p.71.
133 A.K. Menon, "Space Launchers in a Tail Spin," India Today, 5/31/92, p.141.
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DRDO funding as a % of the Defence Budget
1961-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90
Source: Statistics drawn from "Agni Chariot of Fire," India Today, 6/15/89, p. 31.
In addition to the Prithvi and the Agni  , it is thought that India is in 
the process of developing a missile with excess of a 5,000 km range. This 
would give it the beginnings of a nuclear deterrent vis a vis China.134 Given 
the high degree of uncertainty over Pakistan's nuclear position,135 and due 
to domestic political forces India may be tem pted to adopt an open nuclear 
policy w hen it develops an effective IRBM. This will p rovide a true 
deterrent to China. These plans will likely go ahead despite the current 
positive nature of the Sino-Indian relationship. The atm ospherics of the 
relationship do not compensate for the underlying rivalry and unresolved 
border.
134 The press trust of India quoted scientist at the DRDO as stating that after the Agni the 
next objective was to develop a m issile with more than double the range. Mazida 
Kamaruddin, Asian Defence Journal, 7/89. See also Seth Carus, "Ballistic Missiles in Modern 
Conflict," as cited in Andrew Hull, The Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third World Defence 
Strategies," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1991, p. 468.
135 In 1990 Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto was alerted by the CIA of the military's plans to 
potentially use nuclear weapons. At the time tensions had been mounting over the Kashmir 
border. The Prime Minister stated, "I have no proof for this but I feel that someone may have 
turned on the [nuclear] switch in the Spring of 1990 to justify the dismissal of my government 
and, now, having done that, does not know how to turn that switch off." "Bhutto Tells of Plan 
for N-Bomb Attack," The Sydney Morning Herald, 12/4/92.
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The prospects for better relations between the United States and India, 
which had been showing signs of improvement, were dampened by the 
Indian and Russian decision to proceed with a US $250 million deal, first 
made in 1990, transferring sophisticated rocket engine technology. Despite 
denials by the Chairman of India's Space and Research Organisation, U.R. 
Rao, that the cryogenic liquid hydrogen rocket booster technology would not 
be used for military purposes, the United States remained apprehensive and 
threatened to cut Russia and India off from future technology transfers 
unless they desisted. The immediate repercussions of the deal was the 
holding up the delivery of a second Cray computer. This later became a full 
two year ban on exports to Glavakosmos, the Russian arms agency 
concerned, and the Indian Space Research Organization.136 India launched 
its ASLV ten days after the sanctions were announced. The sanctions further 
led to calls, from across the political spectrum, in the Indian Parliament for 
the cancellation of joint naval exercises with the United States, which were 
planned for 26 May 1992.137 While the naval manoeuvres went ahead, India 
took the opportunity to make its second test of the Agni  coincide with the 
naval manoeuvres. This clearly sent a signal to the United States of India’s 
continuing desire to independently develop its missile programme.
India continued during this period to test its short and long range 
missiles, and to resist attempts by the United States to have India join in 
talks with Pakistan on non-proliferation issues in the subcontinent.138 M.M. 
Joshi, President of the BJP, in reaction to the United States moves to prevent 
missile technology transfers, called for India "to go in for manufacture of 
nuclear weapons as a means of self protection."139 In this way, the lack of 
consensus on strategic issues in the areas of non-proliferation and missile 
technology control serve to undermine the prospect of improved relations 
between India and the West. It was the Soviet's disengagement from
136 Barbara Crosette, "Russia’s Rocket Deal with India Leads U.S. to Impose Trade Bans," 
The Neiv York Times,5/12/92.
137 "Spokesman’s Response to Queries Regarding US decision Relating to Sanctions Against 
ISRO," India News, 5/18/92, p. 4.
138 Sanjoy Hazarika, "Moscow Affirms Sale of Technology to India," The New York Times, 
5/7/92.
139 "Joshi Has Urged the Gov. to go in for Nuclear Weapons," India News, 5/18/92, p. 6.
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Afghanistan, and the liberalization of trade practices in India, which created 
the prospect for improved relations between India and the West.
20.3 Overall assessment of the trend in force structure
India’s force structure has expanded significantly since independence. 
There have been aberrations in the yearly budgets, but analysis of defence 
expenditures indicates a concerted effort to augm ent existing capabilities 
since 1962. The 1980s also witnessed another significant push to develop 
force structure. Internal political turmoil and economic restructuring forced 
existing plans to be put off in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Unless India's 
perceptions of its strategic environm ent are fundam entally altered, on a 
level of significance similar to the 1962 transform ation, the upw ard trend in 
defence expenditure will return with the resum ption of increasing economic 
growth.
In 1992 real defence expenditure dropped by over five percent despite 
nominal increases in budget allocations. Budget allocations for the military 
services were increased by 1150 crore140 over the 1991 allocation of 16350 
crore. This seven percent increase was over taken by the 12 percent inflation 
rate for the same period. This will continue to affect the capital outlays for 
im ported ordnance. The 1992 20 percent devaluation of the Rupee further 
diminished the buying power of the arm ed forces. Given this phenom ena, 
and the fact that the debt service allocation is the only other allocation in the 
national budget that exceeds the defence allocation, the im petus for 
indigenous defence production and exports of military equipm ent will grow 
as a more cost effective means of financing the military's requirements.141
20.31 Trends in defence expenditure
Indian defence expenditure grew both in current and constant figures 
during  the 1962-87 period. India's postu re  also grew  relative to its 
neighbours. During its peak, Indian defence expenditure exceeded that of 
Pakistan and China combined. There are, however, problems in trying to
140 One crore equals ten million.
141 K. Subramanyam, "Defence Expenditure in the Budget," Link, 3/22/92, p. 26.
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derive a relative sense of military power by looking at defence expenditures 
alone. Exchange rates and relative buying power of currencies in their own 
respective countries make direct comparisons less than perfect. Nonetheless, 
such figures are an im portan t source of inform ation for beginning to 
develop a sense of the general trends of a nations defence efforts.
W hat can be concluded from the data presented in the charts below is 
that India has, since 1962, been steadily developing its military potential, and 
that this was most dramatic in the mid-to late-1980s. The defence build-up of 
the 1980s, as measured in constant 1988 prices and exchange rates, began to 
abate in 1987. It is interesting to note that this is the same period that 
witnessed a num ber of increasingly assertive gestures on the part of India, 
su ch  as Operations Brass Tacks a n d  Checkerboard, the  M ald ives 
intervention, the Trade and Transit d ispute w ith Nepal, and the IPKF's 
expedition to Sri Lanka.
That the navy's share of net capital expenditures rose significantly 
during the 1980s is also of interest. Naval forces are generally more power 
projection oriented forces than are infantry units. There is a qualitative 
difference between the defensively oriented build up of m ountain units in 
the afterm ath of the 1962 war in the Himalaya and the beginnings of a blue 
water capability in the 1980s.
In addition to its significant indigenous arms industry, India became 
the w orld 's num ber one im porter of arms in the 1980s. For the period of 
1985-89 India was "by far the largest arms im porter of major weapons in the 
w orld."142 Afghanistan and Pakistan also ranked in the top twelve for the 
same period at seventh and twelfth respectively.
Despite short term  fluctuations, the long term  trend  in defence 
expenditure has been for steadily increasing defence budgets in constant 
figures. W hen m easured from the available data as a percentage of Gross 
National Product (GNP) the defence expenditure is m uch more stable at just 
under four percent of GNP. From this perspective, based both on past
142 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, S1PRI Yearbook 1990: World 
Armaments and Disarmament, (London: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 228.
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allocations and the position of the Ministry of Finance in the decision­
making structure, future increases in the defence budget would seem to be 
contingent on a rising GNP. Conversely, a decline in GNP growth would 
ostensibly lead to declining defence expenditures. The average annual 
growth rate for 1971-91 was seven percent. If the economic reforms of 
Narasimha Rao are effective, India could regain and surpass this earlier level 
of growth. In this case, defense expenditures, if they continue to be tied to a 
fixed level of GNP, may also return to or exceed the earlier levels of 
expenditure.143 The influence of economics on India's international 
position will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Defence Expenditure in Current Prices
Source: Ministry of Defence, Defence Service Estimates, (Delhi: Government of India Press, 
various years)
143 Two factors that will act against this are the unlikelihood that India will be able to 
replace the Soviet Union with an alternative source of inexpensive first rate military 
equipment and the rising costs of military manpower after the implementation of the 
recommendations of the fourth paycommission's report. Nearly 60% of the army's budget is 
either directly or indirectly related to manpower. Lt. General Hazari, The Resource Crunch 
and Defence Management," Indian Defence Review, Jan. 1992, p. 47.
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Defence Expenditure in Constant Prices
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Source: The statistics are drawn from Y. Lakshmi, Trends in India's Defence Expenditure, 
(Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, 1988)
Source: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (London: 
Brassey's Publishers, various years).
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Defence Expenditure as % of GDP
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Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, S1PR1 Year Book 1990: World 
Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.196-7.
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Source: The statistics are drawn from Y. Lakshmi, Trends in India’s Defence Expenditure, 
(Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, 1988) Note: Between 1962 and 1987 capital 
defence expenditure averaged 10.93% of total defence expenditure. The figures are in current 
prices. The definition of what constituted capital expenditure changed in 1984. This in part 
accounts for the rise at that time.
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Arms Imports Expenditures
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Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, S1PR1 Year Book 1990: World 
Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.228-9. Note: 
figures are in constant 1985 prices.144
20.32 Concealed aspects of the defence budget
In the attem pt to minimise attention to the expanding defence budget, 
a num ber of significant allocations have been concealed. This practice seems 
to have been started with the build up of the 1980s. The defence budget in 
India includes revenue expenditures on the Army, Navy, Air Force and 
defence production  plus the capital expenditu res on these services. 
Expenditures on the Ministry of Defence and pensions for retired personnel 
are not included in the budget. The budget figures for the ministry and for 
pensions are not kept secret. W hat is im portant is that when citing India’s 
defence budget these areas are generally left out. This has reduced the real 
expenditure in perceived terms by up to ten percent.145 In this way, general 
perceptions have successfully been misdirected.
144 These figures have been challanged. See G. Balachandran, "India’s Defence Expenditure: 
Widely Varying Estimates," Strategic Analysis, vol. XIV, no. 9, December 1991, pp. 1053-7.
145 The suggestion that the Indian government is "not being entirely frank with the public, 
and that defence expenditure and the burden of defence on the economy is considerably more 
than commonly realized." is articulated in Ravi Rikhye "Indian Defence Budget: Fact and 
Fantasy," Economic and Political Weekly, April 29 1989, p. 905.
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A fu r th e r  m an n e r of obfuscation  are the above-m entioned  
paramilitary forces whose budgets are draw n from different ministry sources. 
These forces are budgeted under ministries other than defence, such as the 
Home Ministry or the Ministry of Surface Transport. Their deployments are 
also in part paid for by the states where they are deployed. The defence 
budgets are most scrutinised when they are released in March. At this time 
there is a certain am ount of debate over the defence allocation. Defence 
estim ates are consistently revised upw ard. The 1988-89 budget exceeded 
budget estimates by 4%. The budget for the atomic energy program m e and 
ballistic missile research are under the budgets of the Departm ent of Atomic 
Energy. The governm ent also purchases military equipm ent under civilian 
government budget headings. In 1961 the acquisition of the Soviet transport 
aircraft An-12 was achieved through the border roads budget. In addition, air 
defence ground control environm ent equipm ent has been purchased under 
the Civil Aviation Ministry. 146
The arms and trade relationship w ith the Soviet Union, having been 
based on balanced trade, could have been used as a conduit for off-budget 
military acquisitions. During the 1980s India tended to run  trade surpluses 
in its account w ith the Soviets. It has been speculated that "the logical 
mechanism to balance is to im port Soviet arm s."147 When such diversions 
of expenses and hidden aspects of the defence budget are taken into account, 
the defence budget during its peak in the 1980s may have been closer to 5% of 
GNP rather than the 3 to 4 % figure.
21. Chronological conceptualization of the increasing assertiveness of 
modem India's external posture
W ith this d iscussion  of h idden  aspects of the defence budget 
concluded the chapter now  m oves on from  its focus on expanding 
capabilities to exam ine India 's increased assertiveness. For heuristic  
purposes the chronology of India's evolving posture is interpreted as having 
undergone 4 periods of transition and 3 periods of grow th. These are
146 Ravi Rikhye "Indian Defence Budget." p. 905. India has integrated military air control 
with its civilian air traffic control.
147 Ravi Rikhye "Indian Defence Budget." p. 905.
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outlined in the table below. These seven periods correspond to the periods 
of transition and growth which are subjectively depicted below in a graphic 
interpretation of India’s external posture.148
Suppositions of national security during periods of growth and transition
Period Dominant foreign 
policy concepts
Dominant
characteristics
I 1947-49 Territorial consolidation freedom
struggle
n. 1949-62 Panchsheela / NAM secular-
idealistic
in. 1962-69 Defensive / NAM secular-realist
IV. 1969-77 Real politik/N A M secular-realist
V. 1977-80 N eutralist / NAM com m unal-
realist
VI. 1980-89 Nationalist / NAM com m unal-
realist
VII. 1989-... N ationalist/ international com m unal-
realist
In its first phase prior to the 1962 border war Nehru had largely based 
India's security in a belief in the idealistic policies of Panchsheel149 or 
peaceful coexistence. During this period, the status of the m ilitary was 
neglected as resources were allocated to economic developm ent and away 
from a force previously associated with the maintenance of colonial order.150 
The 1962 war shattered these idealistic hopes and caused a reflective period 
of transition where India became convinced of the need for a military build­
up to a level commensurate w ith a more realistic assessment of its security
148 This graph, and the table below, are not to be viewed narrowly. There purpose is to assist 
in the development of a general understanding of the progression of India's external posture.
149 The concept was first formulated in the preamble to an agreement with China signed on 
4/29/54. They are 1.Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
2.Mutual non-aggression, 3.Mutual non-interfearence in each others internal affairs, 4. 
Equality and mutual benefit, 5. Peaceful coexistence. See Jawaharlal Nehru, from a speach in 
theLokSabha on9/17/55 as repreduced in India's Foreign Policy: Select Speeches, Sept. 1946- 
April 1961. Delhi: The Publications Division of the Government of India, 1961.
150 During the Second World War the British Indian Army had reached a strength of 2.7 
million and fought on behalf of the British in a number of different theatres of operations 
including North Africa, the Mid-East, the Far East and South Asia.
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needs. After the 1962 War, India has m oved from a position of reacting to 
potential threats, to a situation where it had the nascent capacity to project 
power and exert influence w ithin its immediate region.
In the second phase of grow th  of India's strategic posture, India 
moved from an emphasis on repelling an attack by Pakistan, to being able to 
simultaneously fight a two front war along the length of the Pakistani border 
and in the Himalaya against China. Having attained this capability by 1971 
and established a relationship w ith the Soviets through the Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, India was in a position 
to begin neutralizing threats to its security. An opportunity to do this was 
presented by events in 1971 which led to the bifurcation of Pakistan in the 
1971 W ar.151
The deployments in the later part of the 1980s into Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives, as well as the asymmetrical relationships with Nepal and Bhutan, 
bear out India’s capability and willingness to play a m ore prom inent role 
w ithin her imm ediate region. Further, the expansion of indigenous arms 
production capability, the qualitative build-up of naval and air assets, and 
the developm ent of the Agni missile, further dem onstrated the extended 
reach of India w ithin South Asia. India has been caught betw een both a 
s itua tion  of dom estic tu rm oil and confusion, and the fundam ental 
restructu ring  of the in ternational correlation of power. The shift to 
accommodate the new realities has been a difficult and contentious one as 
India's vacillating response to the Gulf W ar and the 1992 NAM sum m it 
indicates.
As here depicted, India's self-image has undergone a num ber of 
perm utations since 1947. Any attem pt to analyse the construction of images,
151 This conceptualization of India's security policy in having undergone these three phases 
has been covered effectively by Onkar Marwah and Raju Thomas in the following works. 
Onkar Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," in O. Marwah and J. Pollack eds. 
Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India and Japan, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980), Onkar Marwah, "National Security and Military Policy in India," in L. Ziring, 
ed. The Subcontinent in World Politics, (New York: Preager Publishers, 1982), Raju Thomas, 
"Defence Planning in India," in S. Newman, ed. Defence Planning in Less Industrialized States, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984) and Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986).
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w hether they be self-perceived or projected, involves an assessment of the 
cultural psychology which underlies the more transparent plane of political 
action. The major influences on Indian political culture are most basically 
d iv ided  into W estern and H indu .152 H indu  influences can further be 
subdiv ided  into Bramin and Kashatriya influences. Similarly there are 
idealist and realist aspects of the W estern idiom. These influences have led 
to two key political orientations within India which can be conceptualised as 
rea lis t and  id ea lis t e lem en ts.153 D u rin g  In d ia 's  e v o lu tio n  since 
independence these influences have had varying degrees of impact on the 
conduct of both internal and external politics.
Through this conceptual lens, three separate periods of grow th in 
India's external orientation are discernible. During these times India's 
international posture has expanded. Each of these periods has been preceded 
by a tim e of transition , during  w hich Ind ia 's political cu ltu re  and 
international paradigm  was altered to the extent that it had an effect on the 
way that country perceived its external environm ent. In the early 1990s, 
India has found itself once again in a period of reorientation and transition. 
This chronological interpretation suggests a trend from youthful idealism 
tow ard  a m ore pragm atic and self assertive realpolitik. The present 
transitional phase will most probably be followed by yet another period of 
grow th of India's external posture. The justification for this assertion will be 
discussed in following chapters. This evolving posture is in terp reted  
som ew hat subjectively and in tuitively  in the follow ing graph. The 
rem ainder of the Chapter will discuss these periods of growth and transition 
in India's external posture.
152 India has also been influenced by Persian-Moghul influences, though to a lesser extent.
153 See J. Bandyopadhyaya, India's Foreign Policy.
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A subjective interpretation of India's external posture
Emerging Posture
Junagadh, Hyderabad Kashmir 1947
Growth
Bandung Conference and NAM 1955
UN and the Congo 1960-4 
Goa 1961 
1962
War with Pakistan 1965
Indira Takes Charge 1969 
Bangladesh War 1 9 7 1
Nuclear Test 1974 
Sikkim 1975
Janata Rule 1977
Indira’s Return to power
Transition nKashmir and Siachen 1984
Brass Tacks, Somdormong Chu,
Sri lanka, A gni/ 1987
Maldives 1988 
Nepal Blockade ^ 9 3 9
Singh/Shekhar Transition 1990 
Rao 's Reforms 1991
Economic Recovery and 
Renewed Growth
Note: External posture is subjectively assessed as being made up of a multiplicity of factors. 
Posture implies the perception of India and as such is not quantifiable in objective terms. This 
subjective interpretation is based on, but not limited to, military capabilities, political 
leadership, relative power within the region, the larger geopolitical sphere, political 
cohesion and economic strength. These components will be treated in more detail in subsequent 
chapters.
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21.1 The first transition: The end of the Raj to 1949; and the birth of modern 
India
Independence was a period of monumental transition for the people 
of India. Consequently, India's international paradigm also changed. Prior 
to independence, the subcontinental external gaze was a construct of the Raj. 
With independence came the need to create a new world view. This was 
largely left to Jawaharlal Nehru. Against this background Nehru brought 
India out onto the world stage. He mixed both elements of idealism and 
realism.154 Under Nehru, India assumed a leadership role within the NAM, 
and clearly defined a place for itself among the nations of the world.
During the initial Nehru period the themes of the consolidation of 
the Indian state, Panchsheela, and the Non-Aligned Movement pervaded 
India's external policy. These themes served to project India onto the global 
arena in a new way. The 1962 war with China, the death of Nehru, and the 
1965 war with Pakistan, led to a lessening of the idealistic aspect of India's 
international policies and a sense of uncertainty and suspicion of the world 
environment. The collapse of the policy of Panchsheela and the Chinese 
invasion of 1962, left Jawaharlal Nehru a broken man. His world view, 
which was tantamount to India's, was crushed. Nehru himself must be seen 
as a pragmatic-idealist, as opposed to the more pure idealism of Mahatma 
Gandhi. During WWII, Mahatma Gandhi advocated the use of satyagraha 
against the Japanese. Since the time of Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, the 
influence of idealism in Indian politics has declined as compared with the 
pragmatic-realist view.
Having recently gained its own independence through a freedom 
struggle, India looked on national independence movements of Asia in a 
fraternal way. The Asian Relations Conference of March 1947, and the 
Conference on Indonesia in January of 1949, were intended to support anti 
colonial struggles in general, and the Indonesians fight against the Dutch in
154 The term realism is here used in the Indian context which would most easily, though 
somewhat simply, be identified with Chanakya as well as with a Western understanding of 
the term. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Select Speeches, Sept. 1946-April 1961, 
(Delhi: The Publications Division of the Government of India, 1961).
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particu lar. It is in this way that newly independen t India m ade its 
international debut. India readily identified with former colonial states. The 
phenom enon of the end of the colonial period coincided with the emergence 
of the cold war. This is w hat led India, and the other newly independent 
states, to adop t a th ird  a lternative in the form  of the N on A ligned 
M ovem ent.
The NAM was an idealistic organisation which India joined to further 
its own national interests in a world of two superpow er blocs. While the 
NAM was adopted as a means to prom ote the ends of Indian interests, its 
ideological appeal to India had the effect of reifying NAM as an end rather 
than as a means of policy. The process of transform ation of the NAM begun 
in Jakarta in 1992. This was in response of the m ovem ent’s need to try to 
adjust to the new realities of the post Cold War world. India’s changed role 
w ithin the new NAM is an example of the general progression of Indian 
policy from an idealist to a p ragm atist approach. N ehru  was also 
instrum ental in setting India's agenda w ith regard to the form er princely 
states.
A com parison of Ind ia ’s reactions to the events in H yderabad, 
Junagadh and Kashm ir in the im m ediate post-independence period is 
necessary to appreciate that Nehru's foreign policy was not entirely driven by 
idealism. Prior to independence there were 550 Princely states. All save 
Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir were either incorporated into Pakistan or 
persuaded to accede to India. In the case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the 
Nizam and Nawab were Muslim rulers of predom inantly H indu states. In 
the case of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh was a Hindu, Dogra, Rajput ruler 
of a population which at that time was three quarters Muslim. Today 
Kashm ir’s population is almost entirely Muslim.
According to the census of 1941, Hyderabad's population was some 16 
million. Of this number, 13 % were Muslims, 81 % were H indus and the 
rem ainder were of other denominations. The pre-independence Nizam was 
a descendant of the Governor, Asaf Jah, who ruled the territory under the
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suzerainty of Aurangazeb.155 The principles who constituted the ruling class 
were predom inantly Muslims.
At the Lahore session of the M uslim league of M arch 1940, Jinnah 
commented that "the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations 
separate hom elands by dividing India into autonom ous national states."156 
Among the six different proposals to come from the session was a proposal 
for the creation not of one or two separate Muslim states but for the creation 
of three. The three states were to be centred on the northw est Muslim areas, 
the Muslim dom inant portions of Bengal to the east of the subcontinent, and 
a southern Muslim state of Usmanistan.157 After m uch bloodshed the first 
two achieved independent statehood while the third was absorbed into 
India.
The fate of the Princely kingdoms of India was addressed by the stand­
still ag reem ent of N ovem ber 1947. D espite nego tia tions p rio r to 
independence, an accession agreement for Hyderabad had not been settled by 
15 August 1947. The Nizam stood by his assertion that w ith the removal of 
British control he was now sovereign of the land. Delhi had offered to allow 
him a degree of autonomy and the right to remain as Nizam, but he refused. 
A compromise was reached in the stand-still agreem ent that ratified the 
status quo for the period of a year. Under the agreement, signed by India and 
the Nizam, India was not allowed to station troops in H yderabad. During 
the period relations and negotiations betw een the Nizam 's delegation and 
India deteriorated over future sovereignty of the land. During 1948, India 
began an economic blockade of H yderabad. The Nizam  responded w ith 
threats that India's actions would provoke the uprising of the Muslim fifth 
column in India.
155 At independence the feudal structure was still largely intact, despite British colonial 
rule. Surrounding the Nizam were some 1,100 vassals who had four million tenants working 
their estates of some 26,000 square miles. Through his 50 % control of state enterprises, the 
Nizam was able to further patronise the Muslim community. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 
"Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy," in Omar Khalidi, Hyderabad: After the Fall, (Wichita: 
Hyderabad Historical Society, 1988), p. 3.
156 Jinnah as quoted in S. Wolpert, A Neui History of India, p. 330.
157 Usmanistan is a derivative of the family name of the Nizam of Hyderabad.
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On 15 June 1948, Delhi came forw ard w ith a new proposal for a 
plebiscite to determ ine the accession or independence of the state. The 
proposal came forward with the threat of military intervention if it was not 
agreed to. India intervened on 13 September 1948 in a "police" action code 
nam ed Operation Polo. In less than a week, two divisions of the Indian 
Army had occupied Hyderabad and suppressed any resistance. Thousands of 
Muslims were killed in retribution for the strong-arm tactics that Razakaris 
had used against the H indus during  their brief period of independence 
under the stand-still agreem ent.158 Following the action, N ehru  was 
resoundingly welcomed by the people of Hyderabad. This action was one of 
liberation  tha t had the effect of b ring ing  a m ore dem ocratic, less 
discrim inating form of governm ent and an a ttendan t red istribution  of 
wealth along more equitable lines.
The Indian government's call for a plebiscite as its source of legitimacy 
in the Hyderabad affair is inconsistent with the course of events in Kashmir. 
This dem onstrates N ehru 's w illingness to indulge in realpolitik  w hen 
confronted with an issue threatening the territorial integrity of India. The 
influence of realist politics is thereby dem onstra ted  even at In d ia ’s 
beginnings when the rhetoric of idealism was much stronger than it is today. 
The current social fabric is less reliant on the idealism of Gandhian thought 
than it was in the late 1940s. In this way G andhi's ponderings on the 
possible future role of power politics in India, as m entioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, were already being answered by 1948.
The situation in Junagadh unfolded in a similar m anner to that of 
H yderabad. Like the Nizam  of H yderabad, the Muslim Nawab ruled a 
predom inantly H indu populace. Unlike the Nizam, the Nawab, rather than 
proclaiming his independence, decided to accede to Pakistan on 15 August 
1947. Junagadh's position on the K athiaw ar peninsula, of present day 
Gujarat, was not so distant from Pakistan to rule out its decision to accede 
based on geographic factors alone. The decision of the N aw ab was 
overturned by an Indian liberation army.
158 Estimates, sourced with the Hyderabad Historical society, of the numbers of Muslims 
killed range from between 50,000 and 200,000. This is thought to be ten times the number of 
killings committed by the Razakaris. W. C. Smith, "Hyderabad," p. 20.
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In the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh, we observe India's assertion 
of the dem ocratic principle of self determ ination construed as being of 
sufficient importance to justify actions which ran counter to agreements and 
principles that India had entered into in the lead up to independence. These 
actions are indeed justifiable by democratic principles of self determ ination. 
In these two cases India could justify its actions both in term s of self 
determ ination and national interest. The im portance of the two incidents 
stems from the perspective which they provide on the moral component of 
the Indian claim on Kashmir. The interplay betw een the idealistic, moral 
com ponent and the more realist aspect of foreign and defence policy is 
dem onstrated through the juxtaposition of the cases.
On 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh, facing an advancing army of 
Pathan tribesmen, formally requested to accede to India. The following 
m orning, India flew in military support, thus beginning the first of three 
w ars betw een India and Pakistan. This unresolved territorial d ispute 
continues to threaten the unstable peace that exists betw een the two 
countries. The on-going discontent in Kashmir is discussed in greater detail 
in Appendix II.
21.2 T he first p eriod  o f grow th: 1949-62, N eh ru , M ahatm a G an d h i, 
Panchsheela, and the m ixed idealist/reaiist posture
Jawaharlal N ehru was one of the few individuals of any generation 
who was able to make a seminal contribution to their world. N ot only 
would his campaigns lead India to freedom from colonial oppression, but his 
econom ic and socio-political perspectives, and articu la tion  of India's 
international position in the non-aligned m ovem ent, w ould become one 
w ith India's identity.
N ehru 's origins were to influence his actions in later life. He was 
born to Motilal and Sw aruprani N ehru in Allabhad in 1889. He was a 
descendant of Kashmiri Brahmins who had some generations before moved 
to the south. Nehru's formative years were to have a lasting impact on his 
political outlook. His tutor, F.T. Brooks, was a member of the Fabian Society 
and a theosophist. Later as Prime Minister, N ehru was able to impose his 
view of state intervention as the means for attaining both social equity and
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econom ic grow th. While N ehru 's economic vision has unintentionally  
brought India to the verge of bankruptcy, his secular course for the country is 
still the only viable path which can accommodate India's diversity. Educated 
at H arrow  and Cambridge, Nehru interacted w ith international socialists in  
Europe on such occasions as the Brussels league against imperialism in 1927 
where he met among others. On his subsequent trip to Moscow, N ehru was 
exposed to European ideas while retaining his Indian roots.159
Fabian socialist views and an increasingly anti-colonialist position did 
not m ean that N ehru would be allowed to entirely break with his cultural 
traditions. The general marriage patterns in the Nehru household support a 
predom inantly secular approach.160 Regarding "religious com m unalism  as 
a cancer that needed to be erased from India," and thinking that "Hindu 
communalism as the Indian version of fascism,"161 N ehru was adam ant not 
to have a religious funeral. Despite his em phatic wishes, Indira gave him 
religious rites.
Mahatma Gandhi posed a threat to both the Westernised intelligentsia 
and the traditional H indu elites. His threat to H induism  extended to both 
the Brahman and the Kashatriya castes. M ahatm a Gandhi was a threat 
because through his synthesis of concepts draw n from both H induism  and 
the West, he sought to make India's periphery the centre of H indu politics. 
This was not in either the interest of the W esternised or the H indu elites. 
He sought to achieve a just transform ation of society by politicising the 
periphery7 of H indu society, its rural peasants and Harijans, while also
159 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography: With Musings on Recent Events in India, (London: 
John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1936), pp. 161-5.
160 Jawaharlal's sisters married outside the Kashmiri Brahmin fold. Two of Indira Gandhi's 
cousins married Muslims, while another married a Hungarian Jew. Indira herself married a 
Parsi though she did have a religious marriage ceremony.
161 The term "communalism" is laden with meanings. Gyanendra Pandey has identified the 
term as being "part of the colonialist knowledge." In this study the term is used as it is 
commonly in India. Pandey has defined the Indian usage of the term to refer "to a condition of 
suspicion, fear and hostility between members of different religious communities." The term is 
not thought of as limited to use in South Asia in the authors view. It is also some times used in 
reference in the context of ethnic communities as well religious. Gyanendra Pandey, The 
Construction of Comunalism in North India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992),p. 6. The 
quote is drawn from Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty: The Story of the Nehru-Gandhi Family,  
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1985), p. 108.
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seeking to deintellectualise politics. This threat pu t M ahatm a G andhi’s 
interests in opposition to the elites once the binding goal of independence 
from British colonial rule had been lifted. Of the two centres of power, 
Gandhi's views posed a greater threat to the traditional H indu elites. While 
the periphery were being mobilised against imperialism , they were also 
becoming politically active to the extent that their new-found power of mass 
action had  given them  a degree of self-aw areness that threatened  to 
"remould the entire cultural stratarchy within Hinduism."162
On 30 January 1948, Nathuram  Vinayak Godse shot Mahatma Gandhi 
dead while he was on his way to pray. Godse was part of a conspiracy that 
perceived the threat which Gandhi posed to their traditional value structure. 
Godse was a member of the Chitpavans, who, through the combination of 
B rahm in p rerogatives w ith the m artial trad itions of the Kashatriyas, 
represented a synthesis of the two dominate castes of H indu society. These 
M aharashtrian  Brahmins also had a long history of struggle against the 
Muslim overlords of H indu India.
[B]y the beginning of the tw entieth century, the M aharashtrian 
Brahmins had reinterpreted their history in terms of the needs of 
H indu nationalism. They saw themselves as the upholders of a 
tradition of H indu resistance against the Muslim occupation of 
India.163
By emphasising Ahimsa, Gandhi w ent against the m artial values of 
the Kashatriyas, and due to their unique history, the Chitpavans. This 
them e has also been discussed by the influential Indian dip lom at and 
geopolitical thinker, K.M. Panikkar:164
O ur vision has been obscured by an un-Ind ian  wave of 
pacifism. Ahimsa  is no doubt a great religious creed, but that is 
a creed which India rejected w hen she refused to follow
162 Ashis Nandy, At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture, (Bombay: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), p. 72
163 Ashis Nandy, At the Edge of Psychology, p. 77
164 K.M. Panikkar was India's Ambassador to China, Egypt and France during the period 1948 
to 1959. Many aspects of his policy recommendations seem to be taken seriously by elements 
within the decision-making elite in Delhi. One suggestion, which was not pursued, was his 
recommendation that India create an independant Tibetan state during the Chinese civil war. 
See Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1986), p. 11.
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Gautama Buddha. The H indu theory at all times, especially in 
the periods of Ind ia’s historic greatness was one of active 
assertion of rights, if necessary through force of arm s .165
Godse was a member of the H indu M ahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayam 
Sevak Sangh. These groups sought to articulate a H indu revival based on 
values which emphasised the Kashatriya traditions. Because he felt that the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSSS) was not sufficiently militant, Godse 
broke away to form his own organisation, the H indu Rashtra Dal. The Dal 
sought to make H induism  pow erfu l th rough  the renunciation  of the 
synthetic and accom m odating aspects of the religion, in favour of an 
organised and ideologically closed religion, oriented for self preservation and 
defence.
The religious and ideological background of M ahatm a G andhi's 
assassin is important for exposing the limits of the freedom struggles' appeal 
to more traditional Indian elites. It also dem onstrates the presence of the 
realist element in the Indian political milieu, though during this phase it 
was subordinate to the idealists, as represented by M ahatma Gandhi and to a 
lesser extent Jawaharlal Nehru. While the M ahatm a synthesized elements 
of H induism  and C hristianity to revolutionise politics in India, N ehru 
brought W estern secular values to bear. Both ran counter to the basically 
conservative nature of traditional H induism , and have encountered stiff 
opposition because of that.
The extent to w hich the governm ent felt th reatened  by these 
conservative values, even at the peak of India's idealism in the im m ediate 
post-independence phase, is m arked by the suppression of the comments 
made by Godse at his trial. These were not made public at the time for fear 
that they would inflame the communal situation and lead to sympathy for 
the cause of Godse.
I felt that the Indian politics in the absence of Gandhiji would 
surely be practical, able to retaliate, and would be powerful with 
the arm ed forces... People may even call me and dub me as 
devoid of any sense or foolish, but the nation would be free to
165 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 16.
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follow the course founded on reason which I consider to be
necessary for sound nation building.166
This perception that the idealism  of the freedom  struggle is no longer 
suitable for the establishm ent of a strong H indu India has come to the 
forefront of contemporary Indian politics in the 1990s. In this way, Godse’s 
trial speech foreshadows the decline of the idealism of Gandhi and Nehru, 
and the rise of the realpolitik of H indu fundamentalism. As this cycle turns, 
so too may it in time return to a more tolerant incarnation of the state.
The idealistic values of Gandhi and N ehru have slowly been eroded 
by the course of Indian history since independence. This erosion is a 
consequence of a gradual reassertion of traditional H indu values as they 
have come to be reinterpreted in such a way as to emphasise the Kashatriya 
aspect. This can be view ed as a reaction to the m ore to leran t and 
accommodating aspects of the Brahman tradition which Gandhi synthesized 
into his message. These internal social and political processes have had a 
direct effect on the way in w hich India has engaged its in ternational 
environm ent. The political culture which stems from the larger culture is 
directly linked to the form ulation of external relations. This is effected 
th rough  the perceptions of the elites w ho occupy the decision-m aking 
structure  as well as by the general political milieu that influences the 
political process in a less direct sense.
Ind ian  foreign policy tow ards China began w ith  the idealistic 
principles of Panchsheela, and concluded with the perception of the necessity 
of a realpolitik approach. India militarily occupied Ladakh in 1948. This, 
and rivalry over Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and Tibet, threatened China, who 
responded with the annexation of Tibet in the late 1950s out of fear for its 
lines of com m unication w ith  its w estern province of Sinkiang. China 
accused India of supporting the Khampa rebels from a base at Kalimpong in 
India.167 After the suppression of the rebellion, the Dalai Lama was given
166Ashis Nandy, At the Edge of Psychology, p. 83
167 Noor Hussein, "India's Regional Policy: Strategic and Security Dimensions," in Stephen 
Cohen, The Security of South Asia, pp. 37-40.
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refuge in India.168 This support has now turned full circle with India being 
careful not to be perceived by China as supporting the Tibetan's cause.
India's m anner of dealing w ith China over both the outstanding 
border dispute and the issue of Tibet was a turning point of Indian foreign 
policy. Having tried the policy of Panchsheela to no avail India increasingly 
turned to more realpolitik approaches. With defeat in 1962 came the more 
pragmatic conclusion that idealism needed to be supported by the force of 
arms.
It is unlikely  tha t Ind ia  w as igno ran t of the CIA's and the 
Kuomintang's India-based support for the Khampa rebels.169 During his 
visit to Delhi in November of 1956, Chou En-lai complained to Nehru that 
the Tibetan resistance was receiving support from  abroad through the 
Tibetan community relocated in Kalimpong, that they were led by the Dalai 
Lama's brother.170 Nehru felt obliged in a statement before the Rajya Sabha 
in 1959 to dismiss accusations that the Tibetans and Khampas were operating 
out of Kalimpong and Mussorie on Indian territory.171 While India may not 
have wished to be associated with the rebels (as it was promoting the policy 
of Panchsheela), this decision was the idealist component of a dual track 
policy of dealing with China. With the shift to the forward policy, support 
for the Kham pas may have been initiated  at a higher level of Indian 
involvement. In this, India would have been joining the CIA, KGB and the
168 See "Prime Minister's Statement on the Situation in Tibet 4/27/59." in Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, The Chinese Threat, (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1964), 
p.75. This is also an excellent source for Indian maps of the Sino-Indian border.
169 "Topay Pangdatshang began to smuggle recruits for training out of Tibet, [sometime after 
1955] These recruits would mix up with smuggler caravans, proceed to Gauhati, and on to 
Calcutta from where CIA or KMT chartered civilian airplanes would slip them out under the 
very noses of Indian intelligence." The rebellion spanned the years 1955 to 1974. IDR Research 
Team, "The Tibetan Rebellion," Indian Defence Review, July, 1988, p. 70.
170 Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, (Calcutta: Minerva Publications, 1977), 
pp. 140-43.
171 "Of course we are charged with as having connived at Kalimpong; of Kalimpong being the 
commanding centre -this is the word they used, I think- of this rebellion in Tibet .... I know 
words have lost their meaning because I find it very difficult to deal with these charges." J. 
Nehru, "The Prime Minister’s Statement Before the Rajya Sabha on the Situation in Tibet, 
May 4th 1959,” as reprinted in External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, 
Prime Minister on Sino-lndian Relations, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, statements 
from the period March 1959 to April 1961), p. 43.
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K uom intang.172 Michael Pissels is of the opinion that Indian support began 
after the 1962 war. It is likely that India was giving at least the minimum 
support of the use of their territory from an earlier date.173
By following the details of Indian position on Tibet and the border, we 
can see the gradual developm ent of the decision to abandon the policy of 
Panchsheela in favour of the more realpolitik practices of the forward policy. 
In this, the post 1962 m etam orphosis was presaged by events beginning in 
the late 1950s. Since this period the idealism of Panchsheela was focussed on 
the N on-A ligned M ovem ent. D espite this em phasis on NAM, Indian  
foreign policy is increasingly realist in character and less idealist inspired.
The importance of the above review of the Sino-Indian relationship is 
not to condemn India for its position on the border, or for its support of the 
Tibetans, bu t to dem onstrate that India was not adverse to shifting its 
international paradigm  by retu rn ing  to the geopolitical intrigues that it 
inherited from the Raj. This it did in response to a threat to its territorial 
integrity. Tibet would, in all likelihood, have found a larger degree of 
autonom y under Indian rule than  it has under the Chinese. Despite 
articulating the policy of Panchsheela in 1954, India was wary of China's 
influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The com m unist take-over of Tibet 
made this evident to India in 1950. China's "conciliatory approach towards 
W estern-aligned Pakistan" at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 
made India more suspicious of China's m otives.174 A further example of 
India's assertive realist approach is that of Goa.
In December of 1961, Indian forces incorporated the former Portuguese 
Colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu w ithin Indian territory. This action ended
172 V. Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, (London: Jonathan Cape 
Publishers, 1974), pp. 116,146 and Michael Pissels, The Cavaliers of Kham: The Secret War in 
Tibet, (London: Heinaman Publishers, 1972), p. 234. Pissels states that by 1966 Khampa exiles 
were ' being openly recruited and incorporated into special Indian brigades armed in part by 
Russia." p. 234. See also Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, p. 104.
173 Michael Pissels, The Cavaliers of Kham:, pp. 200-1. For further information on the 
rebellion which led to the death of 1.2 million Tibetans see George Patterson, Requiem for 
Tibet, (London: Arum Press, 1990) and George Patterson, Tibet in Revolt, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1960).
174 For a copy of the Text of the Asian-African Conference Final Communique see Foreign 
Policy of India: Text of Documents, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1959), p.173.
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almost 500 years of Potuguese presence in India. Goa is similarly important 
to demonstrate the existence of the realist political side of Indian politics, 
even in its early idealistic phase. In a letter to Nehru of 14 December 1961 
President Kennedy strongly appealed to Prime Minister Nehru to refrain 
from the use of force as a means to resolve the dispute. Ambassador 
Galbraith called on the foreign secretary numerous times in the lead-up to 
the action of 17 December, seeking to persuade India from resorting to force 
as a means of resolution. The United States promised to help India by 
organising pressure against Portugal to give up the colonies on the 
subcontinent. Nehru proceeded with the knowledge that the military action 
would tarnish India's image. Through the action, India asserted the 
legitimation of the means by reference to the ends of the elimination of 
colonialism in India. This pragmatic approach ran counter to the idealist 
strain as handed down by the Mahatma. In the following remark by Nehru 
we can see his awareness of both elements of foreign policy:
I hope there is nothing immoral about the part I have played in 
our foreign policy. In any case, I want no moralizing, especially 
about this. We should use our good sense as much as possible. 
Idealism alone will not do. What exactly is idealism? Surely it is 
not something so insubstantial as to elude one’s grasp! Idealism is 
the realism of tomorrow...The practical person, the realist, looks at 
the tip of his nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is 
stumbling all the time.175
The 1962 war with China brought these conflicting visions into focus. A 
more realist outlook was to be the result of the second period of transition.
21.3 The second transition: 1962 to 1969; the 1962 and 1965 border wars with 
China and Pakistan, introspective transition, and the metamorphosis of 
India's self-image
Prior to the 1962 border war, India had, by pursuing the policy of 
Panchsheela, avoided significant defence expenditure. During this period, 
India was not spending sufficiently on defence to support its international 
position. To bring defence in line with India’s desired posture, military
175 Jawaharlal Nehru, from a reply to debate in the Parliament 12/7/50 as repreduced in 
India's Foreign Policy: Select Speeches, Sept. 1946-April 1961. (Delhi: The Publications 
Division of the Government of India, 1961).
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expenditure grew  by a significant 133% from  1960 to 1965.176 Once 
established, the trend in increasing defence expenditure has been generally 
continued.
To a large extent, the failure of Indian diplomacy over the Chinese 
frontier was due to the sycophantic character of the decision m aking 
structure. This in itself, as Richard N ed Lebow has pointed out, is not 
enough to fully explain the reasons for India's inability to read the signals 
China was sending India over its decision to pursue a forward policy on the 
border question.177 The excessive optim ism  of N ehru and the Indian 
decision-making elite, was m ade possible by their self-perceived image of 
India having a special relationship with the Chinese. Through Panchsheela 
India perceived itself as the embodim ent of a new morality of politics based 
on the U panishadic value of Ahimsa as m anifested th rough  G andhian 
Satyagraha and N ehruvian  non-alignm ent. This self-im age of m oral 
rectitude was responsible for India's indulgence in dangerous levels of 
wishful thinking vis a vis China, which culm inated in its defeat in the 
Himalayas. The disillusionm ent that ensued as a result of the 1962 war 
began a process of transformation, both of India's image of itself and how it 
perceived the external environm ent. This transform ation  was to de- 
emphasize idealist conceptions of foreign policy in favour of realist ones. 
These images and perceptions are still evolving.
The circum stances of Indian  involvem ent in Tibet influenced the 
Chinese decision to attack in 1962. Despite the long and convoluted history 
of the border between the British Raj, Tibet and China, the new communist 
regime of China began the process of integrating Tibet into its national 
territory when they m arched into Tibet on 7 October 1950 and defeated the
176 G.L.Wood, "Civil Military Relations in Post Colonial India," p. 274.
177 R.N. Lebow attributes the cognitive closure among Indian strategic planners, which led to 
the 1962 debacle, to three interrelated causal factors. Lebow interprets the politicisation of 
the decision making bureaucracy, the wishful thinking on the part of Nehru and the decision 
making elite and the national self image of India as all combining to form a perceptual 
distortion which lead to the misinterpretation of the Chinese reaction to the forward policy. 
Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 222-8
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small Tibetan army at Chambo.178 With this, the Tibetan government 
collapsed.
Despite Zhou Enlai's visit, and the signing of a Sino-Indian 
Agreement on Tibet in April of 1954,179 which recognised Tibet as part of 
China, tensions continued to mount. After the meeting, Zhou Enlai stated, 
"the talks did not result in resolving the differences that had arisen."180 
China began border incursions into Indian claimed territory in July and 
August of 1954. Communist reforms subsequently led the Tibetans to revolt 
in 1956. The Gartok to Yarkand road was begun at approximately the same 
time. The positive atmospherics of the Zhou Enlai visit did not prevent the 
Chinese from pursuing a strong position on the ground. This is to be 
remembered when considering the positive atmosphere that started to 
develop between the two countries after 1987.
In July of 1958, the Chinese made another incursion into Ladakh at 
Khumak, where they arrested an Indian patrol. In August and October of 
1959, Chinese troops opened fire on Indian patrols near the Longju in the 
NEFA, and at the Kongan Pass, killing nine. By 1959, the revolt peaked with 
the shelling of the Potala palace in Llasa, and the departure of the Dalai Lama 
and 14,000 of his followers to India. On 22 April 1959, the Chinese Peoples 
Daily accused the Indian Government of expansionist ambitions, and of 
being responsible for the rebellion in Tibet.181 The Nehru-Chou En Lai 
summit of 1960 failed to resolve the issue.
This then led India to adopt the forward policy. By mid-1962, India 
had established over forty new border posts in Ladakh. By July, the clashes 
started to build to the massive Chinese attacks on 20 October. Nehru then 
appealed to the United States and Britain for assistance, and the Chinese 
announced their unilateral withdrawal. Poor relations continued for some 
time after this.
178 Jamyang Norbu, The Warriors of Tibet: The Story of Aten and the Khampas Fight, 
(Dharamsala: Central Tibetan Secretariat, 1979), p. 80.
179 The Lok Sabha Secretariat, "Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet," in Foreign Policy of India: 
Text of Documents, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1959), p. 101.
180 G.P. Deshpande, "China, An Unfriendly Neighbour," World Focus, Nov./Dec. 1987, p. 65.
181 A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 127.
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In 1979 External Affairs M inister Vajpayee was in Beijing discussing 
China's support for the Naga and Mizo insurgents182 w hen China launched 
a border w ar against Vietnam. The parallel w ith 1962, and the timing, 
indicate that it was also m eant as a message to India. Evidence of India's 
return to the forward policy on the border began in 1984/5 with Intelligence 
Bureau patrols up to the border areas.183 In 1987, tensions once again 
m ounted to high levels.184 Over 400,000 troops were mobilised by India and 
China in the Sum dorong Chu area of Arunachal Pradesh and across the 
border in Tibet. Tensions were apparently  abated by the visit of Rajiv 
Gandhi to Beijing in 1988.185 This confidence was reassured by Chinese 
Premier Li Peng's visit to Delhi in December of 1991,186 and Indian Defence 
Minister Pawar's visit to Peking in July of 1992.
Such a treatment of the progression of the border dispute provides the 
historical context of Indo-Chinese relations. India's support for the Dalai 
Lama was interpreted as a challenge to China's claims on Tibet. To China 
India’s involvement was an expansionist move. The border war was meant 
to send India the message not to seek to extend its influence into China's 
sphere of influence.
The 1962 border w ar w ith  China was a consequence of Indian 
m isperceptions of how  China w ould  react to its advances. These 
m isperceptions stem m ed from a decision-m aking process w hich led to 
intelligence inpu ts w hich reinforced the percep tions of the political 
leadership, irrespective of independent accounts of events as they transpired. 
This tendency was a direct result of the politician’s concern that the military 
be under firm  political control. These percep tual d istortions, w hen
182 A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 618.
183 Ravi Rikhye, The Militarisation of Mother India, (New Delhi: Chanakya Publishers, 
1990), p. 17.
184 Manoj Joshi, "Quiet Activity on Border," The Hindu, 5/26/87, and Mohan Malik, 'Tensions 
Reduced but Settlement distant," The Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1988, pp. 28,30.
185 Since the visit India has removed three of its eleven mountain divisions from the border 
area. Reportedly China has reciprocated. Dilip Mukerjee, "India After the Cold War,” The 
Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 19.
186 This was the first visit since that of Chou En Lai in 1960. Christopher Thomas, "Li's Delhi 
Visit First in 31 Years," The Sydney Morning H erald ,\\/27/91.
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com bined w ith  unrealistic  political objectives, triggered  the Chinese 
response.
In I960, Nehru and his advisers decided to adopt a forward policy on  
the Indo-Chinese border. The first attem pts to implement this policy in 1961 
were resisted by elements w ithin the military. The most outspoken critics 
were replaced by "men who lacked the courage to oppose N ehru’s foolhardy 
policy."187 This situation was created by the rise of Brij M ohan Kaul, a 
favourite of N ehru and Krishna Mennon, to the Chief of General Staff. Kaul 
surrounded himself w ith sycophants, and underm ined those who did not 
support his policies. By so doing, the potential for intelligence feedback, 
which would have opened the possibility for the decision makers to re­
evaluate their policy as it began to founder, did not arise. Outnum bered, and 
operating at as far forward a position as possible, the soldiers of N ehru 's 
forward policy became something more than a Satyagraha and som ething 
less than a military manoeuvre.
Ind ia’s experience in the 1965 w ar w ith  Pakistan also served to 
reinforce the perceived utility of an expanded military. As India expanded 
its military Pakistan feared that a w indow  of opportunity  for confronting 
India would be closing. After a period of rising tension in the Rann of Kutch 
fighting erupted in Kashmir. The result of the war was to teach Pakistan the 
limits of its position with India.
The parameters of debate over the national identity have shifted away 
from the idealistic notions which were dom inant prior to the 1962 war. 
India's pre-1962 mantle of sanctimony, based on its moral principles of non­
violence and non-alignment, have been tarnished by the wars of 1962, 1965 
and 1971, the on-going internal comm unalist violence, m ercenary politics, 
military alliance and intervention, and the corruption of its leaders. Though 
1962 was a resounding defeat for India, it d id serve as a catalyst for the 
im plem entation of reform s and program m es w hich have subsequently 
strengthened the Indian state. The intelligence disaster precipitated reviews 
of intelligence gathering, w hich began the process of reorganisation of
187 R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 166
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intelligence collection, processing and analysis. While these reforms have 
not substantially changed the subordination of the m ilitary to political 
control, they have become cognisant of the need to effectively gather and 
analyse intelligence on an increasingly expanded basis. The creation and 
expansion of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) activities has, w ith 
mixed results, sought to address India’s past intelligence failures. The speed 
w ith  w hich Panchsheela collapsed highlighted the necessity of backing 
diplom atic initiatives w ith military strength.
21.4 The second period of growth: 1969 to 1977, Indira, the 1971 Bangladesh 
war and the new regionalism
The uncertainty of the late-1960s gave way to a second phase of 
ex ternal engagem ent. The rise of Ind ira  G andhi in 1969, and the 
implementation of the Indira doctrine in South Asia, led India to assert itself 
w ithin its imm ediate region. The 1971 w ar w ith Pakistan over Bangladesh 
established India's predominance in the region. The absorption of Sikkim in  
1974-76, like Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa before, can be viewed as part of 
the drive to establish India's territorial integrity in the subcontinent. The 
dom estic turm oil following the em ergency of 1975, and the subsequent 
Janata rule, from 1977 to 1979, created a transitional period betw een the 
reg iona lism  of the 1970s and In d ia 's  flirta tion  w ith  extra-regional 
expansionism under Indira, and later under Rajiv after her death.
Following on from  her defeat of the Syndicate in 1971, Indira's 
m andate from the people gave her the confidence necessary to deal w ith 
events in Bangladesh in a bold fashion. Fifteen days after the March 1971 
election results were tallied, the new Congress Government was tested by 
events unfolding in East Pakistan. Congress gained 352, of 518 seats, in that 
election. Indira's electoral success was based on her cam paign of Gharibi 
Hatao (remove poverty). There was fear that the Communists might gain 
the upper hand over the Awami League in East Pakistan, and that as a result, 
W est Bengal w ould be d raw n  away from  Ind ia  by the prospect of 
reunification of Bengal.188 While Indira had m ade substantial gains in the
188 R. Sisson and L. Rose, War and Secession, p. 179.
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elections, so too had the Com m unist Party of India (Marxist). They had 
increased their representation in Parliament from 19 to 25 seats.
With her electoral m andate Indira actively engaged the situation, and 
turned this minor potential threat into an opportunity to deal w ith Pakistan 
conclusively. Indira first sought to secure international support for her plan 
by traveling abroad. During Indira's visit to the Soviet Union in September, 
she was successful in gaining Soviet guarantees for her proposed line of 
action. The necessary prerequisite support Indira found in the 1971 Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. This ensured a counter to any 
m oves tha t China or the U nited States w ould m ake against Ind ia ’s 
in itia tive.189 The Soviets vetoed three cease fire m otions in the security 
council. The Soviets assured India that an attack by the Chinese would be 
diverted by a Soviet action in Xinjiang. Reportedly, the Soviet Ambassador 
in N epal to ld  the C hinese A m bassador th a t any action  w ould  be 
countered.190
After the fall of Dacca, and the collapse of Pakistani resistance in East 
Pakistan, Indira called an emergency meeting of Cabinet. Reportedly, Indira 
describes the sentiment of the Cabinet Ministers as insisting "that the war be 
fought to a finish [and that India should proceed to] crush the enemy 
permanently." This view was echoed by the military high command, where 
they "choked and spluttered" at the idea of having to halt their plans for the 
total defeat of Pakistan.191 The reason for her hesitance in the face of 
overwhelming support of her Cabinet and military high command, and her 
own desires to carry the w ar to a conclusive victory, are most plausibly 
explained by limits to the Soviet guarantee. American President Nixon and 
Secretary of State Kissinger had used the cancelling of arms negotiations as a
189 According to Henry Kissinger, Indira had aimed at the liberation of Azad Kashmir and 
the destruction of the West Pakistan State and that the Soviets had promised to take 
appropriate counter action to any Chinese "sabre rattling." Henry Kissenger, White House 
Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1979), p. 901.
190 Jack Anderson, The Anderson Papers, (New York: Random House, 1973) as referenced in 
Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), p. 37. During the Great Game Russia had been involved in numerous 
attempts to annex Kashgaria and other parts of Xinkiang.
191 The above two quotes by Indira Gandhi were drawn from an interview with Tariq Ali in 
January of 1984. T.Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 175.
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means of convincing the Soviets to exert pressure on the Indians to stop 
their plans of invasion of West Pakistan.192
This brinkmanship, further developed with the sailing of the United 
States Enterprise Carrier Battle Group into the Bay of Bengal, forced the 
Soviets to modify their support, which Indira thought she had secured. As a 
result India had to back down from designs on Azad Kashmir and the West 
of Pakistan. Unbeknownst to the Soviets, or the Indians for that matter, 
Pakistan was at that time of extreme importance to the United States because 
of its role in the Nixon initiative to open a dialogue with China. "Pakistan 
was our only channel to China; we had no other means of communicating 
with Peking."193 India's hesitation before Lahore marked a halt to 
significant military advances and plans to carry the war with Pakistan to a 
final conclusion. Indira's decision not to carry on the fight to a conclusive 
victory in West Pakistan would seem to have been made in reaction to the 
Soviet guarantee having been redefined, and limited to, support of Indian 
moves in the East as a result of American protestations of further attacks 
against West Pakistan.
American support for Pakistan’s continued existence was intimately 
involved with the global geopolitical correlation of power. In 1971, the 
United States was in the process of trying to disengage from the Vietnam 
War. As such it was necessary to prevent the appearance that American 
security guarantees had been irrevocably undermined by the Vietnam 
experience. At the same time, Pakistan was serving as the back channel for 
playing the China option.
On 23 November 1971, General Yahya Khan informed Washington 
that the Indian military had gained the upper hand in East Pakistan. It was 
on the same day that Kissinger had his first secret meeting with the Chinese 
permanent representative to the United Nations, Huang Hua in New York.
192 J. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 300.
193 The channel to China had been opened, after signals in the media, by President Nixon 
through President Yahya Khan whom he met in Washington on October 25th, and by Chou En- 
lai who similarly conveyed a desire to open communication through a message which he 
entrusted to President Khan while he was visiting Peking between November 10th and the 
15th of 1970. H. Kissenger, White HouseYears, pp. 699-701, 913.
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K issinger w as concerned to re-establish  A m erica's credentials as an 
international power.
We strove to preserve West  Pakistan as an independent state, 
since we judged  India 's real aim  w as to encom pass its 
disintegration. We sought to prevent a dem onstration that 
Soviet arms and diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in 
crises.194
To have allowed India to destroy Pakistan w ould have m arked a further 
significant blow to America's international geopolitical situation. In this 
way the Bay of Bengal incident, from the American perspective at the time, 
is best understood as being ultimately aimed at sending the USSR a signal of 
American resolve, as opposed to a move specifically designed to underm ine 
In d ia 's  position . This hypothesis is su p p o rted  by the subsequent 
im provem ent of relations between the United States and India in the wake 
of Soviet w ithdraw al from Afghanistan and the subcontinent. The victory 
over Pakistan earned Indira the image of Durga, the H indu goddess of war. 
Indira, however, was to have more difficulty in raising her image to that of a 
deity with regards to domestic issues.
Indira's success in centralizing policy m aking under her personal 
control leads us to focus on Indira, and the office of the Prime Minister and 
cabinet, as we seek to understand India. Indira's psychological profile was 
such that she sought power "primarily as an instrum ent in the service of 
self-defined national goal attainm ent w hich w ould satisfy ultim ately her 
need for esteem and self-fulfillm ent."195 Indira's need to assert herself to 
sustain her self esteem helps explain the perception of India as a status­
seeking power. Indira was not guided by a firm ideological conviction as was 
her father.
194 H. Kissenger, White House Years, pp. 886-7.
195 Y. Malik, "Indira Gandhi: Personality, Political Power and Party Politics," in Y. Malik 
and D. Vajpeyi India: The Years of Indira Gandhi, p. 9. It is of interest that Indira Gandhi's 
role model early in life was Joan of Arc.
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India 's national in terest is w ith  independen t decision­
making in international affairs, economic developm ent at 
home, and the exclusion of India and its neighbourhood in  
sou thern  Asia and the Ind ian  O cean from  either the 
American or the Soviet sphere of influence.196
The decline of Indira's popularity, her imposition of emergency rule, 
and the excesses of her heir apparent, Sanjay Gandhi, all led to her electoral 
defeat by the Janata coalition. This domestic change had implications for 
India's external posture. The internal turm oil and transition weakened 
India's external position. Once the Janata governm ent was in pow er it 
sought to reinterpret the direction of Indian foreign policy as articulated by 
Indira.
21.5 The third transition: 1977 to 1980, the Janata Government
The Janata Government was a creation of the leading non-com m unist 
opposition parties. They joined forces in the wake of The Emergency, 
together with, defectors from the Congress Party, to oust Congress and Indira 
Gandhi from office. This alliance was one of convenience for the mutually 
shared goal of ousting Indira. Its ideology, borrowed from Charan Singh and 
the Socialists, was to include self sufficiency, agrarian values and small scale 
industry, in addition to the agenda of the restoration of the civil liberties 
which had been suspended. O ther than the binding objective of gaining 
office, there was little that stood to keep these divergent parties bound to one 
ano ther after they were successful in rem oving Indira. The infighting 
betw een Charan Singh and Morarji Desai, over the Prime M inister's chair, 
eventually broke the coalition in July of 1979. At that point, Charan Singh of 
the Lok Dal, a Jat from U ttar Pradesh, who represented the backward and 
m iddle peasant proprietor castes, replaced Morarji Desai for three weeks to 
becom e India's fifth Prime M inister before elections w ere called. The 
elections led to the return of Indira as Prime Minister in 1980.
196 Surjit Mansingh, "India and the Superpowers: 1966-84," in Y. Malik and D. Vajpeyi, India: 
The Years of Indira Gandhi, p. 133.
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While the departures of Janata rule are significant enough to warrant 
conceptualizing the period as one of transition, these departures were not 
radical departures from the overall consensus of foreign policy, they were 
adjustments. Morarji Desai, a Gujarati Brahmin, who was unanimously 
elected to lead the Janata coalition government, was himself a "product of 
the Congress culture."197 He held the finance portfolio, and was Deputy 
Prime Minister under Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Indira had jailed Desai for 
his opposition to her policies during the emergency. In domestic and 
international politics, the era of Janata rule was inspired by a view that India 
needed to be put back on track. On the domestic scene, this involved a 
return to civil liberties and press freedom, while on the international scene, 
it was to entail a return to "true non-alignment."
It was felt by the Janata coalition that India, under Indira, had drifted 
too far into the Soviet camp under the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation, signed in August of 1971. The Soviets had 
made their preference clear in the run-up to the elections, as Izvestia had 
labeled the Janata coalition as "a reactionary conglomeration supported by 
the imperialists."198 Once in office, Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee sought 
to reassure the apprehensive Soviets. What the new government was 
seeking was a policy that would allow them to be both close with the Soviets 
without being prevented from equally establishing contacts with the West. 
To reassure the Soviets of this, Desai travelled to the Soviet Union in 
October of 1977. This was followed by the meeting of the fourth session of 
the Indo-Soviet Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical 
Cooperation, headed by Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee and Deputy Prime 
Minister Arkhipov, which concluded a long term cooperative agreement.199
There was a sense of optimism surrounding the return to "true non- 
alignment" with regard to relations with the West, in part because it was felt 
that the administration of President Jimmy Carter, with its emphasis on
197 Craig Baxter, Y. K. Malik, C. H. Kennedy and R. C. Orberst, Government and Politics in 
South Asia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).
198 izvestia as quoted in A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 
(New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985), p. 603.
199 A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 604.
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hum an rights, would be sympathetic to the needs of India. The visit to India 
of Deputy Secretary of State, W arren Christopher, in July of 1977, and the 
return  visit by Foreign Minister Vajpayee to W ashington in September of 
that year set the stage for improved relations. During President Carter's visit 
to India in January of 1978, some im provem ents to the relationship were 
m ade by the Indo-US joint Commission. The C arter visit was in tu rn  
followed by Desai's visit to W ashington in June of 1978. As a result, United 
States (US) assistance, which had been suspended during the 1971 war, was 
resum ed. Despite these gains, Am erican concern rem ained over India's 
nuclear programme. The issue centred on the supply of enriched u ran iu m  
to the Tarapur reactor which the Desai governm ent saw the US as having 
committed to supplying regardless of the provisions of the US Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1978.
In relation to states closer to home, there was a genuine effort by the 
Janata Government to come to term s on a more equitable basis than had 
been the case under Indira’s Congress Government. This A. Appadorai has 
labeled the "Good Neighbour Policy." "Thus, even at the cost of seeming 
conciliatory or even if at times at some ’loss’ to India, outstanding problems 
w ith  neighbouring  countries w ere m utually  resolved."200 The Indo- 
Bangladesh agreement, on the sharing of the waters of the Ganga river at 
Farakka signed in Dacca in Novem ber of 1977, as well as the April 1978 
agreement with Pakistan on the Salal hydro-electric plant, and the policy of 
non-interference, are examples of the Good Neighbour Policy.201
The Janata Governm ent's overtures to the Chinese did not fare as 
well as others. While Foreign M inister Vajpayee had gone to China in the 
hope of resolving lingering border disputes betw een the two countries, 
China decided to use his visit to send a message. The visit coincided with its 
punitive border war with Vietnam in 1979. On 18 February, Desai expressed 
his shock over the Chinese invasion while Vajpayee was still in China. The 
parallel with 1962 could not have been unintended. The Chinese action in
200 A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 610.
201 Statement of A. B. Vajpayee before the Lok Sabha in the Foreign Affairs Record, July 5 
1977, p. 130.
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Vietnam indicates, as A. Appadorai observed, that China did not accept the 
Janata government's independence from the Soviet sphere. It was a further 
demonstration of China's determination to resist what it saw as its 
geopolitical encirclement by the Soviet Union and its allies. During these 
talks, India had raised its concerns with China over the construction of the 
Karakorum highway. This, along with Chinese support for Northeast 
insurgents and continuing occupation of the Aksai Chin area against the 
protests of India, made China's motives in the region suspect.202
Charan Singh was ambitious to become Prime Minister. He felt that 
he had been cheated of the position by the selection of Morarji Desai by 
unanimous vote at the insistence of Jaya Prakash Narayan. This eventually 
led to his defection along with other disaffected members of the Janata 
coalition. With the support of the Congress party he was able to assert his 
brief control of Parliament. His dreams of being Prime Minister were short 
lived. The Janata coalition was split as Congress removed its support, and as 
a result, Prime Minister Charan Singh had to go to the polls. This tactic of 
splitting the opposition was later employed by Rajiv in strikingly similar 
circumstances in 1991, when Chandra Shekhar broke from the Janata Dal. 
He too, would find Congress support to be fleeting.
While the Janata government experienced set backs in its attempt to 
redefine its notion of true non-alignment, in terms of its relations with the 
United States and China, it did experience a relative degree of success within 
its neighbourhood. To an extent this can be seen as an attempt to depart 
from the course which Congress had, under Indira, initiated. This departure 
was an attempt to return to India’s earlier ideals rather than the growing 
assertive regionalism which had begun to emerge under Indira. Despite the
202 YVhile the old silk route is now refered to as "the Karakorum highway” the use of the 
term highway is indeed a misnomer. The highway, which works its way through some of the 
most inhospitable terrain in the world, is in reality a road which winds and twists its way up 
through the Himalaya from Pakistan to Sinkiang. From there it is linked to Tibet and the 
rest of China via Aksai Chin. This connecting section of road traverses the relatively better 
route through the high desert of Aksai Chin which the Chinese are loath to return to India. 
The Aksai Chin sector is 750 miles long and was completed in 1957. The Indians only 
discovered this in 1958. See Mahnaz Z. lsphahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of 
Access in the Borderlands of Asia, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 168.
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past record of Foreign Minister Vajpayee, it is uncertain that the moderate 
stance would be duplicated in a future non-Congress government.
21.6 The third period of growth: 1980-89: the Indira-Rajiv flirtation with 
communalism, expansionism and regional hegemony
W ith the re tu rn  of Indira and Congress rule in the 1980s India 
exhibited external behaviour which was both assertive and in some aspects 
expansionistic. The perception that India was an expanding pow er in the 
1980s is the outcome of demonstrations of both India’s military capabilities 
and its willingness to use such capabilities in pursuit of its interests in the 
region. These incidents were a departu re  from  previous in ternational 
involvements in that they had the appearance of exhibiting a desire to more 
firmly establish India’s preponderant influence in the immediate region and 
to ven tu re  beyond w hat has trad itiona lly  and conventionally  been 
considered India’s region. This expanded notion of what constitutes India's 
region is an example of the changing perceptions among the foreign policy 
elite, which would seem to indicate a continued desire, to expand India's 
international and regional posture. These issues will be discussed further in 
Chapter Four. Despite this growing desire, the present internal situation is 
forcing India to focus on domestic politics and to seek an accommodation 
with the international economic order.
The differences in Jawaharlal's and Indira's upbringing provides some 
insight into the differences in their style and substance as rulers of India. 
Jawaharlal was b rough t up  by his father, M otilal N ehru , in a very 
W esternised Indian household. Through the influence of her m other 
Kamala, Indira was exposed to a more traditional outlook. Kamala, who had 
been given English lessons only after her engagement to Jawaharlal, saw to it 
that Indira "was not simply interested in religion, but also at home in India, 
unlike her aunts who had been brought up in a completely English style."203 
D uring her schooling, Indira was equally happy w ith the International
203 Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 116. After her return from England Indira sought 
successfully to marry Feroze Gandhi who had been at University with her. After beginning 
their family in Lucknow, Indira eventually moved to Delhi to be close to her father. Feroze 
became a member of Parliament. Despite his move to Delhi, Indira and the children remained 
at Teen Murti house with Nehru.
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School in Geneva and the Santiniketan Academy of Rabindranath Tagore. 
After attending the Badminton School in Bristol, Indira went on to 
Somerville College, Oxford.
While living with Nehru, Indira developed a degree of political 
acumen, which she eventually was to use in her own right. In 1957, she was 
elected to the party's central committee. In 1958, she advanced to the 
Congress Parliamentary Board, and in 1959, to the Presidency of the Party. 
Nehru's idealism motivated him to want to take part in the political process 
to see his values come to fruition. For Indira, being born into politics, it was 
a different matter. Indira was from the outset to demonstrate a proclivity for 
the pragmatic approach to politics rather than the idealistic.
This [the Congress demise of the CPI Government in Kerala] was 
a classic case of pragmatism before principles. Once it is accepted 
that power is to be held at all costs, then it becomes impossible to 
defend any basic principle. Secularism remains a paper pledge 
and communalism walks in through the back door, deliberately 
left unlocked.204
Indira Gandhi’s deviation from the secularist path outlined by her 
father opened a Pandora's box from which communalist tendencies have re- 
emerged to threaten the very unity of post-independence India. Indira 
exchanged the idealistic vision of her father for a "power at any cost" 
approach to politics. In the words of Salman Rushdie, Indira Gandhi
was clearly suffering from the grandiloquent, l'etat-c'est moi 
delusions of a Louis XIV. Her cult of the mother -of Hindu 
mother goddess symbols and allusions- and of the idea of shakti, 
of the fact that the dynamic element of the Hindu pantheon is 
represented as female- was calculated and shrewd ...205
Indira lacked the intellect of Nehru, and also suffered from a psychological 
need to assert herself through politics to have a feeling of control over her
204 Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 140.
205 From Salman Rushdie's introduction to Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. xv.
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environment.206 By drawing on notions of Hindu identity, she brought 
religion, and hence divisive communalism, back into politics.
In the lead up to the 1985 elections, there was a distinct possibility that 
Indira Gandhi would not win an outright majority of the Lok Sabha seats. 
Her old election slogan of garabi hatao had not come to fruition. Having 
been unable to deliver on the issue of poverty, Indira was in need of a new 
election issue to be able to carve out a winning vote bank. To do this, "Indira 
Gandhi sought to mobilise support around the issue of Hindu versus Indian 
minorities."207 This marked the first time since independence that religious 
issues were politicised to this extent. For the reason of political expediency, 
Indira Gandhi was to threaten the very secularist vision of India which her 
father devoted his life to establish. These flirtations with communalist 
rhetoric and politics were further pursued by her son Rajiv when he 
assumed office upon her death. Indira's death was a direct result of the 
elevated position of religious politics which stemmed from her politics of 
expediency in the Punjab.
Rajiv Gandhi was not groomed to be the leader of India as was his 
brother Sanjay. Due to Sanjay's death in an air crash, and the assassination 
of his mother by Sikh security guards, Rajiv found himself thrust into the 
centre stage of Indian politics. One of Rajiv's assets was his status as a 
political outsider. As a result, he was not tainted in the public eye as a 
corrupt insider. The Indian public reacted sympathetically to Rajiv, and gave 
him an overwhelming vote of confidence in the election following Indira's 
assassination. This image only serves to highlight the depths to which 
Rajiv’s administration sank in the US $1.4 billion Bofors gun scandal. It was 
alleged that US $38.4 million was paid out in commissions by Bofors to 
Indian officials to secure the deal.
206 Y. Malik and D. Vajpeyi discuss the Marxist and psychoanalytical critiques of Indira 
Gandhi's rule in India: The Years of Indira Gandhi. For a detailed discussion of the 
psychoanalytical perspective of Indira see Henry Hart, "Indira Gandhi: Determined not to be 
Hurt," in Henry Hart, ed. Indira Gandhi's India, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976).
207 Atul Kohli, "From Majority to Minority Rule: Making Sense of the 'New ' Indian Politics," 
in M. Bouton an P. Oldenburg, eds. India Briefing, 1990, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 4.
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Rajiv Gandhi, who won 77 percent of the seats in the Lok Sabha 
election of 1984, was not an ideologically inspired leader, but rather was 
thought of more as a technocrat and an innocent. Rajiv subsequently went 
on to link Indira 's assertive regionalism  w ith a new  internationalism . 
Through this, India began the process of re-engaging the world beyond its 
immediate sphere, though in a different way than N ehru had done before. 
"What stands out as a vital strain in Rajiv G andhi’s psycho-personality is a 
thrust for integrated political architecture w ith in  India and the W orld 
abroad."208
Rajiv Gandhi's fall from pow er can in part be linked to his failure to 
balance the dem ands of communalism and events w ithin the region. Rajiv 
G andhi found  him self caught be tw een  his inability  to p lacate  the 
increasingly mobilized H indu fundam entalist sentim ent and an atrophied 
level of support within the Muslim community. Congress, in its adoption of 
politically expedient policies under Indira G andhi, broke w ith its past- 
inspired leadership of N ehru and failed to resist the tem ptation to opt for 
short-term political gains. In this way Congress can be held responsible for 
its ow n dem ise and the present instability of the country. This was 
competently and successfully exploited in 1991-92 by national and regional 
opposition parties across the Hindi belt. This was done by highlighting the 
Bofors scandal and orchestrating incidents at Ayodhya. These events served 
to underm ine both  Rajiv G andhi’s ind iv idual integrity as well as the 
legitimacy and appeal of the Congress party in general. A serious threat is 
being m oun ted  against the secu lar n a tu re  of the Ind ian  sta te  by 
fundam entalism  and caste politics. If this th rea t continues to grow 
secularism may find itself displaced. A d ivided India w ould serve to 
exacerbate an already destabilized security situation within South Asia.
21.7 The fourth transition: 1989- .... paralysis of the system
The key events of the fourth  transition period, from 1989 to the 
present, stem from the three determ inants of India's external posture.
208 This and the above quote are drawn from; Bhabani Sen Gupta, ”At Ease With The 
World," Seminar 358, June 1989, p. 27. Rajiv Gandhi traveled to 48 countries in the first four 
years of his Prime Ministership.
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W ith in  the dom estic  sphere, the im p lem en ta tio n  of the M andal 
Commission Report on increased reservations for backward castes, and the 
Babri-M asjid/R am janm boom i Tem ple at A yodhya, dom inated  in ternal 
politics and contributed to continuing deteriorating relations between castes 
and religious groups. The geopolitical situation in Kashmir, Punjab and 
Assam continued to underm ine India's national security from within. The 
recent economic reform s im plem ented by the Rao governm ent will also 
have far reaching effects on India. These themes will be developed in some 
detail throughout Chapters Three, Four and Five.
On the domestic side, India has been hindered in its ability to deal 
w ith autonom ist and secessionist tendencies in Kashm ir, Punjab, the 
northeast and in Tamil Nadu. The ability of the centre to deal w ith these 
dom estic problem s on the periphery  has fu rth er been w eakened by 
comm unalist stress, which is being exacerbated by the BJP through their 
em phasis on the B ari-M asjid/R am janm boom i issue, and  the M andal 
com m ission's divisive effect on the caste coherence of the society. To 
further compound this, the political parties have sought to create vote banks 
for themselves out of these issues, thereby furthering the cleavages w ithin 
the society and in the government. This has led to coalition and m inority 
governm ents, a general weakness, if not paralysis, at the centre, and the 
demise of the Congress Party.
O ut of a total 545 Lok Sabha seats, 525 w ere up for election in 
November of 1989.209 The BJP increased its m andate from 2 to 88 seats. In 
the state elections of March 1990, the BJP increased its strength and position 
by picking up a m andate to rule in three of the eight states that went to the 
polls. In coming to pow er in Him achal Pradesh, M adhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, the BJP came to rule in state governm ent for the first time. The 
rise of com m unalist violence and the electoral popularity  of the BJP 
threatens the status of India’s 110 million M uslims.210 Pakistan, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia all reacted strongly against events at the Ayodhya site. Then
209 y wo 0f the seafs which were not up for election are nominative seats. An additional 14 are 
seats in Assam in which elections were not held.
210 India has one of the worlds largest Muslim population.
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Prime Minister Bhutto lamented the situation as a "willful desecration of an 
Islamic Holy place ."211
The key forces of Indian foreign policy are d ivided betw een the 
traditionalists, who would hang on to the idealist rhetoric of the NAM, and 
the pragmatists, who would have India take a sober view of its place in the 
post cold war world, determine India's national interests, and then pursue 
policies which would maximise its interests .212 Under Prime Minister Rao, 
the latter have the upper hand. Prime M inister Rao told his M inister of 
Finance, M anm ohan Singh, to "think big." W ith this m andate, Mr. Singh 
embarked on sweeping reforms which, if fully implemented, would bring 
India more closely in line with the W estern economic order .213
The C handra Shekhar governm ent's decision to allow US cargo 
planes to refuel in and overfly Indian territory during the Gulf War became 
controversial to the extent that it became the centre of Parliam entary and 
media debate. As a result Rajiv Gandhi threatened to w ithdraw  Congress 
support for the governm ent unless the C handra  Shekhar governm ent 
reversed its policies. The War hurt India economically, and this added a 
more tangible element to the ideological debate as India tried to reconcile her 
foreign policy trad ition  of the N on-A ligned M ovem ent w ith current 
in ternational realities. As India comes to term s w ith  the increasing 
irrelevance of the Non-Aligned Movement it must redefine its new place on 
the world stage.
Out of this uncertainty stems m uch speculation as to w hat future 
long-term role India will play within her region. Indeed, the very notion of 
what is India's region is contested. To more clearly understand where India
211 "Shrine on Hold After Rampage," The Australian, 11/14/89.
212 J. Mohan Malik has conceived of the two camps in terms of traditionalists and 
realists in his article "India’s Response to the Gulf Crisis," published in Asian Survey. 
The term pragmatist is here used as opposed to realist because the majority of those 
belonging to this group would support the previous idealist policies of Non-Alignment 
if they felt they were still effective tactics for the promotion of India's interests and 
values. The traditionalists tend to view the concepts and ideals of the Non-Aligned 
Movement as ends in and of themselves rather than as the tactics to be employed in 
support of the national strategy.
213 Christopher Thomas, "Broke India Hopes for Capitalist Salvation," The 
Australian, 9/1/91.
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is heading, this inquiry will turn to the determ inants of India's strategic and 
international relations. It is from these determ inants and the decision­
making process that India's external relations stem. This will be undertaken 
in tandem  with analysis of India's position on the international arena.
As India is in the midst of this domestic turmoil, it is also grappling 
w ith its international identity. W ithin this context the period 1989 to 1991 
m ust be viewed as possibly India’s most significant turning point. India is 
experiencing a growing paralysis at the centre, the end of the N ehru dynasty, 
the advent of coalition politics, and a distancing from the secularism of 
N ehru and the founding fathers. India is trying to come to term s w ith a 
world which it perceives as uni-polar. Having based so much on a policy of 
non-alignm ent, India will have no rational choice but to adjust as this 
concept becomes increasingly outdated. The current dom estic upheaval, 
when coupled with India's experience with the realities of the Gulf War will 
lead to this paradigm  shift. India was comfortable with a bi-polar world. 
Just where this leader of the Non-Aligned M ovement will go in a uni-polar 
world, is a cause of concern and soul searching in India. What the nature of 
the new external policy will be is dependent on a num ber of dom estic, 
geopolitical and economic factors w hich are in the process of playing 
themselves out on the Indian political scene. The following chapters will 
explore these param eters of external policy decision-m aking to better 
understand India's current and future international posture.
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Source: Rajinder Puri, The Illustrated Weekly of India, 11/14/90, Sudhir Tailang, The 
Hindustan Times as reprinted in The Illustrated Weekly of India, 2/16-17/91, Rajinder
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CHAPTER THREE
India's heart is in its society, not in the state .1 
-Rabindranath Tagore
Nationalism is greater than sectarianism. And in that sense we are all 
Indians first and Hindus, Mussulmans, Parsis, Christians after.2 
-M ahatma Gandhi
30. The domestic component of the determinants of India's strategic and 
international relations
A certain tension is set by the above quotes. They imply Indian society, 
in all its diversity, is a significant challenge to state authority. Sectarian or 
com m unalist3 conflict is central to understanding the continuing divide 
within India. In an attem pt to understand conflict in India and South Asia, 
this chapter will begin by briefly exploring several theoretical approaches to 
conflict that have some heuristic value for this chapters inquiry into the 
domestic aspects of India's external relations. Following this, the chapter 
will discuss various aspects of internal strife in India. The chapter proceeds 
from the assertion that nine key sources of identity are similarly sources of 
conflict in India and South Asia. These nine identity nodes are explained in 
more detail in Appendix I. An assessment of the role of Indian political 
traditions and the emerging national identity will also be made. Through 
this analysis the relationship between internal and external conflict will be 
established.
1 Rabindranath Tagore, as quoted in Troy Wilson Organ, The Hindu Quest for the Perfection of 
Man, (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1970), p. 7.
2 This January 1922 quote by Mahatma Gandhi is drawn from Gyanendra Pandey, The 
Construction of Communalism, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 233.
3 Communalism is a much used phrase, but is poorly understood. As such, the recitation of the 
following lengthy definition by Romila Thapar is justified. "Communalism in the Indian sense 
therefore is a consciousness which draws on a supposed religious identity and uses this as the 
basis for an ideology. It then demands political allegiance to a religious community and 
supports a programme of political action designed to further the interests of that religious 
community. Such an ideology is of recent origin but uses history to justify the notion that the 
community (as defined in recent history) and therefore the communal identity have existed 
since the early past. Because the identity is linked to religion, it can lead to the redefinition 
of the particular religion, more so in the case of one as amorphous as Hinduism." Romila 
Thapar, "Imagined Comunities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu 
Identity," Modern Asian Studies, no. 23,1989, pp. 209-31.
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The im portance of the dom estic milieu for external relations was 
noted by Indira Gandhi in 1970 when she stated that "[fjoreign policy can not 
be divorced from a country's domestic policy."4 The causal relationships 
driving India’s foreign and strategic policy are best understood through the 
in teg ra tion  of the b ro ad er ranging  conflict analysis perspective  of 
international politics with a more formal understanding of strategic studies. 
Similarly, the relationship between domestic factors and economic aspects of 
India's position is essential to fully understand the limits of India's external 
position. F rustration over the pace and direction of India's economic 
developm ent has led to increased levels of discontent among its people 
which affects both intra-societal relations and the political process. This is 
because social groups compete both between themselves and w ith the centre 
for limited resources.
The differences betw een India's external and it’s internal behaviour 
have been pointed out by Robert Bradnock in the following quote. "India's 
experience suggests that while heated disputes have frequently characterised 
domestic political activity, foreign policy has been m arked by a striking 
degree of political unity."5 The extent to which Indian society’s physical and 
m etaphorical periphery is in agreement w ith the centre will be discussed 
below. There are significant differences between a states foreign policy and 
its external relations.
This chapter further asserts that India is in the midst of a fundam ental 
reorientation of its national ethos. Communalism is challenging the secular 
model through reinterpretations of H induism . The H indu fundam entalist 
agenda may come to influence both society at large and the decision makers 
perspectives through their rhetoric and actions. This may happen through 
the direct influence of the BJP, Vishwa H indu Parishad (VHP) or Shiv Sena, 
or it may occur indirectly as the Congress Party moves to the right to prevent 
itself from being outflanked by the right's courting of the H indu vote. As a 
result, the foundation ideology of the governm ent will be affected. This
4 A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, (New Delhi: South 
Asian Publishers Private, Ltd. 1988).
5 R. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1990), p. 35.
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change will come either directly through elections or through shifts in the 
political parties orientation towards communalist politics.
This will bring more conflict to India. Conflict w ithin India stems 
from the incongruities and incompatibilities of sub-national groupings as 
they seek self expression and self realization w ithin an existing state 
structure which is less able to meet these dem ands upon it. These tensions 
are further exacerbated by the current phase of economic and political 
transition which the country is undergoing. As this conflict w ithin India 
grows, so too will conflict between India and Pakistan and to a lesser extent 
between India and its other neighbours.
Through the 1980s the Congress Party was compelled for the purposes 
of electoral gain, to play communal politics. This the Congress Party did to 
the detriment of the nation with the result that it eroded the secularist ethic 
that it had itself created, thereby opening the way for H indu chauvinist 
communalist politics to enter the political mainstream. It is projected that 
the on-going stresses of econom ic refo rm  and  the in te rn a tio n a l 
environm ent will serve to exacerbate internal frustration and that this will 
lead to further comm unal strife in an increasingly violent society. The 
communal aspect of internal strife will have a negative impact on India's 
internal stability and social cohesion. This will effect India's ability to 
allocate resources to areas other than internal security. It is unlikely that 
India's neighbours will refrain from continuing cross border assistance to 
Indian insurgents.6 By backing insurgents in India, India's neighbours have 
found their most effective way of keeping India preoccupied within its own 
borders.7 The Indian governm ent will continue to blame the deteriorating 
situation on the hidden foreign hand. As a result, continuing internal strife 
will raise the possibility for international conflict.
6 In 1992 India had by its own admission 50% of its armed forces committed to supressing 
internal insurgencies. This costs India $6.4 million per day. "Where Politicians Fear to 
Tread,” Asiaweek, 6/19/92, p. 28. This is in addition to dramatic increases in internal security 
forces in the late 1980s.
7 Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Burma, and Bhutan have either directly or indirectly served 
as an opperating base for Indian insurgent groups.
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Individual Indian national and sub-national allegiances and identities 
form cluster groupings for the better articulation of their values and interests 
within the larger heterogeneous community These groups will be examined 
in relation  to India's political trad itions and the cu rren t attem pts to 
rein terpret those traditions. These emerging national and sub-national 
identities will be view ed in light of centre-state and centre-periphery 
relations as they relate to India's external environm ent in the following 
chapter on geopolitics. With this brief discussion of the factors that threaten 
India's cohesion, this chapter will now proceed to identify more specific 
sources of conflict.
30.1 An outline of conflict
Various attem pts have been m ade to construct a general theory of 
conflict.8 These attem pts are valuable as heuristic tools for the explanation 
of conflict in particular case studies. A ttem pts which go beyond providing 
guiding principles can distort observations and lead to faulty conclusions. 
The generalist approach to the study of conflict is most useful for its lack of 
exclusion. Not seeking to exclude it opens conceptual space for the analyst to 
observe connections and linkages not previously established. This approach 
contrasts with more narrowly defined strategic studies approaches to conflict 
that w ould refrain from ranging betw een levels of analysis or various 
disciplinary approaches .9 D espite early enunciations of this b roader 
perspective, states are still viewed largely as reified entities in discussions of 
national security .10 The dom inance of the state level of analysis and the
8 For early examples see R. Mack and R. Snyder, 'The Analysis of Social Conflict - Toward an 
Overview and Synthesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. I, no. 2, 1957 and also Clinton 
Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. XII, no. 4,1968, pp. 412- 460.
9 The current resistence to the inclusion of environmental security issues by the mainstream of 
the discipline is an example of this. See also Michael McKinley, "New Directions in 
Strategic Studies," Richard Higgott and J.L. Richardson eds. International Relations: Global 
and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline, (Canberra: Dept, of International 
Relations, RSPacS, The Australian National University, 1991), pp. 288-316.
10 The first issue of The Journal of Conflict Resolution addressed this question in 1957. "Our 
belief in the fruitfulness of an interdisciplinary approach in this area is based on the 
conviction that the behaviour and interactions of nations are not an isolated self contained 
area of empirical material, but part of a much wider field of political behaviour and 
interaction..." as quoted in C. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties," p. 412.
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concomitant exclusion, or minimisation, of the impact of subnational factors 
remains despite previous efforts to establish multi-tiered analysis of conflict.
G reater dep th  of understand ing  emerges from aw areness of the 
interrelated nature of internal and external conflict and the relationship 
between the various levels of analysis. Johan Galtung who used individuals 
as his starting point stated "a theory of aggression should combine the idea of 
frustration with the idea of perceiving aggression as a possible way out of the 
frustrating situation."11
Before proceeding further w ith  this perspective, w hich seeks to 
exp la in  phenom ena  at the in te rn a tio n a l level by dev elo p in g  an 
understanding that takes the individual as its starting point, a m ention of 
the levels of analysis question is in order. There are basic trade offs between 
differing levels of analysis. As we move dow n our ladder of analysis, from 
the global systemic level, to regions, states, sub-national grouping and the 
indiv idual, we are afforded a g reater level of detail in our analysis. 
Concom itantly, these lower levels of analysis w ith their "richer detail, 
greater depth, and more intensive portrayal" provide us with "atomized and 
less coherent image[s]."12 The in tegration of m ultiple levels of analysis 
provides the reader w ith an understanding which describes, explains and 
predicts the dynam ics of conflict as they re la te  to Ind ia 's  evolving 
international posture in the region. This endeavour is undertaken in the 
belief that this will more fully illuminate the phenomena of India's regional 
posture. The chapter will now proceed to a general discussion of the sources 
of conflict in South Asia before breaking such conflict dow n into its 
com ponents.
11 Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in Ted Gurr, ed. Anger Violence and 
Politics: Theories and Research, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 86. Joseph Himes 
has presented an outline of conflict divided into private conflict, civil strife, social control and 
international war. See Joseph Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management, (Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1980), p. 6.
12 David Singer, The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus Knorr 
and Sidney Verba eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), p. 89.
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30.11 Sources of conflict in the South Asian context
Investigation into the sources of international conflict in South Asia 
cannot be divorced from  in ternal dom estic conflict. The particu lar 
composition of the opposing elites is one source of international conflict. A 
more broadly informed perspective involving the sources of conflict down 
to the g roup  and ind iv idual level, p rov ides a m ore com prehensive 
explanatory framework. The groupings of Indian society are formed for their 
ability to represent and m ould the individual's identity. Simultaneous to 
the process of the individual seeking out groups to represent their values 
and interests, the leadership  of the various coalescing groups seek to 
orchestrate the emerging and shifting identities to augm ent their ranks. 
Through these groups Indian political m achinations operate. It is when the 
agendas of the various groups are at odds w ith one another, or w ith the 
centre, that conflict emerges.
To more specifically tailor an inquiry into the sources of conflict 
within the South Asian context it becomes necessary to categorize the specific 
m anifestations which em anate from  those sources. James M anor has 
conceptualized collective violence in India in the following way.
Categories of collective violence
1. Insurrectionary violence and reactions by agents of the state
(a) regional, linguistic or ethnic insurrections
(b) leftist or class based insurrections
2. Non-insurrectionary violence between agents of the state and social 
groups
(a) popular reaction against coercive agents of the state
(b) violent protest over social, economic, political or cultural issues
(c) looting, vandalism and arson
(d) security forces suppression of protests
(e) security force actions against those in opposition to the state
3. Violence between social groups
(a) violence between castes
(b) communal violence
(c) inter-sect violence within a religious group
(d) tribal/non-tribal violence
(e) inter-linguistic group violence
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(f) class based violence
(g) interest group violence
(h) violence over immigration causing demographic pressure
4. Violence involving political parties
(a) inter-party violence
(b) intra-party violence
5. Criminal violence13
Sections 1, a and b and 3, b, d, f and h are the most relevant for an 
inquiry seeking to establish the connection betw een internal and external 
conflict. Elements of the relevant parts of sections 1 and 3 are prevalent in 
Kashmir, Punjab, the northeast14 and to a lesser extent in Tamil N adu where 
internal conflict is vulnerable to external influence.
These four peripheral regions are likely areas for the overlap of 
intranational and international conflict. The ability of insurgents to gain 
support from across the frontier has contributed to their success and further 
draw n India's neighbours into India's internal security conflicts. For this 
reason an understanding of the internal dynamics of conflict serves as a 
partial explanation of the overall inquiry into the nature of India's posture 
w ithin the South Asian region. Internal stability is indirectly linked to 
external relations and strategic posture. When the political and bureaucratic 
elite at the centre are absorbed in internal strife, their political energy and 
state resources are diverted inwardly and are therefore not available for the 
maintenance or promotion of foreign policy objectives.
Existing studies seeking to establish causal relationships betw een 
internal and external conflict lean tow ards a positive correlation. W ork in 
the b eh av io u ris t vein has no t definitively established direct causal 
relationships between levels of internal and external conflict. Despite this 
lack of certainty, they remain of particular interest as partial explanations of 
India's grow ing regional presence at a time w hen it is suffering from
13 James Manor, Conflict Studies 212: Collective Conflict in India, (London: Institute for the 
Study of Conflict, 1988), pp. 8-9. Previously the connection between the Naxalites, the 
communists and the Chinese would have made category four more relevant.
14 The states of the northeast, which have been embroiled in conflict with the centre and 
whose secessionist and autonomous elements have periodically received aid from across the 
frontier, are Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal 
Pradesh.
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dramatically rising levels of internal violence and social conflict. Study of 
the causal relationship betw een the international and sub-national levels of 
conflict have been further extrapolated to the global level where it has been 
asserted that the global conflict process exerts an influence on the m agnitude 
of both internal and external conflict.15
The causal relationship betw een internal and external conflict may be 
dependent on factors of a level of complexity that exceeds the abilities of 
contem porary analysis. There may be certain  characteristics which, if 
identifiable, can give additional meaning to the different m anifestations of 
the internal / external nexus of conflict, bu t empirical studies are thus far 
lacking in their ability to present argum ents w ith high degrees of certainty. 
Certain observations are nonetheless possible. For example, it has been 
recognised that international w ar has had an im pact on the triggering of 
revolutions and other forms of internal strife.
Beyond the argument that internal conflict exerts a positive impact on 
external conflict16 is the question of when and how ?17 The utility of external 
conflict in m aintaining in ternal harm ony has long been recognised by 
statesm en and analysts alike .18 Haas and W hiting articulated the general 
phenom enon that "[i]n times of extreme domestic tensions among elites, a
15 The linkage between the Gulf War of 1991, the change of economic orientation of India’s 
economy away from the Nehruvian socialist model, the social dislocation that this will cause 
and India's foreign policy provide evidence in support of these findings. See Francis Hoole and 
Chi Huang, "The Global Conflict Process," Journal of Conflict Resolution, March, 1989, pp. 142, 
145, 150.
16 The survey of the literature carried out by Michael Stohl in his chapter "The Nexus of 
Civil and International Conflict," in Ted Gurr, Handbook of Political Conflict:Theory and 
Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), is, while leaning toward the presence of a 
positive relationship, inconclusive in its findings on the exact nature of the relationship 
between internal and external conflict. The manner in which the studies were conducted 
probably explains the disparate results. The causal relationship may be obscured by other 
factors.
17 This perspective on the issue of the relationship is akin to the perspective taken in Robert 
Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," International 
Organisation, summer, 1988, p. 427.
18 "The best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and 
civil war is to keep the subjects in amity with one another, and to this end, to find an enemy 
against whom they can make common cause." Jean Bodin 1576 as quoted in Michael Stohl, "The 
Nexus of Civil and International Conflict," in Ted Gurr, Handbook of Political Conflict: 
Theory and Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 297.
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policy of uniting a badly divided nation against some real or alleged outside 
threat frequently seems useful to a ruling group."19 Evidence of stress 
among the elite has been w itnessed in India m ost poignantly since the 
decline of Congress Party rule and the advent of coalition politics, beginning 
w ith the elections of 1991. Frequent continuing reference to the foreign 
h an d ’s role in India's internal turm oil is indicative of the governm ent's 
desire to deflect criticism. It similarly reflects their suspicion of foreign 
powers. Answers, beyond establishing a basic causal relationship, will of 
necessity need to tailor themselves to specific situations and cases.
Ted Gurr's work stands out as one of the more informative attem pts 
to answer the how and why questions of conflict in the abstract. His work in 
developing a causal model of civil strife provides a perspective for initiating 
inquiry into the specifics of internal and external conflict in India.20 His 
articulation of the frustration  theory of aggression is a useful tool to 
understand more fully conflict on the domestic level within India.21 India is 
a case where the expectations of individuals, in both political and economic 
terms, were raised to levels that have by and large not been satisfied through 
India’s pace and style of developm ent.22 India is at a particularly sensitive 
juncture in its developm ent. India is betw een beginning the process of 
m odernisation and industrialisation and making it on terms equivalent to 
the newly industrialised countries of East Asia.
19 Haas and Whiting as cited in T. Gurr, Handbook on Political Conflict, p. 298.
20 For a selection of his work see Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative 
Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, December 1968, Ted Gurr, 
"Psychological Factors in Civil Strife," World Politics, January, 1968, Ted Gurr, Why Men 
Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and Ted Gurr, Anger Violence and Politics: 
Theories and Research, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972).
21 In the frustration theory of aggression a frustration is that which stands in the way of goal 
directed behaviour. Aggression is that behaviour that is intended to injure the source of the 
frustration. Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," in Anger, Violence, and 
Politics, 1972, pp. 34-5.
22 Bety Nesvold, "Stages of Political Conflict," in Judith Gillespie and Dina Zinnes, Missing 
Elements in Political Inquiry: Logic and Levels of Analysis, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1982), p. 179.
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[l]eaders can p u t their follow ers' anger to ra tio n a l or 
rationalized uses. If anger is sufficiently pow erfu l and 
persistent it may function as an autonom ous drive, leading to 
highly rational and effective efforts by both leaders and the led 
to satisfy anger aggressively.23
The situations in the peripheral areas of India that have been engaging in 
secessionist and autonom ous activity24 are heavily reliant on reservoirs of 
frustration. This frustration is subject to, and to an extent dependent on, an 
elite draw n from within its ranks for its articulation. W ithout being focused 
by an elite, these frustrations m anifest them selves in a spontaneous and 
uncoordinated fashion so that they do not significantly effect the stability of 
the state. It is the distinctive aspect of minority ethnic groups that facilitates 
their mobilization. The m ainstream  poor, who are similarly thw arted in 
their attem pts at self realisation, do not threaten the state w ith "a general 
class polarisation or an impending class war ...”25 In order to be mobilised, 
the group's frustration26 must be articulated in such a way that the group 
perceives itself as distinct from the mainstream of Indian society.
W ith leadership, the possibility of attaining dem ands, and thereby 
threatening the centre, becomes a possibility. This proposition is more 
relevant in the context of the shattered periphery of India, (Kashmir, Punjab, 
and the northeast), than it is for the country as a whole. This is because the
23 Ted Gurr, A tiger, Violence, and Politics, p. 35.
24 Seccessionist and autonomous movements are both motivated by the same types of self 
realisation goals. They differ in their perception as to wether or not they they can achieve 
their goals within a state structure which they do not control.
25 It is the conservative nature of India's Hindu society that has made a broad based peasant 
uprising, such as China's, an unlikely event. Indian minority groups share different social 
values than the majority. The Hindu fundamentalist movement seeks to strengthen the state 
while shifting its ideological underpinnings. The quote is drawn from P. Brass, The New 
Cambridge History of India: The Politics of India Since Independence. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 247.
26 Closely linked with the frustration theory of aggression is the concept of relative 
deprivation. Relative deprivation is defined as the "actor's perception of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their environment’s value capabilities. " From the 
frustration theory of aggression and the concept of relative deprivation Gurr posited the 
following proposition. "The occurrence of civil violence presupposes the likelihood of relative 
deprivation among substantial numbers of individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more 
severe is relative deprivation, the greater the likelihood and intensity of civil violence." 
Ted Gurr, Anger, Violence, and Politics, pp. 37, 39.
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m ainstream poor do not have a separate identity, as do the Muslims, Sikhs 
or tribal groups, to articulate their struggle. The m ainstream  poor's H indu 
identity is the primary source of their conservative outlook. India is a rural 
country. The rural areas are economically less integrated into m odem  India 
than the urban centres. This limits the rural poor's expose to alternative 
concepts.
The continued exposure of the masses to m iddle class and elite 
standards of living through the cinemas, D oordarshan, the radio and the 
print m edia will continue to create expectations that have little chance of 
realization for the vast majority of the population. Santosh Ballal of the 
advertisement agency Rediffiision which handled the advertisements for the 
widely popular television series the Ramayana, described his view of this 
phenom enon. "We create the life styles, we create the aspirations, whether 
the view er achieves the asp ira tion  is his problem , not m ine ."27 If 
aspirations are callously created w ithout a chance of realization they will 
even tua lly  c reate  fru s tra tio n  w ith in  society  desp ite  its  in h e re n t 
conservativeness. This will m anifest itself more in the urban areas that 
receive greater media exposure. Many militants come from the ranks of the 
educated unemployed. The rise of the BJP may be linked to this frustration 
as this party has been most successful in urban lower middle class areas.
Increased levels of international conflict in South Asia seem likely 
given the high levels of relative deprivation in Kashmir, Punjab and the 
northeast and the linkage of these internal areas with external conflicts. The 
continuing deterioration of conditions for minority groups, perpetuated by a 
centre whose authority  is increasingly reliant on repressive measures, 
implies continued polarization of these conflicts. The lack of accomodative 
approaches to problem-solving drains away resources from development by 
adding to conflict. This exacerbates problems within m ainstream segments 
of the society which stem from the frustration of their economic aspirations. 
In an atmosphere of scarcity, mainstream society will be less predisposed to 
expend resources on minority groups to forge peaceful solutions than  it
27 As quoted in MarkTully, No Full Stops in India, (Delhi: Viking Penguin, 1991), p.148.
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would during a period of economic growth. Those groups dependent on 
external support are also to an extent subject to foreign manipulation.
While recognising the inadequacies and uncertainties of existing 
knowledge with the in ternal/external nexus,28 a holistic approach taking all 
these factors into account is essential for a balanced understanding of India's 
regional behaviour and posture. Large questions beget uncertain and partial 
answers. The centre-periphery dynamic, the relationship betw een internal 
and external conflict, the frustration theory of aggression and the sources of 
allegiance in India all inform this inquiry into India's external posture. The 
chapter now  tu rns to focus on tensions betw een the centre and the 
periphery.
30.12 The coercive arm of the state in India
The use of force and surveillance by the central government and elites 
to m aintain their hold over dissenting m inorities of the geographical and 
m etaphorical periphery rose sharply in the 1980s. The abuse of civil and 
hum an rights is most severe in those areas that are seeking to distance 
themselves from the centre. There are four key target areas of such abuse in
28 Methodological questions of verification of the frustration theory of aggression present a 
number of problems. Firstly, this theory is one based on perceptions of frustration which are 
subjective in nature and difficult to quantify. Statistics measuring the outcome of this 
frustration, if indeed that frustration is the source of the violent acts, are lacking. These 
statistics are compiled in broad categories and in a less than rigorous manner by a government 
with vested interest in under-reporting increased levels of violence. Further, there exists the 
problem of Western analysts projecting their own cultural interpretations. Additional 
problems arrise in the way in which empirical studies have been compiled. During the period 
1955- 1964, India demonstrated the third highest level of conflict and coercion in the Asian 
region, behind South Vietnam and Laos, as measured by Gurr and Lichback. In amassing their 
data, Gurr and Lichback relied on incidents reported in The Neui York Times and Facts on File. 
Reportage on India in the West is sporadic and competes with the plethora of other news 
items for coverage. As such, the database has liabilities. Even if one were to compile a data 
base drawn from a reading of Indian newspapers, the statistic would be less than perfect due to 
government desires to keep potentially explosive statistics out of the public eye lest they 
trigger further outbreaks of violence. Despite the liabilities and the less than reliable nature 
of available statistics, trends and dynamics can be ascertained from the general course of 
events. These indicate an increasing level of internal violence and coercion which are related 
to India's more assertive and possibly belligerent external posture. Ted Gurr and M. Lichbach, 
"Forecasting Domestic Political Conflict," in J. D. Singer and M.D. Wallace eds., To Auger 
Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 
pp. 153 -194.
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India. These include those groups that are engaged in autonom ous or 
secessionist movements, political opposition groups (at either the national 
or state level), m inority groups and ordinary criminals.29 The size and 
budge t allocations of intelligence, param ilita ry , m ilitary  and police 
organisations expanded significantly during the 1980s as the state sought to 
counter rising dissension with force. The diversion of these security assets 
from  external to in ternal functions fu rther strengthened  the internal 
coercive arm of the state.
Targets of abuse and agents of state security
Targets
1. Insurgents
K ashm ir 
Punjab
Assam and the Northeast 
Naxalites etc.
2. Political opposition
3. Minorities
caste 
religion 
tribal
4. Criminals
The heterogenaity of Indian society is easily exacerbated by various 
com m unal groups seeking to mobilise com m unities for their particu lar 
goals. O ften the sense of group  iden tity  is defined by em phasising 
dissimilarities from the larger community or communities. The centre has 
also abused its power to counter autonom ous and secessionist groups and to 
m anipulate state politics. Emergency powers were used 74 times from 1951 
to 1987.30 These factors create an adversarial relationship betw een the 
m inorities and the majority community, or betw een the periphery and the
Agents
1. Paramilitary
2. Police
3. Intelligence
4. Regular Military
29 Government under reporting of collective violence is motivated by a desire to keep these 
events from escalating. If this were the only matter statistics could be released one or two 
years after the incidents. At such a later date they would be unlikely to trigger reprisals. 
Specific documentation of cases of human rights abuse have been documented in Amnesty 
International, India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody, (London: Amnesty Publications, 
1992).
30 H.M. Rajashekara, "Presidents Rule in the Indian States," The Indian Journal of Political 
Science, Oct.-Dec. 1987, p. 633.
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centre. As these differences become polarised, the more militant factions in 
the m ovem ents gain in stature w ithin their comm unities as they become 
increasingly violent. As groups emerge in opposition to the centre, they 
have found external assistance to aid them in their struggle. This, and the 
alternative cultural identities of these groups, has in turn  led the centre to 
perceive these groups as traitors and enemies of India. In this way laws have 
been passed that suspend norm al rights in these strife torn states. This 
strengthens the coercive powers of the security and police forces and opens 
the way for abuse of hum an rights of minority groups no longer perceived as 
Indian. As such they are seen to deserve the w rath of the state's mailed fist.
The state has extraordinary powers at its disposal for the maintenance 
of law  and order. The trend is tow ards expanding resources to meet 
increasing disturbances among the people. The police force has grown from 
468,000 in 1951 to 904,000 in 1981.31 As they have grow n so too have their 
excesses.
Amnesty International documented 415 cases of death in custody since 
1985. Of these only 42 cases were investigated by a magistrate. This is despite 
Section 176 of the Criminal Procedures Code which makes such an inquiry 
m andatory. Under Sections 30 and 331 of the Penal code, torture to extract 
inform ation is a crime punishable by a ten year prison sentence while 
causing death by torture is to be tried as m urder.32 Of the 415 cases only 20 
resulted in judicial inquiries w ith only three policemen being convicted of 
m urder of the detainees in their custody.33 It is further probable that the
31 Paul Brass, "Politics in India," in Francis Robinson,The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 181.
32 The list compiled by Amnesty International of the types of torture used in India is a lengthy 
one. Methods used include: sleep deprivation, deprivation of food and water, beatings with 
belts, lathis, rods etc., forcing water through nostrils, crushing with heavy rollers, rape, 
sexual mutilation, crushing of testicles, burning with iron rods, electric shock, blinding with 
acid, insertion of chilies into rectum, eyes, open wounds, etc., forced drinking with penis tied, 
tearing out of finger nails, asphyxiation, beating of pregnant women, impaling with iron rods 
forced through anus, burial to the neck, etc.
33 The Government of India reported that "76 criminal cases have been registered against 
members of the security forces; two army officers have been dismissed and they have been 
sentenced to 10 and 11 years respectively; 23 Central Reserve Police Force and 10 Border 
Security Force personnel have been suspended in J&K. In Punjab , 89 police officers of various 
ranks have been dismissed; 68 prematurely retired." The High Commission of India,
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cases documented by Amnesty International are only a fraction of the total 
num ber of cases. In such situations there are cover-ups with the authorities 
using threats and bribes to silence those who would speak out. The police 
have come to take on the role of both judge and executioner.34
In those areas declared to be under a state of emergency, the security 
forces are almost immune from prosecution. Deaths in custody can easily be 
passed off as either the result of a fire-fight between insurgents and security 
forces, a suicide or as having happened while the suspect was trying to 
escape. The Terrorist D isruptive Activities Act allows security forces to 
arrest and detain for up to one year w ithout charge or trial individuals in 
counter insurgency areas. U nder this act the accused is presum ed guilty. 
This is in d irect contraven tion  of Article 11 of the U nited N ations 
D eclaration of H um an Rights. The Arm ed Forces Special Pow ers Act 
provides the security forces with immunity from prosecution for events that 
occur while on duty in disturbed areas. This is in operation in Kashmir, 
Punjab and in the northeast. The act states that "Any commissioned officer, 
non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the 
armed forces may ... fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of 
death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order 
for the time being in force in the disturbed area..." Section 6 of the act goes 
on ''[n]o prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except 
w ith the previous sanction of of the Central Government..." Section 197 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides immunity for public servants from 
prosecution without prior approval from either state or central governm ent 
au thority  that em ployed them. Section 197 "[p]rotects all governm ent 
officers from any prosecution for actions taken in the cause of duty w hen a 
state is under direct rule from central governm ent.”35
The abuse of power is w idespread among groups that can do so with 
little or no chance of prosecution for such behaviour. In disturbed areas the
Canberra, "Spokesman's Response to Queries on Amnesty International Report Dated 26 March 
1992," India News, 3/30/92, p. 2.
34 Amnesty International, India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody.
35 Amnesty International, India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody, pp. 59-60.
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laws insulate the security forces from  any legal recourse to excesses. 
Collusion by fellow police officers, some m agistrates and some coroners 
allows these excesses to continue w ith little repercussion beyond transfers 
and dismissals in a limited num ber of cases. One explanation of India’s 
tolerance of such abuses is that they are primarily directed at the dissenting 
periphery. The centre, by perceiving sub-national groups as other than 
Indian, blurrs the distinction betw een internal and external conflict. This 
section now shifts to examine identity structures and allegiances in India.
30.2 Identity nodes as sources of allegiance and conflict
There are nine key identity nodes which act as the building block of 
the identities, and in turn the allegiances, of the peoples of India. These 
identities are present to varying degrees among individuals. Some identities 
are almost exclusive, Hindu as opposed to Muslim for example, while others 
are closely interw oven w ith other identities as in the case of regional and 
linguistic  affinities. In d iv id u a l id en titie , w hile fo rm ed from  the 
ind iv idua l’s unique background and experiences, are by no means static. 
The exact mix of the various identity  nodes inpu t into an individuals 
perceptions shifts betw een issues and over time. It is this "rem arkable 
fluidity, together with India's unparalleled social and cultural heterogeneity, 
[which] provides much of the explanation for a central feature of conflict and 
collective violence in India..."36 This internal dim ension of conflict also 
plays a role in external conflict as the allegiances of peoples are mitigated by 
political differentiations of territory. The following is a list of the key 
identity nodes around which allegiances are formed in the Indian context.
Identity nodes of India
1. Religion: Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, Jain
2. Territory: urban-rural, state, regional, sub-regional, local
3. Caste: jati and varna and w hen com bined w ith political 
identity other backward castes (OBC) and scheduled castes (SC) 
become meaningful identities as well
4. Politics: secular, traditional, or fundam entalist-reform ist, as 
broad categories with party affiliations such as Congress, BJP,
36 James Manor, Collective Conflict in India, pp. 12-3.
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Janata Dal, Janata Dal (S), CPI, Telugu Desam, N ational
Conference etc.
5. Class: W esternised and traditional elite, the growing m iddle
class, the marginalised rural and urban poor
6. Race: A ryan/D ravidian/M ongol
7. Ideology: secular, communalist, nationalist, communist
8. Tribe: Mizo, Naga, Bodo, etc.
9. Language: Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, English, etc.37
U nderstanding the sources of India’s identity helps to clarify how 
Indians form allegiances. It is the complex interplay of the identity nodes 
which determ ines allegiances. As individual allegiances amalgamate into 
groupings and find their way into the realm of politics, they come to set the 
agenda of sub-national-intergroup politics. As a sense of seperateness 
develops within sub-national groups "a more violent feeling of antagonism, 
w hich is expressed as a form  of xenophobic rejection  of w hat is 
other'em erges. In most cases this is directed at m ainstream H indu culture 
which is the force against which the sub-national group struggles to define 
itself.38 The dangers associated with extrapolating from the individual level 
of analysis, through the group and state levels to the international, are 
outw eighed by the perspectives value in helping to establish a m ore 
comprehensive explanation of events.39
N otions of ethnicity by definition are composed of a collection of 
identity nodes. An exact definition of ethnicity is elusive though there are 
many proposed. Despite the term s problem atic qualities the following 
definition by Urmila Phadnis will suffice.
37These nine key identity nodes are discussed in greater detail in Appendix one.
38 Jean Racine, "A Contribution to the Geopolitical Analysis of India," in P. Girot and E. 
Kofman eds. International Geopolitical Analysis, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p.94.
39 James Manor has discussed the identity choices of Indians and established a list of 
identities which omits race as a category. The above list has omitted ethnicity as a category. 
It has done so because ethnicity is here viewed as a composite of elements of the above list of 
nine key identity nodes.
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... an ethnic group can be defined as a historically form ed 
aggregate of people having a real or imaginary association with 
a specified territory, a shared cluster of beliefs and values 
connoting its distinctiveness in relation to similar groups and 
recognised as such by others.40
The concept of identity nodes is useful as a tool to rem ove the layers of 
m eaning associated w ith  the "shared cluster of beliefs and  values" 
component of the above definition of ethnicity.
Despite the prevalence of the H indu culture throughout India there 
are six states within India which have alternative core identities. The most 
notable is Jammu and Kashmir w ith its overw helm ing Muslim religious 
identity. The Kashmiri Muslims desire to express their separate identity has 
led to a high degree of conflict between Kashmir and the centre. Punjab 
similarly presents a m inority dom inated state w here Sikhs com m and a 
plurality of 60.8%.41 Less well know n are the three Christian states of 
Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram, with 52.6%, 80.2% and 83.8% Christian 
populations respectively. Furtherm ore Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and 
Nagaland's inhabitants are roughly 80% tribal in their orientation. While 
there exist m ultiple core identities w ithin India, the above m entioned 
identities are m ore im portant due to both  their position of being the 
majority within their own state and because of their peripheral position on  
an external border which opens the possibility for foreign support.
The tactics and policies which achieved lim ited success during the 
1950s and 60s in am eliorating conflict among these differing groups of 
peoples are no longer proving fruitful. This is most violently dem onstrated 
by the degeneration of the situation in both Kashmir and Punjab into civil 
w ar and terrorist rule. The redraw ing of state boundaries to allow sub­
national groupings to m ore fully express their identity, while placating 
some, has led to further agitation as those not incorporated in earlier 
solutions seek to achieve similar demands. The lack of faith that the centre
40 Urmila Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Buildin? in South Asia, (Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1990), p. 14.
41 "When redressing a wrong is not possible through peaceful means, it is pious and corect to 
take up the sword.” -Guru Gobind Singh "Hopeful Three," India Today, 2/28/93, p.30.
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will protect the interests of the sub-state peripheral groups leads to their 
desire to achieve a political solution allowing more direct control over state 
affairs. This exacerbates centre-periphery tensions. Those who have become 
radicalized and are situated on an external border have increasingly turned 
to India's neighbours to gain strength for their cause. The asymmetrical 
pow er relations betw een India and its neighbours have m ade these 
peripheral states eager to tty to offset the power imbalance through support 
for insurgents in India. These dynamics of India's relations w ith its region 
have resulted in high levels of cross border support for Indian secessionist 
and autonom ous insurgents. India has similarly used insurgents as a 
foreign policy tool as in Bangladesh in 1971 and more recently in Sindh. 
This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
Before looking at the particular dynamics of India's relations with its 
region, an examination of India’s political traditions and emerging national 
identities is in order.
30.3 Indian political traditions
Ancient Indian political thought should be taken into account in an 
assessment of the composite factors of India's socio-political make up. The 
relative importance of the influence of the ancient Indian political tradition 
on the contem porary Indian political milieu has been underem phasised. 
India has inherited a parliam entary system and a language of governm ent 
from its previous colonial m etropole. While breaking from its exploited 
position w ithin a colonial system India retained many W estern influences 
after independence. These linkages to a W estern political tradition, as 
represented by the outward adoption of a W estern structure of government, 
belie the Indianess and presence of H indu  socio-cultural values of that 
system. In many respects these socio-political values differ significantly with 
W estern traditions. As India is working through its current transitional 
period it is looking within its indigenous political traditions for guidance in 
setting its future agenda. Part of this process is the reinterpretation of past 
traditions.
Friction w ithin the H indu com m unity over how to deal w ith the 
Ramjanmboomi-Babri Masjid and Muslim m inority rights issues in 1989
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and 1990, illustrate how India, and more specifically H indu society, is now 
having to come to terms with the ideology of secularism. The Bharatiya 
Janata Party is appealing to the comm unalist tendencies w ithin the H indu 
community. By doing so they are appealing to an earlier political psychology 
than the secularist rhetoric of the founding fathers of the m odern Indian 
state. Given the seeming inability of the existing dom inant ideology, (which 
is to a large extent based on imported concepts), to address India's problems, 
it is not surprising that the BJP is drawing on the indigenous Indian political 
tradition as a source of inspiration.
The H indu caste system’s separation of power and status is unique. By 
commanding the highest level of status w ithin the four varnas of the caste 
system of H indu society, Brahmins have traditionally had the most central 
role in the interpretation of H indu traditions. This is due to the emphasis 
placed on their sanctified religious position by the com m unity. It was 
traditionally the Kshatriyas who were the ruling caste and hence the 
repository of state power of the society. Often the Kshatriya warriors would 
be in a position to exercise more temporal power than their caste superiors 
and spiritual lords, the Brahmins. By strict adherence to ones dharm a42 and 
the reinforcing concept of pollution in inter-caste relations as opposed to 
purity in intra-caste relations, H indu culture has traditionally divided status 
and power. Though they exercised more temporal power, Kashatriya duties 
placed them  in a subo rd ina te  position  to B rahm ins. W hile strict 
interpretations of caste are slowly evolving, notions of caste continue to be of 
relevance in India.
A separation and distinction between spiritually inspired norms of the 
society and the norms of the rulers of state has allowed Indian rulers to 
behave in w hat in W estern nom enclature is best characterized as being 
"machiavellian" w ithout being subject to the same societal sanctions to 
which their W estern counterparts have been subject.43 The Indian tradition
42 Dharma is defined as "duty, righteousness, moral law; social and personal morality; 
natural law, natural obligation." in Raghavan Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of 
Mahatma Gandhi, (London: Concord Grove Press, 1983), p. 440.
43 Lucien W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 136-7.
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separates status from power as well as spiritual power from temporal power. 
This differs substantially from the W estern tradition of the divine right of 
kings.
Because of their role as the preservers of the societal order traditional 
Indian rulers were not judged by the same religiously prescribed m odes of 
behaviour as was society at large. "The role of the ruler is that of Indra 
(bestower of rewards) and of Yama (who meets out punishm ent). Rulers are 
thus visible dispensers of (divine) punishm ent and rew ards. Those w ho 
disrespect them  will be punished by the G ods ."44 W hile the Kashatriya 
rulers enforced the order of society, the Brahmins were closely linked w ith 
them in deciding what that order should be. "By enforcing the adherence of 
the people to the observance of duties prescribed for the four castes and the 
four stages of life and rooting out all unrighteousness, the ruler functions as 
the dispenser of justice.” 45
The legitimacy of H indu rulers rested on the societal belief that social 
order was necessary in order for everyone to fulfil their dharm a. The 
Bhagavad-Gita illustrates the imperative of the ruler to fulfil his role so that 
the cosmic order of things will remain 46 In the Bhagavad-Gita, the H indu 
God Krishna, who is acting as Arjuna's charioteer in battle, urges him on to 
achieve the destruction of his enemies. Arjuna is hesitant because he knows 
it will result in great carnage. Through the discourse between Krishna and
44 This excerpt is drawn from the work of Chanakya, or Vishnugupta, who is better known as
Kautilya. Though there is some debate as to whether these three are indeed one and the same 
person in all probability they are. The work for which Kautilya is best known is the 
Arthasastra. It is the Prince of Indian politics. Through his counsel, Kautilya helped 
Chandragupta Maurya defeat the Nanda kingdom and establish his rule in 321 BC. The 
Mauryan empire was the first unified Indian state. The works of Kautilya were most likely  
produced between 321 and 290 BC. See V. K. Subramanian, Maxims of Chanakya: the
Crystalized Wisdom of the Indian Machiavelli, (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1980), p. 
144. See also R. P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthasastra Part IT. An English Translation with 
Critical and Explanatory Notes, (Bombay: University of Bombay Publishers, 1963).
45 V. K. Subramanian, Maxims of Chanakya, p. 146.
46 The dictums of Chanakya, the Bhagavad-Gita, The Code of Manu and other treatises 
should not be relegated to mere historical curiosities. The modem Indian state has looked to 
India's intellectual tradition as a foundation for redefining a modern indigenous political 
philosophy. Kautilya can be thought of roughly as being a non-Westem equivalent to Hobbes 
and Machiavelli. This is mentioned in passing in Richard Falk, The End of World Order: 
Essays on Normative International Relations, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).
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Arjuna the ideal of the need to fulfil one's caste obligation is put forward. 
Arjuna as leader of his people had no choice but to wage war to fulfil his 
caste duty.47
N ehru’s and Gandhi's contributions, while an inextricable part of the 
m odern Indian political tradition, m ust be seen in historical term s as 
innovative ideas which were added to a historically im pressive political 
tradition. As India continues to develop, it is returning to its indigenous 
culture. The retu rn  to H indu political traditions is dem onstrated by the 
increased use of H indu imagery in  politics, the desire on the part of the 
north Indians to use Hindi as the national language rather than English and 
from the more native character of the sociological background of MPs.48 
N e h ru ’s foreign policy of Panchsheela, w hile insp ired , seem s less 
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances of South Asia than Kautilya's 
2,300 year old advice on relations w ith neighbouring states. "A ruler with 
contiguous territory is a rival. The ruler next to the adjoining one is to be 
deem ed a friend. N eighbouring states are the source of treatises and 
hostilities."49 The following section will assess Kautilaya's work in more 
detail.
30.31 Kautilya’s Arthasastra
Despite India’s readiness to adopt alien governm ental structures the 
roots of an indigenous H indu tradition of statecraft extend back to 300 BC. 
Kautilya’s Arthasastra, or science of polity, like Machiavelli's Prince of 1513, 
was written by an adviser to the Prince of state as a m anual of dictum s for 
successful statecraft. Kautilya's prince was C handragup ta , w ho w ith 
Kautilya’s assistance, w ent on to become the first king of the M auryan 
Dynasty. This was the first kingdom  of sufficient size to be thought of as 
India. C handragupta built his em pire in the period im m ediately after 
Alexander the Great's army turned back from further eastward expansion at 
the river Beas. It is thought that Kautilya met Alexander the Great in 325
47 The Bhagavad-Gita in R.C. Zaehner, translator and editor, Hindu Scripture, (London: Dent 
& Sons, 1978).
48 R. Barz in India: Rebellion to Republic, pp. 100 -103.
49 V.K. Subramanian, Maxims of Chanakya, p. 11.
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BC.50 The Greeks laid waste to all significant opposition in the northwest of 
the subcontinent. This created a vacuum  into w hich C handragup ta  
expanded his empire. Alexander left General Seleucus in charge of their 
conquests in the subcontinent. As the M auryan em pire began to grow 
General Seleucus marched on C handragupta to reclaim the lands that had 
been lost but was forced to sue for peace. Through the peace Chandragupta 
gained present day Baluchistan and Afghanistan. In this way Chandragupta 
came to rule from the H indu Kush to Assam .51
An Indian tradition of realist statecraft was establish w ith the work of 
Kautilya. It held political life to be separate from the general tenets of H indu 
law in that the rulers dharm a, to preserve H indu society, necessitated 
behaviours that would not be acceptable otherwise .52 Herein lies a partial 
explanation of the more cynical side of Indian politics. This relationship 
between arthasastra and dharma, and betw een the realist conceptualization 
of politics and the ethical and moral behaviour of H indu society continues to 
have influence in contemporary Indian politics.
The Arthasastra provides one of the first foundations for a theoretical 
conceptualisation of in ternational relations. K autilya em phasised the 
im portance of power in statecraft. To him there were three com ponents of 
power. These were the power of deliberation or decision making, the power 
of the treasury and the power of the Armed forces.53 The objective of power
50 It is interesting to note that two of the most expansive empires of the era, those of 
Alexander and Chandragupta, had behind them the teaching of such great minds as Aristotle 
and Kautilya.
51 R.C. Majumdar, "Kautilya," in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: 
Macmillan Free Press, 1968), p. 354.
52 Like Machiavelli many years later this raises the issue of the justification of the means by 
the end achieved. It should be acknowledged that at the time of his writing Kautilya's 
justification of the means of the ruler by the end of the preservation of Hindu society would not 
have universaly been accepted. Many in 300 BC would have associated the King's dharma 
with the dharma of his people. Just as Machiavelli’s work was thought to be evil, the 
prudence of its suggestions were acknowledged despite its initial perception as being 
inconsistent with the professed morals of society. John Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient 
India: A Study of Kingship from the Earliest Times to Circa A.D. 300, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1964), p. 211.
53 George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu 
World," The American Political Science Review, Sept. 1964, p. 551. Partial inspiration for the 
dissertations model stems from Kautilya’s sources of power.
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for the King was to secure and expand his position and preserve the existing 
order of society. The king's status measured in term s of his pow er, would 
dictate his foreign policy. This emphasis on status has continuing relevance 
for contemporary India’s strategic posture.
One interpretation of India’s military build-up in the late 1980s is that 
it was motivated by a quest for status. Reinforcing Kautilya’s em phasis on 
status was his em phasis on asym metrical relations as opposed to equal 
relations betw een states.54 In Book Seven of the Arthasastra Kautilya 
explores the six m easures of foreign policy of kings. These are 1. 
accomm odation, (sandhi) 2. hostility, (vigraha) 3. indifference, (asana) 4. 
attack, (yana) 5. protection, (samsraya) and 6. double policy, (dvaidhibhava).55 
These policies are arrived at through an assessm ent of ones pow er. The 
element of power dictates policy.
This Realpolitik is more readily associated in the W estern m ind to 
Machiavelli (1467 - 1527) than to the land that produced M ahatma Gandhi. 
Both Kautilya and Machiavelli were trying through their w ritten  works, 
which were dedicated to their monarchs, to unite their respective nations. 
The importance of a discussion of the work of Kautilya stems from the need 
to become aware that India has an ancient and enduring realist trad ition  of 
foreign policy.56 Realism has always been a central them e of the Indian 
political tradition despite the idealism  of N ehru  and M ahatm a G andhi. 
Realist conceptions of statecraft were articulated there much earlier than  in 
the West despite the emphasis on the m etaphysical by the religions of the 
subcontinent.
54 John Spellman, The Kautilya Arthasastra, Book Seven "The Six Measures of Foreign 
Policy," pp. 372 - 444.
55 See Modelski, p. 552 for these summaries. The original text, as translated in Kangle s 
Arthasastra, p. 373 is as follows. "When in decline as compared to the enemy, he should make 
peace. When prospering he should, make war. (When he thinks) The enemy is not able to do 
harm to me, nor I to him,' he should stay quiet. When possessed of a preponderance of 
excellent qualities he should march. Depleted in power, he should seek shelter. In a work 
that can be achieved with the help of an associate, he should resort to a dual policy. Thus are 
the measures established."
56 This said, it is a tradition which is in an on-going process of reinterpretation.
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Kautilya’s system of geopolitics
= Potential allies against two and three
Adapted from Joseph Campbell ed. Philosophies of India, (London: Routledge and Keegan 
Paul Publishers, 1967), p. 292 and also from G. Bhagat, "Kautilya Revisited and Revisioned," 
Indian Journal of Political Science, April/June, 1990.
The m ost know n of Kautilya's concepts is the adage that one’s 
enem ies’ enem y is an ally. This Kautilya originally conceptualised as a 
mandala of concentric circles of states emanating out and away from ones 
own sta te .57 The understand ing  of the m andala system was aim ed at 
helping the king attain the twofold objectives of state, security and interest. 
In this "moral and religious consideration, m atters of ideology and the 
common spiritual trad ition  do not have the force of this geom etrical 
[mandala] fact."58
57 In the above diagram states 4, 5 and 6 would, acording to Kautilya, be potential allies of 
state 1 against state 2. Likewise 4, 7 and 6 would be potential allies of 1 against state 3.
58 Joseph Cambell as quoted in G. Bhagat, "Kautilya Revisited and Re-Visioned," The Indian 
Journal of Political Science, April-June, 1990, p. 198.
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It becomes essential to determ ine to w hat extent, and in what ways, 
elements of H indu culture are a part of contem porary Indian politics. To 
establish that a certain tradition exists falls short of establishing its influence 
on  the contem porary situation. In India 's case these are very subtle 
questions. Myron Weiner has addressed the problem and concluded that the 
degree of influence of the ancient teachings on contemporary statecraft and 
politics is minimal despite the references made to that body of knowledge. 
Weiner points out the problematic of establishing a correlation between the 
H indu political tradition and contemporary politics. The dynamic whereby 
subsequent generations continue to return  to the set texts and reinterpret 
them to give new meaning to the contem porary age differs from similar 
attem pts in W estern though t .59 K autilya's use of the im agery of the 
mandala, with its circles and connotations to the wheel of life, connotes a 
m ore cyclical way of conceptualisation . W einer’s rem arks on this 
phenom enon echo the views of B. A. Salatore .60 This is a testament to the 
staying power of the Hindu society over its closely related political structure.
This dynamic of the reinterpretation of the sacred texts, whether they 
beThe Arthasastra, The Codes of Manu, The Vedas, Upanishads, or Pur anas, 
is instrum ental in giving legitimacy to new ideas as they are represented as 
part of the tradition despite there recent origin.
There is a well known phenom ena of reinterpreting the past to 
bring it more in conform ity w ith contem porary beliefs and 
practices. Although all societies do this to some extent, Indians 
are particularly skilled in the art .61
59 In the West such cyclical interpretations, such as Francis Fukayama's rediscovery of Hegel, 
are not joined with an individual conception of life that itself is concieved of in rebirth. As 
such the perception of the inevitability of cycles is not as common in the West.
6(1 B. A. Salatore, Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions, (London: Asia Publishing 
House, 1963).
61 Myron Weiner, "Ancient Political Theory and Contemporary Indian Politics," in S.N. 
Eisenstadt, R. Kahane and D. Shulman, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India, (New 
York: Mouton Publishers, 1984), p. 113. A similar view that "cultural history is a projection: 
one reads into it or takes out of it according to present-day needs," has been put forward by 
Ashis Nandy, "The Making and Unmaking of Political Cultures in India," in At the Edge of 
Psychology: Essays in Political Culture, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 46 - 69.
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A non-continuous tradition based on reinterpretations of original referents 
of the society draw s on a firmly grounded source of power of identity to 
im plem ent reforms or reinterpretations of the existing order of political life 
in such a way that they are seen to be consistent with the order of society.
W einer's argum ent that "using the past is not the same as being 
influenced by i t "62 is interesting to contemplate in context w ith the rhetoric 
and actions of the BJP as a means of political m obilisation. Symbols are 
m anipulated, possibly cynically, to evoke images and sentim ents based on  
reinterpretations of the core concepts of H induism , as a means of political 
m obilisation. This perspective is supported  by observations by Stphen 
Cohen.
This vigourous growth of a mass political culture indicates that 
the revolution of modernity will not be led by the W esternised 
elites but by these newly powerful groups .63
There is evidence of rising belief by the electorate in the symbols and 
the values which are presented to them as catalysts for action. The new 
interpretation of the role of political leadership, especially in the context of 
the  p re s e rv a tio n  of re lig io u s  soc ie ty , is cu rren tly  undergo ing  
reinterpretation. Previously the pluralistic aspects of H induism  had been 
stressed to facilitate political pluralism .64 Now the H indu revivalists are 
reinterpreting the H indu past to rationalize a more interventionist role for 
governm ent in support of the H indu majority. The secularist interpretation 
of the H indu past emphasises the protection of minority rights and religious 
pluralism . The potential sociological im plications of this trend is for an 
increasingly self confident and righteous India. Such a re in te rp re ted  
national ethos may be less accomm odating to both its Muslim m inorities 
and its Islamic neighbours who are perceived as trying to underm ine the 
stability of the Hindu state.
62 Myron Weiner, in, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India, p. 114.
63 Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.195-6. Cohen continues to view the army as a secularising 
force.
64 Myron Weiner, in, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India, p. 125.
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It is w ithin this practice of the reinterpretation of symbols and texts 
that the chapter turns to look at the contem porary politics of the BJP with 
regard to the Muslim minority. This is done w ith a desire to examine the 
possibility that internal inter-religious tension m ight have the effect of 
increasing conflict between a more H indu India and Islamic Pakistan.
30.32 The Muslim minority, the Hindu identity and external conflict: Shah 
Bano, communalist-secularist debate, Babri Masjid-Ramjanmboomi and 
Kashmir
The question then follows; what is the effect of these developments 
on India's external relations, especially w ith Pakistan. How will the shift in  
attitudes within India on the proper place of minorities, and the Muslim 
minority in particular, affect India’s external relationhips? Indian politics is 
based on the competitive interests of individuals as represented by groups. 
Political parties have played on religious issues to gain the electoral support 
of these groups. As such, the interplay betw een the ideologies of secularism 
and communalism have come into direct conflict.65 The Muslim m inority 
will increasingly become m arginalised as communalist tensions continue to 
mount. This may happen in a relatively calm and gradual way. Converesly, 
it may come to pass through a violent backlash of a dislocated and frustrated 
H indu majority who have come to feel threatened by the special status given 
to M uslim s and o ther m inority  groups under the rule of N ehruvian  
inspired secularism. The effect that a dram atic rise in already high levels of 
com m unalist violence will have on the Indo-Pakistani relationship  is 
negative. To understand how this perception of minorities has been formed, 
this section will examine some of the more im portant causes and issues.
The Shah Bano case is inform ative on the shifting attitudes of the 
H indu majority towards the Muslim minority. The case has had the effect of 
challenging the secularist ideal which undergirds the legal system and the 
country as a whole. The suprem e court's ruling on Shah Bano challenged
65 It should be noted that within the Indian context the concept of secularism is one which 
does not deny the veracity of religion but merely asserts that all religions are equally correct 
in their belief structure. This particularly subcontinental view of secularism is distinct from 
the Western concept of secular humanism because it does not deny the transcendental element. 
Ainslie Embree, Utopias in Conflict: Religion and Nationalism in Modern India, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 95 - 7.
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m inority com m unities' previous right to their own legal codes of conduct 
w ithin India. In 1978 Ahm ed Khan, a Muslim, divorced his wife and, 
consistent w ith Muslim law, returned the Rps 3,000 m ehr which he had 
received as a marriage settlement. His wife, Shah Bano, then sued under the 
Criminal Procedures Code for alimony. The bench ruled that under section 
125 of the code, Khan would have to pay a maintenance. Khan's appeal that 
he should not have to pay the alimony was based on the duty of Muslims to 
obey Shariat law. Reacting negatively to K han's case Chief Justice 
Chandrachud stated th a t"... the time had come for a common legal code for 
all Indians, irrespective of religion."66 After his initial support of the ruling, 
Rajiv Gandhi was forced to m ute his support for fear of antagonising the 
Muslim com m unity.67
The Muslim W omen Protection of Rights of Divorce Bill that would 
exem pt Muslims from section 125 of the Crim inal Procedures Act was 
defended on the grounds that it furthered the interests of secular society by 
providing guarantees that minority groups would not be deprived of their 
rights. This is in direct contradiction to the pre-independence position of the 
Congress Party that India should be ruled by common laws for all citizens. 
The bill was seen bo th  as a "capitu la tion  to the forces of Islamic 
obscurantism" and as "pandering to Muslim separatism."68. This politically 
m otivated rein terpretation  had the effect of contributing to the further 
decline of secularism  in India. By catering to a religious m inority for 
political support, on this and other issues, com m unalist politics and, in 
reaction, H indu fundam entalist ideology have moved to the mainstream of 
Indian politics.
A m isunderstanding  of the H indu tradition  and its approach to 
violence exists. This is largely a m atter of confusion by many in the West 
over the H indu basis of M ahatm a G andhi’s teaching. The M ahatm a 
integrated H indu and Western values and traditions . One such product was
66 Ainslie Embree, Utopias in Conflict, p. 97.
67 The Muslim community is one of the most valued vote banks in Indian politics. Of the 542 
seats of the Lok Sabha the Muslim community is influential in 150.
68 Ainslie Embree, Utopias in Conflict, p. 108.
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his articulation of the concept of ahimsa or non-violence. It is this view that 
causes difficulty in coming to terms with the levels of violence in India.
... there is no absolute proscription of violence either in classical 
or folk culture of H induism  ... [the] Upanishadic view of life 
was that it was essentially based upon violence. Life feeds on 
life, said the Upanishads, and therefore it is impossible to live 
w ithout violence.69
Rajiv Gandhi later continued to bend his secularist principles when 
pressed by the BJP for the Hindi heart-land vote in U ttar Pradesh and Bihar 
over the Ramjanmboomi issue. He again bowed to political pressures in the 
1991 election campaign when he sought to use his image of solidarity with 
Iraq as a m eans of gaining the M uslim  vote. This act of bending to 
com m unalist pressures for electoral gain was a pragm atic policy w hich 
Indira Gandhi utilised before Rajiv. In this way M ahatma G andhi's vision 
of a united India continues to fade.
The struggle for independence led to communalist inspired collective 
carnage that resulted in the dislocation of ten  m illion H indus70 from  
Pakistan and the deaths of approxim ately one million inhabitants of the 
subcontinent. Since independence the numbers of incidents and their levels 
of lethality have been increasing. The Bombay riots in the wake of the 
destruction of the Babri-Masjid Mosque and the continuing strife in Kashm ir 
in the begining of 1993 attest that this is an ongoing problem.
Jawaharlal N ehru believed that "The governm ent of a country like 
India ... can never function satisfactorily in the m odern age except as a 
secular state."71 Despite the seeming incongruities betw een Islam and any 
secular state within the Indian context, a secular state, as opposed to a H indu 
state was appealing. It is from this basis that the Congress Party originally 
attracted the Muslim vote. W ith the rise of com m unalist violence in the
69 V. Das and A. Nandy, "Notes on Violence," as quoted in James Manor, Conflict Studies 212, 
Collective Conflict in India, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict), p. 1.
70 Radhakamal Muherjee, "Studies in Inter-Group Conflicts in India, Indian Jour)ial of Social 
Research, March, 1988, pp. 31- 42.
71 Mushirul Hasan, "In Search of Integration and Identity: Indian Muslims Since 
Independence," Economic and Political Weekly, 11/88, pp. 2467-78.
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sixties and continued discimination in the governm ent and private sectors, 
Muslims began to explore alternative political afiliations such as the Jamaat-i 
Islam i and Itehad  ul M usilm een. W hile com m unalism  has always 
threatened the political fabric of Indian society it has in the last decade risen 
substantially . The seventies w ere m arked by a com parative lull in  
com m unalist violence. The eighties w itnessed a four fold increase of 
communalist deaths. Utar Pradesh, Bihar, M aharashtra, Gujarat, and West 
Bengal have traditionally been those states w ith the highest casualty figures. 
The com m unalist sentim ent is strong enough that it is underm ining the 
very institu tions w hich are responsible for countering its abuses. In 
comm unalist rioting in Bihar in December of 1989, 100 Muslims were taken 
into custody by the military and then later turned over to the police. The 
next day they were found to have been killed.72
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Adapted from: George J. Bryjak, "Collective Violence in India,” Asian Affairs: An American 
Review, Summer 1986, p. 37, B.R. Nayar, Violence and Crime in India: A Quantitative Study, 
(Delhi: Macmillan Company of India, 1975) Crime in India 1977, (Faridabad: Government of 
India Press, 1981) The riot statistics, while useful as a gage of general levels of violence and 
tension within the society, take into account many forms of collective violence which are not 
necessarily inspired by Hindu-Muslim conflict. As such they would include Hindu-Sikh 
conflicts and all other riots.
72 James Clad, "A mixed Verdict but Opposition fails to win a Majority," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 12/7/89.
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Atul Kohli, in his recent study, Democracy and Discontent, concluded that 
there has been a "dramatic increase in political violence in India.'73 Kohli 
attributes this dramatic rise to feebleness of the om nipresent state to fulfil its 
responsibility to "foster the 'life chances' of many diverse social groups..."74 
Reliable consistent data is difficult to obtain. Despite this there is a definite 
rise in the levels of violence. One hu n d red  and thirty  people were 
reportedly killed in association with the the 1991 election.75 Home Minister 
S.B. Chavan reported to the Rajya Sabha that in the three months of April, 
May and June of 1992 600 militants and 462 police and civilians were killed 
in Punjab alone.76 From January 1990 to August 1992 almost 8000 people 
w ere killed in m ilitan t and  counterinsurgency actions in K ash m ir77 
Communal violence in India
Year No. of incidents No. killed No. of injured
1976 169 39 794
1977 188 36 1,122
1978 230 110 1,853
1979 304 261 2,379
1980 421 372 2,691
Adapted from: George J. Bryjak, "Collective Violence in India," Asian Affairs: An American 
Review, summer 1986, p. 41, Bisharif, Economic and Political Weekly, May 1,1981. The Home 
Ministry definition of communal violence includes conflict between two or more ethnic, 
linguistic and or religious groups and as such is not limited to Hindu-Muslim confrontations. 
This increasing trend can be projected into the 1990s.
These figures indicate that existing statistics, such as those below, have been 
rapidly overtaken. Further, intercom m unal conflict has been expanding
73 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crissis of Governability, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 6-7. Kohli has produced a similar graph 
based on statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs and Baldev Nayar, Violence and Crime 
in India: A Quantitative Study, (Delhi: Macmillan, 1975), p. 17. His findings, covering the 
years 1955 to 1985, confirm and extend the general progression towards dramatically incresing 
levels of political violence in India as presented in the above graph.
74 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent, p. 8.
75 Sergie Irodov, New Times, p. 15.
76 "600 Punjab Militants Killed," The Hindustan Times,7/15/92.
77 "Rao Vows to Hold Kashmir," The Australian^/17/92.
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into areas where it was heretofore unknown. For example, H indu - Muslim 
strife left over 100 dead in M anipur in May of 1993.78
India's social fabric has suffered the necessary and painful stresses of 
transition which have led to increased com petition for political pow er to 
control the paucity of available resources. While the nature of collective 
conflict and  rio ting  in Ind ia  has a tendency to be fragm ented  and 
unorganised, it is being used by the political parties for the purposes of 
carving out of vote banks.
Vote-bank politics is dividing India. V.P. Singh, of the Janata Dal, 
sought to gain backw ard caste votes through the im plem entation of the 
M andal Commission Report recom mendations. Rajiv Gandhi flirted w ith 
the H indu fundam entalists in the lead up to the 1989 elections only to 
reverse and try to court the Muslim vote in the lead up to the 1991 elections. 
Despite these attem pts it is the determined, and well orchestrated, efforts of 
the BJP to mobilise the country through a new sense of a H indu India that is 
potentially  the m ost d isruptive to international relations. Incidents of 
Hindu-M uslim  conflict will, in an indirect way, have an impact on India’s 
external posture. In the first instance they will extend the BJP's power base 
and influence political discourse. Such m ilitancy against the M uslim 
comm unity may gain sufficient m om entum  to get the electoral support to 
form state governm ents in the north, and to become a necessary coalition 
partner to form a government at the national level. Rising levels of Hindu- 
M uslim  conflict in India will reflect negatively on the Indo-Pakistani 
relationship as perceived by both sides.
The nature of statistical reporting makes it difficult to distinguish 
betw een  com m unalist conflict betw een H indus and M uslim s or, for 
example, between H indus and Sikhs, Assamese and Muslims or inter caste 
violence. The H indu majority feels besieged by the m ounting collective 
conflict. As this perception grows, frustrations will grow and pressure will 
build for an attem pt to find a comprehensive solution. Many H indus can
78 While the northeast and Manipur have witnessed much conflict it has been based on tribal 
affiliation or as a response to demographic shifts. This incident is a departure for its primary 
comunal basis. Sanjoy Hazarika, "100 Dead in Religious strife," The New York Times, 5/5/93.
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still recall their flight from areas now part of Pakistan or Bangladesh. These 
memories of carnage, rape and destruction have become part of the national 
psyche. Building on this international image of Muslims and the creation of 
Pakistan are the wars of 1965 and 197179 and the present on-going efforts by 
Pakistan to fan the flames of seccession in Punjab and in Kashmir. Though 
it is som ewhat problematic to attem pt to dem onstrate a direct correlation 
betw een the in ternal inter-com m unal group level of analysis and the 
in ternational level, the rising levels of internal conflict are eroding the 
relationship, possibly to the point of war, between India and Pakistan. It is of 
interest that "support for organisations such as the [Vishwa Hindu] Parishad 
seems to come largely from the H indu urban m iddle class..."80 This is the 
most rapidly expanding and politically im portant socio-economic grouping 
within Indian society today.
The Ram janm boom i/Babri Masjid d ispute was the focal point of 
inter-communal conflict between H indus and Muslims in India between the 
mid 1980s and 1992 when it was destroyed. The origins of the dispute date 
back to the sixteenth century. In 1526, Babur com m em orated the first 
M ughal invasion of India by converting the H indu Temple of Rama at 
Ayodhya to a Mosque. It is from these origins that the Mosque takes its 
name. In 1949 images of Rama and Sita were found inside the Mosque. By 
the 1960s, the issue had become a focal point of resentm ent by the H indus 
toward the Muslim minority. In 1970, the courts ruled that the site should 
be closed lest it provoke further conflict between the two communities. In 
1986, the courts reversed the earlier decision and reopened the site. It is from  
this time that the high levels of violence have been associated w ith the 
dispute. Coincidentaly this is the same period  of m ounting tensions 
betw een the H indu and Sikh communities in Punjab. And the increase in 
cross border support for Kashmiri and Sikh militants.
79 The next war between India and Pakistan may not be confined to the border areas. India 
may not, as it did in 1971, hesitate after another bifurcation of the country. It may then seek a 
victory which will beyond a doubt assert its regional dominance. This war, in the minds of 
Hindu India, will be waged with the legitimatizing perception that it is a matter of self 
defence.
80 Ainslie Embree, Utopia's in Conflict, p. 130.
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Ayodhya cost Rajiv Ganhi dearly by underm ining Congress’ H indu 
support in the electoraly vital H indi belt w hich spans northern  India. 
Ayodhya, located 532 kilometers to the southeast of Delhi, is allegedly the 
birthplace of the H indu God Rama. Timed to coincide w ith the lead up to 
the national elections in Novem ber of 1989, the Vishwa H indu Parshad 
gathered sanctified bricks from 375,000 towns and cities throught India, 
Canada, the United States and Europe to start construction of a new tem ple 
to their Lord Rama. The bricks were brought to the site by believers. In the 
course of transporting the sactified bricks to the site some 280 people were 
killed in com m unalist violence.81 Despite the controversy w hether a 
H indu temple to Rama did occupy the site prior to the erection of Babri 
Masjid, what is important is that it is widely believed to have been the case.82
Initially it was the governm ent’s position, as articulated by Rajiv 
G andhi’s Home Minister, Buta Singh,83 that if there was to be any further 
construction in Ayodhya it would take place at a location distant from the 
existing Mosque so as not to exacerbate tensions by threatening the existence 
or legitimacy of the Mosque and by extension Muslim rigths to their form of 
w orshhip . The reality was that on 11 N ovem ber 1989, VHP sadhus 
orchestrated the excavation of a foundation less than 22 feet from Babri 
Masjid. Security forces on the scene did nothing to stop this action. This 
inaction indicated a reluctance by Congress to openly oppose the VHP.84 The 
VHP has also targeted other sites, including M athura and Varanasi, where 
Mosques have been built on the sight of former H indu temples.85
The excavation of the foundation  touched off M uslim  reprisals 
against H indus across northern India. Hindus were burned to death in their 
villages, killed in their dormitory beds and pulled from trains and stoned to
81 "Bricks Pave Way to Religious Strife." The Sydney Morning Herald, 11/6/89.
82 Clad, James The Hindu Card: Appeal to Command Sentiment Could Backfire." The Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 11/23/89.
83 Home Minister Buta Singh lost his parliamentary seat by more than 53,000 votes to the BJP 
candidate in the November 1989 elections. Other key Congress Council of Ministers members 
such as Rajesh Pilot, Jagdish Tytler, Ram Niwas Mirdah and Natwar Singh also lost their 
seats. The Australian, 11/28/89.
84 In this way Prime Minister Rao is following Rajiv Gandhi's precedent.
8d Clad, James 'The Hindu Card: Appeal to Command Sentiment Could Backfire." The Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 11/23/89.
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death. To quell the Muslim mobs, Indian security forces were forced to open 
fire. In light of this violence excavation at the sight was suspended.
This attem pt to play on H indu sym pathies was a major electoral 
blunder for the Congress Party. Rajiv's acquiescence to the militancy of the 
VHP over the affair served to alienate the Muslim community while adding 
to the m om entum  of the H indu  fun d am en ta lis t m ovem ent. This 
m om entum  resulted in the December 1992 destruction of the Mosque. The 
Mosque's destruction triggered violence against H indus and H indu shrines 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Former Indian prime minister, and leader of the Janata Dal Party, V.P. 
Singh was joined by leftist parties in calling for Prime M inister Narasim ha 
Rao, of the Congress Party, to step down from the prime m inister's chair as a 
result of his failure "to protect the constitution" in connection w ith the 
destruction  of the Babri Masjid. Though Rao dispatched some 20,000 
members of the Central Reserve Police to help control the crowd of more 
than 200,000 who had assembled at Ayodhya, they failed to assist the 3,000 
local police who d id  little to p revent the M osque’s destruction  on 6 
December 1992.
Rao's inability to prevent the destruction of the Mosque threatened 
the policy of secularism enshrined in India’s constitution. The official death 
toll in subseqent rioting was 1,119. Violence associated with the M osque’s 
destruction spread to 15 of India's 25 states. M ost of those killed were 
reportedly Muslims shot by police.86 Imam Syed Ahmed Bukari expressed 
his com m unities lack of faith in the governm ent and accused Rao of 
allowing the "death of secularism."87 Rao sought to avoid his ouster in 
Parliament by dismissing the BJP Uttar Pradesh government, by arresting BJP 
leaders Advani and Joshi and by banning the Shiv Sena and the VHP.88
This is not the first instance w here in ternal conflict has led to 
increased international tension and conflict. The theft of the prophet's hair
86 "Mosque Death Toll," The Sydney Morning Herald, 12/6/92.
87 "Destroyed Mosque Spells Uncertainty for India,” Reuters News Service, 12/7/92.
88 "India Facing Further Religious Violence," The Canberra Times, 12/10/92.
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in 1964 is an example of the interrelationship betw een internal and external 
conflict in South Asia. The loss of the sacred relic from a Kashmiri Mosque 
in early 1964 resulted in retaliatory rioting against H indus in East Pakistan. 
This touched off anti-M uslim violence in West Bengal and Bihar and the 
overall situation led to a hightening of tensions in the period immediately 
preceding the war of 1965.
O ther examples of the in ternal/ex ternal dynamic are the policies of 
Panchsheela and non-alignment. The consensus approach to the freedom 
struggle adopted  by M ahatm a Gandhi and Jawaharlal N ehru brought a 
majority of Indians together to achieve its independence. Likewise N ehru 
sought to bring together the breath  of the political spectrum  through his 
foreign policy of Panchsheela and non-alignment. He was largely successful 
in bringing together views as d isparate  as conservative pro W estern 
capitalists and communists. In this way NAM was not merely an Indian 
response to the external environm ent but an outgrow th of Indian internal 
politics and domestic conditions.89
The on-going recurrences of com m unalist violence im plies that, 
while India has the veneer of secularism enshrined in its constitution, the 
people have not accepted or internalised its secular ideology.90 The Indo- 
Nepal dispute of the spring and sum m er of 1989 was primarily touched off 
by Nepal's flirtation with China as a source of arms. Gorkaland’s dem ands 
for the inclusion of N epali as one of the constitutionally  recognised 
languages of India and the status of Nepali speakers in the rest of India, 
while subordinate to strategic considerations, did affect the external equation 
w ith Nepal.91
The mercenary style of politics employed by the Congress Party has 
had a deleterious effect on the ideology of secularism and Kashmir's desire 
to rem ain a part of the Indian state. This further erosion of the secular 
ideology, which had heretofore kept comm unalist violence in abeyance, is
89 Partha Ghosh, "Domestic Sources of India's Policy of Non-alignement," India Quarterly, v. 
36, 1980.
90 A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 64.
91 Robert Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy, p. 28.
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responsible for increased violence in Kashmir. The anti-H indu, Muslim 
riots in Anantnag, Kashmir in February 1986 led Rajiv Gandhi to seek to 
placate the Muslim comm unalist sentim ents through the in troduction of 
the Muslim Women Protection of Rights of Divorce Bill that would exempt 
Muslims from Section 125 of the Criminal Procedures Act. The impact of 
internal tensions has led H indus to ask the question: "are Muslims really 
committed to being Indian citizens or do they have an extraterritorial loyalty 
to Pakistan, the state that destroyed the unity of India in 1947 and remains its 
enem y?"92 As the levels of communalist violence grow, the H indu majority 
is increasingly coming to the conclusion that the Muslim minority and other 
m inority groups, including tribal and  ethnic groups, are placing their 
primary identity ahead of that of the Indian state. This creates the perception 
that the minority groups are other than "Indian" as defined by the majority. 
Concomitant w ith this is the trend of H indu revivalists to more closely 
identify  the sta te  w ith  a H indu  iden tity . This effort rep resen ts a 
fundam ental reorientation of the ideological basis of the m odern Indian 
state. It should also be understood that this is not a reactionary m ovem ent 
but one that seeks to m anufacture a new ideology of the state through 
redefinition of the myths of the state based on a H indu identity emphasising 
strength rather than tolerance.
Neo-traditionalists are, within the Indian context, best conceptualised 
as constituting the new radical right. T hrough focusing atten tion  on 
glorious notions of a H indu past, as represented by the attention focused on 
Ram through the Ramjanmboomi issue, support for redefinition of the 
present allows a new future to be created. This process of reinterpreting the 
past began with the subordination of Muslim rule, which had been in place 
since the 12th century. With British rule came the opportunity of H indu 
thinkers to reinterpret their past. D uring the freedom  struggle leading 
thinkers sought to em phasise the eclectic, integrative, absorptive and 
tolerant aspect of H indu culture to create an ideology which could allow the 
formation of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic state.93 As tolerance gives way
92 Ainslie Embree, Utopia’s in Conflict, p.105. .
93 Many of the above mentioned themes concerning interpretations of Hindu culture have been 
discussed by Ainslie Embree in Utopias in Conflict.
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to strength, India's external orientation will adjust to reflect the changing 
domestic ethos. The VHP reconverted 20,000 Muslims during the 1980s, 
despite the lack of an evangelist tradition within Hinduism.94
Threatened by centrifugal tendencies, the centre is now in search of a 
ideology to counteract the entropy which is setting in. This ideology will 
either be a revitalised form of secularism or an ideology based on Hindutva.
H indutva is built on the tenents of reform ed Hinduism  of the 
19th century. Reformed according to the readings of those who 
saw Hinduism as inferior to the Semitic creeds, in turn seen as 
well bounded , m onolithic, well organised and capable of 
sustaining the ideology of an imperial state.95
The short sighted electoral policies of the Congress Party during the 
1980s created an atmosphere where secular conventions and the rule of law 
were being underm ined. Rajiv Gandhi both accentuated communal tension 
and showed that he would bow to vote bank pressure for electoral gain by 
not accepting the suprem e courts ruling on the Shah Bano case, and by 
responding by introducing the Muslim W omen's Bill. W hen the H indu 
vote bank began to pressure him on Ayodhya he again shifted position. His 
stand on Shah Bano, and the extension of presidential rule in Punjab by 
am endm ent of the constitution, further underm ined the rule of law. Rajiv 
Gandhi and the Congress Party were put on the electoral defensive by the 
BJP’s attem pt to carve out the biggest vote bank in India~the H indu vote. It 
is the BJP’s aim to cut across caste, class, region, language, or other 
subdividing categories of Indian society to capture H indu India. The BJP’s 
emphasis on the geographic aspects of the definition of the term Hindu also 
leaves room  for non H indus to join. Despite this, it is unlikely that its 
support base will expand beyond Hindi speaking north India.
The rise in internal tensions in the mid to late 1980s was m irrored by 
increasing  signs of conflict be tw een  Ind ia  and  its neighbours, as 
dem onstrated  by Operation Brass Tacks, Operation Checker Board, the 
intervention in Sri Lanka, the deteriorated relations w ith Nepal and the
94 javed Ansari, "Evangelism Safron Style," India Today, 2/28/93, p. 50.
95 Ashis Nandy, "Hinduism Versus Hindutva," Times of India,!/18/91.
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intervention in the Maldives. The question then arises as to whether or not 
there is a correlation betw een the rising levels of internal and external 
conflict. The existence of underlying insecurities betw een comm unities 
w ith in  India had  been  overla id  by the early political leaderships 
championing of the precepts of secularism.
As political life entered the realm  of cynical political expediency, 
dem onstrated by Indira's relationship w ith the radical Sikh m ovem ent in  
Punjab and the earlier manipulations of the politics of Kashmir, the restraint 
of secularism was w ithdraw n. Indira  G andhi's use of Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranw ale as a political m ercenary to aid her in an attack on the 
moderate Akali Dal contributed to the events which ultim ately led to her 
death. Indira Gandhi, w ith Giani Zail Singh, hom e m inister and later 
president, created a fundam entalist Sikh m ovem ent, led by Bhindranwale, 
to destabilise and split the the Akali Dal. The Akali Dal had been outspoken 
against Indira and the emergency. By attacking the Akali Dal, Indira hoped 
to create openings for a retu rn  of Congress to office in Punjab .96 This 
delegitim ised the legitim ate sub-national and autonom ous agenda, as 
opposed to militant and avowedly secessionist elements, such as the Dal 
Khalsa, which sought a separate Sikh state. The Sikh struggle has been 
radicalised by being cynically m anipulated by the centre. This has brought 
Punjab to the brink of being irreversibly beyond a negotiated settlement.
96 R. N. Kumar and G. Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle, pp. 249-59.
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6000  - | Punjab Violence 1988-91
5000 -
Terrorists
Police4000 -
Civilians
3000 - Total
2 0 0 0 -
1000 -
1990
Source: Punjab Police as published in Hamish McDonald, "The Toll of Terror," 
The Far East Economic Review, 4 /9 /92  p.24
The underlying tensions resurfaced w ithin the context of a H indu 
com m unity which sought to redress its siege mentality by asserting itself 
over those communities which it perceives as threatening. In this context, 
internal and external conflict are understood as part of a larger nexus 
betw een security environments. The nature of conflict in the subcontinent, 
and India's emerging position w ithin it, is better understood by refraining 
from  draw ing rigid distinctions betw een discreet areas of conflict in 
international or domestic environments. The causal relationship is difficult 
to firmly establish bu t it does come closer to an explanation of India's 
behaviour than superficial discussions of India's need to be taken seriously 
as an international actor.
The above m entioned events resulted in no less than a communalist 
challenge to the seculer state. In 1993, it was not clear which of these two 
national identities would predominate.
30.4 Emerging national identities: the communalist/fundamentalist 
challenge to the secularist state
The Babri M asjid/Ramjanmboomi controversy highlighted the extent 
of Hindu-M uslim tensions in the north of India. This tension is not limited
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to the Hindi belt heartland of U ttar Pradesh and Bihar since there are clear 
signs that the communalist tensions are spreading to other areas of India. 
The outbreak of extensive rioting in Bangalore and Mysore in Karnataka and 
more generally in central southern India during the 1980s bears this out.97 
Other states that have recently witnessed heightened levels of communalist 
violence are Jam mu and Kashmir, M aharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujrat, West 
Bengal and Madhya Pradesh.
H indu chauvinism is cumulatively effecting a transformation of India 
from a secular to a communally based society. Its rhetoric and actions are 
divisive, and confrontational towards India's minorities. In January of 1992 
H indu nationalists planned to drive a m otorcade from the south of India to 
Kashmir as part of a "pilgrimage of unity" and as an act of defiance against 
M uslim  secessionists.98 Though the caravan was halted by security forces 
w ho were unable to ensure its safety, BJP leader, M.M. Joshi, and 70 of his 
supporters were flown to Srinagar. There he carried the Indian national flag 
to the central square, Lai Chowk, "in a defiant gesture of Indian dom ination 
of the rebellious, predominantly Muslim region."99 In addition, the VHP is 
committed to a structure at the Ayodhya site that will replace the destroyed 
Babri-Masjid M osque.100 L.K. Advani has called for "a clear cut stand "that 
w ould let the Pakistanis know "that there are limits to which [India] can 
tolerate" Pakistani intervention in Indian affairs.101
India’s neighbours have further cause for concern should the BJP gain 
control of the government. The chief of the Shiv Sena, Bal Thackeray, in 
denying the militancy of his organisation’s approach, stated that "we don't
97 Dennis Austin and Anirundha Gupta, 'The Politics of Violence in India and South Asia," 
Conflict Studies, July/August 1990, p. 8.
98 This assertion of Hindu authority was concluded in 11 minutes while sporadic fighting 
carried on in the city. Edward Gargan, " Kashmir Caravan by Hindus is Halted," The New 
York Times, 1 / 26/92.
99 Edward Gargan, "Airlifted Hindu Nationalists Fly Indian National Flag in Kashmir," 
The New York Times,!127/91.
100 Gautam Navlakha, "A Show of Hindu Power," Economic and Political Weekly, 4/1/89. 
"Hindus Stop Work on Temple," The Australian, 7 /2 /92. Raju Golpanakrishna, "Hindu 
Militants Converge on Spot Near Disputed Shrine," Reuters News Service, 10/19/91.
101 "Advani for Realistic Approach on Pakistan," Hindustan Times, 12/7/90.
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have a violent attitude. But if we are attacked, we will retaliate."102 He 
further dem onstrates the growing defensive a ttitude  of H indus tow ard 
m inority  groups in the following. "Where will the H indus go if the 
governm ent and the minorities keep on behaving the way they do? ... This 
will rem ain saffron Hindustan." BJP President M. M. Joshi echoes these 
sentim ents stating "This concept of m inorities having different economic 
and political interests than anybody else is wrong."103 Ashok Singhal of the 
VHP has predicted that "You will soon see within this country a vertical 
d iv ide w ith in  each political political party  — those who accept H indu 
nationalism and those who don’t." M. M. Joshi has articulated Hinduism  as 
a "geo-cultural concept" and further proposed "that there should be a 
confederation [based on this geo-cultural concept] from A fghanistan to 
Indonesia" under India's influence. His vision for India is one where "India 
takes its place in the community of nations; a few centuries ago we were at 
the top of the world-- why can’t we be again."104
Despite the appearance of overwhelm ing support from the Indian 
electorate, the Congress party received less than 45% in most elections. The 
communal appeal which has been propelling the BJP's electoral success has 
always been a part of Indian politics. Post independence political parties can 
be thought of as communal or secularist in their orientation. Examples of 
the communal regional parties include the National Conference in Kashm ir, 
the Akali Dal in Punjab, the All India Anna Dravida M unnetra Kazhagam 
(AIADMK) of the south, Telugu Desam of A ndhra Pradesh, and the Shiv  
Sena of M aharashtra.105 The communists regional base of support in W est 
Bengal is an exception to this general rule. W hat makes the communalism 
of the BJP a significant threat to secularism is that it has potential for pan- 
Indian support that the other secular parties do not.
102 This and the following two quotes are drawn from an interview with Bal Thackeray and 
Ashok Singhalin I. Badhwar, et. al, "Communalism: Dangerous Dimensions," India Today, p. 
35.
103 Interview, M. M. Joshi, BJP Party Headquarters Delhi, 2 /7 /91 .
104 Interview, M. M. Joshi, 2/7/91.
105 Robert Bradnock, India's Foreign Polio/, pp. 25 - 6.
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30.41 The 1989 and 1991 elections
1989 Lok Sabha Election Results106 seats % % of vote
Congress 197 37% 40.3%
N ational Front
Janata Dal 141 27% 18.3%
Telegu Desam 2 1% 3.4%
Congress (S) 1 - -
BJP 86 16% 11.8%
Left Parties
CPI (M) 32 6% 6.5%
CPI 12 2% 2.7%
Other Left 8 2% 1.1%
Others
AIADMK 11 2% 1.6%
Akali Dal 6 1% -
Bahunjan Samaj Party 3 1% -
Small Parties and 30 6% -
Independents
The most salient features of the 1991 elections are the gains made by 
the BJP. This weakened the status of the Congress Party. The 1991 elections 
marked the further expansion of coalition politics at the national level with 
regional parties becoming parties of national scope.107
The BJP’s electoral success was more significant than the num bers 
alone w ould  suggest. In the 1989 election, the BJP increased  its 
representation in Parliament to 86 seats. In the 1991 hustings, it increased its 
representation from 86 to 117. Its significant success in 1989 was m ade 
possible by collaboration on the issue of voting trade offs w ith V.P. Singh's 
Janata Dal and the National Front (NF). In the 1991 elections, there was no 
agreem ent betw een the BJP and the NF as to who w ould stand against 
Congress in which districts. The BJP stood on its own in 1991, consolidated
106 yhere are a total of 545 seats in the Lok Sabha. Of these elections were held for 529 seats. 
Elections were not held for Assam's 14 seats or for the two Anglo-Indian seats. Richard 
Sission, "India in 1989: A Year of Elections in a Culture of Change," Asian Survey, February 
1990, p. 122.
107 In the November 1989 elections at least 110 people, including some candidates, were killed 
in election related violence. This is twice the figure killed in the 984 election. "Big Gains for 
Hindu Fundamentalist Party." The Austrailian, 11/28/89.
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its previous gains and expanded on them . Furtherm ore, Congress's 
perform ance was bolstered by the sym pathy vote in the wake of Rajiv 
Gandhi's demise in the later two days of polling. The BJP's position is 
stronger because it captured power in the politically crucial areas of U ttar 
Pradesh and Bihar. Between them, U ttar Pradesh and Bihar control 139 of a 
total of 545 seats in Parliament. Overall, the BJP increased its share of the 
popular vote from 11.5% to 23%.108
The BJP would have had a larger victory had Rajiv Gandhi not been 
assassinated. The "sympathy vote" turned voters in favour of Congress. In 
this way Congress’ Rajiv Gandhi, like his m other, helped his party even in  
death. This was most notable in Tamil N adu w here Rajiv G andhi was 
assassinated.109 There Congress gained a clear ro u t over the D ravida 
M unnetra Kazhagam (DMK). The DMK had been closely associated w ith 
support for the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers whom  the Indian central bureau of 
investigation has indicated as being behind the assassination.110
The Indian voter is voting for change in the hope that eventually 
some governm ent will im plem ent program s to alleviate h is /h e r problems. 
This reactive voting behaviour was evident in the 1989 elections w hen the 
south supported Rajiv Gandhi. Even the BJP who are the new-comers to 
governm ent cannot escape the vote for change. In 1991 they lost seats in  
Madya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachel Pradesh.111
108 Hamesh McDonald, The Hindu Burden," Far Eastern Economic Review, 6/27/91, p. 12.
109 A Marketing and Research Group (MARG) poll indicated that there were significant 
shifts in support towards the Congress Party on the June 12th and 15th polling dates as 
opposed to the election trends on the opening polling date 20 May 1991. Rajiv Gandhi himself 
was swept into power on a massive sympathy wave based on the voter reaction to the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. The fact that the sympathy vote did not have the 
same effect in 1991 as it did in 1984 can be attributed to the lack of another family member for 
the voting populace to extend their sympathy to. Rajiv's Italian born wife, Sonia refused to 
accept leadership of the party. Rajivs two children were too young and without political 
experience. Further contributing factors to the diminished impact of the sympathy vote would 
be the time delay and the fact that Rajiv was assassinated in Tamil Nadu by foreign Tamils. 
In 1984, Indira's assassination by Sikhs in Delhi could immediately be vented on the local 
Sikh populations in the north. See also Hamesh McDonald, "Fractured Mandate," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 6/27/91, pp. 10-13.
110 Hamesh McDonald, "Fractured Mandate," pp. 10-13.
111 The BJP came to power in these states in 1989. BJP Lok Sabha representation decreased 
from 27 to 12 seats of Madhya Pradesh's 40. In Rajasthan its share dropped from 13, to 12 of 25.
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H in d u  fu n d am en ta lism  is p ro m o ted  by a nu m b er of key 
organisations. The political wing is the Bharatiya Janata Party which has 
been making significant inroads into the national political arena. The 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad is a socio-religious body which has taken up the 
cause of Ram in the effort to prom ote H induism  in India. The H indu 
nationalist Rashtriya Sw ayam sevak Sangh (RSS) is one of the earlier 
organisations which seeks to protect the H indu faith. In addition there is the 
more extreme Shiv Sena.
The Shiv Sena are seeking to develop H indu assertiveness and self 
confidence. A Shiv Sena area leader of the Thane district of Bombay 
describes his frustrations in the following way. "I have contem pt for 
Gandhi. He believed in turning the other cheek. I believe that if som eone 
slaps you, you must have the power to ask him why he slapped you, or you 
must slap him back. I hate the idea of non-v io lence ."112 This attitude is 
characteristic of the H indu backlash against policies of accommodation and 
tolerance tow ard m inority groups. W ith the scarcity of opportun ity , 
majorities are less benevolent towards their minorities.
Roop Rekha Verma, professor of philosophy at Lucknow University, 
has h ighlighted the natu re  of the tension  set by the Babri Masjid- 
Ramjanmboomi issue.
The Babri Mosque is a symbol. By removing it, the H indus can 
show the Muslims they can’t have everything their way. The 
Muslims know that the Mosque is useless, and has not been 
used for prayers for decades. But they know that after that, 
H indu rule will come. In this situation how can the Muslims 
give up the m osque .113
The destruction of the Mosque at Ayodhya is the first step tow ards a 
redefinition of the foundational ideology of the Indian state. The
In Himachel Pradesh it dropped from 3, to 2 of 4. Hamesh McDonald, "The Hindu Burden," 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 /27/91, p. 13.
112 V.S. Naipaul, India: A Million Mutinies Now, (Calcuta: Rupa & Co., 1990), p. 24.
113 Hamish McDonald, 'Temple Trauma," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11/7/91, p. 13.
Hindu chauvinist majority has shown that it can assert itself over the 
will of the government.
1991, Lok Sabha Election Results114
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Congress 226
National Front
Janata Dal 56
Telegu Desam 13
BJP 117
Left Parties
CPI (M) 35
CPI 13
Others
AIADMK 11
Small Parties and 31
Independents
Only 53% of the eligible voters cast ballots in the 1991 election.115 This 
is the lowest turnout of any modern Indian election. This apathy reflects the 
exasperation of the Indian voter with the cynical quality of Indian politics. 
This dissatisfaction can be characterised by the "throw the rascals out" rule. 
The increasingly wary Indian voter in the 1991 election voted for change 
regardless of region or previous affiliation. The most significant change was 
the increase from 11.5% of the popular vote to 23% by the BIP.116
The degree of influence of Hindu fundamentalism can be measured 
by the non-Hindu parties willingness to bend their demands for fear of 
loosing the "Hindu" vote. On 9 November 1989, Rajiv Gandhi allowed a 
VHP bricklaying ceremony for the new temple at Ayodhya to proceed despite 
the earlier decision by then Home Minister, Buta Singh, to keep such 
ceremonies away from the site.117 In February of 1991, Chandra Swami
114 Walter Andersen, "India's 1991 Elections," Asian Survey, Oct. 1991, p. 980 and Hamish 
McDonald, "Fractured Mandate," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 6/27/91, p. 10.
115 The hot weather at the time of the elections also contributed to the low turn out. Barbara 
Crossette, "Disgruntled India: The Voters Make Clear Their Discontent, Giving No Party a 
Majority in Low Turnout," The New York Times, 6/18/91.
116 Support for the Communists of Bengal and the regional parties of the south are exceptions. 
Hamish McDonald, "The Hindu Burden," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 6/27/91, p. 12.
117 James Clad, "The Hindu Card," The Far Eastern Economic R evieu \ll/23/89.
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courted Bal Thakeray of the Shiv Sena on behalf of Chandrashekhar.118 
Prime Minister Rao raised only token opposition to the BJP assembly at 
Ayodhya which resulted in the Mosque’s destruction. He was also reluctant 
to stop the BJP rally at the boat club in Delhi on 25 February 1993. The rally 
was to celebrate and consolidate the BJP’s victories in the previous months. 
Rao agreed to oppose the rally only in the face of stiff cabinet opposition. 
Arun Singh emerged in early 1993 as a chief rival to Rao’s leadership of the 
Congress Party by condeming Rao as soft on the BJP and Hindu 
fundamentalism.119
After their major success in the 1991 elections the BJP decided that 
they could win without having to pay too much attention to the minorities. 
This strengthened the position of the hard liners in the party.120 The 
position of the hard-liners in the party was further reinforced as a result of 
intra-party struggles over future policy on Ayodhya in July of 1992 which 
subsequently led to the Mosque’s destruction. M.M. Joshi, with his policy of 
continuing to push for construction at Ayodhya, was successful in sidelining 
L.K. Advani, A.B. Vajpayee and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Kalyan 
Singh.121 The M.M. Joshi faction of the BJP and the VHP, in pressing their 
right to build a temple at the Ayodhya site made direct attacks on the secular 
policies of the Congress Party.122 The hard-line wing further seemed to have 
influence with the youth wing of the BJP when they picked up the theme of 
attacking pseudo-secularism by burning it in effigy in Delhi.123 Despite these 
obvious signs of increasing militancy the Congress Party did little to openly 
challenge the Hindu agenda.
30.42 The electoral rise of Hindu parties
It is a historical curiosity to ponder whether the Congress Party and its 
somewhat elitist views would have ever come to occupy the central position
118 Ambrash Mishra, "PM's Overture to Shiv Sena," Sunday Times, 2 /10/91. Swami is also 
popular with PM Rao.
119 1. Badhurwar and Y. Ghimire, "Battle for the Party," India Today,2 /28/93 , p. 26.
120 S.A. Aiyer, The BJP Sold on the Hindu Card," India Today,7 /15/91.
121 Vida Subramaniam, "Joshi Group Tightens Grip on BJP," The Statesman, 7/ 22/92.
122 "BJP to Take on 'Pseudo-Secularists,"' The Hindustan Times, 7/16/92.
123 "Youth Wing Burns Pseudo-Secularism in Effigy," The Statesman,?/ 28/92.
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which they eventually did w ithout the assistance of M ahatm a Gandhi, 
Jaw aharlal N ehru and the lim ited franchise of the early stages. The 
franchise in India in the provincial elections of 1937 only included 10% of 
the population. M ahatm a G andhi was crucial to the freedom  struggle 
because he brought together the independent peasant and m iddle class 
movements for independence. In 1951 the franchise was extended to all 
adults and as a result the electorate jum ped from 40 million to 200 million. 
The nature of politics has also changed as the electorate has expanded and 
larger numbers of people have been brought into the electoral process.124
In the Western press, the BJP has been viewed, som ewhat mistakenly, 
as a recent phenomenon. To make an accurate assessment of the degree to 
which H indu fundam entalist views have influenced political discourse in 
India, and to be able to make an assessment of the proposition that they are 
gaining additional influence, it is necessary to be acquainted with the BJP’s 
antecedents. The Jan Sangh, the H indu  M ahasabha as well as such 
organisations as the Shiv Sena, the RSS, and the VHP are the base upon 
which the BJP has established itself.
The first electorally  significant m odern  H indu  fundam enta list 
organisation was the H indu M ahasabha which held its first session in 
1915.125 Another of the early H indu groups was the Ram Rajya Parishad, 
which was created after World War Two to defend orthodox Hinduism. In 
its initial stages, the Mahasabha existed both within and externally from the 
Congress m ovem ent though it subsequently broke in 1933 over Congress 
Party appeasement of Muslims.
It would be a mistake to view the H indu communal m ovem en t 
as an expression of orthodoxy, unless this orthodoxy is seen in  
contrast to the more W esternized leadership of the country.126
In 1925, the Mahasabha created the non-political organisation, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh or national volunteer corps, to act as the defenders of
124 Ravinder Kumar, The Past and the Present," p. 44.
125 Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multiparty System, (Delhi: 
Low Price Publications, 1990), p. 166.
126 Myron Weiner, Party Politics, p. 197.
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the H indu faith. M ahatma Gandhi's assassin was a m em ber of the RSS. 
After having established itself, the RSS's membership wished to take a more 
active role in politics. Though not differing significantly from  the 
Mahasabha, the RSS did not wish to be politically subordinate. The RSSS 
decided in 1951 to form a successor organisation to the Mahasabha, the Jan 
Sangh, so as to be able to overtly enter politics. The M ahasabha achieved 
minimal electoral results in the 1952 and 1957 elections.
The Jan Sangh was formed in the early 1950s by Mookerji, a former 
president of the Mahasabha. The Jan Sangh was created on the principles of 
"one country, one nation, one culture and the rule of law [and advocated] 
nationalizing all non-Hindus by inculcating in them  the idea of Bharatiya 
culture."127
In the afterm ath of the assassination of M ahatma Gandhi in January 
of 1948, the home m inister had the heads of the RSS and the M ahasabha 
arrested. He further declared the two organisations unlawful.128 M ahatm a 
Gandhi had been killed by N athuram  Vinayak Godse who had been a 
m ember of both the M ahasabha and the RSS.129 This had a significant 
negative impact on the image of these H indu groups as the M ahatma was an 
adm ired and venerated figure. While the organisational structure remained 
intact the ban slowed electoral progress.
By plotting the electoral rise of the H indu fundam entalist parties in 
India it becomes apparent that these have been long standing, ideologically 
indigenous political actors that have, by and large, m aintained a rise in 
popularity since independence. The recent resurgence in the popularity of 
the BJP in the 1989 and 1991 elections is a ttributable to the growing 
frustration of the country with the secular basis of Congress Party rule. As 
we have seen in the preceding discussion of issues such as the concessions to 
linguistic minorities, the Shah Bano case, Article 370 granting land rights to
127 Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 196.
128 B.D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of 
the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 11.
129 The current Leader ofthe Shiv Sena, Bal Thakeray, has remarked "We are proud of 
Nathuram Godse. He saved the nation from another partition." S.A. Aiyer, "The BJP Sold on 
the Hard Line," p. 62.
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Kashmiris, the protection of shrines, etc. all have contributed to the H indu 
m ajority 's fru stra tions. These frustrations, exacerbated by continued 
economic difficulties, have created the necessary conditions for a H indu 
backlash. This was effectively orchestrated by the BJP in the lead up to the 
1991 elections through the Ramjanmboomi-Babri Masjid issue.
There are several factors which will limit the scope of BJP electoral 
inroads. One of the problems of H indu fundam entalist electoral appeal is its 
inability to extend its electoral base of support beyond the Hindi belt. The 
different orientation tow ards H induism , the language issue and ethnic 
divisions will continue to act as significant impediments to the expansion of 
H indu fundam entalist parties into the south of India. The BJP will also 
have difficulties, though less so, in those districts w ith concentrations of 
Muslims. W ith 11.4% of the total population,130 which is concentrated in 
the north, the northeast and south central areas, Muslims can not be easily 
discounted. There was evidence in the 1991 election that the Muslim 
community cast its votes on the basis of opposition to the BJP.
Despite these limits the BJP is strongest in the Hindi heart land. The 
strength of the BJP rests with the young, urban, upper caste, Hindi speakers 
of the north of India. The strata of society in which the BJP is the most 
popular w ill be the stra ta  from w hich Ind ia’s bureaucrats and decision 
makers will be drawn. In Suren Navlakha’s analysis of H indu civil servants, 
industrial managers and university teachers, 83.9% of respondents were of 
upper-caste H indu background. Their overall representation in the H indu 
population is only 9.9%.131 Approxim ately 85% of India's population is 
Hindu. Even if the BJP remains thwarted in its drive to capture the centre it 
will continue to be a pivotal player in the electorally crucial areas and among 
the nation's decision making elite. They will be well placed to influence 
policy either through coalition, from outside governm ent, or indirectly 
through the bureaucratic, m anagerial and educational institu tions and 
structures.
130 pauj ßrasS/ The Neiv Cambridge History of India, p. 189.
131 S. Navlakha, Elite and Social Change, p. 64.
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An additional factor indicating an increased future role of H indu 
fundam entalist influence in foreign affairs issues is the degree of popularity 
of H indu fundamentalism among the expanding ranks of the urban middle 
classes. The BJP drew  27.7% of the urban vote as opposed to 17.5% of the 
rural vote in the 1991 elections. The Janata Dal was more reliant on the 
rural vote while the Congress Party was evenly split w ith 36.1 and 37.3 
respectively.132 The urban voter, through his exposure to the media, is m ore 
aware of the nuances of foreign policy issues than the rural voter. He is 
more readily able to gain access to alternative m edia sources than  the 
government owned All India Radio or Doordarshan.
In its election m anifesto of 1989,133 the BJP h igh ligh ted  the 
im portance of internal threats to India's national security "in strategically 
sensitive border states." The situation  in Kashm ir, Punjab, and the 
northeast were specifically identified. While calling for good relations with 
India 's neighbours, the m anifesto  w ent on to sta te  "We stand  for 
normalization of relations with China, w ith due safeguards for Tibet, proper 
recognition of India's national interests and honourable solution of the 
border dispute." The manifesto outlines a seven point platform.
1. Work tow ards reim parting dynam ism  to the non-aligned 
m ovem ent;
2. Pursue a policy of peace, friendship and cooperation w ith 
neighbouring countries;
3. Reject the dom ination of superpow er interest in South Asia 
and the Indian Ocean;
4. W ork tow ards the establishm ent of a regional com m on 
market by strengthening the South Asian Regional Conference;
5. Work for the establishment of a new international economic 
order, take initiative for trade and m onetary reform, North- 
South dialogue w ith emphasis on enhanced South-South Co­
operation;
6. Continued effort for world wide rejection of apartheid; and
7. C ontinuously w ork tow ards the solution of problem s of 
people of Indian origin living abroad.
132 Marg Research Group Exit Poll, "How India Voted," India Today, 7/15/91, pp. 54-5.
133 Bharatiya Janata Party, Election Manifesto, Lok Sabha Elections, 1989, (New Delhi: BJP 
Central Office, 1989), pp. 38-40.
161
In the area of defence the BJP accused the Rajiv Gandhi adm inistration of 
bringing "to a standstill all policy making and im plem entation w ithin the 
Defence Ministry." The Manifesto further articulated a six point policy on 
defence.
1. O ptim um  defence preparedness including production  of 
nuclear bombs and delivery systems
2. Diversification of sources of supply of defence hardw are, 
continued em phasis on maxim ising indigenous production, 
self reliance and defence research and development;
3. Greater accountability of defence expenditure;
4. Enhancement of Indian navy's capability;
5. Identification and elim ination of foreign lobbies associated 
with defence weapons procurement and contracts; and
6. Improve service conditions in the armed forces so as to make 
careers more attractive to the best talent in the country.
Though the above platform includes many standard Indian policies, a 
num ber of departures from traditional Congress Party positions can be 
discerned. Further, with hindsight we can see Congress coming closer to its 
opposition on some policy positions over the intervening period of BJP 
electoral success. This pressure from the right reinforces the nuclear and 
m issile p rogram m es ow n im petus. C ontinued  developm en t of an 
intermediate range nuclear missile capability may endanger the hard w on 
im provem ents in India’s relations w ith both the United States and China 
since 1988.
As Narasim ha Rao reorients India's foreign policy in the post-Gulf 
War environment, he has no choice but to rem ain committed to program s 
which are vital to a national image of strength. To back away from such 
program s as the Agni missile w ould serve to give the H indu right an 
exclusive claim to being the party of strength. In a statement clarifying that 
India would not sign the NPT, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao called for "an 
independent foreign policy" that w ould not be "subservient" or subject to 
"arm twisting."134 To hand the BJP the defence and foreign policy areas 
would be electoral folly. As a result, the Congress Party continues to oppose
134 "We Will Not Sign the NPT: Rao," The Hindu, (int. ed.)5/16/92.
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American efforts to include India in regional nuclear non-proliferation talks, 
the missile technology control regime or a non-proliferation treaty while at 
the same time opening the Indian economy to the international market 
economy and courting technology assistance, such as the LCA project, and 
increased defence dialogue with the United States.135
These incongruities came together on 28 May 1992 when India 
simultaneously participated in its first joint naval manoeuvres with the 
United States in the Arabian Sea and conducted a test fire launch of the 
nuclear capable Agni missile in the Bay of Bengal. Such timing can only be 
interpreted as sending a signal that India's improving relations with the 
United States will be pursued in tandem with continued independence of 
action.136 Indian policy makers have expressed the sentiment that they have 
no choice but to continue with such programs or "risk being thrown out of 
office ...”137 Given Rao’s emphasis on economic reform, one might wonder 
if he would be willing to jeopardise such an ambitious programme unless he 
felt compelled to do so.138
135 Defence Minister Pawar met with Secretary of Defence Cheney in April of 1992 where 
India was encouraged to contact American subcontractors and manufacturers concerning the 
development of the LCA. R. Chakrapani, "US to Help Push LCA Project," The Hindu, 
(int.ed.) 4/18/92.
136 R. Chakrapani, "Pawar Sees Change in US Atittude," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 4/18/92 and 
"India-US Military Accord in Offing," The Hindu, (int. ed.)4/18/92.
137 Steve Coll, "India Tests Controversial Agni Missile," The Washington Post, 5/30/92 and 
Sanjoy Hazarika, "India Successfully Tests a Medium Range Missile," The New York Times, 
5/31/92.
138 Note for the following chart: In the 1977 election, the Jan Sangh joined the Janata 
coalition along with the Congress (O), Swantantra, Socialist, and Bharatiya Lok Dal Parties. 
The Coalition won in 1977 with 298 Lok Sabha seats. In the 1980 election Janata polled only 31 
Lok Sabha seats. Percentages are rounded to .5.
Sources: Walter Andersen, "Elections 1989 in India: The Dawn of Coalition Politics,” Asian 
Survey, 6/6/90, Hamesh McDonald, "Puppet on a String: New Prime Minister Rules at the 
Mercy of Congress," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 11/22/90, p. 8. High Commission of 
India, "Official Tally of Lok Sabha Results," India News, 12/20/89, Walter Andersen and 
Shridhar Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, (Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1987), pp. 263-6, 
James Clad, "Congress Falls But Opposition Fails to Win a Majority: A Mixed Verdict," The 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 12/7/89, Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India, (Delhi: Low 
Price Publications, 1990), Unatributed, "National Alternative to Congress: The Non-Left 
Parties," (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1989), Electoral Commission India, Report 
on the First General Election 1951-2, vols. 1&2 (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1955), 
Election Commission India, Report on the Second General Election in India 1957 vols. 1&2, 
(Faridabad: Government of India Press, 1959), M. Pattabhiram, General Election India 1967, 
(Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967), S.P. Varma and Iqubal Narain, eds. Fourth General
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Lok Sabha State Assemblies
1952 H indu Mahasabha 4 20
Jan Sangh 3 33
Ram Rajya Parishad 3 32
10 3% 85 3%
1957 H indu Mahasabha 2
Jan Sangh 4 46
6 6% 4%
1962 H indu Mahasabha 8
Jan Sangh 14 113
Ram Rajya Parishad 13
6.5% 134 6%
1967 Jan Sangh 35 9.5% 268 9%
1971 Jan Sangh 22 7.5%
1977 Jan Sangh 91 14%
1980 Jan Sangh 14 8.5% 147
1984 Bharatiya Janata Party 2 7.5% 167
1989 Bharatiya Janata Party 86 11% 556
1991 Bharatiya Janata Party 117 20%
Shiv Sena 4
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The most plausible explanation for the parallel rise in Indian domestic 
political violence and an assertive external posture, begining in the 1960s 
and rising dramatically in the 1980s, is the failure of the central governm ent 
to deal with the rising expectations of its population. This frustration has led 
to the formation of groups who increasingly express these feelings through
Election in India vols. 1 &2, (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1970) and Craig Baxter, The ]an Sangh: 
A Biography of an Indian Political Party, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 
1969).
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violent acts. The political leadership, on the one hand, opportunistically 
m anipulates these circum stances to capitalise on them  for short term  
electoral gain. This further exacerbates these tensions. On the other hand, 
the leadership resorts to placing blame on external sources thereby deflecting 
criticism from itself while attempting to create national solidarity by creating 
a common enemy. In this atmosphere relations with Pakistan and China are 
under threat of deteriorating. Blaming an external enemy also puts off the 
reso lu tion  of the conflict by creating the false im pression  that the 
government is not in a position to rectify the problem.
What does seem clear is that the secularist ideology that served as a 
foundation to the m odern Indian state is eroding. Indeed, the 1990s will 
witness the struggle betw een those who seek to adhere to the secularist 
identity  and those H indus who are seeking to redefine Indias identity  
through Hindutva. The destruction of the Babri-Masjid Mosque has led to 
escalating alienation and intercom m unal strife as dem onstrated by the 
ensuing anti-M uslim  pogrom  in Bombay in January of 1993 and the 
suppression of a BJP mass dem onstration  at the Boat Club in Delhi in 
February of 1993. When unable to hold the February demonstration, party 
leader A.B. Vajpayee stated that "When the central governm ent prevents 
the people of the country from entering the capital, it shows it has a screw 
loose ... This is the death knell for democracy."139 In  order to suppress the 
d em o n stra tio n , the Rao G overnm en t a rre s ted  over 45,000 H in d u  
fundam entalists across the country and brought into the capital m ore 
security forces than had been witnessed since before independence.140 W h en  
the government is besieged by its own people democracy itself is in danger.
This process of erosion may not be irreversible but, at a minimum, 
India has a long period of readjustm ent to reconcile those forces which are 
threatening the secularist foundation.
W ithout a countervailing politics rooted in som e notion of
transcendental service (which, for all its faults, did animate the
139 Edward Gargan, "Police in India Block Big Rally Arresting 1,000," The New York Times, 
2/26/93.
140 Edward Gargan, "Indian Police Seize Tens of Thousands to Block Protest," The New York 
Times,2 / 25/93.
socialism of Ind ia’s first two decades of independence), the
Kautilyan antecedent seems set to prevail.141
The particular ideological orientation of Indian society and politics is 
important not for making projections as to whether or not India will emerge 
as a powerful state, which is a m atter of time, bu t for understanding the 
purposes to which that pow er will be applied. There is a building sense 
w ithin India of wanting to be taken seriously on the world stage. This is 
most notable amongst elites and the rising m iddle classes. The extent to 
which this is indicative of a broader consensus in the country at large is 
difficult to firmly establish. Domestic social and economic issues will 
continue to dominate the political attention of the average Indian for some 
time to come. As these dom estic issues become entangled in regional 
politics and the global political economy, the Indian voter will increasingly 
have to come to terms with the external environment.
India, as a heterogeneous, m ulti-ethnic, m ulti-religious society may 
become vulnerable to the spread  of ethno-nationalist and  secessionist 
m ovem ents. If such sub-national units as Croatia, Slovenia, Arm enia, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova are successful in their attem pts to realize national 
sovereignty, India may find itself increasingly hard  pressed to m aintain 
central control over newly em boldened secessionist movements. India may 
conclude that it m ust address the problem by cutting the militants off from 
external support. Existing efforts to interdict cross border assistance at the 
border or within India have met w ith mixed results in their efforts to stem  
the flow of weapons. Opinion may shift to view a war with Pakistan as a 
necessary defensive step to preserve India's unity. Evidence that this view is 
gaining credence is appearing. Retired counter insurgency specialist Major 
G eneral Afsir Karim projects an escalation of Pakistani support for 
insurgents in Kashmir and Punjab. This may in tu rn  trigger a recourse to 
the military option to stem the rising tide of support.142 Conversely, recent 
counterinsurgency operations in Punjab may indicate the enduring strength 
of the Indian state. What is certain is that as long as there are significant
165
141 James Clad, "India: Crisis and Transition," The Washington Quarterly, winter 1992, p. 
101.
142 "Intervention by Pakistan: India May Use Military Option," The Statesman,?/28/92.
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disaffected groups within the society there will be some level of friction and 
conflict. If the alienated peripheral elements have little to loose, have a base 
of support and the hope of gaining concessions, conflict of varying degrees of 
intensity will remain. As this conflict continues, the mainstream Hindu 
community may further move away from a tolerant view of minorities to 
an antagonistic one.
167
Sourvce: Ajit Ninan, India Today, 7/31/91, p.48.
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CHAPTER FOUR
W hoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This 
Ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the tw enty first 
century the destiny of the w orld will be decided on its 
waters.
-Alfred Thayer M ahan1
40. Geopolitical factors as parameters of India's strategic and international 
affairs
From the above statement it is apparent that Mahan appreciated the 
geopolitical im portance of the Ind ian  Ocean. C onceptually , M ahan 
approached the region from an extra-regional maritime perspective. In this 
way he emphasised the control of the Ocean as the key to controlling the 
littoral, and as a result Asia and the Eurasian w orld island. Indian 
geopolitical thinking centres itself first in either the northern Gangetic plain 
or the southern Indian peninsula which projects into the Indian Ocean. In 
this way Indian geopolitics are centred on the littoral.
The Indian Ocean has been an integral part of the history of the 
peoples of the southern  M alabar and C orom andel coasts. For Ind ia’s 
geopolitical position it is im portant that India extend its influence in the 
Indian Ocean to prevent maritime powers from projecting themselves onto 
the shores of India. Further, the Indian perspective, unlike Mahan, views 
the Pamir, Karakorum  and the H im alayan m ountain  ranges as natural 
barriers to the Eurasian interior. The degree to which transm igration, 
invasion and exchange has occurred between the subcontinent and Central, 
Southwest and Southeast Asia has been dependent on surm ounting the 
m ountainous terrain of the northw est and northeast frontiers. Further 
cultural and trade relations were established w ith Southeast Asia through 
maritime contact.
Colin Grey, in The Geopolitics of Superpower, uses George Luttwak's 
definition of geopolitics as, "the relation of international political power to
1 As quoted in P.S. Gupta, 'The Indian Ocean and World Politics: Reflections on its Future,” 
India Quarterly, July/December, 1987, p. 195.
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the geographical setting ."2 The pre-em inent Indian geopolitician, K.M. 
Panikkar has defined geopolitics "as the study of the state in space, that is an 
attem pt to analyse and understand the perm anent political factors arising 
from geographical features of a coun try ."3 Grey correctly identifies Sir 
Halford Mackinder as the "intellectual father of U.S. containm ent." The 
w ork of Mackinder, along w ith that of Mahan, Spykm an and Haushofer, 
was known to K.M. Panikkar, the intellectual father of m odern Indian 
geopolitics.4 Working w ithin the accepted Clauswitzian notion of war, or 
military force, as "a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the 
same by other means,"5 a slightly modified definition w hich includes an 
internal dynamic is used in this chapter. Geopolitics is here defined as the 
re la tio n  of in te rna tiona l and  sub -na tiona l po litica l pow er to the 
geographical setting.
To Panikkar, "geopolitics in relation to the countries of the rim land 
has to work out other doctrines, which are more closely related to their 
developm ent ."6 Much of his work was devoted to modifying geopolitics as 
a framework for understanding India's position. One of the objectives of 
this chapter is to examine Indian notions of its territorial delineations.
2 Colin Grey, The Geopolitics of Superpower, (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 
1988), p. 4 and Colin Grey, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, (New York: Crane Russak and 
Co., 1977).
3 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan, 1955), p. 89.
4 Other Indians who write from the geopolitical perspective include Baldev Raj Nayar,
American Geopolitics and India, (New Delhi: Manohar Book Services, 1976), Admiral S.N. 
Kholi, "The Geopolitical and Strategic Considerations that Necessitate the Expansion and 
Modernization of the Indian Ngvy," Indian Defence Review, Jan. 1989, pp. 33-46, Manorama 
Kholi, "Indian Foreign Policy: A Geopolitical Perspective," India Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1990, 
pp. 33-40, B.L. Sukhwal, India: A Political Geography, (New Delhi:1971), Vice Admiral 
M.P. Awati, "Islands of the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical and Geostrategic Assessment," The 
Indian Ocean Review, January 1991 and Pradyumna Karan, "India's Role in Geopolitics, 
"India Quarterly, Sept., 1953, pp. 160-9. Other South Asian authors include, Mohammed 
Ismail Siddiqi, "Inter- and Intra-regional Conflicts in Pakistan's Border Landscapes," in 
Dennis Rumley and Julian Minghi, The Geography of Border Landscapes, (London: Rutledge 
Publishers, 1991) and Mahnaz Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in
the Borderlands of Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
3 Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 119.
6 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 13.
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There are some contradictions in Panikkar’s work on the question of 
India's natural boundaries and its expansion beyond them. In Geographical 
Factors in Indian History, Panikkar stated that "one of the preoccupations of 
European geopolitics, that is the desire for space, has not the sam e 
significance in India."7 He also describes "extra Indian" territory  as an 
"unnatural geographical agglom eration" for Ind ian  ru lers.8 Panikkar 
referred to the Kautilyan definition of w hat is "Indian" territory. "Kautilya 
defined Chakravarti Patha or the empire state as extending 2,000 yojanas 
from the H im alayas across the peninsula of India."9 Later Panikkar 
observed that "Wherever the H indus colonised they took w ith them  their 
love of the Himalayas."10 The act of colonising includes a desire of a power 
to extend a political unit's control over territory  not already under its 
control.
W hile there is a valuable body of theoretical lite ra tu re  in the 
geopolitical area,* 11 it was discredited as a consequence of Hitler's adaptation 
of H aushofers work to justify his concepts of Liebensraum and drang nach 
osten which led to the policy of ethnic cleansing of Jews and Slavs from 
territory so that it would be suitable for the occupation of the German race. 
Of those who continue to write from a geopolitical perspective, the work of 
Jean Gottman and Saul Cohen stands out.12 Generally, contem porary South 
Asian regional security analysts tend not explicitly to use the perspective.13
7 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 20. Panikkar examines in great 
detail the maritime traditions and exploits of the Southern Indians in Southeast Asia in 
India and the Indian Ocean.
8 In this case Panikkar is describing Chandragupta Maurya’s control of the Hindu Kush. K.M. 
Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 20.
9 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 20.
10 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 37.
11 Three of the most influential works are Sir Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and 
Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: Henry Holt and Co. Publishers, 
1942), A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History, 1660-1783, (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston & Co. Ltd., 1890) and Nicholas Spykman, "Heartland and Rimland," in R. Kasperson 
and J. Minghi, The Structure of Political Geography, (Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1969).
12 Jean Gottman, Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics, (Beverley Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1980). Saul Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided, (New York: 
Random House Publishers, 1963), Saul Cohen, "Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold 
War Era," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Dec. 1991 and Geoffrey 
Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century, (London: Croom Helm, 
1985). An innovative perspectives on geopolitics includes Richard Ashley, 'The Geopolitics
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40.1 India’s changing conceptions of its security environment
India’s perception of its external security environm ent has evolved 
through several phases since independence. India inherited three political 
traditions that were to have an impact on the way in which it formed its 
security perceptions of its national security environm ent. In the im m ediate 
post independence period both  Gandhian concepts (such as ahim sa and 
satyagraha) and colonial traditions inherited  from the British Raj "made 
uneasy bed fellows."14 A third and interestingly im portant tradition is the 
H indu fundam entalist perspective. This is potentially the most significant 
catalyst of change for the way India perceives its external environment.
W hile this th ird  perspective is in process of re in terpreta tion  its 
origins are to be found in the works of Kautilya. The Kautilyan concept of 
the circle of states, as discussed in the previous chapter, has at its core a 
firmly grounded notion of geopolitics. George Modelski has described the 
m andala of states in the following way. "By developing further the axiom 
that neighbourhood entails actual or potential opposition or enm ity, he 
deems the King beyond the ari to be an enemy of ari and therefore a friend 
(m itra ) . . ." 15 This locational determ inism  of geopolitics on the subcontinent 
is more persuasive in a world limited to states with ideologies similar to 
H indu society. The concept suffers som ew hat w hen competing ideologies 
are introduced into the equation. Nevertheless, it is likely that India will 
continue to court Afghanistan, Iran and Russia to balance Pakistan and 
China.
of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," 
Alternatives, XII, 1987.
H For a recent exception see, Peter Lyon, "South Asia and the Geostrategics of the 1990s," 
Contemporary South Asia, 1 (1), 1992.
14 S. Gordon, "Domestic Foundation of India's Security Policy," in Babbage and Gordon, 
India's Strategic Future, p. 6.
G. Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu 
World," The American Political Science Review, Sept. 1964, p. 554.
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It is difficult to understate the im portance of the centre-periphery 
relationship  w ithin both India and South Asia.16 From a geopolitical 
perspective the centre-periphery dynam ic is far m ore salient than  the 
W estern notion of the frontier. The dichotom ised view of national and 
international territory is not held as strongly in South Asian cultures as it is 
in the West. The integration of internal and external security was effected in  
July of 1970 when the Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet and the Internal 
Affairs Committee were merged. The need for an integrated approach had 
been understood by N ehru who stated that "External affairs will follow 
internal affairs."17 India's strength in the South Asian periphery will be 
w eakened as long as its in ternal periphery  is itself open to external 
m anipulation .
Ultimately, India will be forced to resolve its sub-national problems, 
at both the internal and external levels. Internal reform and the effective 
cutting of cross border support to India's insurgents will be necessary to quell 
the ram pant internal strife that shatters India’s peace. While first placing 
India w ithin a w ider geopolitical context, this chapter will focus on India's 
three key strategic frontiers, the northw est frontier, the northeast frontier 
and the Indian Ocean. This is in addition to discussion of the centre- 
periphery relationship. The tension betw een Delhi and those dissatisfied 
sub-national groups peripheral to the Indian state, has a direct bearing on 
India’s geopolitical position. The chapter will also further exam ine the 
relationship betw een Ind ia’s internal turm oil and its relations w ith its 
neighbours by examining how these developments affect India’s geopolitical 
position in South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions.
As discussed in Chapter Two, Nehru's foreign policy was based on the 
m ixture of concepts of Panchsheela, the NAM and realism. W hile the 
concepts of Panchsheela did not incorporate fully the M ahatm a’s notions of 
peaceful resistance, they did reflect the idealistic values of the struggle for
16 For a brief discussion of centre-periphery in South Asia see Nirmal Bose, "The Centre- 
Periphery Relationship: Problems of Separation in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka," in Gean 
Gottman, Centre and Periphery. Bose, in viewing Bangladesh as "one insofar as their 
cultural identity is assumed" fails to recognise the distinct character of the Chakma. p. 213.
17 A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 13.
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independence. With defence spending kept below two percent prior to 1962 
the nation's security was, to a large extent, placed in a faith in fraternal 
relations. The NAM similarly reflected this idealistic vision for basing 
foreign relations on a more progressive policy.
The influence of idealism on notions of security gave way to real 
politik in the wake of the 1962 breach of the H im alayan barrier by the 
Chinese. This hum iliating defeat by a fellow developing Asian state was 
devastating to both Nehru and the nation. Indian security policy henceforth 
shifted to a more realistic footing. The Third World had, with exceptions, 
been thought to be in league w ith newly independent India due to the 
shared  colonial experiences and the  com m on need  for econom ic 
development. Now the Third World, as well as the First World, came to be 
perceived as potentially  adversaria l. It is at this po in t in Ind ia 's 
developm ent tha t India began to m eaningfully  develop its m ilitary 
capabilities and defence doctrine along realist lines. In pursuit of a defence 
doctrine, India returned to familiar British traditions and conceptions of 
subcontinental security.
India’s national security self image has thus far lacked the confidence 
necessary for it to consistently act as the regional hegemon. This insecurity 
is part of the w eak /strong  conceptualisation of security as in terpreted by 
Sandy Gordon. Since 1971 India has been acquiring confidence through its 
achievements such as its defeat of pakistan in 1971, its highly successful 
Agni missile program  and the M aldives intervention. Conversely, there 
remains a high degree of anxiety over the multiple stresses which have been 
impairing national security. This theme of the threat to national unity has 
been used by both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi as a way of mobilizing political 
support behind their banners of national leadership. This was dem onstrated 
in 1981, when Pakistan acquired 40 F-16 aircraft from the United States, and 
also in 1989 during the lead up to the elections of that year.18
The seeming incongruity of the weak /s tro n g  conceptualization of 
security is understandable under the present circumstances. In the long
1® S. Gordon in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, India's Strategic Future, p. 15.
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term, India is in transition from being the leading pow er in South Asia to 
becoming the dom inant pow er of the Indian Ocean region. In the short 
term, internal strife, the loss of Soviet support and the turmoil of economic 
reform have all diminished India's standing in its immediate region. One 
definition of a great pow er is a state that can project pow er outside its 
imm ediate region. As long as India cannot project its pow er beyond its 
immediate borders it will fail to attain great power status.
The Indian Ocean region is itself com prised of several regions.19 
There are five key factors which continue to inhibit the expansion of Indian 
influence beyond South Asia and the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. 
These are, 1. the continued resistance of Pakistan to concede to Indian 
hegemony, (even within South Asia), 2. continuing internal strife, 3. rivalry 
w ith China, 4. intra-regional and extra-regional resistance to the Indian 
Ocean becoming an Indian lake and 5. the need for economic reforms to take 
hold and yield the high rates of grow th to sustain India's ambitions in the 
region.
W hat can be observed, from an analysis of both Indian external 
behaviour and the thinking of key Indian strategic thinkers, is an increased 
desire for India to assume a more significant role on the world stage. India 
desires a role commensurate with its size and self-perceived sense of coming 
of age in the international arena. These manifest themselves in a new and 
expanding definition of India's region, the emerging "Hindu" identity, a 
self-reliant m ilitary-bureaucratic complex and an increased willingness to 
acquire and use military capabilities in support of foreign policy and security 
initiatives. A willingness to use acquired capabilities was dem onstrated in 
Bangladesh in 1971, operations Brass Tacks and Checkerboard in 1987 and 
through the interventions in the late 1980s in Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
A central objective of India’s national security posture has been the 
enhancem ent of India's in ternational status. Ind ia’s "em ploym ent of
19 These eight regions are, Southern Africa, East Africa and the Horn of Africa, The Persian 
Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and the islands of the Indian Ocean. William 
Dowdy and Russell Trood, The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1985).
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military resources as a status enhancem ent m echanism "20 can be seen as a 
means of prom oting its national interests on the international stage. This 
could be perceived as a way of transform ing significant regional military 
pow er, or a regional p reponderan t influence, into global, w orld-order 
influence. W hat has been term ed the Rodney Dangerfield approach would, 
in this way, transform regional military power into status, and then in turn, 
into tangible world-order input .21 Thus India seeks to
translate heightened regional influence into acceptance as a 
major participant in global security and political arrangements.
This policy determ ination is likely driven by prestige and other 
psychological considerations. 22
If India can establish its credentials as a m iddle power equivalent to that of 
its former colonial overlord it would be in a better position to dem and a 
global role commensurate with its new self-perceived power position.
The Indira Doctrine23 is India's equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine. 
The Indira doctrine seeks to establish India as the unchallenged regional 
hegemon. W hat is potentially alarming about the Indira Doctrine, to states 
ou tside  South Asia, is no t India 's assertions of a righ t to exert a 
preponderant influence over states in its region, but that the definition of 
India’s region is itself expanding. The Indira Doctrine, when w edded with 
an expanding notion of w hat constitutes Ind ia’s "region," presents the 
broader region with the prospect of an expanding power. Indian foreign 
policy will be the product of the on-going debate between realist and idealist 
inspired practitioners and theorists of Ind ia’s strategic and international 
affairs.
2(1 Jerrold Ekin and Andrew Ritezel, "India," in D. Murray and P. Viotti, The Defense Policies 
of Nations: A Comparative Study, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 523.
21 Raju Thomas put forward the Rodney Dangerfield theory that India "can't get no respect" 
and as a result has been building up its military muscle as a means of achieving the desired 
respect, at a conference on India’s Strategic Future at the Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, The Australian National University, in April of 1990.
22 J. Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India," p. 527.
23 Babani Sen Gupta, "The Indira Doctrine," India Today,8 /31/83.
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The overriding prim ary objective of the military in India has been, 
and rem ains, the m aintenance of India's territorial integrity. In d ia ’s 
statements with regard to the presence of extra-regional powers have been 
traditionally set in terms of the rhetoric of the Non-Aligned M ovement. 
Opposition to foreign bases, the Zone of Peace Proposal, and solidarity with 
o ther developing nations have been an am algam  of the N on-A ligned 
component of India's foreign policy. This position derives from a desire to 
secure the region against outside competition. W hat is interesting, is the 
distinction betw een the rhetoric used, and the reality of the strategic 
environm ent, and the way in w hich the policy m aking elites have 
conceptualised  tha t ex ternal env ironm ent. D espite  the decreasing  
im portance of idealism in the form ation of Indian strategic thought and 
policy, there is a continued reliance upon its rhetoric to prom ote Ind ia’s 
image both w ithin the international and domestic spheres. The emphasis 
on rhetoric is such that the Non-Aligned Movement as ideology has become 
reified as the objective, rather than as a means, of foreign policy.
It has been proposed by Elkin and Ritezel that Indian military doctrine 
has the two-fold objective of the "creation of asymmetrical pow er relations 
w ith South Asia states and a greatly augm ented m aritime force projection 
capability ."24 While the above quote rem ains fundam entally unchanged 
there are a num ber of m odifications w arran ting  a review . Economic 
constraints, the m ilitary-technological implications of the Gulf W ar and 
continuing internal strife all have an impact on the geopolitical equation. 
While the economic factors will be discussed in the next chapter, this section 
will focus on the internal-external nexus and its impact on India’s strategic 
frontiers.
Despite the continuum  in fundam ental objectives, India is adjusting 
to the changing geostrategic realities m ade evident by the Gulf War. The 
importance of air superiority and the efficacy of high technology weapons 
are not to be underestim ated . The im portance of w eapons of m ass 
destruction as a potential deterrent to superpower involvement in the Third 
W orld was also highlighted by the war. General discussion of the w ar
24 J. Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India," p. 257.
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during the preparatory  stages em phasised the chemical and potential 
nuclear weapons of Iraq. These weapon systems were proven to be valuable 
for their negative impact on the enthusiasm  of the public in dem ocratic 
countries for initiating hostilities. Their value in operational terms is less, 
especially when weighed against the ability of First World powers to respond 
in kind. By having the capability to raise the perceived costs of war, these 
weapons systems become appealing to second order powers as a deterrent to 
superpow er intervention, despite larger stocks of weapons in First W orld 
arsenals.
Based on the trends of India's expanded m ilitary capabilities, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, it appears that India is preparing to move beyond 
its im m ediate position w ithin South Asia. If this is the case, India will 
acquire those additional weapons systems25 necessary to project its influence 
out into the Indian Ocean and its littoral regions. While this portrays India 
as an aggressive power it is the position of this study that India is m otivated 
to seek greater pow er for several reasons. A desire for internationally  
recognized status, continuing insecurities and, to a lesser extent, the 
presence of a small elite that genuinely desire India to become a hegemonic 
power in the region all contribute to this motivation. The security elite26 
has come to perceive security and defence issues in both a W estern-realist 
m anner as well as from a South Asian perspective. They seek to augm ent 
India’s power in both real and symbolic ways.
These are the reasons why India will continue to seek greater 
influence among the island states of the Indian Ocean, and in the Persian 
Gulf, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The interventions in the M aldives 
and in Sri Lanka are here interpreted as the beginnings of an expanding 
posture. Off-shore interests such as ethnic Indians abroad, the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), sea-borne trade or deep sea bed mining may also push 
India to expand its interests beyond its territorial waters. The chapter now
25 Such systems as nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, extended range aircraft, aircraft 
carriers and amphibious forces are therefore of particular interest to those seeking to 
ascertain India's motives and defence doctrine.
26 The nature and composition of the decision-making elite will be discussed in Chapter Six.
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shifts to discuss India's historical inheritance and its affect on geopolitical 
perceptions.
40.11 The ’’Great Game” and the inheritance from the Raj
As the Russian border was being extended to the south and east 
during the 19th century, the boundaries of the subcontinent were being 
pushed to the north and west by the British and their allies. This was often 
at the expense of the Chinese. Gulab Singh's forays into Jammu-Kashmir 
led to his eventual control over the region in 1846. He successfully extended 
his influence into Ladakh in 1834 and Tibet briefly in 1841. The Anglo- 
Afghan Wars of 1839-42 and 1878-81 were also waged to secure the north 
w est frontier. The G urkhas conquest of Nepal and their unsuccessful 
invasion of Tibet in 1792 and the subsequent extension of British influence 
into Nepal as a consequence of the Anglo-Gurkha War of 1814-16 extended 
subcontinental influence to the northeast. These moves were followed by 
influence over Sikkim in 1890, Tibet in 1904 and Bhutan in 1910,27
These efforts of the British, Sikhs and Gurkhas to extend their borders 
were associated more w ith geopolitics than religion or ideology. W hen  
India assum ed political legitim acy it also assum ed responsibility  for 
subcontinen tal security. This rea lity  d iffers little  from  the reality  
confronting the British. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the 
com m unist Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1949-50 can only be properly 
understood within their historical geopolitical settings. So too m ust we 
view India’s actions on its borders in this context. M arxist/Leninist and 
now  nationalist (as opposed to Czarist) Russia, M aoist (as opposed to 
imperial) China and m odern India (as opposed to the Raj) are all more 
recent manifestations of existent states whose geopolitical imperatives have 
not been significantly modified despite changes in the dom inant ideology of 
the state.28
27 See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in Central Asia, (London: John 
Murray Publishers, 1990), Neville Maxwell, India's China War, (Bombay: Jaico Publishing, 
1970) and K.M. Panikkar, The Evolution of British Policy Towards Indian States 1774-1858, 
(Delhi: Mital Publications, 1986).
28 This again raises the question of what the impact of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism will 
be on Indian Geopolitics. While it will not change India's fundamental position it may
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There were two schools of thought on the question of British India’s 
borders. The first was the forward school whose proponents advocated 
pushing India's borders forward to meet the challenge extended by Russia. 
This was m otivated by the belief that conflict w ith Russian interests was 
inevitable and that it would be best to engage Russia as far as possible from 
the Indian plains. The second school of thought was concerned with the 
cost of such a forward strategy and advocated instead the support of buffer 
states to protect British interests. Its advocates supported independence for 
Afghanistan and H unza and sought to encourage Chinese influence in 
Sinkiang and Tibet as a means of p reventing  the extension of Russian 
influence into those regions. The forward school was of the view that only 
by extending India's control into these regions could its borders be protected. 
This forward strategy eventually led Britain to invade Afghanistan. During 
the first Afghan War of 1838-42 the initial British army of some 16,000 was 
destroyed by the Afghans whilst withdrawing from Kabul. The rem nants of 
this army made their final stand at Gandamack in the winter of 1842.29
D ifficulties associated w ith  the delineation  of fro n tie rs  w ere 
com pounded by the alternative conceptions of "boundaries" w ithin the 
subcontinent. W estern m inds focusing on the delineation of the frontier 
met with the Asian perspective which is based on the extension of influence 
from  the centre to the periphery in d im inishing circles of influence. 
Demands of tribute and influence over peripheral kingdoms would be less 
than on those close to the capital:
motivate India to be more intrusive in the affairs of other states. This 
fundamentalist/secular debate has been presaged by previous debates concerning India’s 
external relations.
29 Of the retreating force, only one individual managed to escape to the British garrison a t 
Jalabad. D.S. Richards, The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars, 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 44-5. The Soviet Union was to repeat this mistake in 1979. 
The history of the fiercely independent peoples of Afghanistan continues to have relevance 
for the political situation of that country in the post communist period.
... it would be easy to say that demarcation has never taken 
place in Asiatic countries except under European pressure 
and by the intervention of European agents .30
W ith the introduction of W estern ideologies to the ruling elites of India, 
their ways of conceptualising the state and its geopolitics changed. This is 
most notable in K.M. Panikkar's adaptation of Western geopolitics.
40.12 Expanding notions of region
There is evidence of an expanding notion of what constitutes India's 
region among some Indian strategic thinkers. As India becomes a more 
significant international actor there is no doubt that it will expand its 
relations w ith foreign countries. These increased social and economic ties 
incorporate a strategic dimension .31 In the past thirty years India has m oved 
from being Pakistan's rough equivalent and China's inferior, in terms of the 
strategic balance, to being the dom inant pow er in South Asia and a rival to 
China in the Asia-Pacific region.
Before exploring the contemporary redefinition of India's region, it is 
helpful to be acquainted with traditional Indian concepts of what is "India." 
These concepts ground contem porary debate in India's cultural-historical 
context. Q uotes d raw n from  the Rgveda, the M ahabarata and the 
Arthasastra give us a sense of the territory that throughout the centuries has 
been thought of by the people of Sindhu, Bharat and India as their natural 
territorial range. A further quote from M egasthenese’s Indica confirm s 
these traditional notions of India. The place nam es m entioned in the 
Vedas, the Ramayana the M ahabarata, the A rthasastra and by the Indo- 
Greeks have been plotted on m aps by J. Schwartzberg and Shiva Gopal
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30 viceroy Curzon from Frontiers, Romanes lecture of 1907 as quoted in Neville Maxwell, 
India's China War, p. 21. While this statement is a little extreme, and certainly 
ethnocentric, it is largely correct.
31 This phenomenon can also be seen in countries such as Australia where increased trade 
with, and immigration from, the Asia-Pacific region has led to a significant reorientation 
away from its traditional relationships with Britain and the United States.
181
Bajpai.32 From these maps it becomes apparent that after the Vedic period 
"India" came to include the Deccan as well as the Indo-Gangetic plain:
Like mothers to their calves, like milch-kine w ith their milk, so, 
Sindhu, unto thee the roaring rivers run. Thou leadest as a 
w arrior king thine arm 's wings w hat time thou comest in the 
van of these swift streams. Favour ye this my laud, O Ganga, 
Yamuna, O Sutudri, Parushni, and Sarasvati. W ith Asikni, 
Visata, O M arudvridha, O Arjikya with Sushoma hear my call.
The Hymns of the Rgveda, Translated by R.T.H. Griffith, 1889, vol, II, 10, 75 
4-9.
King Bharata, I shall depict for you this land of Bharata ... There 
are these seven m ain m ountains the M ahendra, Malaya, Sahya, 
Suktimat, Rksvata, Vindhya and Pariyatra, but thousands more 
m ountains are recognised in their general vicinity, massive and 
vast ones with colourful ridges. Then, there are other hills less 
well known, low ones that are inhabited by short people, both 
Aryan and barbarian, as well as folk that are a m ixture of both.
The population drinks from many rivers: the Ganges, the Indus 
and Sarasvati ...
The Mahabarata, translated by J.A.B. van Buitenen, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960).
Place means the earth. In that the region of the sovereign rule 
extends northw ard  betw een the H im avat and  the sea; one 
thousand yojanas in extent across
The Kautilyan Arthasastra, ed. by R.P. Kangle, (Bombay: University of 
Bombay Press, 1960).
India is bounded on the north by the extremities of Tauros, and 
from Ariana to the Eastern Sea by the m ountains which are 
variously called by the natives of these regions Parapamisos, and 
Hemodos, and Himaos, and other names, but by the Macedonians 
Kaukasos. The boundary on the west is the river Indus, but the
32 J. Schwartzberg and Shiva Gopal Bajpai, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 13-16. The following four quotes are drawn from this 
informative work. See also the earlier work of Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the 
Indian Peninsula, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1949).
182
southern and eastern sides, which are both much greater than the 
others, run out into the Atlantic Ocean ...
Megasthenese, lndica, as cited in J.W. McCrindle, Ancient India as Described 
by Megasthenes and Arrian, (Calcutta: 1926).
The question remains, what are the "natural" borders of "India"? For 
that m atter what is "India"? The above references are more cultural than 
political zone demarcations. For most of the subcontinent's history it has 
been ruled by several states in any given period. It is a recent phenom enon 
that the territorial delineation of the dom inant political unit has come close 
to the borders of the cultural zone. Of 63 key powers of the subcontinent 
since 500 BC, 28 were based on the Gangetic plain while only nine m anaged 
to achieve pan-Indian status.33 Of the nine, only five ruled over more than 
50% of the subcontinent.34 There is a tendency to view the bifurcation of the 
British Raj into India and Pakistan as a unnatural occurrence. In fact, such a 
fracture of a pan-Indian empire is part of the historical cycle of integration 
and disintegration of the subcontinent. One prerequisite of pan-India 
powers is that their core area power base is located in the Gangetic plain. 
This has more often than not been at Delhi. The political power of India is 
today located in Delhi and in the Hindi belt of the north, particularly w ith 
the electorally significant block of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
The debate over what is to constitute India's region, while ultimately 
subjective, is im portant because of the justifying and legitimating impact of
33 peter Lyon, "South Asia and the Geostrategics of the 1990s," Contemporary South Asia, 
vol. 1, no. 1, 1992, p. 26.
34 "A Geopolitical Synopsis: The Evolution of Regional Power Configurations in the Indian 
Subcontinent," Joseph Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 255. Our concept of India, as a single territorial identity similar to 
either present day India or the previous notion of the subcontinent, leads us to think of India 
as truly a subcontinental state. Historically speaking this pan subcontinental 
conceptualization of India is more an aberration than a norm. Since 500 BC only five 
empire/states, the Mauryan, Chola, Delhi Sultanate, Mughal and modern British 
Raj/Independent Indian state have extended their control over "India." All these pan-Indian 
empires had their centre of power in the Indo-Gangetic plain, usually in Delhi. Analysis of 
the subcontinent's periods of centralized control and the intermittent periods of diffused 
power centres reveals a cyclical pattern. The pattern is tending towards condensed time 
periods between the increasing crests of higher degrees of authority.
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being considered a "regional" actor, rather than an "extra-regional” one. 
Jasjit Singh has reconceptualised India's region in the following way:
In reality, China, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are 
also all immediate neighbours w ith w hom  we have common 
boundaries and other countries in the proxim ity cannot be 
excluded from the region in terms of geo-political realities ... It 
w ould therefore be more appropriate to term  the region as 
Southern Asia ...35
By identifying India's geopolitical region as "Southern Asia," Singh is 
reform ing and expanding the notion of India's region. This is not 
surprising, or inherently destabilising, as the two key concepts of "India" of 
this century, the subcontinent and South Asia were, and are, the creations of 
Britain and the United States, who view India from their own perspectives. 
By expanding the recognised limits of India's region, India is given a higher 
degree of legitimacy in seeking to influence events in these areas than it 
would if it were perceived as an outside power. Indeed w hen India was 
endorsing the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean it focused on excluding 
"ex tra -reg io n a l"  p o w e rs  d e p lo y m e n ts  in to  the  reg io n . This 
reconceptualisation of region has been discussed by others such as A dm iral 
Nayyer and K.R. Singh who favour a stronger role for India in the Southeast 
Asian region.36
There have been only a few points throughout India's history during 
which a single empire, dynasty or sultanate has extended its influence 
beyond the subcontinent. These were usually based in the Indo-Gangetic 
region. Many states of Suvarnabhum i, (Southeast Asia) such as Funan, 
Champa, Chenla and Dvaravati became Indianised during the first to sixth 
centuries AD. In 1025 the Cholas established their suprem acy over the 
former Sri Vijaya empire. The Cholas continued to have active relations
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Confidence Building Among Neighbours,” The Hindu, 
3/22/90.
36> K.R. Singh, "Maritime Security of India," United Services Institute Journal, Oct.-Dec. 
1990, pp. 414-25. Not all reconceptualisations of India's region are expansive. General Rao 
has divided India in the following manner. 1. The mountainous north, 2. The Indo-Gangetic 
plain and 3. The central Indian and Deccan plateau in Prepare or Perish: A Study of National 
Security. (Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), p. 2.
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with China and Southeast Asia through the 13th Century.37 The Cholas, 
like other states of Indian history that engaged in maritime activity, (and 
these tended to be South Indian), were not successful in establishing control 
over the powerful states of the northern plains although they could project 
their culture, trade and power as far as the Indonesian archipelago. What is 
unique about the m odern Indian state is that the northern subcontinental 
power is politically integrated w ith the Southern m aritim e zone for the 
common purpose of prom oting "Indian" interests in a larger geopolitical 
arena. This has been widened by the increase in speed and reach of weapons 
systems. The imagery of the relative combat potential of A rjuna’s chariot, 
the war elephant, the Portuguese man of war, the INS Vikrant, or the Agni 
missile provide a sense of this.38
Another justification for extending Indian influence is proposed by 
Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, A.K. 
Banerjee, in his concept of the three "I"s of the Indian Ocean. This is a 
another view which seeks to have Indian Ocean issues handled by Indian 
Ocean states and in particular by India, Indonesia and Iran. Indonesia 
reportedly offered to seize the A ndam an and Nicobar Islands during the 
1965 w ar to take pressure off Pakistan.39 The opening of a nuclear 
relationship betw een China and Tehran,40 and the past history of naval 
support having been offered by both Iran and Indonesia to Pakistan in the 
1965 War, make the three "I"s an unlikely possibility. This concept does 
nonetheless express the extent to which Indian Ocean status can be utilised 
to discredit extra regional actors. This is part of the reconceptualisation of 
the Indian Ocean as a truly "Indian" or a "littoral states" Ocean.41
37 Joseph Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, p. 32.
38 By analyzing the battlefields of Agincourt, Waterloo, the Somme and Dien Ben Phu, John 
Keegan has effectively studied this issue. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, New York: The 
Viking Press, 1976).
39 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia, p. 41.
4(^  Bryan Boswell, 'Tehran Reactor Sale Chills US-Sino Links," The Australian,*}/14/92.
41 A.K. Banerjee, "The Three Ts of the Indian Ocean: A Management Approach," 
Mainstream, 1/5/91. By Australia's exclusion the Indian perception that Australia is a non- 
Asian, non-Indian Ocean state seems to remain.
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What is of the utmost concern is not that India will claim a legitimate 
interest in a broader region, but how this will be done.42 To make the best 
possible estimation of India's future course, history and current trends are 
essential indicators. The history of India's external relations indicates a 
move away from the idealism of its early m odem  period and a return  to the 
realist geopolitics of the Raj model, w ith the modification that the interests 
served are exclusively linked to the subcontinent and not to a broader extra- 
Indian im perial netw ork. India has been subject to colonisation and 
dom ination from across the seas. As such, India has legitim ate security 
concerns. Current trends, such as the rise of H indu fundam entalism , and 
o ther issues discussed in  the p rev ious chap ter, together w ith  the 
reorientation of the economy to be discussed in the following chapter, will 
have a considerable impact on the nature of India’s foreign relations.
The extent to which India's desire for an expanded posture will come 
into conflict with other states is not entirely clear, though there are already 
some indications. A lthough invited into Sri Lanka, the Indian  Peace 
Keeping Force was less than enthusiastically received by the populace and 
was subsequently asked to leave by the Sri Lankan government. The trade 
and transit dispute w ith Nepal in 1990, and the Nepali Congress Party's 
victory in 1991, further extended India's sphere of influence over Nepal. 
Indian differences with the United States over the developm ent of India's 
nuclear and missile technologies are also points of contention. Just where 
India is headed in its external relations is still uncertain in this period of 
transition. W hat is probable is that India's future foreign policy will be 
determ ined by a mix of reinterpreted traditions, w hether geopolitical or 
politico-cultural, and contemporary imperatives. In this way, ideas, such as 
those of K.M. Panikkar, may mix w ith the rise of fundam entalist rhetoric 
and the influence of economic reform to m ould a new policy direction for 
India.
42 Surjit Mansingh has articulated five patterns of relations between India and the nations of 
South Asia. These are: l.The Kautilyan, 2. The Raj, 3. The American, 4. Bilateralism, 5. 
Regional Cooperation in India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-82, 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 273-311.
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In 1992, the Indian response to reports that the Pentagon was in 
favour of a reinsta tem ent of a substantial strategic relationship w ith 
Pakistan was guarded. Leaks of the Pentagon's blueprint for the new world 
order reportedly portrayed India as "among the aspirants to global power 
status." The Defence D epartm ent docum ent further referred to India as 
having "hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean." The report goes on to state that the United States m ust 
"maintain [its] status as a military power of the first magnitude ... acting as a 
balancing force and [preventing the] emergence of a vacuum  or a regional 
hegem on."43 In response to the leaked docum ent, the Indian Foreign 
Secretary indicated that "India's view of this could have consequences in 
term s of Indian  assessm ents and policy orientation."44 The In d ian  
governm ent issued a statem ent indicating that they were assured by 
m embers of the State D epartm ent and the National Security Council that 
the views of the Pentagon paper were of "middle level officials and [did] not 
reflect perception at policy making levels."45 W hether India and the United 
States can resolve their differences on the NPT and the MTCR will be a test 
of rapport between W ashington and Delhi. The chapter now proceeds to 
address the centre-periphery question and its linkage with internal-external 
relations.
40.2 C entre/periphery and the in terconnectiv ity  of internal and external 
relations
One of the key factors which has led to increased conflict betw een 
India and its neighbours has been the nexus between internal and external 
politics. W ithin this nexus the role of Indian centre-state relations has 
exerted a negative impact on the stability of the region. This section focuses 
on those secessionist and autonom ous m ovem ents in India’s peripheral 
border regions because of their connection w ith India's external security
43 Reportedly excerpts of a confidential United States Department of Defence Document, 
Defense Planning Guidance, were leaked to the New York Times early in March of 1992. As 
cited in Susumu Awanohara, The Lone Ranger: Pentagons Blueprint for the New World 
Order," The Far Eastern Economic Review,3/26/92.
44 "No Change on India Signing the NPT," India News, (Canberra: The Indian High 
Commission, 3/18/92), p. 2.
45 "No Change on India Signing the NPT," India News, 3/18/92, p. 2.
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environm ent. There are o ther au tonom ous m ovem ents, such  as the 
Telangana movement of Andhra Pradesh, which have been om itted due to 
their lower profile in connection with internal and external politics.
The peripheral groups are disaffected because their prim ary identity is 
separate from, and subordinate to, the m ainstream  identity of the Indian 
centre. Moving away from the cultural heartland of the Indo-Gangetic 
plain one encounters variations of subcontinental culture. The electoral 
significance of Uttar Pradesh is but one example of how this pow er of the 
centre is expressed. The high percentage of Brahmins in key adm inistrative 
positions is another. To the northwest there is the influence of successive 
waves of invasion and assimilation from Southwest and Central Asia. To 
the northeast an alternative indigenous tribal identity predom inates. To the 
south, the Dravidian culture, with its separate but similar traditions to the 
Aryan north predominates.
As India's political leadership under Indira and Rajiv came to ru le  
more for the benefit of the coterie of the prim e m inister and the Congress 
party than for the long term benefit of the country, short-term , stop-gap 
m easures were applied to dom estic political situations w hich called for 
serious and meaningful solutions. This has led to a point w here situations 
such as exist in Kashmir and Punjab have become ”pawn[s] on  the chess 
board of electoral politics [where] narrow  short term  considerations" usurp  
the role of the national interest.46
The degenerating situation today in both Punjab and Kashmir allows 
Pakistan to continue a low level conflict w ith India which stops short of 
open war. Here the politically opportunistic elem ent of the centre is to 
blame. If the political leadership were more visionary, less partisan, and 
willing to risk electoral losses for the larger good of the dem ocratic process
Satyapal Dang, Genesis of Terrorism: An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists, (New  
Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1989), p.xvi. The Congress party is not alone, as suggested, in its 
self-serving manipulation of the Punjab situation. The CPI position on Punjab, as represented 
here by its Punjab head, has been critical of Khalistan's religious basis. In 1980 and 1981 the 
CPI worked with the Akali Dal when this was perceived as furthering its ends. See Ram 
Narayan Kumar and George Sieberer,77ie Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution and Present Phase, 
(Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), p. 215.
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the current levels of internal conflict betw een Delhi and Kashm ir and 
Punjab could have been averted. This w ould, at least in part, have 
am eliorated the Indo-Pakistani conflict. If political accom m odation had 
been reached w ith the autonom ous elem ents in Kashm ir and Punjab, 
Pakistan would not be in a position to exert considerable pressure on India. 
W ithout the leverage which the cross border insurgency gives Pakistan, it 
would be more inclined to pursue a negotiated solution. Instead, elements 
w ithin Pakistan hold on to the belief that they can achieve their objectives 
through support for low intensity insurgency.
One of the symptoms of the desire to internationalise issues is the rise 
in the taking foreign hostages as a m eans of attracting attention to the 
m ilitants' causes. Hostage-taking of foreigners may be understood as a 
sym ptom  of increasing  fru s tra tio n  and hostility  to the ex ternal 
environm ent. During the one year period preceding October 1991, eight 
foreigners were taken hostage in Pakistan while ten were abducted in India. 
While the taking of Indian and Pakistani hostages has been commonplace 
for years, the new wave of hostage taking is increasingly focusing on 
foreigners. This may reflect an increased sense of po larisation  and 
desperation which in turn leads the groups to increasingly radical strategies 
in their attem pt to focus international opinion and governm ental attention 
on their causes. Among those who have been taken are: four Chinese, four 
Israelis, three Japanese, three Swedes, two Soviets, one Frenchm an and a 
R om anian .47 These individuals were taken by Kashmiri, Assamese, Sikh, 
and Sindhi groups. Prior to 1991 Sikhs had not taken foreigners hostage.
In one of the more interesting incidents, six Israelis were taken 
hostage in Srinagar. The Israelis m anaged to disarm  some of their captors. 
In the ensuing fire-fight one Israeli was killed and others were w ounded 
although they did manage to escape. Pakistani papers subsequently ran
44 *7 "India: Militants Kidnap French Engineer", 10/19/91, "Japanese Students Apologize for
Kidnap Stir in Pakistan," 5/1/91, "Indian State to Free Hundreds in Soviet Hostage Deal,"
7/8 /91 , "Captured Israelis Fight Back in Kashmir," 6/27/91, "Sikh Militants Set New
Deadline for Romanian Diplomat Deal," 10/21/91, "Pakistan Says Political Motives Behind 
Kidnap of Three Chinese," 6/6/91, "Sweden Sends Envoy to Kashmir in Bid to Contact 
Kidnappers," 6/13/91. All of the above are drawn from the Reuters Neivs Service.
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stories alleging that the Israelis were in Kashmir in an advisory capacity to 
the Indian Armed forces and that they were involved in a plan to attack the 
Kahuta nuclear plant.48 The official response of the Pakistani Foreign 
Ministry was that the "presence of Israelis of this kind is incongruous in the 
tourist context."49
The m otivation for k idnapping  varies from  a desire to a ttract 
attention to the secessionist cause to mere "dacoitery," or banditry, for profit. 
The result is an increasingly hostile environm ent for the local authorities 
and those foreigners associated with them. The majority of those kidnapped 
have  no t been tou ris ts  b u t peop le  associated  w ith  governm enta l 
developm ent projects. In October of 1991, India had only a seven year 
maximum penalty for hostage-taking though the government of N arasim ha 
Rao was considering raising the penalty to a capital offence.
Having discussed changing Indian conceptions of space w ithin India's 
h is to r ic a l co n tex t and  in  te rm s of the  Ind ian  core-periphery  
conceptualization of territory we will now go on to analyse in more detail 
the interrelationship between these concepts and India’s three key strategic 
arenas. These are, the northw est frontier, the northeast frontier and the 
Indian Ocean.
40.21 The northwest frontier
The northwest frontier has been the single most effective entry point 
for invasion of the subcontinent. A lexander the Great, Tim urlane, the 
Aryans, the Kushans, Huns, Arabs, Afghans and Moghuls have all in turn  
descended onto the Indo-Gangetic plain of the subcontinent through the 
NWF. Today India's stability is also threatened from this quadrant. This 
threat is not one of overt invasion, but one of subversion. Such threats, 
either of invasion or subdivision, are part of India’s recurring history. In 
the past it has been the strategic depth of India that has allowed its culture to
4® After the destruction of the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq, Israel offered to attack the 
Pakistani facility at Kahuta if the Indians would provide refueling. Ramesh Thakur, India's 
Foreign Policy, forthcoming.
49 "Pakistani Premier Threatens War if Nuclear Sites are Attacked.” Reuters News Service.
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renew itself.50 In part the distinctive character of the Deccan stems from its 
distance from the traditional invasion routes through the Bolan and Kyber 
Passes.
40.211 Punjab
The Centre’s on-going efforts to bring Punjab under its control has 
polarised the community and played into the hands of the militants. As the 
militants gained strength, they too, alienated large segments of the people 
through their excessive dem ands which changed the habits of everyday life. 
In an attem pt to placate dem ands for Punjabi Suba, or a separate Punjabi 
speaking state, the centre reorganised Punjab in 1966 by creating the state of 
Haryana to give Punjabi speakers a majority w ithin a state they could call 
their own.51 The situation in Punjab began to deteriorate in 1983. Congress 
party  fears of antagonising the H indu vote in H aryana preven ted  Rajiv 
Gandhi from carrying through compromise measures aimed at diffusing the 
conflict w ith the Rajiv-Longowal accord of 1985.52 By 1987 the failure to 
implement this agreement betw een the centre and the Akali Dal added to 
Sikh's frustrations concerning autonomy and m ade more extreme measures 
seem necessary. Pakistani assistance came to be perceived as a necessary 
lever to gain the implementation of the reforms.53
The continuing deterioration of the situation led to the imposition of 
President's rule on 12 May 1987. Since May of 1990 all security forces in 
Punjab have been placed under the control of the state Director General of 
Police. The state was declared a disturbed area in 1991 thereby giving the 
arm ed forces additional powers through the legal protection that the act 
gives them. Despite these measures, control slipped away from the centre 
and the moderates during the 1983 to 1990 period.
5° K.M. Panikkar, "Indian History," p. 83.
51 Pravin Patel, "Violent Protest in India: the Punjab Movement," Journal of International 
Affairs, Fall 1986, p. 271.
Raju Thomas, "Wrestling with India's Sikh Crisis," The Christian Science Monitor, 
6/7/88.
Manoj Joshi, ’Terrorists trained abroad, Says PM," The Hindu, 10/18/86.
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In 1992, active day and night patrols by the army and paramilitary 
forces gave the necessary backing to the police who then were able to make a 
series of key arrests of militant leaders and to interdict larger numbers of 
contraband arms from Pakistan. In Novem ber 1992 police killed Nissan 
Singh Makhu, military leader of the Khalistan Liberation Front, Kulip Singh 
Fauji of the Babbar Khalsa Group, G urdas Singh M ansurwal, operations 
chief of the Zafarwal Group of the Khalistan Commando Force, and four 
other m ilitary com m anders of the Zafarwal Group. This governm ent 
success followed the elim ination of Sikh m ilitant leader Talw inder Singh 
Permar in October of 1992. He was w anted in connection with the bombing 
of the Air India flight in 1985 where over 300 people were killed. In late 1992 
Police Chief K.P.S. Gill said "Over 70% of terrorists in Punjab have now been 
elim inated."54 W ith these leaders elim inated, the police seem to have 
regained the initiative in the civil war that has claimed 15,000 to 20,000 lives 
since 1981 when the insurgency began.55
In 1993 the centre was able to consolidate its gains in Punjab. This is 
particularly interesting because it is not yet clear w hether it was the 
application  of force or o ther factors that effected the shift in the 
governments favour. With the introduction of the military the police forces 
were freed to move against the militants. Also, better interdiction at the 
border helped to isolate the militants. It is unclear whether this is but a lull 
in an on-going insurgency or w hether the militants have been crushed. To 
keep this in perspective, it is useful to bear in m ind the on-going resurgence 
of insurgencies in the northeast as well as the Sri Lankan governm ents' 
success against the JVP.
The blood being spilled each day in Punjab stems from the unique 
position that the Sikhs and Punjab have played in the history of the 
subcontinent. Traditionally they have been caught betw een the Islamic 
pow ers w hich have descended from  the m ountains of the northw est 
frontier and passed through Punjab into the Gangetic plain. In this way
54 "Indian Police Kill Most Wanted Sikh Militant," Reuters News Service, 10/15/92.
55 "Indian Police Kill Sikh Militant Leaders," Reuters Neu^s Service, 11/1/92 and Two Top 
Sikh Terrorists Killed in Punjab," Reuters News Service, 11/16/92.
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Punjab has been the scene of m uch conflict betw een Islamic and H indu 
cultures. Centre policies that place more emphasis on the retention  of 
electoral gain than in seeking a lasting peace do little to resolve the conflict. 
The cost of such a policy direction may be India's territorial integrity.
The signing of the Rajiv-Longowal accord and its subsequent non­
implementation underm ined m oderate Akali confidence and worked to the 
advantage of the militants as the average Sikh increasingly believed that the 
centre w ould only respond to the force of arm s. By failing to draw  a 
distinction betw een m oderate, au tonom ous, Akali dem ands and the 
militant calls for Khalistan, the centre polarised Punjab to grim effect.56 In 
this polarised atmosphere, full implementation of the Longowal accord may 
not be sufficient. Further autonom ous m easures, along the lines of the 
A nandpur Sahib resolution may be necessary.57
T here  exists a th resho ld  of v io lence and  cynical po litical 
manipulation beyond which conflict enters a phase where alienated peoples 
come to perceive separatist solutions as the only way to solve their 
problems. At this point, especially in peripheral border states, the situation 
is open for external m anipulation of the situation.58 In the lead up to the 
1965 war, Pakistan overestim ated the suppo rt of the Kashm iris. The 
situation in Indian-held Kashmir has deteriorated significantly since then. 
The potential for a fifth column also exists in Kashmir.
40.212 Kashmir
The continuing unrest in Kashmir remains close to expanding into a 
broader conflict59 The seemingly unending string of communalist atrocities
56 Hancharan Bains, "Punjab: Victim of Piecemeal Tinkering," The Business and Political 
Observer, 12/19/90.
57 D.N. "Which Political Solution for Punjab?" The Economic and Political Weekly,9/15/90, 
p. 2037.
56 Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a London based advocate of Khalistan reportedly has contacts with 
American Senator Jesse Helms and former National Security Council co-chairman General 
Daniel Graham. Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 254.
59 The region of Kashmir is defined as those areas known as, the vale of Kashmir, Jammu, 
Poonch, Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit. This work is primarily concerned with those areas of 
Kashmir under Indian control.
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that pervade the political landscape of the Indian subcontinent serve to 
anaesthetise the in ternational com m unity to the possibility that these 
tensions are at times dangerously close to escalating from relatively minor 
civil unrest to national strife or international conflict. The centre's success 
in counter insurgency operations in 1992 in Punjab was not m atched by 
similar successes in Kashmir. In Kashmir the situation has been steadily 
declining since the im position of direct rule in 1990. According to the 
Council for H um an Rights in Kashmir 36,772 were disabled, 21,425 were 
detained for interrogation, $2.3 billion w orth of crops were destroyed, 3,688 
females were raped and a total of 27,000 have been killed during the period 
1990-93 as a result of Ind ia’s counterinsurgency operations in K ashm ir 
alone.60 Somewhere betw een these som ew hat inflated figures and the 
under reported figures of the government rests the truth of the matter.
There are no signs that India will relent in its attem pts to force the 
militants to capitulate. Narasim ha Rao has declared, ”[t]his is the bottom  
line, no force on earth can alienate it [Kashmir] from us.”61 India and 
Pakistan have fought in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Border skirmishes along the 
Kashmir border and on the Siachen Glacier have occurred regularly. The 
parallels betw een the tensions in Kashm ir in the spring of 1990 and the 
situation prior to the 1965 War, indicate that conflict will recur if underlying 
problems are not addressed. These problem s stem from the relationship 
betw een the m ajority and m inority  g roups. Such tensions will not 
disappear through neglect. Neglect of the underlying social causes of unrest 
will lead to an escalation of tensions that will further erode relations 
betw een India and Pakistan. T raditional solutions, such as increased 
deploym ent of param ilitary and m ilitary forces, have thus far failed to 
address the underlying concerns upon which the conflict feeds.
Because of the centrality of Kashmir in the foundation ideology of 
India and Pakistan, conflict resolution has tended  tow ards zero sum  
approaches. This is the root cause of the seemingly intractable nature of the 
dispute. If the Kashmir question is not resolved it will continue to escalate
60 Council for Human Rights in Kashmir, "Roses for Freedom," The Neu; York Times, 3/12/93.
61 "Rao Vows to Hold Kashmir," The Australian,SI 17/92.
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to greater magnitude. It is in India's interest to see the issue settled and the 
existing border accepted. Conversely, it has been perceived to be in 
Pakistan's interest to retain high tension in order to keep the pressure on 
India.62 This policy serves the Pakistani purposes of keeping India 
strategically off balance as it continues to be embroiled in internal security 
m atters. C ontinued unrest and turm oil serve that purpose while also 
keeping open the possibility that Kashmir may one day m anage to break 
with India, either to join Pakistan, or to become independent.
The Pakistani Prime M inister's freedom  to m anoeuvre in Kashmir, 
as well as a num ber of other issue areas, such as the defence budget, 
Afghanistan or the nuclear program m e, is severely lim ited by domestic 
political constraints and a lack of control over the intelligence or military 
structure. Fortunately for India, the Indian military has been a staunch 
supporter of democratic rule. The Indian intelligence agencies record is, 
however, less clear. The centre in India is also increasingly bound by 
political perceptions that are in part created by the H indu fundam entalist 
organisations.
The source of Pakistani antagonism tow ards India as stemming from 
a core group of between five and fifteen percent of the population with a real 
hatred for India.63 1S1 is one organisation where there w ould be a larger 
concentration of such individuals than in the w ider com m unity. This 
m inority anti-Indian elem ent has sought to sabotage talks in the past 
through tactics such as the abuse and harassm ent of Indian diplom ats in 
Islamabad prior to discussions. There may be a similar anti Pakistani group 
inside Indian intelligence. On 6 December 1992 M ohammad Ashfan of the 
Pakistani H igh Com mission was picked up  by Indian intelligence for 
espionage. Pakistan alleged that he was severely beaten in the process of 
interrogation. This incident was timed to cause friction between India and 
Pakistan in the lead up to the South Asian regional sum m it m eeting in
6,2 The question remains as to whether or not General Zia’s death may have been connected 
with dissent over the possibility that he was close to resolving the border dispute in 
Kashmir.
63 This observation is a distillation of interviews conducted between 1990 and 1993.
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Dhaka on 12-13 December 1992. Pakistan has accused India of 11 cases since 
1987 where Pakistani diplomats have been either beaten or tortured.64
The governm ent of V.P. Singh was unproven in the spring of 1990 
when it had to deal with a major crisis and make its own m ark on Indian 
foreign policy. Kashmir was the first significant test of Singh's leadership in 
the foreign policy area. The w ithdrawal from Sri Lanka was planned under 
the previous government. At that juncture V.P. Singh let it be known to 
the Pakistanis that if they were to go to war India would not refrain from a 
protracted campaign along an extended front. In such a w ar an eventual 
Indian victory is now a foregone conclusion.
Identifying and addressing the underlying causes of the conflict in 
Kashmir is a first priority in de-escalating the strife there. Existing channels 
have failed to provide sustainable resolutions to K ashm ir's problem s 
because graft and corruption in the area have exacerbated poor economic 
opportunities and tensions. The people of Kashm ir have increasingly 
turned to violence from 1989 onwards to express their frustrations. The 
existing political administration is either not interested in, or incapable of, 
addressing their concerns. The level of un res t w ould be reduced  
considerably if the special powers which give the param ilitary forces a free 
hand to abuse their authority were revoked and if economic opportunities 
were m ade available for the newly educated. By addressing the problems 
that exacerbate the root com m unalist tensions, unrest w ithin the valley 
would be less likely to draw India into wider conflict.
There are signs that the more fundam entalist, pro-Pakistani elements 
w ithin the militant movements are gaining on their more m oderate rivals. 
The beginnings of fundamentalist inroads could be noticed in 1990 with the 
increased use of the chaddur by women. The fundamentalist m ilitants have 
now convinced the majority of the urban female population to wear knee 
length burquas over their regular dress. This move has been unsuccessfully 
opposed by the Muslim Khawateen M aukaz, who are affiliated w ith the
64 •"Pakistan Protests to India Over Spy Row," Reuters Neu^s Service,12/6/92.
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Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).65 The divisions between the 
JKLF and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) backed Hizbul M ujahideen are 
becoming more apparent. Clashes between them were reported in June of 
1992 66 Pakistani support for the militants continues both with covert arms 
and training, and w ith overt exhortations of support. Prim e M inister 
Nawaz Sharif voiced his endorsem ent of the Kashm iri’s struggle against 
India by praying for "the success of their jihad."67
D espite their differences the JKLF and the H izbul M ujahideen 
endorsed a 21 page document outlining their joint com m itm ent to let the 
people of Kashmir decide whether Kashmir will become independent, jo in  
Pakistan or rem ain w ith India. This developm ent in December of 1992 
indicated that the groups were, despite their diferences, willing to join forces 
in united opposition against Indian rule.68
The situation in Ladakh dem onstrates that the centre is not in all 
cases the enem y of peripheral sub-national groups. As the M uslim  
Kashmiris resent the imposition of H indu Indian influence, so too do the 
B uddhist Ladhakis resen t the grow ing influence of Islam  in the ir 
traditionally Buddhist land. The inconsistency of resenting one overlord 
while aspiring to similar status elsewhere does not prevent the continued 
desecration of ancient Ladakhi stupas and chortens, or the insensitive 
Islamic calls to prayers in Buddhist Leh. The ethnic mix of Mons, Dards, 
Baltis and Tibetans in Leh has been disturbed by the increasing influx of 
Kashmiri Muslims. While culturally a distinct entity from Jammu and 
Kashmir, Ladakh has been incorporated into the state for adm inistrative 
purposes. As pressure  from  K ashm iri M uslim s grows, Ladakh has 
increasingly view ed closer direct relations w ith  the centre, through a 
redefinition of Ladakh's status as a Union Territory, as the way to preserve 
its socio-cultural identity. Slogans such as "Pakistani agents go back 
scrawled on the walls of the bazaar attest to this desire and resentment of the
"Full Blown Fundamentalism in J&K," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 6/20/92.
66 "J&K Militants Make it Business," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 6/23/92.
67 "Sharif Supports Kashmir Terrorists," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 5/16/92. 
"Kashmiri's Said More United Against India," Reuters News Service, 12/6/92.
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influx of non Buddhist peoples.69 Thus the sub-national identity has led to 
increased loyalty to the centre, due to the centre's ability to protect the sub­
region's identity from a larger regional identity that threatens it.70 If other 
sub-national groups could similarly come to perceive the centre as a source 
of support, rather than a threat, then the m otive for secession would be 
rem oved.
Beyond Punjab and Kashmir there are two other particularly sensitive 
geopolitical segments of India's northwest frontier. These areas are located 
to the north of Kashmir per se. They are the Siachen Glacier and the Aksai 
Chin plateau. The chapter will now go on to assess their significance.
40.213 Siachen
The Siachen Glacier has a geopolitical importance which is belied by 
the bareness of its terrain. The glacier itself is some 3000 square kilometres 
of high altitude, craggy, snowbound terrain located on the eastern end of the 
Karakorum Range. The glacier, and the Karakorum  Pass, fall between the 
trila teral juncture of Ladakh, Baltistan and Aksai Chin,71 w hich are 
controlled by India, Pakistan and China respectively. The key issue is the 
leverage that control of the glacier w ould give either India or Pakistan 
should they face each other once again in war. The strategic Karakorum pass 
is at an altitude of 18,290 feet and is located to the east of the glacier. The 
frozen waste that Siachen is has led to the conflict over it being characterized 
as "a fight between two bald men over a comb."72 Despite this, the potential
6,9 Jug Suraiya, ’Troubled Times in High Places," The Guardian, 5/ 23/92.
79 These impressions are drawn from interviews and discussions with Ladakhis while in Leh 
in 1990. See also Jug Suraiya, "At Cross Purposes in Little Tibet," Times of India, 10/7/90. The 
presence of large numbers of Indian military personnel has also led to conflicts between them 
and the local inhabitants.
71 The Chinese were not party to the Pamir Agreement of 11 March 1895 which delineated 
the Russian Afghan and British Raj frontiers in the Pamirs and Karakorums. A British 
boundary commission was set up to survey the "imperfectly known Chinese frontier." This the 
Chinese ignored. The fact that the people of Hunza seasonally migrated over the Karakorum 
watershed to the Chinese side caused difficulties in establishing the frontier between the Raj 
and the Chinese empire. C.P. Skrine and P. Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar, pp. 79-81, 
92-3, 95.
77 Stephen Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives, 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 240.
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geopolitical significance of the territory to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, if 
somewhat dubious to outside observers, remains "real" in the m inds of the 
strategic p lanners in both  countries. Control of the Siachen area is 
strategically im portant for all concerned for securing current and future 
strategic positions in Kashmir and Aksai Chin. It has also become a test of 
will and a prize to enhance status.
The crux of the dispute rests in the larger conflict over the disposition 
of Jammu and Kashmir. Baltistan and Ladakh are presently subsum ed 
w ithin this larger territory. Beyond this there are particular ambiguities 
which are responsible for the history of the on-going fighting. As part of the 
Shimla Agreement the border in Kashmir was surveyed for the first time to 
establish a line of control. Concluded in 1972, the line of control survey 
recommended that the border, extending north and / or eastward from grid 
reference NJ 9842, was of insufficient im portance to require  detailed  
delineation.73 There exists a difference in subsequent interpretation as to 
whether the interim agreement was that the line be draw n straight from the 
grid reference to a point im m ediately south of the K arakorum  Pass or 
w hether the border was sim ply to rem ain undefined . The Pakistan 
government does seem to have interpreted the border as being undefined, at 
least in the period immediately after the Shimla agreem ent. A Survey of 
Pakistan approved map of 1975 does not delineate the border between India 
and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, nor does it give any indication of a 
border between India and Pakistan in the Siachen region. W hat the m ap 
does do is to draw  a line demarcating the border between the Gilgit Agency 
and China and extends this line through K2 to the Karakorum Pass at which 
point the line ends and the map then reads "frontier undefined." From the
73 There is a degree of confusion over the legitimacy of the Pakistani claim to the territory to 
the west of the line drawn from NJ 9842 to the Karakorum Pass. General Chibber's comments, 
as reported in Manoj Joshi, "The Siachen Imbroglio," The Hindu, 6/22/89, assert that the 
Indian decision to take up a position on the glacier in 1984 was an effort to prevent a Pakistani 
fait accotnpli with regard to their claim, confirmed on 21 August 1983, that the territory in 
question was to be under their control. Brian Cloughley, being more sympathetic to the 
Pakistani position, has interpreted the situation that the Indians were the first to break the 
tacit agreement not to specifically define or occupy the disputed territory. See Brian 
Cloughley, "India, Pakistan and the Siachen Glacier," Janes Defence Weekly, 11/14/87, p. 
1121.
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Pakistani m ap of 1975 it is unclear, beyond Gilgit, just w here the Indo- 
Pakistani border lies.
There is no doubt about the im portance of maps as indications of 
interpretations of states’ demarcations of actual, or intended control, and the 
impact that these representations have on subsequent action. This is made 
evident by General Chibber's74 recollection that it was an American map, 
presented to his attention in 1978, during a discussion about the fact that 
Pakistan had allowed international m ountain climbing expeditions in the 
region, which, by delineating the border as extending northeast from the 
terminal point, aroused his concerns of Pakistani intentions in the area. It 
was General Chibber's understanding  that the 1972 Shimla Agreem ent, 
similar to the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which had described the border as 
extending "thence to the glaciers," had been that the border was to rem ain 
undefined beyond NJ 9842 despite India's territorial gains in the Shyok 
valley to the south of the Karakorum Range in the 1971 war. The 1965 war, 
being term inated by an agreement to return to the status quo ante bellum, 
did not alter the situation.75
Beginning with the Kumar expedition in 1978, India began to assert its 
presence in the Siachen area through sum m er m ountaineering patrols.
74 Lt. General Chibber retd, as Director General of Military Operations at Army Head 
Quarters in Delhi was directly involved with the decision to send Colonel Kumar on the 
mountaineering expedition to Terramkangi in Siachen in the Summer of 1978. He was further 
involved in the on-going conflict after assuming the Army Northern Sector Command in 1982. 
7  ^A shift in some American map representations of the degree of Pakistani control over the 
region is detectable between 1971 to 1984. The American National Geographic Map of Asia of 
1971 does not delineate the Indo-Pakistani border in the Siachen region. Interestingly, it 
includes the Aksai Chin region within Indian territory. The National Geographic map of 
South Asia of 1984, while still retaining an element of ambiguity, does imply that the border 
does extend northeast from the terminal point NJ 9842 to the Karakorum pass and that the 
Karakorum Pass falls within Pakistan. By 1984, National Geographic represents Aksai Chin 
as under China s control though disputed by India. India felt that Pakistan was winning 
international recognition of its control of the Siachen Glacier area through its sponsorship of 
mountain climbing expeditions, and through international map representations, and therefore 
felt compelled to reverse this perception by asserting its own claim by military action. India 
did approach the United States and Pakistan concerning the issue of map representations of 
the region. Western magazines are stamped with a warning to Indian readers that the border 
representations are inaccurate. This dispute also highlights the importance of external 
perceptions to both India and Pakistan
Lt. General M.L. Chibber, "Siachen the Untold Story," Indian Defence Review, 1/90, p. 147.
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T his am biguous arrangem ent was sufficient un til 1982 w hen more 
substantial scouting probes began in the area. On 21 August 1983, a formal 
protest was issued by Pakistan's northern  area com m ander over Indian 
patrols into the area. By 13 April 1984, the issue became further militarized 
w hen an Indian Brigade took up position on the Glacier in Operation 
M eg h d o o t76 In June of 1984 the Indian contingent was successful in 
repelling a Pakistani effort to dislodge them from their position.77
A ttem pts to negotiate a solution on Siachen, beginning in January 
and June of 1986, proved fruitless. The Siachen question is inextricably 
w rapped in the overall fate of Kashmir. In May of 1989, the Indian Defence 
Secretary travelled to Islamabad to meet with General Zia. It is thought that 
at that time there came to be an inform al understand ing  to exercise 
"restraint" on the issue. In April of 1991, Pakistan called for the Kashmir 
border to be referred once again to the UN. With regard to Siachen, the two 
sides agreed to refer the issue to further secretarial level talks. The April 
1991 meeting was the fourth such meeting on the Indo-Pakistani Kashmir 
bo rder w here little diplom atic m ovem ent on the Siachen d ispute was 
achieved.
The accomplishments of secretarial level talks have been agreements 
n o t to attack each o th er’s nuclear facilities, the prom ise of advance 
notification of m ilitary m anoeuvres and restra in t on the violation of 
airspace.78 These can be viewed either as the beginnings of confidence 
building or as m easures which grant the states more control over war 
initiation and management. This latter explanation is the more plausible as
76 Meghdoot is the divine cloud messenger after the famous Sanskrit play by Kalidasa. The 
Pakistani counter operation was code named Ababeel which is the Urdu word for a high 
flying sparrow. The Indian position is that their intelligence indicated that Pakistan had 
made preparations to occupy the area and that the Indian deployment was to pre-empt the 
move. Pakistan may have felt obliged to respond to the Indian patrols which themselves 
were in response to six Japanese and American mountaineering expeditions into the area 
between 1975 and 1980. Lt. General M.L. Chibber, "Siachen the Untold Story," Indian Defence 
Review, 1/90, pp.146-49.
77 Brian Cloughley, "India, Pakistan and the Siachen Glacier," Janes Defence Weekly, 
11/14/87, p. 1121.
7  ^The agreements on military exercises and airspace violations were signed in Delhi on 6 
April. "Government Signs Border Deal with Pakistan," The Daily Telegraph,4/8/91
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long as Indian and Pakistani negotiating positions rem ain fundam entally 
unaltered. The desire of Pakistan to internationalise Kashmir by bringing it 
before the UN, and the Indian desire to treat Kashmir as an internal matter, 
w hile focussing on estab lish ing  a pacified  bo rder, are seem ingly 
irreconcilable. This is further exacerbated by the ease with which Pakistan is 
currently able to destabilise the situation in Kashmir. Despite the lack of 
m ovem ent on Siachen the two sides agreed to place the issue back on the 
negotiation agenda. Little diplom atic effort had been expended on the 
Siachen issue between 1989 and the April 1991 meeting where they agreed to 
resum e negotiations. It is most likely that the issue will remain hostage to 
the overall relationship.
Despite open conflict since 1984, the two countries have been careful 
not to allow fighting on Siachen to expand into a general war, or even a 
broader, border skirm ish in Kashmir. The fighting has, in an alm ost 
surrealist fashion, continued at this localized low-level at the top of the 
w orld seemingly w ithout effect on the overall nature of the relationship 
between the two countries. Siachen is a costly affair. To 1989, India had lost 
some 350-400 dead and 1,500 wounded while Pakistan is thought to have lost 
twice that num ber. This is the w orld 's highest battlefield w ith troops 
operating at altitudes of up  to 22,000 feet. The estim ated cost of India's 
operation was thought to be more than Rs 30 crores per annum 79 or $US 1.6 
million a day.80 An annual expenditure of $US 584 million is indicative of 
the strategic importance placed on Siachen.
Siachen rem ains an issue of national prestige for both Pakistan and 
India. On 30 July 1991, then Army Chief General Aslam Beg, in a statement 
issued from the Pakistani side of Kashmir, asserted that Pakistan had 
"m aintained a upper hand [by having] defended every inch of our sacred 
land." Further, in stating that under his leadership  Pakistan had  not 
"yielded an inch of its land to the enemy" but had rather dom inated all 
along the border.81 Beg seemed to both dem ean Zia ul H aq’s stewardship of
Manoj Joshi, "The Siachen Imbroglio," The Hindu,6/22/89.
Mahnaz Isphahani, Roads and Rivals, p. 209.
"Pakistan Army Chief Claims Upper Hand Against India on Border," Reuters News 
Service,7 /30/91.
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Pakistan's territorial sovereignty and equate a strong position relative to 
India w ith the proper role of Pakistani leaders. Such confrontational 
attitudes are not indicative of a desire to meaningfully resolve the border 
issue even if they are primarily aimed at a domestic audience. The ability of 
Pakistani leaders to stand against the Indians seems to be the standard by 
which they are to be measured. In an interview  conducted im m ediately 
before he was assassinated, Rajiv Gandhi stated that he and General Zia had 
been "close to finishing the agreement on Kashmir, we had the maps and 
everything ready to sign and then he [Zia] was killed."82 Elements w ithin 
Pakistan had accused Zia of capitulating on Kashmir. This portrayal of 
events by Rajiv Gandhi introduces an additional motive to the possibility 
that Army Chief Beg was behind the Zia assassination.83
If this, and the Ravi Rikhye scenario on Operation Brass Tacks are 
true, then it would seem as though the intelligence agencies of India and 
Pakistan are in effect in a position to veto any substantial peace initiatives 
sought by more enlightened elements w ithin the democratic and m ilitary 
establishments of the two countries. The role of intelligence agencies in 
India will be discussed further in Chapter Six. The chapter will now turn  
from Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir to look more closely at border 
disputes between India and China over Aksai Chin and Tawang.
40.214 Aksai Chin
During the 1984 skirm ish betw een India and Pakistan on Siachen 
there was a build-up of Chinese troops across the border in Aksai Chin.84 
The Chinese response is most plausibly explained by a desire to be prepared
82 "Pakistan Denies Report on Gandhi-Zia Pact on Kashmir," Reuters Nervs Service, 5/27 /91.
83 Prime Minister Zia, the American Ambassador, Arnold Raphael, and top military officers 
were killed in a aeroplane crash on 17 August of 1988. A Pakistani special commission 
investigating the crash was told by a electron microscopy expert that the wreckage contained 
"unusual concentrations of antimony, phosphorous, potassium and sulphur" which suggested 
sabotage by explosion. Moreover, former Pakistani Air Force pilot, Mohammed Akram Awan, 
has accused General Aslam Beg and ISI of colluding in the sabotage effort. Awan is currently 
serving a prison sentence for disclosing information to the CIA and Mossad with regard to 
covert Pakistani sales of arms to Iran. "Army Leader Killed Zia," The Guardian, 9/29/92. 
"Detonator in Wreckage of Zia’s Plane," Reuters News Service, 10/28/92.
84 Mahnaz Isphahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of 
Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
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should India decide to additionally redress its position, w ith regard to its 
territorial dispute with China, in Aksai Chin. Those acquainted with the 
d ispu te  will also rem em ber that Pakistan ceded, th rough  a bilateral 
agreement, 4500 square kilometers of territory of Pakistan held Kashmir to 
China thereby raising the prospect of Indo-Chinese conflict should India 
seek to reclaim her perceived losses in Kashmir. Pakistan and China signed 
this agreem ent on 2 March 1963. India has not recognised this transfer of 
territory. Since 1984 the Indian position on Siachen has rem ained intact 
along the Saltoro ridge. In the defensive context, Indian moves in Siachen 
were designed to prevent Pakistan from accomplishing a fait accompli 
similar to that of the Chinese in Aksai Chin.
The dispute between India and China is primarily concerned with two 
pieces of territory along the Himalayan border. These are known as Aksai 
Chin and Tawang. The Aksai Chin area is an uninhabited and inhospitable 
plateau at 12,000 feet altitude situated to the north of Ladakh.85 Leh, the 
nearest Indian staging area in Ladakh, is snowbound much of the year, and 
in summer is accessible through a narrow, winding, high altitude m ountain 
road which links it to both Srinagar and more recently to the Kulu-M anali 
valley. At the time of the conflict the route was little more than a donkey 
track. The region is more readily accessible from the Chinese side of the 
border. Unbeknownst to the Indians, during the 1950s the Chinese built a 
road across the Aksai Chin region connecting Tibet w ith Sinkiang and the 
Karakorum  highway. Tawang, falling betw een Bhutan and Tibet, is an 
equally difficult area for military operations for the Indians.
The basis of the Indian claims in Aksai Chin and Tawang are part of 
the imperial legacy of the Raj. The inclusion of Aksai Chin within India 
was based on the Ardagh line proposed in 1887 by Major General Sir John 
Ardagh, of the forw ard school, who favoured pushing British imperial 
India’s borders as far out as possible to counter Russian encroachm ent on 
the subcontinent. India's border claims in the northeast are based on the 
McMahon Line which was asserted as the boundary betw een the Raj and
85 Aksai Chin is white desert in Chinese.
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Tibet.86 This was not acceded to by the Chinese who later overran Tibet. 
The McMahon line runs along the peaks of the Himalaya as they span the 
region betw een Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. The Tawang sector, while 
falling on the southern side of the crest line, reflects the ethnic composition 
of the Tibetans on the northern side of the border, rather than the Assamese 
character of most of Arunachal Pradesh. Similarly, Bhutan and Ladakh are 
ethnically and religiously closer to Tibet, than to Assam or M uslim -Kashm ir 
which are situated to their south.
As N ehru sought to establish India's presence up to the M cM ahon 
line he felt that Chinese actions would be constrained by their agreem ent to 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence of Panchsheela. A lthough China 
did not resist the Indian occupation of Tawang in 1951, the belief that China 
would feel constrained by Panchsheela proved to be over optimistic. India's 
rejection of the Chinese p roposal to accept this sta tus quo w as not 
commensurate with India's strategic position. Given the inferior position of 
India in the Himalayan region in the early 1960s an exchange of Aksai Chin 
for Tawang w ould certainly have been perceived as reasonable by the 
Chinese. Signals, such as the August 1959 border clash at the Longju and 
Kongka Passes, were demonstrations by the Chinese of their intent to resist 
the forw ard policy. Despite this, the Indian dom estic political situation, 
which was critical of Indian acquiescence over the Chinese assertion of 
control over Tibet, Aksai Chin and the Passes, w ould not to lerate  a 
settlement based on such a exchange of territory. India's refutation of the 
offer and continued assertion of the forward policy antagonised the Chinese 
into the border demonstration of 1962.
Richard Lebow postulates that it was the politicisation of the Indian 
military that was an im portant cause of India's misperception of the Chinese 
reaction to India's forw ard policy. This is not in itself enough to fully 
explain the extent of cognitive closure that characterised the decision-
86 Interestingly this frontier has been breached from both the Indian side of the border, with 
the Younghusband military expedition of 1903, as well as by the Chinese in the 1962 War. 
Parushotan L. Mehra, "India, China and Tibet, 1950-59," in Verinder Grover, International 
Relations and Foreign Policy of India, vol. 3 China, Japan and India's Foreign Policy, (New  
Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1992), pp. 464-487.
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making process at that time. Lebow goes on to speculate that heavy doses of 
wishful thinking in conjunction with the politicisation of the military led to 
the intelligence failure and m ilitary defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 
1962. Lebow draws from the work of Janis and Mann in their work Decision 
Making.  Such studies have hypothesized "that sensitivity to warnings is 
related to the subject's capacity to cope w ith the reported danger. The lower 
their perceived ability to cope, the lower their sensitivity to inform ation 
reporting danger."87 In April of 1961, Indian military reports suggested that 
"should the Chinese wish to carry out strong incursions into our territory at 
selected points, we are not in a position to prevent them from doing so."88 
So it w ould seem that India's inability to deal w ith the Chinese in the 
Himalayas led it to the point that despite warnings the top leadership could 
not accept the reality of India’s inferior position. This misperception made 
the defeat a much more m omentous blow to the national security psyche of 
the country than it would have been if India had entered the conflict with 
realistic notions of its capabilities and limitations. The effect was to lead 
India to seek greatly expanded capabilities. Having discussed Punjab, 
Kashmir, Siachen and Aksai Chin as zones of conflict the section will 
conclude its examination of India’s NWF with a brief look at events as they 
are beginning to unfold in Sindh.
40.215 Sindh
Pakistan has provided assistance to Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents in  
order to counter India’s increased m argin of superiority in conventional 
arms. By emphasising covert operations, Pakistan’s armed forces can share 
their security burden with their intelligence arm, while running less risk of 
encountering another humiliating defeat. India has responded to continued 
Pakistani efforts w ith similar levers in Pakistan 's Sindh and northw est 
fron tie r Provinces. Further, Ind ian  d ip lom atic  in itiatives have, in 
Kautilyan fashion, sought to gain influence w ith Afghanistan and Iran in 
order to divert Pakistani attention away from its Indian border. These
R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 171. 
88 R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 166.
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initiatives give India more policy options as it seeks to respond to Pakistani 
m eddling in its internal security situations.
The fissiparous tendencies of South Asia are not confined to India. 
Pakistan has extrem e problem s of regional division and is therefore 
sim ilarly vulnerable to external m anipulation . Due to its m ilitary 
inferiority, Pakistan is more reliant upon covert operations to prom ote its 
position . The continuing  pressure  of Pakistan-backed secession is 
contributing to India's will to take a more assertive stance against Pakistan.
Pakistan's attem pts to increase its level of security from India may, 
counter to intentions, lead to a underm ining of its security posture. In this 
way Pakistan falls into the security dilem m a. This may happen  either 
through Indian counter operations in Sindh, Baluchistan or the Northwest 
Frontier Province, or from the more general build-up of ill will in India 
towards Pakistan. India, like Pakistan, continues to deny involvem ent with 
insurgents. Home Minister Chavan has described Pakistani allegations that 
India was sending infiltrators into Sindh as, "absolutely false ."89 Indian 
diplom atic support for Afghanistan's position on Azad Paktoonistan was 
initially given to counter Pakistan acquiescence to the use of East Pakistan as 
a staging ground for assistance to the Naga and Mizo by the C hinese .90 India 
is likely to continue to maintain good relations with Afghanistan. This will 
help maintain leverage on Pakistan.
The situation in Sindh, Pakistan’s second largest province, is ripe for 
exploitation by those washing to destabilise Pakistani central control over the 
area. The Muslim Muhajirs, who emigrated to Pakistan at partition, are of 
different ethnic origin from the Sindhis. The U rdu  speaking Muhajirs 
make up sixty percent of the ten million inhabitants of Karachi. They also 
settled in the Sindhi city of Hyderabad. The M uhajir Qaum i M ovem ent 
(MQM) w7as formed to prom ote their interests w ithin the province and the 
country at large and has a well trained commando force. This was created 
with the initial support of General Zia who saw this organisation as a means
"Chavan Denies Charge," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 6/13/92.
90 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Succession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of 
Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), p. 43.
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of underm ining the support of the Pakistan Peoples Party in Sindh.91 But 
the MQM has been seeking increased autonomy within the province. Thirty 
percent of the population of Karachi is either Punjabi, or from the NWFP, 
while only ten percent of Karachi rem ains Sindhi.92 This has produced 
among the Sindhis a great deal of resentm ent of the immigrants from both 
within Pakistan and from India.
Sindhi discontent over the increasing position of the M uhajirs has 
given rise to the Jiye Sindh M ovem ent led by G.M. Syed, which seeks 
independence from Pakistan for Sindh. To finance their separatist struggle 
for ethnic Sindhis, the Jiye Sindh M ovement has resorted to hostage-taking. 
Both foreigners and Pakistanis have been taken prisoner. The Jiye Sindh 
M ovement is generally considered to be opposed by both the PPP and the 
MQM, although the MQM has accused the PPP of being in collusion w ith 
the Jiye Sindh Movement. Such a mix of ethnic conflict and separatist 
movem ents is vulnerable to external intervention.
Amid the conflict betw een the MQM, the PPP and the Jiye Sindh 
M ovem ent are counter allegations from Islamabad that these groups are 
conspiring against the governm ent and are in collusion w ith RAW. On 9 
August 1991, 147 individuals taken by the authorities allegedly confessed to 
being trained by India in the arts of sabotage. The Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq 
Ali, reported that there were some 5,000 trained saboteurs active in Sindh.93 
The Minister of State for Science and Technology, Javed Jabar, further made 
reference to the Indian "foreign hand" in both the deteriorating law and 
order situation in Sindh and the situation in Indian Kashmir. It was his 
opinion that Indian in tervention in Sindh was an effort to relieve the 
m ounting pressure in Indian Kashmir 94 Former Prime Minister Sharif has
91 Salamat Ali, "Sindh Erupts in a Wave of Ethnic Killing," The Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 6 /7 /90 , p. 22. There is a parallel between the dangers to the state of such 
machinations getting out of control. Indira and Bhindranwale in Punjab and Rajiv and the 
Tamils in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka are interesting previous cases.
92 Salamat Ali, "The Sindh Government is Paralysed by Ethnic Disorder," The Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 9/21/89, p. 20.
93 "Indian Trained Saboteurs Active in Sindh," Reuters Nezvs Service,8/9/91.
94 N.D. Khan, "Foreign Hand Involved in Sindh Crisis," The Pakistan Times,2/9/90.
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accused the PPP of being connected to RAW through its param ilitary arm 
the Al-Zulfiquar.95
While w eapons have always been valued in the NWFP, they have 
become comm onplace in Sindh and throughout the country. This is a 
consequence of the Afghan war. Between 1983 and 1989 more than 1,500 
people had been killed in ethnic violence in Sindh. A further eighty people 
died in Sindh during the first two months of 1990.96 With this discussion of 
the northw est frontier complete, the chapter now turns to consider the 
second of India's three key geopolitical Frontiers, the Northeast Frontier.
40.22 The northeast frontier
The N ortheast Frontier (NEF) is geopolitically more fractured than 
the NWF and its po ten tial im pact on the unity  of the centre is less 
pronounced. The hilly terrain of the NEF is connected to the rest of India by 
a narrow  land corridor. The vulnerability of this corridor dictated India's 
absorption of Sikkim in 1975. The proximity of this area to Bangladesh, 
China and Burma, its demographic problems and the tension betw een the 
centre and the regional ethnic groups make this a vulnerable region for 
India. The predom inantly tribal and Christian orientation of the people, 
and their geographic, as well as cultural, isolation from the H indi-H indu 
centre, has led Delhi to perceive them as som ewhat less "Indian.” These 
peoples' primary identities are with their local ethnic-tribal group and not 
with the national territorial identity of India. Recognition of this has in the 
recent past led to a coercive policy by the centre ra th e r than  the 
accomodative approach of earlier policy. Such an approach, if continued, 
will accentuate conflict by exacerbating the sense of alienation am ong the 
ethnic groups. This will lead to increased polarisation and a fu rther 
deterioration of relations between the centre and its northeastern periphery. 
If allow ed to continue, th is will then underm ine India's geostrategic 
position in this quadran t of the subcontinent. If Indo-Chinese relations
Aabha Dixit, ’The Backlash in Sind,” The Telegraph,6/22/90.
96 Aabha Dixit, "Kalishnikov Culture is Blighting Sind," The Times of India, 2/28/90. See 
also "Pakistani Separatist Politician Says Kidnapping Justified," Reuters New Service, 
6/27/91.
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deteriorate, China could easily escalate centre-periphery conflict on the NEF 
as Pakistan has on the NWF.
40.221 The territories of the northeast: Assam Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Gorkhaland, Manipur, Naxalbari District,
Both the borders of the northeast and the northw est of India are 
permeable to cross border support. Recent restraint on the part of India’s 
neighbours on the NEF is responsible for the lack of even higher levels of 
assistance to India's secessionists. The ambience of China's, Bangladesh's 
and Burma’s relationships w ith India determines the degree to which those 
countries provide support for the insurgents operating inside India. This 
cross border support of insurgents has become a tool for national foreign 
policy objectives w hen diplomatic relations are poor. This "carrot-and-stick" 
approach attem pts to influence neighbours to move to a position compatible 
with a state's aims. The establishment of Chinese training camps for Naga 
and Mizo rebels in East Pakistan in 1969 p u t China in a position to 
underm ine  Indian  security  in the region. W ithin the context of an 
unresolved Indo-Chinese border, such a lever im proved China’s bargaining 
position. These camps, and the Chinese line of support to insurgents in 
India were curtailed in 1971 as a result of India's victory in the war of that 
year. This war was aided by assistance from the Mukti Bahini, which India 
had been supporting.97 China held military m anoeuvres on the border of 
Arunachal Pradesh in 1986 in response to Delhi's decision to grant the 
northeast Frontier Agency state  status. China thereby expressed its 
dissatisfaction w ith a possible alteration in status of the disputed border.98 
One reason why China has exercised restraint in its support for Indian 
insurgent groups is its awareness of its own vulnerability to external support 
for dissatisfied elem ents in Tibet and Sinkiang. India's involvem ent in 
Sindh implies that it w ould consider countering Chinese interference by 
such a course of action.
97 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Succession, pp. 43, 286. China subsequently 
reestablished its lines of support to these groups through Bangladesh and Burma until 1978 
when it decided to cut its support to improve the diplomatic relationship with India. In 1991 
the Governor of Assam again accused China of resumption of its support for Northeast 
insurgents.
R. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy Since 1971, p. 34.
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Northeast India has been a source of almost perpetual agitation and 
in su rrec tio n  desp ite  receiv ing  a d isp ro p o rtio n a te  share of Ind ia 's  
developm ent funds. The problem is essentially one of alienation amongst 
the population. This is due to the centre’s inability to placate sub-national 
dem ands despite some attem pts to do so. D uring the 1970s Assam was 
subdivided to give local autonomy to disgruntled groups. Bangladesh was 
assisted  in its desire for au tonom y from  Pakistan, and Sikkim was 
incorporated into India. All these m easures were undertaken to stabilize a 
volatile and vulnerable region. It was hoped that bending to local dem ands 
would alleviate the pressures of discontent. Despite these measures the NEF 
continues to rem ain vulnerable to external m anipulation. By failing to 
accommodate more fully the legitimate needs of the indigenous peoples of 
the region, central authority has underm ined Indian security. But while the 
policy of accommodation seems the most prudent way to prevent the rise of 
dissent, it too has its own liabilities. The m yriad of tribal and subtribal 
groups could lead to an unending subdivision of territory as sm aller and 
smaller groups sought self realization ."
The key source of stress for the indigenes of the northeast is 
demographic. This pressure is created by im m igration rather than local 
population increase. It is this pressure that threatens their culture and way 
of life. The majority of immigrants come "lured by opportunities of casual 
labour and cheaper rice."100 This is understandable given Bangladesh’s 
population density of over 1,500 people per square mile. These m igrants 
have come into a land characterised by its diversity and differentiation from 
the rest of India and Bangladesh. There are majority Christian areas in 
Nagaland and Mizoram. The tribal groups of the northeast have become a 
m inority  in their ow n land due  to the im m igration  of Bangladeshi 
Muslims. In Tripura the tribals have been reduced to 29% of the total 
population of the state.101 This demographic pressure has come to threaten
"  Among the 26 million inhabitants of the seven districts of the northeast there are 116 
scheduled tribes who speak some 420 languages with 1652 dialects.
100 Jaswant Singh, "Assam's Crisis of Citizenship," p. 1059.
101 L.P. Singh, 'The Northeast: The Problem," Seminar, No. 366, Feb. 1990, p.15. L.P. Singh 
is a former Home Secretary of India.
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the cultural integrity of the ethnic groups of the northeast. Many have 
responded by joining insurgent groups that seek to defend their identity.
The insurgency by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has 
existed since the early 1980s. The most recent phase of escalation, spanning 
1989 to early 1992, has threatened to plunge the state further into strife. The 
military Operation Rhino,  resulted in the arrest of some 2,000 guerillas and 
the capture of a significant number of the m ovem ent's leaders.102 Through 
pressure from the centre, the ULFA was brought to the negotiation table in 
1992. This breakthrough in Assam was brought about not through a 
negotiated settlement but through the above mentioned force of arms. Such 
a military show of strength is a necessary, though not a sufficient cause, for a 
settlem ent of the autonom ous/secessionist m ovem ent in Assam .103 The 
military operations need to be linked to economic and cultural program s 
that change the way the periphery perceives the centre and vica versa. 
Continuing employment of military solutions, independent of meaningful 
reforms, will serve only to further alienate the populace.
The discontent of the peoples of Assam has created another tense 
relationship betw een the centre and this northeastern  corner of India's 
periphery. An attempt to obtain a negotiated settlement was made with the 
1985 Assam Accord. The chief grievance of the Assamese has been the 
influx of foreigners into the state. This animosity led to the death of over 
4,000 Muslim Bangladeshis during the 1983 elections. During 1990, the 
Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) state governm ent came under criticism from 
the All Assam Students Union (AASU). The major issue was the non­
im plem entation of the deportation of post 1971 entrants under the 1985 
accord.104 Insurgencies and protests will continue to erode the basis for 
association between Assam and India unless underlying substantive issues 
are addressed.
The peace in Assam is not entirely a m atter of the appeasem ent of the 
sub-national loyalties of the Assamese whose identity is separate from the
102 "Army, Rebels Cease Fire in Hope of Assam Peace Talks," The Australian,1/15/92.
103 This also holds true for Punjab and Kashmir.
104 F. Ahmed, "Assam: The Split Within, Discord over the Accord," India Today,3/15/90.
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Indian m ainstream .105 The relative isolation of Assam and the northeast in 
general makes it difficult for the centre to exert influence in the region. One 
of the various tribal groups yet to realise independent statehood, as a first 
step towards realizing their ethnic identity w ithin India, is the Bodo. This 
group comprise some ten percent of Assam's 23 million people. The Bodo 
began agitating against the Assamese majority in the state in 1988. They are 
strategically placed to carry out their threats as their territory spans the 
narrow  corridor of Indian territory connecting the northeast w ith the rest of 
India. The Bodo can periodically cut off the northeast through bombings of 
bridges and rail lines.106 Their dem ands for a separate state follow on the 
demands of the Naga, Mizo, Tripuri and other tribes active in the 1960s and 
70s. Under interrogation captured activist Benjamin Daimary of the Bodo 
Security Force acknowledged the existence of training camps in Bhutan 
opposite the Darrang district of Assam.107
Assam was split into five units in 1971 to reduce tensions by 
providing a territorial identity for the dom inant ethnic groups of the region. 
For these groups, the choice is either for greater autonomy from the centre 
or for succession. In the words of Bodo legislator Binoy Basumatari "If sub­
nationalism  is not accepted, then India can not rem ain as one complete 
nation ."108 While these movements operate on a smaller scale than those 
in Punjab or in Kashm ir, they are poten tially  equally volatile and 
vulnerable to external m anipulation. O n 2 A pril 1992 Assam Chief 
Minister, Hiteswar Saikia, accused Pakistan of colluding with Bangladesh in 
support of the ULFA.109 This view of Pakistani involvem ent was reiterated 
by the Home Minister, Mr. Chavan, on 9 May 1992. He accused ISI of "aiding 
and abetting" the terrorists of Assam.110 Furtherm ore, there is fear that
105 In Assam alone there are nine scheduled castes and 23 scheduled tribes recognised by the 
Indian government with an additional 37 sub-tribes. Since the Mandal commission agitation, 
Other Backward Castes (OBC) are also seeking recognition.
106 "Militants Step Up Bombing Campaign," The Sydney Morning Herald,4/14/90.
107 "7 0p Bodo Militant Admits Existence of Camps in Bhutan," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 6/6/92. 
Sanjoy Hazarika, "New Ethnic Violence is Shaking India’s Northeast," The Hew York
Times, 6/11/89.
"Pak Bangladesh Fomenting Trouble: Saikia," The Hindu, (int. ed.) 4/11/92.
110 "Pakistan Aiding ULFA," The Hindu, (int.ed.) 5/9/92.
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precedents set in the northeast could influence the course of events in other 
autonom ous or secessionist struggles.
The regeneration of insurgent organisations, after being militarily 
suppressed or co-opted, highlights the tenuous nature of existing attem pts at 
conflict resolution. W hen sym ptom s rather than causes are addressed, 
conflict resolution will be short lived. The situation in Tripura supports 
this regenerative perspective on insurgencies. This is an example where the 
insurgent group itself, rather than the underlying grievances which caused 
the form ation of the group, became the target of conflict resolution. In 
February 1988, the coalition betw een the Congress Party and the Tripura 
Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS) was successful in bringing Bijoy H rankhaw l's 
T ripura N ational Volunteers (TNV) into Parliam entary politics and the 
political mainstream. This surrender by the TNV, however, d id  not stop 
insurgent activity in Tripura. Shortly afterwards, the cause was taken up by 
the Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF). The TNLF’s leadership was 
also subsequently co-opted th rough  the offer of governm ent jobs and 
contracts in 1989. As the TNLF faded it was replaced by the All Tripura 
Tribal Force Volunteers (ATTFV). The ATTFV ambushed a group of Border 
Security Forces jawans on 12 December 1990, just four m onths after the 
TNLF was brought into the m ainstream . This indicates a continuation of 
the rank and file of the m ovem ent, if not of their leadership. In  keeping 
with the established pattern, the TUJS struck a bargain with elements of the 
ATTFV on 27 January of 1991. Shortly thereafter the ATTFV leader, Nihar 
Chakma, was arrested. The periodic absorption or suppression  of the 
dissident leaders, either through cooption or the use of force, has not 
stem m ed the regenerative pow ers of insurgency in the sta te . The 
continuing presence of insurgency indicates that by addressing sym ptoms, 
and no t the underly ing  causes, a long term  reso lu tion  will rem ain  
illusive.111 It remains to be seen w hether this will be the case in Punjab 
where the governemnt had a measure of success in 1992.
While the regeneration of the insurgent groups is facilitated by 
Bangladeshi support from across the border, such assistance could not create
111 This question is similarly of importance to Punjab in 1993.
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the various groups themselves. It has been alleged that Bangladesh has been 
supporting the ATTFV from three bases w ithin its territory.112 Jagadish 
Debbarma, the chairman of the Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council, 
stated in March of 1991 that a, "large num ber of the ATTF recruits have 
received training in the use of arms in the Chittagong Hill Tracks."113 The 
presence of a dissatisfied populace is a prerequisite for establishing such 
insurgencies as in Tripura or the other northeastern states. While external 
support can raise the level of conflict, it cannot create it.
Conflict in the northeast has led to direct border incidents betw een 
India and Bangladesh. On 21 April 1984, the Bangladesh Rifles and Indian 
Border Security Forces had a border skirmish over India's decision to begin 
the construction of a barbed-wire fence to curb illegal immigration and other 
cross bo rder m ovem ents from B angladesh in to  A ssam .114 B urm a's 
persecution of its Muslim population similarly led to border tensions with 
Bangladesh.
The N aga’s desires for autonomy represents yet another group whose 
identity is separate from the Indian state. As early as 1929 the NNC sought 
independence from British authority. Having fought alongside the British 
against the Japanese in W orld W ar II, the Nagas believed they would 
achieve independence at the war's end. To their dissatisfaction they were 
incorporated into India. After the Nagas incorporation into an independent 
India they resumed their efforts for independence in different ways and to 
differing effect. In the 1950s the Naga conducted a satyagraha campaign to 
highlight their independent character w ithin India. The m ost intense 
fighting took place between 1956 & 58. As a result, the Naga became split 
between those supporting autonomy within India and those who wished to 
continue to push for independence.
112 "Tripura Rebels to Make a Come Back," Business and Political Ob server ,12/7/90.
113 Subir Bhaumik, "Shot Down: A New Insurgent Group Lays Down Arms.” Sunday, 3/10- 
16/91.
114 Jaswant Singh, "Assam's Crisis of Citizenship: An Examination of Political Errors," Asian 
Survey, 10/10/84, p. 1056. India decided to go ahead with the construction of a similar fence 
on the Pakistan border early in 1992.
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In 1960, an agreement was reached that granted the Nagas their own 
state within India. Nagaland was made a state in 1963 and the first elections 
were held in 1964. Despite this, Nagas continued to agitate for increased 
autonom y and independence. The fighting resum ed in the late 1960s. The 
N ational Socialist Council of N agaland (NSCN) rebels have continued 
insurgent operations with their force of some 3,000 members. The NSCN 
has had associations w ith the Peoples Liberation Front of M anipur and the 
UNLF.
The resum ption of fighting in 1972 led to the deploym ent of three 
army divisions and additional paramilitary forces. Military pressure on the 
Naga led to an agreem ent betw een the m ore m oderate Naga and the 
m ilitants to shift from secessionist to autonom ous goals. The Shillong 
accord was signed between the Naga governm ent and the militants in 1975. 
Despite this, the Phizo and M aivah groups continue their resistance from 
Burma. The M aivah group is reported  to have sought close ties w ith 
C hina.115 In 1992, the NSCN, a pro-Chinese organisation, rem ains the 
strongest force in Nagaland in opposition to the centre.116 There are signs 
that the Naga's members are becoming m ore professional. In 1992 they 
adopted the fund raising tactic of going directly to the people for funding 
rather than relying on bank hold ups or other sporadic fund raising efforts. 
This involved 25% to 50% individual income tax and additional payments 
by businesses. The NSCN reportedly raised $1.1 million in the year to 
November 1992 and was seeking "twice that amount" in the following year 
to finance "large scale arms purchases."117
A similar, yet smaller, insurgency to that of the Nagas has been waged 
in Mizoram. The first large scale Mizo uprising in the Assam district of 
India occurred in 1960. The Mizo National Front (MNF) was one of the 
smaller insurgency groups of the northeast with some 600 members fighting 
for greater autonom y w ithin India for M izoram ’s 500,000 inhabitants. 
Mizoram was made a Union Territory, along w ith Meghalaya, M anipur and
115 Z. Khalilzad, T. George, R. Litwak and S. Chubin, Security in South Asia.
116 "Naga Extremists Kill 10," The Hindu, (int. ed.), 6/20/92.
117 "Indian Seperatist Seek to Boost 'Loyalty Tax,’" Reuters News Service, 11/1192.
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Tripura, in 1971, but Mizoram did not receive full statehood until 1987. Like 
the ATTFV it was alleged that the Mizo have received support from 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh's motive has been to "attempt to counter their ow n 
dissiden t g roup , the Shanti Bahini" w hom  the Ind ians have been 
supporting.118 On 30 June 1986, the MNF signed a peace accord with the 
centre putting an end to their twenty year old insurgency. Since the accord, 
the short lived Zoro movement, for an autonom ous tribal region within the 
state, has also subsided. Despite the accord, some Mizos continue to wish for 
a greater M izoram including the Mizo areas of Tripura, Bangladesh and 
B urm a.119 Another, as yet insignificant, insurgent group, the Brachin 
N ational Union (BNU) seeks to incorporate the northeast of India, the 
Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) and parts of Burma to form another new  
state.120
Through the examples of Tripura, and the northeast in general, the 
connection between the centre /  state relationship and internal and external 
politics is evident. India is strategically  vulnerable to cross bo rder 
subversion because of the profusion of disaffected groups along the 
northeast and northwest frontiers of India. If Indian relations betw een the 
centre and the periphery were grounded on a m utually beneficial basis, then 
Bangladesh w ould not be able to exert even a lim ited counter to the 
influence which India can w ield over it. India's other neighbours are 
similarly vulnerable to such pressures.
The Chakma, who inhabit the 5,500 square mile Chittagong Hill 
Tracks (CHT) of the southeast of Bangladesh, bordering on T ripura and 
M izoram, have increasingly been the victims of dem ographic pressure 
caused by the influx of some 300,000 Bengali settlers into their tribal 
homeland. In an effort to preserve their position, relative to the growing 
num bers of Muslim Bengalis from low er lying areas of Bangladesh, the 
Chakma have established a defence force of Marxist orientation called the
118 Brian Cloughley, "The Troubles in Nagaland," TV1 Journal, summer, 1985, p. 38.
119 "Mizoram Most Peaceful State in India," The Statesman, 2/22/91.
12  ^ The BNU was formerly the Kangleipak National Union. See also B. Cloughley TVI 
Journal, summer, 1985, p. 38.
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Shanti Bahini.121 In 1986, the Shanti Bahini killed hundreds of Muslim 
settlers. In response, Bangladesh security forces conducted retaliatory raids 
which produced a mass exodus of 60,000 Chakma to Tripura. During the 18 
year old conflict 3,000 have been killed. In wishing to see an end to the 
encroachment of Muslim settlers from Bangladesh, the Chakma's dem ands 
are similar to those of the Assamese. Both groups would like all Bengalis to 
leave their traditional areas. According to the Chakma political wing, the 
Parbatya C hattogram  Jansanghati Sam ity (PCJS), p rospects for the 
repatriation of the Chakma in Tripura are dim despite the more democratic 
predisposition of the post-Ershad government. The Greater Chittagong Hill 
Tracks Pahari Chatra Parishad student organisation has also reaffirmed 
extant Chakma dem ands.122 Despite static policy by Prime Minister Begum 
Khaleda Zia, the Shanti Bahini stepped up  their low level insurgency 
against the settlers and the security forces in the CHT to press their demands. 
This was done from both within the CHT and from bases across the border 
in Tripura.123
The Chakma have shifted from m oderate dem ands to radical ones as 
their grievances have gone unaddressed . Initially, Chakm a dem ands 
centred on increased autonom y, based on a separate legislature for the 
region and the regulation of Bengali settlem ent in the region. W ith 
continued influx of settlers, and attem pts to convert the population to Islam, 
the movement shifted its dem ands to self determ ination and a total ban on 
Bengali settlers, w ith their expulsion and retu rn  to Bengali Bangladesh. 
Chakma desires for a separate state in the CHT increased in 1971 as the 
Bengali Muslims achieved their independence from West Pakistan. This 
progressive rad icalisation  of au tonom ous dem ands in to  secessionist 
objectives is consistent with other groups within South Asia. In the process, 
communist ideology found fertile ground as witnessed by the establishment
121 Shanti Bahini's meaning is peace force. Manash Ghosh, "Chakma Chief Looks at 
Kurdish Have," The Indian Ocean Review, Sept. 1991, p. 6.
122 Subir Bhaumik, "Waiting in the Hills: The Fall of Ershad Raises Hopes for the Homeless 
Chakmas," Sunday, 1/27-2/2/91.
123 "Eight Die in Separatist Campaign in Bangladesh," Reuters Neuis Service, 6/30/91.
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of the Rangamati Communist Party (RCP) with its open forum with the 
PCJSS and the PCJSS's military wing the Shanti Bahini in May of 1972.124
Other groups which are becoming increasingly alienated as they seek 
greater self expression are the Gorkhas, the Manipurese and the Naxalites. 
The Gorkha movement aims to create an independent state for the Gorkha 
group from the Dooars district of West Bengal. Although this is not yet a 
serious militant movement it does show signs of following the South Asian 
pattern of increasing radicalisation. Gorkha issues can also be viewed as an 
example of the creeping potential for unending territorial subdivisions. 
Nepali speakers are only 15% of the population, while 60% are tribal in 
Gorkha areas.125 The Gorka National Liberation Front (GNLF) seeks the 
inclusion of Nepali as one of India's official languages. The inroads made by 
the ULFA inspired the Gorkha movement to raise their demands despite 
their weakness. A domino effect is discernible here. As one group gains 
concessions from the centre others are encouraged to try. The tendency for 
increased radicalisation of groups as conflicts become protracted, highlights 
the efficacy of dealing with the root causes decisively and quickly. The 
Gorkhas testify to importance of achieving a formula for the resolution of 
conflicts which stem from the incompatibility of the individual and sub­
national group's core identities, and their allegiance to India. To date, 
attempts by the centre, such as the Darjeeling-Gorka Hill Council Act, have 
been received as insincere gestures.126 Some of these same issues are 
witnessed in Manipur.
Manipur's subjugation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Manipur 
lost its independence to the Burmese in 1819. In 1826 it regained a degree of 
independence by taking British assistance to break with Burma. After an 
uprising in 1891 this independence was lost. Manipur was made a Union 
territory of India in 1956, and a state in 1971. A plethora of Manipuri sub­
nationalist groups have sought varying degrees of autonomy and
124 Mohammad Nurul Amin, "Secessionist Movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts," 
Regional Studies, (Islamabad) winter 1988-9.
12  ^ Utoal Chatterjee, "Gorkhas Set on Autonomy," Illustrated Weekly, 3/9-10/91.
12  ^ Marcus Dam, "An Insincere State has Failed Us," The Statesman,7 123192.
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independence from the centre.127 Some of these groups have called for 
union w ith Nagaland and parts of Mizoram. Tension continues betw een 
people inhabiting the valleys and those of the hills. The profusion of 
political organisations w ithin M anipur, and the northeast in general, 
indicates a high degree of local identity and a lack of identity w ith the Indian 
state of the centre.
Like the Naga the "Meiteis insurgents in M anipur are able to operate 
only because they can cross over to their bases in B urm a.”128 Similar to 
other movements, the key issues in M anipur are, the exclusion of the local 
M anipuri language from  the e igh th  schedu le  of the C onstitu tion , 
restoration of indigene lands taken by im m igrants and the lack of upw ard 
mobility of M anipuris in the bureaucracy, despite their 69% share of the 
state's population.
While most insurrectionist m ovements in India are based in a given 
territory and with a specific ethnic group who identify with that territory, 
there has existed a degree of ideologically inspired opposition. The Naxalite 
rebellions in the Naxalbari area of the Darjeeling district of West Bengal in  
1967, and Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh in 1968, were to an extent 
inspired by ideological factors though tribal, political, and economic factors 
also played a significant role. The m ovem ent also had an external aspect 
through the CPI(M)'s relationship with the Chinese. Unlike the other tribal 
groups, the Naxalites do not occupy lands exclusively on the periphery of 
India. The rebellion in Srikakulam again highlights the extent to which 
frustrations w ithin a group can be m obilized w hen the governm ent is 
ineffectual in addressing the central concerns or values of a disaffected 
elem ent in society. The N axalites are in teresting , partly  for their
127 Among these groups are Meitei Marup, the Manipur Cultural Association, the Pan 
Manipur Youth League, the Manipur Peoples Convention, the Cultural Integration Conference, 
the Metei Satate Committee, the Revolutionary Nationalist Party, the Pan Mongoloid 
Movement, the United Nationalist Liberation Front, the Naga Integrational Council, the 
Manipur National Party, the Manipur Peoples Party, Manipur Hill Union, the Janata Party, 
the Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kanglepak, the Peoples' Liberation Army and the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland. L.P. Sinha, "The Politics and Government of 
Manipur," The Indian Journal of Political S c ie n c e Oct.-Nov. 1987, p. 490.
12  ^ L.P. Singh, "The Northeast," p.14.
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mobilization of a marginalised group, through a Maoist communist agenda 
shortly after the Sino-Indian w ar of 1962, but also because they are an 
example where religious, ethnic or tribal identities are melded to ideological 
values.129 The Naxalites illustrate the erosion of governm ental authority 
and legitimacy. They demonstrate the process whereby alienated peoples are 
m obilised against the centre. This highlights the im portance to the 
governm ent of m aintaining the respect of the people as a source of 
legitimacy lest it lose control over other alienated groups. It is essential for 
the GOI to be perceived as maintaining order in an effective way.130
W hile Delhi has not succeeded in satisfying the various group 's 
calling for separate  iden tities w ith in  India, it has used  rou tes for 
m aintaining regional control and dependency. Appreciating the strategic 
and political importance of com m unications and transit links, Delhi has 
established direct air links with six of the seven state capitals.131 Despite this 
centre-periphery focused in frastructu re , the seven no rtheastern  states 
them selves suffer from poor intra-regional transit and com m unications. 
The fastest way to Guwahati Assam, from Aizawl Mizoram, is via Calcutta. 
Rail links extend from India into five of the region's seven states. None of 
the other state capitals are linked to Guwahati.132 In her discussion of the 
influence of rou tes on the centralisation  of state control, and their 
rela tionsh ip  w ith  the linkage betw een  security  and developm ent in 
Southwest Asia, Mahnaz Isphahani has further pointed out the importance 
of the "anti-route."133 The dynamics of communications and transit in the 
northeast indicate a desire on the part of Delhi to facilitate centre control 
while m aintaining the anti-routes betw een the regional states. This is 
indicative of a non-accomodative strategy of suppression that may redound 
to the centre's disadvantage.
129 Sreemati Chakrabarti, China and the Naxalites, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 
1990).
DO Leslie Caiman, Protest in Democratic India, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
131 The seventh, Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh's capital, is only a two hour drive away from 
the airport at Lilabari. There are also military airfields in the region.
132 M.S. Prabhakara, "Communications Links in the North East; A Distance Maintained," 
The Hindu, 11/10/91.
133 Mahnaz Z. Isphahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands 
of Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
223
The problems of the Bodo, Tripuri, Nagas, Meitei, Chakma and other 
tribal groups in northeast India are a microcosm of the predicam ent which 
confron ts India as a w hole. The prob lem  of accom m odating the 
au tonom ous desires of su b n a tio n a l, or sub -sta te  affin ities, w hile 
m aintaining a functioning and viable national governm ent is one which 
India will be forced to grapple with for some time. This is exacerbated by the 
strategic importance of peripheral areas to internal security7. Chief Minister 
of Assam, Prafulla M ahanta’s 1989 rem arks concerning the Bodo hold true 
for many of India’s autonom ous movements: "If we give them [the Bodo] a 
separate state, then we will get similar dem ands from all the other smaller 
tribes."134 The fear is that to allow autonom y will open the floodgates of 
secession. The problem is that to resist all dem ands only serves to radicalise 
the movements. The "centre", w hether it be in Delhi for the tribal groups 
who have already gained a territorial identity, or Gauhati, for the Bodo who 
have yet to achieve their territorial identity  from Assam, has a choice 
betw een suppression or accommodation. Suppression may achieve short 
term  gains bu t w ill s tren g th en  the a lte rn a tiv e  identities, w hereas 
accommodation of the competing identities and loyalties would diffuse the 
underlying cause of tensions.
In dealing w ith  the secession ist/au tonom ous issue the central 
governm ent's  policies have increasingly relied  on the im position of 
Presidential rule, the use of param ilitary and regular armed forces, special 
pow ers and the co-option of dissident leaders into m ainstream  politics. 
These m easures have achieved limited short term success in dispersing or 
diffusing insurgent groups, but have yet to achieve the longer term objective 
of substantially changing the insurgent's perception of the centre as a threat 
to their prim ary identities. Only by changing the circum stances to 
accomm odate these groups' need to find expression for their collective 
identities can the centre moderate perceptions so that allegiance to the centre 
is not m utually exclusive to their more prim ary identities and allegiances. 
By creating dissatisfied groups which are seeking assistance from across the 
frontier, and by avoiding the m eaningful resolution of internal conflicts,
134 S. Hazarika, "New Ethnic Violence is Shaking India’s Northeast," The Neiv York Times, 
6/ 11/ 89.
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India becomes increasingly unstable and vulnerable. In such an unstable 
environm ent in ternational conflict is more likely than it w ould be in a 
stable situation.
The num erous references to cross-border assistance given to the 
various insurgent groups in the northeast by Bangladesh, Burma and China 
establish the connection between internal and external conflict. Bangladeshi 
support for Indian insurgents can be viewed as a counter to Indian attem pts 
to gain influence through the Chakma. W ith Burma, the cross-border 
support comes from the Burmese insurgents operating out of the Kachin 
region. A certain level of cooperation has been effected in the past between 
Delhi and Rangoon in dealing with this common problem. In February of 
1988 Indian air forces and Burmese ground forces conducted a joint attack o n  
NSCN and NFG bases in Kachin.135 Given Burm a’s continued inability to 
control its periphery, the region will probably rem ain a sanctuary  for 
northeastern  insurgents. It is alleged that the "Chinese have extended 
m oral and m aterial support to the Naga, Mizo and M eitei M anipuri 
insurgents by arranging for their training in guerilla warfare and subversion 
in training centres in the Yunan province of m ainland China and Llasa, 
Tibet."136
India's complaints over such intervention have rem ained m uted  as 
India has sought to improve relations with China. Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit 
to Beijing and Li Peng's 1992 visit to Delhi are efforts seeking to rebuild a 
fragile relationship  which seems unaffected by low level su p p o rt for 
insurgencies. Through its ability to intervene in the northeast, China can 
remind Delhi of its leverage in the region. This could also be exploited, to a 
certain extent through Indian involvement with Tibet. India's reluctance to 
do so suggests that Delhi has calculated that it stands to gain more through 
diplomacy than through covert operations.137 For its part, China has, at
135 Shaheen Akhtar, "Insurgency in NE India: A Search for Autonomy," Regional Studies, 
(Islamabad) Autumn, 1989, p. 105.
136 M.K. Dhar, "Worry at Chinese Hand in NE," The Hindustan Times, 1 /11/87. See also 
Shaheen Akhtar, "Insurgency in NE India," p. 105.
137 It is interesting to note that on 8 May 1965 Sheik Abdulla was arrested upon his return 
from a Haj to Mecca because of his meeting with Chou En Lai in Algiers. Lamb, pp. 118-9.
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least since 1988, largely complied w ith a policy of non-interference despite 
the low level support which does reach these groups. It should be noted that 
between 1988 and 1993 the Chinese defence budget doubled.138
Despite the recent improvements in Sino-Indian relations, the period 
between 1954 and 1988 was marked by intermittent border clashes, war and 
cross-border insurgency support. This period of Indo-Chinese relations was 
im portant for causing India to lose its innocence. It was as a result of this 
that India moved to a pragmatic and realist outlook on international affairs.
Should large segments of the northeast rem ain disaffected, the region 
w ould be a source of concern if the Indo-Chinese relationship were to 
deteriorate in the future. This w ould  be in some ways sim ilar to the 
uncertainty over Punjabi and Kashmiri loyalty with regard to Pakistan in a 
possible future conflict. The destabilised situation in Burm a, and the 
potential for increased Sino-Burmese collaboration, further underm ines 
India’s position in the northeast.
The problem  of how the centre can appease the m ilitant groups 
w ithout allowing their concessions to be seen as proof of the efficacy of 
m ilitant agitation remains unresolved. If m arginalized elements perceive 
that the centre has been forced to make concessions to m ilitant groups, then 
concessions will be met with further dem ands.139 Conversely, if the centre 
quickly and decisively moves to accom m odate some subnational group 
demands its actions may ameliorate the source of frustration of the group in 
question, creating the perception that the centre is not necessarily an 
adversary. W ithin this context a dual track policy of first establishing the 
state’s authority and then dispensing a liberal justice would seem to be the 
only means of reducing tension and m aintaining India's territorial integrity. 
W ith this review of the insurgent m ovem ents of the NEF complete the 
chapter will now assess India’s relations with the Himalayan kingdoms.
138 The goverment announced military budget for 1993 represented a 15% jump from 1992 to 
$7.4 billion. It is speculated that Chinese government statistics account for only half of total 
military expenditure. Nicholas Kristof, "China raises Military Budget Despite Deficit," 
The Nerv York Times,3/17/93.
139 This opinion is represented in Brian Cloughley, "India's Stresses and Strains," The Pacific 
Defence Reporter, Aug. 1985, p. 10.
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40.222 The Himalayan Kingdoms (Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim) and Burma
These Himalayan kingdoms and Burma form an integral part of the 
subcontinent's NEF by acting, to greater and lesser degrees at different points 
in history, as buffer states between India and China, or, as was the case with 
Burma during WWII, between India and Japan. For these reasons they are 
included in a discussion of the geopolitics of the NEF.
The historical relationship between India and Nepal is a deep one. 
Nepal is the only other Hindu nation in the world. Further, Nepal has a 
even higher concentration of H indus than does India. Despite the cultural 
and religious similarities, the asymmetrical power relationship and differing 
system of governm ent have created tensions between the two states in the 
m odern  period. Indian involvem ent in the affairs of the Ranas, the 
monarchy and most recently with the Nepali Congress has sought to create a 
more pro-Indian attitude in K athm andu.140
India's absorption of Sikkim on 16 May 1975 was its last significant 
territorial adjustm ent.141 The Chogyal's loss was a cause for concern for 
Nepali King Bhirendra. The Foreign Minister, G.B. Karki stated Nepal's 
position that "it is our irrevocable policy that there should be no outside 
interference in the internal affairs of any nation."142 There was obvious fear 
in K athm andu  that sim ilar pro-dem ocracy dem onstra tions could be 
m anipulated by India as a p retex t for Indian  in terven tion  in N epal's 
internal affairs.
Similar concerns were expressed by Prince W angchuck Nam gyal of 
Bhutan. If India "believes in the principles of Panchsheel, I think it should
140 For more information on the evolution of the Indo-Nepal relationship see Leo Rose and 
John Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), S.D. 
Muni ed., Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy, (New Delhi: Chetna Publications, 1977), S. K. Jha, 
ed. Indo-Nepal Relations, (New Delhi: Archives Books, 1989), S.K. Chaturvedi, lndo-Nepal 
Relations in Linkage Perspective, (New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1990) and 
Rishikesh Shaha, Three Decades and Two Kings, 1960-90: Eclipse of Nepals Partyless 
Monarchic Rule, (Katmandu: Ratna Pushtak Bhandar, 1990).
141 For a detailed account of India's involvement in Sikkim see Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. 
Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Ltd. 1984).
142 As quoted in A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, p. 583.
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do justice to us."143 Events such as the October 1990 ethnic conflict between 
Bhutan's N epali-G orkha and D rupka groups144 raised fears of creating 
opportunities for Indian involvem ent.145 The agitation centring in the 
south of Bhutan is also intertw ined w ith the Gorkha National Liberation 
Front. There have been accusations that India was instigating the 
agitations146 or that China was behind the disturbances.147 If the ethnic 
Drupka majority is overturned by illegal ethnic Nepali im m igration the 
m onarchy's support will erode. Some fear this could be used to increase 
Indian influence in Bhutan. To prevent India feeling a need to annex 
Bhutan, Bhutan has charted a policy of accommodation with India. Further, 
China's former policy of regarding Bhutan as part of Tibet, and therefore a 
natural part of its territory,148 makes Bhutan's position that m uch m ore 
precarious. This was dem onstrated  during  the 1962 w ar w hen China 
occupied the Towang district just to the north of Bhutan.
The Indo-Nepalese trade and transit dispute of 1989-90 is an example 
of India's subcontinental security  doctrine in practice. India m ade a 
unilateral decision not to renew  separate Trade and Transit Treaties w ith 
Nepal in March of 1989. India preferred to combine the issues w ith Indo- 
Nepalese security concerns. Specifically, India sought to quash any notions 
in Nepal of seeking a middle way between China and India. For some time 
there has been the perception in N epal that "Indian policy is designed for
143 Prince Wangchuch Namgyal, as quoted in Sunanda K. Datta-Ray Smash and Grab: 
Annexation of Sikkim, p. xiii.
144 Statement by Mr. Sonam T. Rabgye, First Secretary, Royal Bhutanese Embassy at the 
India International Centre, 16 October 1990.
145 James Clad, 'The Kurkri’s Edge," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 12/20/90, pp. 22-6. 
see also Barbara Crossette, "India-Based Groups Seek to Disrupt Bhutan," The New York 
Times, 10/7/90.
146 "Trouble in the Kingdom," Newsweek, 10/29/90.
147 B. Bhanumathy, "Bhutan Crisis Boils Over," The Business and Political Observer, 1/8/91. 
l 4  ^Though ethnically largely Tibetan, Bhutan has been politically independent from Tibet 
for some three hundred years. At that point the influential Tibetan Lama, Sheptoon La-Pha 
declared himself the Dharma Raj of Bhutan. The current King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, or 
Fearless Thunderbolt, Master of Cosmic Order, is the third in the line of Kings descendant 
from Tongsa Penlop who made himself hereditary ruler of Bhutan in 1907 with the assistance 
of the British. Pradyumna P. Karan, "Geopolitical Structure of Bhutan,” in Verinder Grover, 
International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 
1992), pp. 186-98.
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the projection of power."149 The feeling of many Nepalese is that they are 
"sleeping between two elephants"150 and that to sleep too close to either 
India or China would be to run the risk of being crushed.
N epal’s attem pt to establish a m odicum  of independence from the 
Indian sphere of influence led India to seek to disabuse Nepal of that notion. 
Under the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 India and Nepal have m aintained an 
open border and a special security relationship.151 As a result of the trade 
and transit dispute all but two of the border transit points between the two 
countries were closed.152 This had the effect of decreasing N epal’s economic 
grow th rate for 1990 from an expected 5% to 1.5%.153 The dispute was 
India’s way of sending a strong signal to K athm andu that it w ould not 
tolerate a security relationship betw een Nepal and China. The Nepali 
attem pts to import anti-aircraft weapons and other arms from China were 
them selves in reaction to Indian in terventions in Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives. The common theme linking these three incidents is that New 
Delhi draws its defence perimeter in subcontinental terms rather than along 
the lines of India's international border. Pakistan is the lone exception 
among SAARC countries capable of contesting this notion of India's security 
perimeter. King Mahendra's visit to China in October 1961, which led to the 
K athm andu-K odari road agreem ent during the lead up to the 1962 war, 
created the im pression in Delhi that the H im alayan frontier had been
149 Interview with Yadu Nath Khanal, Katmandu, March, 1991. See also "Nepalese 
Diplomacy," South Asian Forum, (Katmandu) joint issue, 1983.
150 interview with then General Secretary of the Nepali Congress Party, Koirala, 
Katmandu, March, 1991.
1^* 1 While falling short of a military alliance the treaty did provide for consultations and 
had an arms import clause. ’The two governments do hereby undertake to inform each other 
of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any 
breach in the friendly relations between the two governments." See Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship Between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal as reproduced in 
A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947-1972, Vol.II. 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 13.
Salamat Ali, "A Matter of Time: Facing Up to Goliath," The Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 5/3/89, p. 24.
353 Dhruba Kumar, "Managing Nepal's India Policy?" Asian Survey, July, 1990, pp. 697-710. 
The partial blockade severely affected Nepal's reforestation programme as the forests were 
cut down to compensate for the lack of imported petrol for fuel.
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breached. As a result, the Chinese Vice Premier stated "if any forces attack 
Nepal, we the Chinese people will stand on your side."154
India's intolerance of N epal’s attem pts to assert its independence 
demonstrates India's reluctance to allow its junior partners in South Asia to 
drift outside its sphere of influence. N epal’s unsuccessful attem pt in 1989-90 
to move to a more neutral stance than defined by the 1950 Indo-Nepali 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, shows that Nepal is subject to the 
Indira Doctrine. Sri Lanka's desire to redefine its position in a m ore 
independent way than is set out in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 is 
another example of opposition to the doctrine. The Indira Doctrine draw s 
India's defence perim eter along subcontinental lines of Im perial India. 
While allowing autonom y in the small states of the Flimalaya and the 
Indian Ocean it will not allow foreign influences to challenge its position. 
Pakistan alone remains capable of defying India's attem pts to assert itself in 
this manner. The way in which the Pakistani anomaly in India's security 
doctrine will be redressed remains to be resolved. Its resolution may lead to 
yet another Indo-Pakistani war. Nepal, and the other smaller states of South 
Asia have little choice but to work within Indian defined parameters.
W orld War II left a lasting im pression on independen t Ind ia ’s 
strategic perceptions of the eastern approaches to its territory. Japan captured 
the Andam an and Nicobar Islands after capturing Singapore and gaining 
access to the Indian Ocean through the Straights of Malacca. The Japanese 
had also marched through Southeast Asia and Burma to India's frontier in 
Nagaland and Manipur. The Japanese incursion into the northeast Frontier 
made an impact on Indian security thinking.
.... the dram atic Japanese sweep through archipelagic and 
m ainland Southeast Asian in a remarkably short time, had 
driven  home the lesson to India's nationalist elite that 
Ind ia 's eastern  flank and seaw ard  approaches to the
1 4^ S.D. Muni, "India and Nepal: Erosion of a Relationship," in Nepal-lndia Relations: 
Views From Katmandu and New Delhi, (Katmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 
Tribuvan University, CNAS Forum Series, 1989), p. 41.
subcontinent were as im portant for India's defence as the
land boundaries of the northwest and the north ....155
Later these fears of Japanese expansionism were replaced by the prospect of 
an expansion of Chinese influence in the region. Burma and the states of 
northeastern India continue to be vulnerable to outside intervention. The 
strategic lessons of history dictate that if India cannot itself draw  a defence 
perim eter through the straits of Malacca, Burma, and the northeast, then it 
should at least attem pt to exclude potentially hostile powers from gaining 
influence in these areas.
The internal turm oil and instability of Burma present particu lar 
problems to India in this context. Burma's internal chaos underm ines the 
NEF of the subcontinent. Burma has been used as a haven and base of 
operations by insurgents operating in N agaland and M anipur. Further, 
Burmese operations against the Rohingya Muslim minority of Burma led to 
border skirmishes between Burma and Bangladesh in January and February 
of 1992.156 Such a destabilised situation may well be exploited by the 
C hinese to exert p ressu re  on the Ind ian  no rtheast fron tier defence 
perim eter. This w ould occur only if relations betw een the tw o states 
deteriorated significantly. The situation could also be exploited to gain 
leverage in border negotiations if they were to come to a critical point.
The more recent movement of Muslim refugees escaping persecution 
in Burma by crossing the border into Bangladesh has given rise to tensions 
between those two countries. Troops were deployed on both sides of the 
border while Burma m ined the 112 km Bandarban district border. The 
refugees are members of the Rohingya guerilla groups who are opposing the 
ruling Burmese Junta. Estimates place the Burmese refugee population  in 
Bangladesh at 65,000357 They are predom inantly located in and around 
Cox's Bazaar. This further exacerbates the situation in the CHT which in 
turn has repercussions for the Bangladesh-India relationship.
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155 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia, (London: Routledge Publishers, 1990), p. 8.
156 "Burmese Terror on the Border," Asia Week,2/21/92.
157 Ahmed Fazal, "Burmese Troops Mining Border," The Australian, 1 /2 4 /9 2 . See also 
Richard Ehrlich, "Burma, Bangladesh on the Brink of War," The Australian,!/11-12/92.
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Evidence exists indicating that China is seeking to extend its influence 
into Burma. India will feel compelled to respond to the Chinese overture 
towards Burma if they progress much beyond present levels. India provided 
military and economic assistance to Burma's U Nu governm ent prior to its 
overthrow  in 1962.158 Khin Nyunt, accused India indirectly of "interfering 
in the internal affairs of our nation" by providing financial support to the 
pro-democracy movement in Burma. India has settled Burmese refuges in  
M anipur and Mizoram. In August of 1992, inconclusive discussions were 
held between Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U Aye, and 
Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit in Delhi.159
As China moves closer to the authoritarian regime, India will become 
closer to the dem ocratic opposition as a m eans of countering Chinese 
influence in its northeastern defence perim eter. It was reported on 17 
September 1992 that China was to build a naval facility in collaboration with 
the Burmese at Hanggyi Island in the Irraw addy delta at the m outh of the 
Bassein River. Further reports have speculated on Chinese assistance for 
the upgrading of Burmese naval facilities at existing facilities on Great Coco 
Island, opposite the Andamans, at M ergui on the isthm us near the Thai 
border and at Sittwe in Arakan near the Bangladesh border. Diplomatic 
sources indicated that "India is w orried and ASEAN should be w orried 
too."160
Since 1989 China and Burma have been developing their bilateral 
relationship through development projects and arms deals. In December of 
1991 Indian Foreign Secretary Solanki expressed India's concern over the 
growing Sino-Burmese arms relationship.161 This was in reaction to an 
announced purchase by Burma of $900 million w orth of Chinese arm s.162
I"*8 Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies, (London: 
Rutledge Publishers, 1990), p. 13.
159 High Commission of India, "Visit of His Excellence U Aye," India News, 8/28/92, p. 2.
160 'Burma Builds New Naval Base," Reuters News Service, 12/2/92. William Ashton, 
"Chinese navy Base: Many Rumors, Few Facts," Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, June-July, 
1993, p. 25.
161 "China Sends Top Military and Aerospace Delegation to Burma," Reuters News Service, 
11/14/91.
162 "China Sells Arms to Burma," The Financial Times, 2! 11/91.
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In 1992 Burma had initiated its plan to double its arm ed forces to 300,000. 
The Burmese navy was in 1992 considering adding Chinese corvettes to its 
inventory of six Hainan fast attack craft and three Yugoslav PB 90 patrol 
boats.163 Sino-Burmese developm ent projects include a hydro-electric 
scheme, road, rail and bridge construction, increased cross-border trade and 
satellite communications. It was announced in February of 1992 that China 
would send a survey team for the construction of a ground satellite station. 
This was part of a 50 million yuan agreem ent on economic co-operation. 
Sections of northern  Burma, which are under heroin drug lord control, 
have close links w ith the Yunnan Province of China.164 These ties and 
increased relations with the government imply that the Chinese are seeking 
greater influence. On 18 October 1989 a 24 m an team, including Burmese 
Com mander in Chief Lieutenant General Than Shwe and Brigadier General 
Khin Nyunt, met w ith Prime Minister Li Peng and Chinese military Chief 
H aotian.165 This presaged the developm ent of closer relations betw een 
Beiging and Rangoon. If this trend is to continue in the 1990s it may lead to 
friction between India and Burma and / or China. The chapter now turns to 
examine India’s third strategic frontier.
163 "China: Govt Allegedly Helping Burma to Build Naval Base,"BBC Monitoring Service, 
9/18/92. and "China: Beijing Navy Heading West," South China Morning Post, 9/13/92.
164 Bertil Litner, "Triangle Ties," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 3/28/91, pp.19-20.
163 Bertil Litner, "Tugging the Tigers Tail," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 11/16/89, p. 
19.
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Source: K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on
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40.23 The Indian Ocean
To the early Aryan peoples of north  India, the Indian Ocean was 
traditionally  of little interest. There, em pires, w ealth  and trade were 
focussed on the rich and fertile Gangetic plain and overland trade routes to 
China and the Arab world. Conversely, the Dravidian peoples of the Deccan 
viewed the Indian Ocean with more promise. They did not avoid the sea to 
the extent that the north  Indian Brahmins d id .166 Increasingly, India is 
looking out into the 73.6 million square kilom etre ocean and viewing it 
both as a neglected frontier and as a potential source of opportunity. In the 
words of Admiral S.N. Kholi ".... we had to pay a very heavy price for the 
neglect of the defence of the Himalayas, to neglect the seas in the future 
would be a blunder of the same Him alayan dimensions."167 K.M. Panikkar 
states, "The Ocean, while it separates, also provides the highw ay of 
commerce and contact."168 Opportunity in the sense of fishing, off-shore oil, 
deep seabed mining, maritime trade and as a conduit for engaging a broader 
region than India’s immediate South Asian neighbours.
The Indian Ocean constitutes India's third geopolitical front. It ranks 
second after the NWF as an avenue of invasion to the subcontinent. The 
waves of invasion from the NWF were followed by the influx of new races 
and religions from Southwest and Central Asia. The more recent brief 
breaches of the NEF by the Japanese in Burma and the Chinese in the 
H im alaya were lim ited in their scope and im pact on the subcontinent. 
Invasions from the sea, beginning at the end of the fifteenth century, have 
had a significant im pact on India. W hile sea-borne invaders did  no t 
significantly affect the racial or religious composition of the subcontinent, 
they did significantly alter economic and political life.
It is necessary to emphasise that from that historic day w hen 
Vasco da Gama, with his fleet of warships arrived at Calicut, India 
has ever been under the relentless pressure of sea power, steady
166 xhejr history of sea faring has been discussed above in chapter two's treatment of the 
Indian Navy.
167 Admiral S.N. Kohli, The Indian Ocean and India's Maritime Security, (New Delhi: 
United Services Institution of India, 1981), p. 99.
16  ^ K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p. 50.
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and unseen over long periods, bu t effectively controlling our 
economic life and political life.169
For these reasons Panikkar goes on to advocate that:
... the best and most effective reply is to develop our ow n naval 
power, strong enough to exercise control over the waters necessary 
for our defence.170
As India consolidated  its independence  from  the p e rio d  of 
dom ination by colonial m aritim e powers, the Indian Ocean has changed 
from a source of subjugation to a source of opportunity  for India. This 
enables India to engage a broader region than those land areas immediately 
contiguous with its own borders. India has initiated a process of establishing 
cultural, economic and strategic ties w ith the other states of the Indian 
Ocean littoral. India’s naval expansion of the 1970s and 1980s brought it 
closer to the goal of displacing extra-regional naval supremacy w ith its own 
presence. Continued American and W estern economic interests in Persian 
Gulf oil will continue to make this aspiration elusive for some time to 
come.
Nevertheless, India's increased naval capabilities do open possibilities 
for India to intervene beyond its im m ediate coastal waters. The IPKF’s 
expedition to Sri Lanka and the Maldives operation are two examples. India 
is also intent on creating greater degrees of freedom of action from external 
maritime powers. This is understandable in light of its colonial subjugation 
by the maritime powers of Europe. In the words of Admirals N adkarni and 
Kholi:
... there is no ocean in the world, other than the Indian Ocean, 
w here the non-littoral presence is stronger than the litto ral 
presence. The result is that the outside powers are in a position to 
seriously undermine the freedom of action of the countries in the 
region. The natural balance that should exist in a region, based
169 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors on Indian History, pp. 95-6.
170 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors on Indian History, p. 97.
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on the relative sizes and capabilities of different countries, is thus 
not allowed to be established.171
The navy m ust adopt a strategy that does not leave the initiative 
w ith  the aggressor. The neu tra lization  of the opponen t's  
instrum ents of maritim e w arfare is a prerequisite to achieving 
the exclusive control of the seas, which in turn  sets the stage for 
victory.172
As India joins the in ternational m arket it will increasingly become a 
m aritim e state as its economy becom es m ore involved in exports and 
imports and other maritime related activity. The Indian m erchant m arine 
has increased dramatically from 350,000 tons in 1947 to over seven m illion 
tons in 1991. Its maritime trade is expected to double in the 1990s and its off 
shore oil assets have dramatically increased from one million tons in 1978 to 
over 20 million in 1991. M oreover, these increases in production  are 
expected to increase as new oil fields are developed. In addition, India has 
plans to increase its fishing catch from the 1.5 million ton figure in 1991 to 
25 million tons. India is a pioneer investor in the United N ations deep 
seabed mining scheme.173
Unlike the H im alayan region, which has exercised m ore of a 
insular effect, the Oceanic region has enabled India to establish 
contacts with far flung states and peoples.174
India is extending its contact as far as Antarctica. In 1991 the Director of 
National Institute of Oceanography, B.N Desai, in discussing plans to create 
an Antarctic Research centre highlighted the nexus betw een Antarctica, the 
Indian Ocean and India's desire to actively engage in this wider sphere.
171 Manorama Kholi, "Indian Foreign Policy: A Geopolitical Perspective," India Quarterly, 
Oct.-Dec. 1990, p. 39.
172 Admiral S.N. Kholi, "The Geopolitical and Strategic Considerations that Necessitate 
the Expansion and Modernization of the Indian Navy," Indian Defence Review, January 1989, 
p. 38.
173 "An Interview with Admiral J.G. Nadkarni" The Indian Ocean Neuis and Views, January 
1991, pp. 9-10.
174 M. Kholi, "Indian Foreign Policy a Geopolitical Perspective," International Quarterly, 
pp. 33-9.
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We are now in Antarctica. We are in the polymetallic nodules 
business. We are scouring overseas to ga ther a fund of 
knowledge. All this is a matter of national pride.175
M.A.H. Siddiqi of the N ational Defence Academy in an article on the 
security implications of Antarctica has pointed out that: "the stations in 
Antarctica may provide it [India] strategic footholds to monitor and control 
the India Ocean lanes effectively."176 These above quotes are indicative of 
strategic thinking that is coming to perceive the Indian Ocean as indeed an 
Indian Ocean. The debate focuses on how to extend Indian influence rather 
than on whether it should be attempted.
This section will now address the Non Resident Indians (NRIs) issue 
and India's relations with the islands and states of the northern reaches of 
the Indian Ocean.
40.231 Non Resident Indians
One factor of the geopolitical equation that may draw  India out into a 
wider region is the diaspora of its people. Many states, and especially those 
of the Indian Ocean, have significant ethnic Indian populations. These 
populations are significant both for their num bers and for their economic 
standing in some of the countries in which they reside. Out of a total NRI 
comm unity of 12 million there are over two m illion in Sri Lanka,177 1.5 
m illion in Southeast Asia,178 700,000 in M auritius, one m illion in the 
Persian Gulf region, another million in South Africa, some 300,000 in other 
African states,179 350,000 in Fiji, 840,000 in the United States and a large
175 ’Antarctic Research Centre to be set up," The Indian Ocean Nervs and Views, January 1991, 
p. 14.
176 M.A.H. Siddiqi, "Antarctica and its Implications for Indian Security," The Geographer, 
[Alighar] July 1990, p. 26.
177Usha Mahajani, "India and the People of Indian Origin Abroad," in M.S. Rajan, India’s 
Foreign Relations During the Nehru Era, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1976), p. 236.
17  ^For a study of the Indian minority in Thailand see, Zakir Hussain, The Silent Minority: 
Indians in Thailand, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1982).
179 Colin Clarke, C. Perch and Steven Vertovec, South Asians Overseas: Migration and 
Ethnicity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 2. These statistics date to 1987 
and, while more comprehensive, are lower than the more recent figures in other sources.
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num ber in the United K ingdom .180 There were only 3.5 million NRIs in 
1966.181 The large num bers of Tamils who were brought from Tamil N adu 
to Ceylon during the colonial period continues to add to the complicated 
relations betw een India and Sri Lanka. T hough num bering 12 m illion 
people, South Asian NRIs represent approxim ately one percent of South 
Asia's population. W hen com pared to the Jews, of whom  11 million live 
w orld w ide and 3.5 m illion in Israel, th is d iaspora  seem s small in 
com parison.182 They nevertheless represent a significant interest for India.
Since the beginning of the Congress m ovem ent there has been 
concern in India for its ethnic community in other countries. In 1936, the 
All Party Congress Com m ittee instructed  its Foreign D epartm en t to 
m aintain contacts w ith overseas Indians. It further stated that "a radical 
amelioration in their status m ust ultimately depend on the attainm ent by 
India of independence and the power to protect her nationals abroad."183 
Nehru also expressed his concern for their welfare,
... while on the one hand we are obviously intent on protecting 
the interests of Indians abroad, on the other we cannot protect any 
vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. 
There is that difficulty. Nevertheless, undoubtedly, we shall try to 
do our best to protect all legitimate interests.184
The socio-economic configuration of NRIs today has changed. 
W hereas earlier waves came with the British as soldiers and labourers, and 
later as guest workers to the Gulf, the new Indian emigres are relatively well 
educated and affluent. Shortly after graduation  25% to 30% of Indian 
Institutes of Technology students find their way abroad. Because of the 
different types of emigres the socio-economic conditions of the NRI vary
James Clad, "Paradise Abroad," The Far Eastern Economic Reviere, 4 /26/90, p. 26. When 
the NRIs were forced to flee Uganda many went to the UK. This was made easy as many had 
British passports.
1^* 1 Usha Mahajani, "India and the People of Indian Origin Abroad," p. 217.
C. Clarke et al South Asians Overseas, p.l.
^ 3  Usha Mahajani, "India and the People of Indian Origin Abroad," p. 202.
Jawaharlal Nehru, from a speech in the Constituent Legislative Assembly on 12/4/47 as 
reproduced in India's Foreign Policy: Select Speeches, Sept. 1946-April 1961, (Delhi: The 
Publications Division of the Government of India, 1961).
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significantly among countries. In Hong Kong, the small population  of 
18,500 Indians reportedly contributes over 10% of Hong Kong's overseas 
trade of $52 billion.185 Increasingly wealthy NRIs are making dem ands on 
India. As a quid pro quo for increased investm ent in India NRIs are 
pressing for dual citizenship, voting rights and a free economic and export 
processing zone in the Andam an and Nicobar Islands.186 This group 
contrasts sharply with the poor, rural, unskilled Indians of the Malaysian 
rubber plantations. Of these, many families live at the poverty line of thirty 
dollars a m onth. There, Indian share of corporate ownership is less than 
one percent.187
The status of ethnic Indians abroad has been uncertain  in some 
countries. After independence Burma adopted policies that forced the vast 
majority of Indians to leave the country. Prior to W orld W ar II ethnic 
Indians num bered over a million out of a total population of 14.5 million. 
By 1964 this number was reduced to 450,000388 Malaysia's New Economic 
Policy uses reverse discrim ination to help Bum iputras raise their socio­
economic status relative to ethnic Chinese, bu t Indians have been left 
outside the scheme.189 Indians from Malaysia account for 15.5% of the total 
num ber of emigres while constituting only 8% of the population. A lthough 
6.5% of the population, NRIs accounted for 14.9% of the em igres from 
Singapore in 1990. These statistics reflect the rising uncertainty among the 
Indian community abroad about their status in their host countries.190
Indians have also been made to feel unwelcome in countries such as 
Uganda and Fiji. In 1972 under Idi Amin those of South Asian descent were 
expelled from Uganda. Some returned only to have their businesses looted 
during a coup in 1985. At that point many left permanently. During a visit 
to Delhi by U gandan President M usevehi on 12 October 1992 it was
185 d .R. Rajagopal, 'The Life and Times of Indians in Hong Kong,” The Business and Political 
Observer, 2 /7  / 91.
186 Salil Tripathi, "NRIs Asking For More," India Today, 12/31/90, p. 106.
I®7 N. Balakrishnan, "Ethnic Exodus," The Far Eastern Economic Review, 5/10/90, p. 13.
188 Usha Mahajani, "India and the People of Indian Origin Abroad," p. 222.
189 Suhaini Aznan, "The Forgotten Ones: Ethnic Indians Fall Behind," The Far Eastern 
Economic Review, p. 15.
190 N. Balakrishnan, "Ethnic Exodus," p. 13.
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announced that Uganda would seek to encourage the return of Asians who 
had previously been forced to leave. The visit and the announcem ent were 
said to "provide a fresh stimulus to Indo-Ugandan relations in political and 
economic fields."191 It would seem that this policy reversal on the part of 
Uganda was an Indian precondition for political and economic cooperation. 
Asian businesses have also been the target of looting in Kenya.192 In Fiji the 
native Fijian com m unity rose up  against an elected Indian dom inated 
coalition governm ent in two coups and then institutionalised, through a 
new constitution, Indian political inferiority.193
The ethnic Indian comm unity in politically volatile South Africa is 
arguably the most vulnerable to abuse in the 1990s. As the African National 
Congress gained against the National Party in South Africa in 1992, many 
Indians started to feel m arginalised in a m ovem ent w ithin which m any 
ethnic Indians had been prom inent activists. The fear was that the Indians 
would be expelled as they had been from Uganda. One radio announcer 
sum m ed up public sentim ent tow ards the Indian com m unity  in the 
following manner, "Their money is in Switzerland, children in England and 
their hearts are in India. So why are they in South Africa?" In 1985 blacks 
destroyed the Pheonix Ashram built by M ahatm a Gandhi. Many of the 
affluent have already left. Even after 130 years in the country the Indian 
community is not perceived as a part of the nation. The distinctiveness of 
Indians abroad makes them easily identified as a community of outsiders. 
For this reason they are vulnerable. As India acquires the capabilities, it 
may wish to assist NRIs in cases where they or their rights are threatened.
W ith the g row th  of Ind ia 's  naval and  air pow er p ro jection  
capabilities, the country will increasingly be able to intervene on behalf of 
NRIs should they come to strife. In this way the potential for India to come 
into conflict with a nation that m altreats its Indian m inority is raised. At
191 High Commission of India, "India Hails Uganda’s Decision for Return of Asians," India 
N ew s,\\ 12192.
192 Michael Twaddle, "East African Asians Through a Hundred Years," in C. Clarke et. al. 
South Asians Overseas, p. 150.
193 Victor Lai, "The Fijian Indians: Marooned at Home," in C. Clarke et. al. South Asians 
Overseas, p. 114. The situation in Fiji is also discussed in Chapter Six.
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present the on-going conflict in Sri Lanka, and the Tamil question, is the 
most likely situation involving NRIs that w ould bring India into conflict 
with another Indian Ocean countries.
It is not only NRIs bu t displaced populations from other countries 
that affect the security equation  of the region. Instability due to major 
refugee situations has been dem onstrated th roughou t South Asia. The 
influx of Afghans and Paktoonistanis to Pakistan's N orthw est Frontier 
Province and the earlier mass exodus of Bengalis from East Pakistan to 
Bengal prior to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, as well as the m ore recent 
events on the Burma- Bangladesh border, all serve as examples of internal 
tension spreading to neighbouring countries. In these cases internal conflict 
has created refugee m ovem ents of such proportions that the m igrants have 
become a destabilising group for the adjoining state or province. By May of 
1971, 3,435,243 refugees had fled into refugee camps in West Bengal to escape 
the m ounting conflict in East Pakistan.194 The cost of feeding and caring for 
such num bers is a substantial d rain  of state resources. The masses of 
A fghans in cam ps in P ak istan ’s N orth  W est F rontier Province and 
Baluchistan is one of the largest concentrations of refugees in the world. 
There were some five million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The 
UN Afghan refugee assistance program m e costs $750 million annually .195 
The prospect that a significant proportion of the refugees will become quasi 
perm anen t residents, and  thereby incur add itional costs in term s of 
relocation and em ploym ent, is a fu rther reason for policies to prevent 
potential refugee problems.
40.232 Sri Lanka
Indian involvem ent in the affairs of Sri Lanka in the 1980s, was 
m otivated by a desire to both  assert the Indira Doctrine and resolve the 
Tamil problem, lest it spill over to Tamil Nadu. This developed along three 
paths. The first negotiation track was to persuade the Tamil insurgents to 
m oderate their dem ands from  those of separatism  to autonom y. Tamil
194 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Succession:, p. 295.
195 Salamat Ali, "Zones of Tranquillity: UN Urges Repatriation of Refugees to Safe Areas," 
Far Eastern Economic Review,4/12 /90.
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separatism  would have negative implications for the Indian m ulti-ethnic 
state if it was perceived as possible to successfully wage a separatist 
movement. The second diplomatic channel was to persuade the Sri Lankan 
governm ent to offer liberal autonom y to the Tamils of the no rthern  and 
eastern Provinces under a federal governm ental system. These first two 
aspects of Indian foreign policy were carried out through diplomacy. The 
third track, which gave the Indians leverage in the first two, was to supply 
the Tamils with arms and supplies.196
Indian policies tow ard Sri Lanka have been guided  by tw o key 
geopolitical imperatives. The need to keep Sri Lanka's ports free from 
potentially hostile extra regional powers and secondly the need to contain 
Tamil independence movem ents together m ould Indian policy towards Sri 
Lanka:
There is a general lesson implicit in this pattern  of political 
change. In Tamil N adu, India's m ain nationalist party  was 
deposed by a party7 cham pioning regional nationalism  at the 
sta te  level. That p ro v id ed  a leg itim ate  and p o p u la r 
governm ent for a while.197
At present there are approxim ately 50 million Tamils in Tamil N adu. In 
1983 there were an additional 160,000 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka.198 By 
January of 1992, this num ber had been reduced to 30,000399 In 1992 support 
in Tamil N adu for the Sri Lankan Tamils was again growing. To prevent 
Sri Lanka from serving as a host to a foreign presence, India has sought to 
control port access to foreign powers at Trincomalee and Colombo. Fears 
that Sri Lanka’s civil w ar betw een the Tamils and the Sinhalese will spill 
across the Palk strait and create social unrest in the Indian state of Tam il 
N adu have further involved India in Sri Lanka’s internal concerns. Indeed, 
the state government of Tamil N adu has at times pursued its own policy of
196 See Bhabani Sen Gupta's, "Indira Doctrine," India Today, 9 /15/83 and by the same author 
"At Ease With the World," Seminar No. 358, June 1989, p. 29.
197 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 183.
19  ^R. Bradnock, Indian Foreign Policy Since 1971, pp. 31-2
199 Vilma Wilmaladasa, "Tamil Refugees Start Tentatively for Home," The Australian, 
1/24/92.
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assistance to the Tamils in Sri Lanka.200 It was the com bination of both 
these factors that led to Indian assistance for the Tamil insurgents and then 
the IPKF intervention.
To help alleviate some of the ethnic tensions with Sri Lanka's Tamil 
m inority the Shastri government agreed in 1964 to repatriate some 750,000 
Tamils originally brought from Tamil N adu to Sri Lanka by the British. 
Relations between Delhi and Colombo began to deteriorate w ith the election 
of President Jayawardene in 1978. His liberalizing economic policy, and the 
concom itant tilt to the West, threatened to establish Sri Lanka's foreign 
policy as separate from India's. By 1985 the view in Delhi that Colombo 
m ight grant the U nited States base rights in the country was causing 
concern. This view was prom pted by the Sri Lankan decision to permit the 
Voice of America to install large new transmitters on the island. India came 
to fear "the intrusion of foreign agencies in Sri Lanka, the British SAS, 
Israel's Mossad, the CIA and the facilities given to the Voice of America."201 
Indian concerns over the refugee problem  are illustrated by the somewhat 
prem ature repatriation of the estimated 30,000 Tamils who sought to avoid 
the civil w ar by taking refuge in Tamil N adu. The first boat of Tamil 
refugees was sent back to Sri Lanka on 23 January 1992 am idst continued 
bloodshed. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) forces had am bushed 
an army patrol the previous day killing 20 soldiers.202
In 1982-83 the inter-com m unal relations betw een the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils deteriorated. It was in response to a massacre of Tam ils in 
Colombo in 1983 that the waves of refugees began to flow into Tamil Nadu. 
During this period conflict m ounted and the LTTE began to establish their 
control of areas of the northeast. Similarly beset by a Sinhalese insurgency 
of the Janata Vimukthi Peram una (JVP), the Sri Lankan governm ent was 
losing control of the country. To establish a lever of influence on events in
200 Stephen Cohen, "South Asia," in R. Litwak, and S. Wells, Superpower Competition and 
Security in the Third World, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishers, 1988), p. 170.
201 Lok Sabha Debates, April 1985. See also Dennis Austin and A. Gupta, "Lions and Tigers," 
Conflict Studies ft211, (London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1986).
202 Vilma Wimaladasa, "Tamil Refugees Start Tentatively for Home," The Australian, 
1/24/92.
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Sri Lanka, India gave arm s and sanctuary to Tamil insurgents in Tamil 
N adu. As Colombo increasingly sought a military solution and blockaded 
Jaffna, India intervened by airlifting supplies to the Tamils.203 This lever 
was used to obtain concessions as outlined in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 
29 July 1987. This Sri Lanka had been trying to avoid, even at the cost of 
obtain ing  external m ilitary  assistance to m ain tain  its independence. 
P re s id en t Jayaw ardene  tried  to rev ive  the  A nglo-C eylon defence 
arrangem ent in 1984. In 1985 he reportedly invited Britain to station troops 
in Sri Lanka, as it does in Belize, to provide a security guarantee.204 In the 
accord Sri Lanka fell under the Indira Doctrine as had Nepal Sikkim and 
Bhutan before it. India then reversed its policy for support of the Tamils 
and sent in its troops to assist the Sri Lankan governm ent in disarming the 
Tamil insurgents in the north and east of the country. India also agreed to 
deny its territory as a base of operations for the Tamil insurgents. In return  
this allowed the Sri Lankan governm ent to focus its energy on the JVP.205 It 
was at this point when assistance was w ithdraw n by the centre that the 
Tamil N adu  state governm ent of Chief M inister M.G. R am achandran 
interceded. The Sri Lankan government began to think differently about the 
IPKFs presence once their authority had been reestablished. The IPKF was 
eventually w ithdrawn by Prime Minister V.P. Singh in March of 1990 at the 
request of President Premadasa, who had been elected on 19 December 1988.
The central objectives of Ind ia’s involvem ent in the affairs of Sri 
Lanka since 1983 have been to ensure that Sri Lanka's air and naval facilities 
were denied to foreign powers and to prevent the inter-com m unal tensions 
between the Tamils and the Sinhalese from spreading across the Palk strait 
to destabilise Tamil Nadu. The policy also allowed India to assert itself as
203 pjve An-32 transport aircraft dropped 22.5 tonnes of food and medicine over Jaffna. They 
were escorted by four Mirage 2000 aircraft. It has been said that this incident led Nepal to 
seek anti-aircraft weapons. See Manoj Joshi, "IAF Drops Relief Supplies over Jaffna,” The 
Hindu, 6/4/87.
204 p Venkateshwar Rao, "Foreign Involvement in Sri Lanka, " The Round Table, no. 309, 
1989, pp. 88-100.
205 vvith the capture of the movement's leader, Wijeweera, and a number of his lieutenants, 
the army was soon able to annihilate the movement. With the fall of the JVP some "50,000 of 
its members and sympathisers" were killed. Jayadeva Uyangoda, "The Politics of Sri Lanka 
in 1989," South Asian Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 2,1989. p. 6.
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the regional policeman. These concerns are consistent with the long term 
objectives of Indian security and influence in the region. This phase of 
Indo-Sri Lankan relations highlights both the degree to which India has 
been able to assert itself in its immediate region and the importance that it 
places on opposing external naval powers' attempts to gain influence in its 
region.206 Considering India's history since the close of the fifteenth 
century, this is not surprising.
The success of the military option against the JVP has led the Sri 
Lankan Government to pursue a military solution to the Tamil problem. 
This has proved to be a bloody and protracted conflict for Sri Lanka. Similar 
to the situation in Kashmir, the army wages its war against the Tamils with 
a "sense of impunity" for war atrocities.207 The struggle with the JVP was 
primarily ideological. With the Tamils it is ethnic. This difference in the 
source of conflict may have a bearing on the efficacy of a military solution. 
Though from the Indian perspective Sri Lanka is the single most important 
island state in the Indian Ocean, the others are also of increasing 
importance.
40.233 The Islands of the Indian Ocean
The geography of the Indian Ocean is more like that of the Pacific 
than the Atlantic Ocean. This is due to the large number of islands that span 
its waters. The strategic implications of the islands of the Pacific were made 
evident by both the Japanese and allied campaigns of the Second World 
War. The beginnings of this island strategy were employed by Japan in its 
brief campaign against the British Indian Ocean squadron through its attacks 
on Sri Lanka and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The American-leased 
air and naval facility on Diego Garcia, like other European bases on Indian 
Ocean Islands in earlier periods, provides the United States with a base of 
operations from which it can project power into the littoral of the Indian
206 This policy has not been without significant costs for India. The loss of Indian soldiers 
during the IPKF expedition, the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, turmoil in 
Tamil Nadu and further terrorist attacks in India are a result of India's involvement in the  
internal affairs of Sri Lanka.
207 Myhe Tamils are Trapped," The Guardian, 6 /2/92. In the year June 91 to June 92, 8,000 died 
in the conflict.
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Ocean. Its 12,000 foot runw ay, deep lagoon, prepositioned supplies and 
subm arine berths facilitated the coalition effort against Iraq during the Gulf 
War of 1991. Just as the islands can be utilized as bases from which to project 
power from the ocean to the littoral they can be used as forward bases of 
defence to extend defence perim eters of littoral regions. This forw ard 
defence role is certainly part of the motivation behind Indian air and naval 
base construction in the Andam an and Nicobar Islands.
Among the Indian national security comm unity the most strategic 
vision is dem onstrated by those in the navy. The army and airforce are 
focused on more traditional defence related issues such as border disputes 
w ith Pakistan and China. The navy has included in its sense of mission, a 
p e rc ep tio n  of secu rity  th a t d e m o n s tra te s  its  aw aren ess of the 
in terre la tionsh ip  betw een the m ilitary , politics and  space. A dm iral 
N adkarni dem onstrates this awareness and goes on to conceptualise the 
Indian Ocean as part of India’s sphere of influence in the following quotes:
Besides the military posture, it is also im portant for us to take 
concrete politico-military initiatives to ensure that the littoral 
countries look up to India as an equal partner and do not look to 
external influences. O ur m ain aim should be to protect our 
legitim ate interests which are likely to be considerable in the 
maritime sphere in the next 25 years.
As our population increases, the pressure on land resources will 
considerably increase. We may ru n  out of land and m ineral 
wealth and at that time it will be inevitable that our countrym en 
will be compelled to look to the sea to better their economic 
prospects.208
The island states of the Indian Ocean have proven to be vulnerable to 
coups. These coups have also been externally inspired. The Comoros 
Islands were ruled by a band of 50 European mercenaries who took control 
of the island in 1978 under the figure head President Abdallah.209 "Mad 
Mike Hoare" unsuccessfully led a band of mercenaries in an attem pt to take
208 "An Interview with Admiral J.G. Nadkarni’’ The Indian Ocean News and Views, January 
1991, pp. 9-10.
209 "France Likely to Intervene,” The Wall Street Journal, 12/11/89. "Murdered President 
Buried." The Sydney Morning Herald, 11/30/89.
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control of the Seychelles, possibly w ith the backing of the South African 
government. India successfully averted a coup that sought to overthrow  the 
governm ent of President Gayoom of the M aldives th rough  Operation 
Cactus by sending 300 paratroopers and other forces to the island to thw art 
the 150 to 400 attackers involved.210 In addition to its interventions in the 
M aldives there were rum ours of a proposed intervention in M auritius in 
Novem ber 1988. "Indian forces might have been sent to M auritius if an 
assassination attem pt on its Prime Minister had been successful."211 In May 
of 1990 there was a further coup in Malagasy 212
India and M auritius have significantly expanded ties in recent years. 
As part of its growing relationship with M auritius, India sold four Indian- 
produced Dornier maritim e patrol aircraft. The State Bank of India has 
entered into a num ber of joint ventures w ith M auritius including a seven 
million dollar fund and a joint radio telecom munications project 213 It is 
generally accepted that India could have naval facilities on M auritius. Sir 
Veraswamy Ringdoo, prior to becoming Governor General in M auritius, 
stated that India "would no doubt be able to get facilities here if it w anted 
them ."214
By giving its assent to Operation Cactus the United States tacitly 
accepted India's role as a regional policemen. In a message to Rajiv Gandhi 
after India foiled the coup attem pt in the Maldives, President, Reagan m ade 
this clear: "I w ould like to extend my appreciation to you and your
governm ent for thw arting the a ttem pted  coup against the M aldivian 
Governm ent ... w ith warm personal regards ...”215 While there are many 
areas of common understanding, including approval of the liberalising of
210 Sanjoy Hazarika, "Indian Troops Arrive to put Down Coup Attempt," The New York 
Times, 11/4/88.
211 Rodney Willox, "The Military Three Step: Trends in Rapid Deployment," Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1989, p. 36.
212 "Malagasy Coup Bid," The Canberra Times, 5/14/90.
213 "Mauritius Keen on Tie-ups," Indian Express, 12/8/90. "India," Asia-Pacific Defence 
Reporter, 7/90. "India Plans Revolving Fund to Promote Joint Ventures," Reuters News 
Service, 7/27/92.
214 As quoted in Selig Harrison. India and the Indian Ocean: New Changes for American 
Policy. (Washington: Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1986), p. 5.
215 R.S. Sassheen, "Maldives," Asian Defence Journal, 12/88.
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the Indian  economy, nuclear proliferation and missile technology may 
cloud an otherwise improving relationship.
With this review of India's changing conceptions of region, its centre 
periphery relations and its three key strategic frontiers concluded a number 
of observations are evident. To begin w ith "India" is not a static concept. 
Indeed the present is a period of transition for that territory known as India. 
It is both altering its sense of region and its ability to involve itself beyond its 
post partition borders. In historical terms the powers of the subcontinent 
have expanded and contracted though few can lay claim to pan-India status. 
W hat is unique about present day India is that it has both united the north 
and the south of India while similarly acquiring the capabilities and desire to 
become involved in an extended sphere. At the same time that there are 
m ovem ents tow ards a more expansive involvem ent there are increasing 
fissures w ithin India. These are a threat to India's cohesion. By being 
located on India's periphery they fu rther offer opportunities for India's 
rivals.
India continues to have unresolved border disputes w ith Pakistan 
and China. These two states remain as obstacles to India's desire to acquire 
greater position and status in both South Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific 
regions. W hether India will be able to project its pow er beyond its 
im m ediate region, and thereby become a great power, is dependent on its 
ability to subordinate Pakistan, as it has the other states of South Asia, and to 
meet China as an equal. India's acquired capabilities, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, and its changing sense of region both indicate that there are influential 
elements w ithin the decision-making structure that seek this direction for 
India. After the following chapter reviews India's economic factors, which 
could potentially focus India's energies into a m ore benign sphere of 
competition, we will turn  to discuss the process of decision-making for 
foreign and defence policy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
From thy propitious gaze, oh mighty goddess, men obtain wives, 
children, dwellings, friends, harvests, wealth. Health, strength, 
power, victory, happiness are easy of attainm ent to those upon 
whom  thou smilest ... Oh thou who purifiest all things, forsake 
not our treasures, our granaries, our dwellings, our dependents, 
our persons, our wives.
-Hymn to Lakshmi, Vishnu Pur ana1
Economic aspects of India’s strategic posture and external relations
Economics have influenced India’s strategic and defence posture by 
defining the size of the pool of resources that can be draw n upon to augm ent 
existing capabilities. The Prime Minister's office, the CCPA and bureaucrats 
from the Defence and Finance Ministries have played a key role in defence 
expenditure.2 Economic scarcity also leads to frustration and increased 
tension within the society. Because Indian defence spending has rem ained a 
fairly constant percentage of India's GNP the growth of the defence budget in 
absolute terms has been m ade possible by the expansion of India's overall 
economy.3 This expansion during the 1980s was facilitated by the beginnings 
of economic reform. These gains were slowed in the early 1990s. This led 
India to realise that it's centrally planned economy was being outpaced by 
other models of developm ent such as those employed in ASEAN and East 
Asian countries.
India has, under Prime Minister Rao, embarked on a truly substantial 
set of economic reforms. If these reforms are allowed to be established and 
expanded upon India may well realise GNP grow th rates up to, or in excess 
of, 5%. This economic growth could help placate, at least in part, many of 
India's dissatisfied groups. W ith economic prosperity, general levels of 
frustration within the society would be reduced and, as a result, so would
1 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political 
Economy of the Indian State, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). p.i.
2 The decision-making process will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
3 For an excellent discussion of Indian defence spending see Sandy Gordon, "Indian Defence 
Spending: Treading Water Through the Fiscal Deep." Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1993.
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centre-periphery tensions. Renewed economic grow th would also, if past 
trends are repeated, lead to renewed increases in defence expenditures.
50. The economy as a component of India’s evolving posture
Just as there are two m ain schools of Indian strategic and foreign 
policy thinking, the realist and the idealist, there are two main schools of 
though t on Ind ian  econom ic developm en t stra tegy . The tw o key 
philosophical camps put forward varying models for economic developm ent 
in India. The first camp derives its ideas from outside the subcontinent. It 
emphasised industrial developm ent as the path to true independence. The 
second developed from the idealistic and agrarian  based traditions of 
M ahatma Gandhi. W hat has resulted out of the mix of W estern economic 
theories and Gandhian values was an alternative model. This model, which 
was articu la ted  by D irector of the P lanning  Com m ission, P rofessor 
Mahalanobis in the second Five Year Plan of 1956, sought to create economic 
self reliance. In this way economic planning was influenced by the larger 
goals of the freedom struggle.
Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi both advocated a mixed economy which 
incorporated  Indian values of independence. N ehru  believed  th a t 
"production comes first" and that "industrial capitalism  ... solved the 
problem of production." He also would state "I shall continue to believe in 
and w ork for socialism."4 The resu lt w as a m ixed econom y w hich 
emphasised state intervention while working w ith  capitalists under state 
control. N ehru took the view that comm unism  and democratic socialism 
would "ultimately ... be tested by the results achieved."5 As a pragm atist 
Nehru would approve of the reorientation of his failing economic policies 
which were begun under Prime M inister Rao. N ehru was of the opinion 
that ”[i]f we fail to solve these major problems, [food, clothing, housing] we
4 J. Nehru at addresses before the Constituent Assembly on 2 /17/48 and before the business 
community on 3 /4 /49  in Appadorai, Documents on Political Thought in Modern India, pp. 466- 
7
5 Extract from an address at the annual meeting of the Chemical Manufacturers Association in 
New Delhi on 26 December 1950. As referenced in A. Appadorai, Documents on Political 
Thought in Modern India, p. 470.
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shall be swept away and somebody else will come in and try to solve them."6 
M ahatm a Gandhi felt that "capital and labour need not be antagonistic to 
each other."7 He further was of the opinion that organising national power 
involved the best m ethods of production and distribution. He advocated a 
harm onious relationship between the two groups that w ould be equitable 
based on their shared belief in a common set of social values.
It has been the failure of the mixed economic approach of Nehru that 
has led Prime Minister Rao to seek to abandon it. The move away from a 
planned economy comes at a time when India is also having to confront the 
redundancy of a Non-Aligned Movement in a post cold war world. These 
changes force the issue of the trade offs between independence and economic 
developm ent. India is having to come to term s w ith the lim its of its 
economic autonomy in the world economic system.
Since independence, India has had to grapple w ith its desire for 
autonomy and its need for development. Many obstacles have stood in the 
way of India’s independent path of developm ent. The structure of India's 
economy has been changing from the ru ral sector to the industrial and 
service economies. In 1992 agriculture occupied 30% of India's economy 
while Industry and sendees were 32% and 38% respectively.8
India’s population is staggering. The 1991 census estim ated India's 
population to be 843.9 million. World Bank projections estimate that by the 
year 2000 India's population will exceed one billion. During the 1980s India's 
population grew by 160.6 million people. The increase in the average age of 
death and the decline in the infant m ortality rate are responsible for this 
change. At its current rate, India will surpass China as the world's largest 
nation in the first half of the tw enty first century. Such an awesome 
population increase erodes m uch of the economic grow th that India has
6 J. Nehru before the business community on 3 /4 /4 9  in Appadorai, Documents on Political 
Thought in Modern India, pp. 468.
7 Extract from a speech at Jamshedpur in August 1925 in A. Appadorai, Documents on Political 
Thought in Modern India, pp. 520.
8 International Economic Data Book, The Australian National University drawn from World 
Bank statistics for 1990 in Jytte Laursen, Trade and Growth in India," unpublished paper, The 
Australian National University, 1992, p. 7.
253
achieved .9 Despite this erosion the overall size of the Indian economy is 
expanding .10
The in te rre la tionsh ip  of p o p u la tio n  and econom ic g row th  in 
developing societies can be characterized as having to proceed through three 
phases. Both the rate of economic development and the rate of population 
growth increased during the first phase. In the second phase income and 
population continue to increase though the rate of population growth begins 
to outstrip the income growth rate. This is largely due to im proved health 
care and diet which are m ade possible by im proved incomes. In the third 
phase the rate of population growth levels off and begins to decline vis-a-vis 
the income growth rate .* 11 India is in the latter stage of the second phase and 
as such is poised for economic take off. W hen India curbs its population 
growth its per capita income will improve dramatically.
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Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, Nepal, 1992-93, (London: The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992), p. 7.
9 In 1970-71 prices average annual percentage increase in per capita income rose steadily from 
1.7% in the first plan [1951-56] to 3% in the sixth plan 1980-1985.Ashok Dutt and A. Sen, 
"Provisional Census of India 1991," The Geographical Review, p. 207.
10 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, p. 12.
11 j. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, p.51 Harvey Leibenstein, A 
Theory of Economic-Demographic Development, (Princeton: 1954).
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In the long term, declining rates of population grow th will help the 
economy to increase per capita wealth. The period 1965-1980 w itnessed 
population growth rates of 2.3 percent. This declined to 2.1% for the decade 
1980-90. Per capita GNP for India stood at $340 in 1990. Though there are 
some variances in the statistics as reported, Indian poverty seems to have 
been reduced from 50% to 37% of the population. Much of this reduction of 
poverty is the result of the green revolution.12 The green revolution began 
in 1965 and marked a turning point for India’s Five Year Plans. Prior to 1965 
land reform had been the focus of rural economic developm ent. These 
reforms sought unsuccessfully to breakup large land holdings and to do away 
w ith the zam indar system. With the green revolu tion  came a shift in 
emphasis to increasing agricultural production through the use of high yield 
varieties of rice. When used in conjunction w ith increased irrigation and 
fertilizer the program did raise food production.
It is Ind ia’s unique caste struc tu re , w ith  its conservatism , that 
prevents a revolutionary uprising in a country of such disparities of wealth 
and poverty. The Indian countryside is dom inated by a rural elite peasantry. 
Their class and caste standing reinforces and legitimises their power over the 
rural poor. While controlling over half of the land, predominantly in 5 to 25 
acre plots, they make up only 20% of the rural population. This leads to a 
situation where, as of 1971, 38% of the rural, as opposed to 50% of the urban 
population, were living on 1 to 1.5 rupees per day. Paul Brass has pointed 
ou t tha t of the four "revolutionary" up risings since independence  
(Telangana, Naxalbari, Srikakulam  and the A ndhra  M ovem ent) all 
involved tribal peoples and localised affairs w ith little support from outside 
their linguistic group with the exception of a few communist cadres. In this 
way it appears that class based frustration is more readily mobilized w hen 
wedded to caste, tribal or ethnic identities.
Further, this scale of class struggle has not occured since 1970. In the 
subcontinent, ethnic, religious, caste and linguistic divisions (as discussed in 
Chapter Three) are far more salient causes of conflict than issues of class
12 Jytte Laursen, "Trade and Growth in India," unpublished paper, The Australian National 
University, 1992. The green revolution may also have led to higher than normal levels of 
labour unrest.
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struggle. In this way India's economics are viewed as a necessary, though 
usually not sufficient, cause of instability amongst the lower socio-economic 
levels of society. They are viewed as having an effect on the desires and 
aspirations of the middle and upper classes.
India's economy has suffered for its emphasis on im port substitution. 
India's world trade declined from the small figure of 2% of world trade in 
1950 to 0.5% world-wide in 1980. India's share in world industrial output 
also declined from 1.2% to 0.7% globally and from  12% to 4.6% among 
developing states over the same period.13 In these ways India's economy 
has lost relative to the world.
One positive ramification of im port substitution policies has been the 
relatively small debt that India has compared w ith some other third world 
countries. India's external public debt ratio, expressed as a percentage of 
GNP, was 18.7% in 1988. Its debt service ration as a percentage of GNP was 
1,5% in 1988,14 It is necessary to more specifically discuss the economy as a 
basis for India's external position.
In keeping with its desire for autonom y and independence India has 
sought to produce its own product. Despite this effort it has been forced to 
im port key goods such as oil and m achinery. Its efforts at im port 
substitution have succeeded, through artificial protection, in making Indian 
goods less competitive. India realises that past policies have worked to the 
detrim ent of the country. It is this realisation that has led to a move away 
from the economic policy direction outlined by Nehru.
Indian oil im ports reached 50% of consum ption during 1979. Such 
large imports strained existing levels of hard currency reserves and made 
India more reliant on the export of labour to the Persian Gulf as a means of 
gaining, through remittances, the foreign exchange to pay for the oil. This
13 Paul Brass, The New Cambridge History of India, p. 256.
14 A.N. Agrawal, R.C. Gupta and H.O. Varma, India Economic Information Yearbook, 1990- 
91, (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1991), p. 323.
256
dependence exposes India to external influence over internal com m unalist 
issues.15
After two decades of economic planning "48% of India’s rural and 41% 
of its urban population" were living in poverty. This indicates that it is "the 
m iddle class which has been reaping the benefits of India's economic and 
industrial developm ent."16 Very little of the im provem ents in the Indian 
economy are being passed onto either the u rban or ru ral poor. This 
concentration of benefits has allowed India's m iddle class to grow rapidly 
despite the conservative rates of annual grow th for the country as a whole. 
Even the limited liberalization under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s 
achieved an increase to 5% GDP grow th during The 1980s.17 As the m iddle 
class becomes empowered economically they will come to desire a national 
governm ent that reflects their sense of strength. This may explain why the 
urban middle class has favored the BJP and could, as a result, lead to a more 
assertive foreign policy.
15 Pakistan tried to exploit this through the Islamic Gulf states in the aftermath of the 
Aligarh communalist riots of 1979. India was sympathetic to Iraq during the Gulf War of 1991. 
Such an issue highlights the interrelatedness of the domestic, economic and geopolitical 
parameters of foreign policy. See also S. Gordon in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, India’s Strategic 
Future, p. 17.
16 These two quotes are drawn from Y. Malik, "Personality, Political Power and Party 
Politics," p. 4.
17 Jytte Laursen, "Trade and Growth in India," unpublished paper, The Australian National 
University, 1992.
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50.1 Nehruvian socialist legacy: the centrally planned economy
Though India inherited a substantial infrastructure from the British 
there w ere enorm ous socio-economic problem s to be overcom e. The 
structure of civil adm inistration, the railroad netw ork and the irrigation 
canals assisted India in its attem pts to attain higher levels of developm ent. 
The partition of the subcontinent exacerbated India’s existing problems. It 
was estimated in 1944 that in normal times 30% of Indians were underfed. 
By 1947, 89 crore Rs were being spent to im port food. This led to the 
incongruence of being an agricultural country that could not feed itself. 
Though 80% of raw jute production was in Bangladesh only 14 of 394 jute 
mills fell on the Bangladesh side of the border after independence. Likewise 
w ith Pakistan, a majority of subcontinental milk production and irrigated 
farm land fell on the Pakistani side of the border.18 It was against such a
18 Percival Griffiths, Modern India, (London:), pp. 215, 223.
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setting that independent India embarked on its post independence path of 
developm ent.
U nder the colonial adm in istra tion , India had  been artificially 
prevented from industrialising. The freedom  struggle had come to view 
industrialisation as the key to developm ent. This drive for developm ent 
was itself divided into two schools of thought. The first were the Gandhian 
advocates of small scale cottage industries. The second school, the 
modernists, advocated large scale industry. It was this second view that was 
to become India's main path to development.
The Industrial policy resolution of 6 April 1948 recognised the need to 
expand India's industrial production through a mixed economy. Under this 
policy the state was to work with the private sector by focussing on new 
industrial sectors w here existing private sector com panies had not yet 
become established. In this way the governm ent controlled areas such as 
arms production and the railroads. The policy also tried to encourage 
foreign investm ent while retaining majority Indian participation in joint 
ventures. To implement the policy, the governm ent passed the Industries 
(developm ent and regulation) Act of 1949 and established the Central 
Advisory Council. This act allowed the governm ent to assume control of 
mismanaged industries and to establish its system of industrial licensing. In 
this initial phase the government focused on setting up, and regulating, new 
industry rather than on nationalising existing industry. After the 1952 
election the left wing of the Congress party gained in strength. This shift in 
emphasis, tow ards the socialist aspect of the mixed economic approach, 
continued with the 1956 annual session of the Congress party. At the session 
the phrase "socialistic" was dropped in favour of "socialism" as the path  of 
development that India should pursue.19
50.2 The contemporary structure of India’s economy
India's continuing balance of payment situation, which was brought to 
a head by the decline of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, eventually 
brought India to make the inevitable reconciliation with the world m arket
19 Percival Griffiths, Modern India, p. 230.
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economy. Prior to its collapse the Soviet Union was one of India’s largest 
trading partners. The internal turm oil in  the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s disrupted that trade relationship. Further, the Gulf War led to an 
increase in the price of oil, a reduction of foreign currency reserves and a 
continuing negative balance of trade. These factors, in com bination with a 
change of governm ent and  the feeling in the days follow ing the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi that drastic times required drastic measures, 
led Rao's governm ent to introduce the reforms. In 1991 India’s economic 
situation had deteriorated to the point that India alm ost defaulted on its 
loans. To avoid doing so it had to borrow $2.2 billion from the IMF.
To reverse the situation it became apparent that India w ould need 
higher rates of economic growth. To achieve this India needs to attract 
investm ent capital from abroad. For this reason m any of the reform  
proposals were intended to make India a more attractive investment. These 
reforms came with costs. In addition to making large num bers of people 
redundant the reduction of tariffs reduced governm ent revenue. It was 
projected that a 10% reduction in tariffs would result in a $1.55 billion loss of 
governm ent revenue. This shortfall m ade India further reliant on bridge 
loans from the World Bank and the IMF during the transition phase. India 
in 1992 had some of the world's highest im port duties w ith tariffs at up to 
110%.
The success of the reform s is, in the short term , relian t on the 
government's ability to placate those groups within the society that stand to 
lose while dem onstrating that all will benefit from expanded grow th once 
the reforms take hold. To do this India is in the short run  very dependent 
on loans to ease the transition. In the longer term  it needs to satisfy the 
international economy that India will be a stable and lucrative area of 
investment. For this reason it is unlikely that India will pose a significant 
challenge to the dominant states of the world system in the near future. As 
it develops economically, so too, will it expand its external posture. This will 
be merged with the primary goal of attaining international independence.
W ithout investm ent the economy will not attain the high rates of 
economic growth that are necessary to raise India’s wealth. Real growth for 
1992/3 ending in March is projected to be 3.5% up from the 2% level of the
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previous year.20 Rao has also been able to cut inflation from 17% in August 
of 1991 to 9% in October of 1992.
The initial stages of reform did attract a significant increase in foreign 
investm ent. In the first eight m onths of 1992 foreign investm ent increased 
five fold to 28.6 billion Rs from the 1991 level of 5.2 billion Rs.21 This was a 
direct result of opening foreign ow nership of joint ventures from 40% to 
51%. The United States led international investm ent during this phase with 
8.8 billion Rs as compared to Japan’s 4.7 billion Rs during the same period. 
This increase seemed to justify Finance M inister Singh's policy of de- 
politicising and stabilising India's economy to attract investment.
So people don't have to worry from year to year about the rate of 
taxation, about a new trade policy, about w hat changes a new 
cabinet minister will bring. Depoliticising the economic processes 
is an irreversible fact of our economic life.22
Though this commitment is not shared by all, it does seem as though it will 
proceed. The Parliam entary investigation into a $1.2 billion securities 
scandal cast some uncertainty  on banking reform s. The head of the 
Committee, Ram Niwas Mirdha, has called on the governm ent to consider 
the conditions under which "foreign banks should be allowed to operate in  
India."23 Such opposition to opening up  India's economy is unlikely to 
reverse the process of economic reform though it could shift its emphasis 
somewhat. Jay Dubashi of the BJP national executive m ade the following 
statem ent.
I think its time to tell the IMF to mind its own business ... 
getting foreign competition is not the answer. In fact we 
have to stim ulate dom estic industry ... If it m eans some 
reversal of this governm ent's policy, we might have to do 
it.24
20 Jeremy Clift, "Indian Reform Process Enters Tricky Phase,” Reuters Neivs Service, 11/16/92.
21 "Liberalisation Weathers Storm," Reuters Neivs Service, 11 11192.
22 Bill Tarrant, "Indian Economy Set for 6-7% Growth," Reuters News Service, 11 /4/92.
23 "Foreign Banks Accused of Initiating Scandal," Reuters Nervs Service,\\16/92.
24 Smil Jain, "BJP Alternative," India Today, 2/28/93, p. 108.
261
Rao's reforms quickly attracted investment and yielded higher rates of 
econom ic grow th. Such grow th  is likely to lag behind  the stronger 
economies of East and Southeast Asia for some time. Depite this, India is 
likely to realize the higher rates of Asia’s economic tigers as the reforms take 
hold. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh has projected 6-7% growth for the 
mid 1990s stating that:
India can not be an island cut off from the rest of the world. If we 
have international ambitions, as a country of 850,000 m illion m ust 
have, then we must prepare ourselves.25
It is more likely that India wall attain five percent growth in the early reform 
period.
In a com parative analysis, India has been far behind other Asian 
states' rate of growth. In 1992 China's economy grew by 12.2%. One study 
projects an average rate of growth of 7.6% for all Asian D evelopm ent Bank 
members in 1993.26 This economic growth has allowed China to expand its 
military. If India wishes to challenge China’s position in Asia it will have to 
achieve significant rates of growth.
25 This once again begs the question as to what those ambitions are. Bill Tarrant, "Indian 
Economy Set for 6-7% Growth," Reuters Neu^ s Service, 11/4/92.
26 "Asia's Economy to Grow by 7.6% in 93," Jiji Press Newswire, 11 /6/92.
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The reform s have sought to increase India's exports to boost economic 
growth. In an attempt to do this, and to prepare the Rupee for convertibility, 
the Rao governm ent devalued the currency by 22% during the 18 m onth 
period of the first phase of reforms. Based on the previous graph the 
devaluation does seem to have had a positive effect on India’s balance of 
trade. Only four of India’s key commodity exports in 1987 occupied more 
than five percent of the w orld market. These were, tea & m ate- 14.4%, 
spices- 10%, iron ore and concentrates- 8.8%, and leather goods- 5.9%.27
27 A.N. Agrawal, H.O. Varma and R.C. Gupta, India: Economic Information Yearbook, p. 191.
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The energy sector has played a key role in forcing India to embark on 
economic reform. The Indian industrial sector has produced a dem and that 
exceeds India's energy production. If the Indian economy achieves higher 
rates of grow th as projected it w ill have an increasing gap betw een 
production and consumption. This will necessitate increased imports and 
external reliance.
India's level of energy consum ption is presently one of the w orld ’s 
lowest. Per capita energy consumption was 272 kgs equivalent of coal in 1986 
as compared to a world level of 1,896 kgs for the same year. One off-setting 
factor underlying this statistic is that approximately 40% of Indian energy is 
consumed in non-registered burning of cow dung and firewood by the rural 
subsistence sector of the economy. Overall, India produces 85% of its energy 
needs. As the population and the industrial sector grows this percentage will 
decline. Oil, natural gas and coal remain in the public sector.28
The increasing gap betw een oil p roduction  and consum ption will 
have significant ram ifications for In d ia ’s in ternational econom ic and
28 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India and Nepal, (London:The Economist, 
1988), p. 27.
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political relations. Increasing oil imports will necessitate increasing reserves 
of foreign currency. The policy options that will yield such increased 
reserves involve increasing investm ent by NRIs in India and increasing 
Indian exports. The roub le /rupee  exchange of the past w ith the Soviet 
Union is no longer a viable option. Russia's falling oil production may 
make it an oil importing nation unless it can raise investm ent to open up 
new wells. As such it does not seem to be in a position to provide oil to 
India.
A plausible longer term projection to the year 2004 sees production 
reaching a m axim um  plateau  of 50 m n tons a year and yet 
demand, if unconstrained, would rise to 100-125 mn tons on some 
estimates. 29
This situation necessitates that the governm ent em bark on an ambitious 
exploration and developm ent program m e if it is to avoid a large external 
dependency situation. W hether such an ambitious program m e will be able 
to keep up with the rising rates of consumption is as of yet unclear.
Mining, fuel and power production
iron ore 
crude oil
off shore oil, indued in total 
electricity
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, (New Delhi: Government of India Press) 
[various years], The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, Nepal, 1992-93, 
(London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992), p.31.
Note: The electricity production levels are in billions of kilowatt hours.
29 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, p. 29.
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Despite India's past policy of encouraging im port substitution, India 
still requires sizable amounts of foreign currency to finance im ports. With 
"20-25% of national income saved and invested domestically [India is] close 
to the limit of possible domestic resource m obilization."30 India derives 
m uch foreign currency from repatriation of wages by Indian guest workers 
abroad and by investm ent by NRIs. India has actively sought out NRI 
capital. In 1990 the Reserve bank of India raised the interest rates on foreign 
currency non-resident deposits. In Novem ber of 1990 foreign currency non­
resident deposits rose to Rs 18,000 crore. This figure represented 10% of the 
annual plan. These funds were particularly needed in the wake of the Gulf 
W ar of 1990-1. The w ar led to a mass exodus of Indians who had been 
working in the Gulf. This resulted in a decline in foreign currency reserves. 
This was further exacerbated by the rising cost of oil as a result of the war. 
Indian foreign currency reserves were reduced to three weeks w orth of 
imports at that time. Further, India's external debt equalled $69.7 billion at 
the end of 1990. While this only represented a 2% increase over 1989 it 
resulted in a debt service ratio of 30% for 1990. The debt service ratio for 1980 
was 9%. The NRI investable surplus of an estimated $45 billion would make 
a significant contribution to the Indian economy. The NRIs will also become 
a more im portant source of investment as competition for funds by Eastern 
Europe and China m ounts.31
Being in direct competition for international investm ent funds, India 
will need to provide incentives to investors that com pensate for the 
continuing internal strife if they hope to attract investments. The pace with 
which India can shed its residual "licence Raj" structure will also have an 
impact on how much investment it can attain.
The positive effect of India’s economy on India's foreign policy is to a 
large degree dependent on the rise of the m iddle class. As politics of scarcity 
lead to subnational group competition, economic growth placates frustration 
at the internal level and builds the strength of the emerging middle class. As 
the nation is increasingly em powered, the m iddle and upper classes will
30 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, p. 11.
31 Salil Tripathi, "NRIs Asking For More," India Today, 12/31/90, pp. 106-11.
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wish India to similarly reflect their new found sense of independence and 
strength. With increased numbers the m iddle class will be in a position to 
register their desires.
In recent years India’s rising middle class has begun to be noticed in 
the West. It has been noticed because it challenges existing W estern notions 
of India as a land of vast poverty. It has been estim ated that India has a 
rising middle class of up to 200 million. When we discuss India’s expanding 
middle class we should bear in mind that they are middle class in a different 
sense than is usually thought of in the West. A new m iddle class family in 
India will have an apartm ent in the city, a m otor scooter or a M aruti car, a 
TV, and possibly a video player and will have money enough to lavish on 
weddings. Though their buying power has grown significantly they still do 
not have a standard of living comparable to average W estern m iddle class 
families. That said, the expansion of the Indian m iddle class in recent years 
has been extraordinary. It has been extraordinary not only for the speed with 
which it has come into being but also for their potential impact on India's 
political culture.
The rising middle class is composed of entrepreneurs, elite labourers 
p rosperous farm ers and new  professionals. D uring the 1980s the 
entrepreneurial class expanded three fold to some 1.2 million. W ith factory 
employm ent increasing by 40% over the same period there are increasing 
num bers of the labour elite who can attain m iddle class life styles. Earlier, 
the green revolution created a num ber of wealthy farmers. The last decade 
has also witnessed increasing numbers of professionals who have joined the 
ranks of the middle class. This has had a m arked effect on the political 
culture.
Ten years ago, the political rhetoric centred on abolishing poverty; 
today it looks forward to the 21st Century ... now a governm ent 
talks of the in d u stria l m odern isa tion  and opening  up  the 
economy.32
32 T.N. Ninan, "Rise of the Middle Class," in Robin Jeffrey ed. India Rebellion to Republic, p. 
326.
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As increasing numbers of voters are members of the middle class their 
priorities will increasingly become part of the political agenda. Notions of 
developm ent now include access to consum er goods such as refrigerators 
and m otor scooters. The shop w indow s of the major cities and the 
advertisem ents on TV and in the weekly m agazines also reflect the 
emerging middle class desires for material wealth.
50.3 India's evolving international economic position
In the W estern mind India has in the past been equated w ith mass 
poverty and under development. The emergence of a sizable m iddle class in 
India is challenging these perceptions. By not conform ing to existing 
international expectations, India's changed international image comes as a 
shock to some Western audiences.
Despite its poor economic standing in the first half of the twentieth 
century, India has begun to reverse its position. W ith sound m anagem ent 
and planning India will re tu rn  to a m ore privileged place among the 
com m unity of nations. It has been estim ated that in 175033 India was 
responsible for 24.5% of world m anufacturing output. By 1913 India’s share
33 This was just seven years before the Clive s victory at Plassey.
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had been reduced to 1.4% while the developed nations had attained 92.5% of 
m anufacturing output. This trend has once again begun to change. In 1980 
India (without the production of Pakistan and Bangladesh) had increased its 
share of world m anufacturing to 2.3% while the developed countries had 
slipped to 88%.34
By taking a long term historical view, perceptions of India as a poor 
agricultural nation are put into perspective. India's social structure, though 
changing, continues to allow a m odern urban m iddle class economy to 
expand w ithout having to expend significant resources on the masses of 
poor. This should facilitate the grow th of the economy in the short term, 
though the demands of the poor will have to be addressed in the mid term 
as the economy begins to expand. To affect this expansion of the economy 
foreign investment will be critical.
34 Colin Simmons, "De-industrialization, Industrialization and the Indian Economy," in Robin 
Jeffrey ed. India Rebellion to Republic, p. 201.
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50.31 The IMF, the World Bank and pressure to join the market economy
In November of 1992, World Bank President Bill Preston toured India 
to lend support to India's ambitious reform program . During the trip  he 
pledged an additional one billion dollars in assistance for trade adjustm ent 
and the national renewal fund. In recent years the W orld Bank has been 
providing India approxim ately two billion dollars of assistance annually. 
This additional assistance came at a time w hen the economic reform s of 
Prime Minister Rao and Finance M inister M anm ohan Singh seemed to be 
faltering. The World Bank sought to avert a "stop start" process of reform.
Foreign aid & World Bank dependence
World Bank as % of total aid
Aid as total of plan finances
1951-56 1969-74 1974-79 1980-851956-61 1961-69
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Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, (New Delhi: Government of India Press) 
[various years], The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, Nepal, 1992-93, 
(London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992), p. 56.
The National Renewal Fund was created by Rao to co-opt opposition 
to the economic reform process by providing assistance to those who find 
themselves disadvantaged or made redundant by the reforms. According to
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an Indian Official the fund is to "help cushion the blow of closing unviable 
state industries."35
India is also seeking an additional nine billion dollars in assistance 
from the IMF, World Bank and the Asian Developm ent Bank over the next 
three years to add to the $20 billion in unutilised assistance available in 
November of 1992. As a result of shortages of foreign capital to meet import 
costs, India was forced to go to the World Bank for substantial loans. It was 
estimated in mid 1992 that India owed a sum  equal to one quarter of its total 
national income. As a result, the Indian  governm ent spent 50% of its 
revenue in 1992 to finance internal and external debt. As these burdens have 
m ounted, the need for economic reform has increased.
Because India was forced to borrow to meet its imports it became more 
indebted to the World Bank and the IMF. This borrowing, and increased 
dependence on external loans, was brought on by the failure of a model of 
developm ent that sought to avoid dependence. In this way the recent set 
backs to the Indian economy have eroded the gains that were m ade during 
the 1970s and 1980s. When the economy recovers India will again seek to 
minimise its reliance on external loans to regain its financial independence. 
In 1992 the IMF and the Aid to India Consortium called on India to reduce its 
defence expenditu res and established the linkage betw een econom ic 
assistance and defence reductions.
50.32 Rao’s reforms and the end of India’s licence Raj
The bomb blast which assassinated Rajiv Gandhi brought an end not 
only to the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty but m arked the beginning of the end of 
Nehruvian-socialism. W ith the assassination came a national realization 
that the country had entered dire times. Following on the Gulf War and 
continuing unresponsiveness in the economy, the loss of the national leader 
opened the way for change. That change came from the unlikely source of 
Narasim ha Rao. Prime Minister Rao set in m otion plans to revitalize the 
Indian economy, a decision his predecessors were not able or willing to fully
35 Jeremy Cliff, "World Bank Chief Presses India to Keep Up Reforms," Reuters News Service, 
11/ 14/ 92.
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implement. The reforms proposed by Rao were aimed at integrating India 
into the world economy and thereby reversing the dow nw ard spiral which 
had engulfed its economy. Prime M inister Rao, along w ith his Finance 
M inister M anm ohan Singh, who was the form er governor of the central 
bank of India, began the arduous process of d ism antling the layers of 
governm ental red tape which have ham pered Indian industrial growth for 
years under the licence-permit-Raj.
C onventional w isdom  had thought that N arasim ha Rao was an 
unlikely candidate to lead India out of its economic predicam ent. Rao, 
despite his past portfolios, had a repu ta tion  for being a quiet spoken 
indecisive intellectual. He speaks six languages, writes poetry and is a 
scholar in Sanskrit and Hindi. A further unlikely characteristic is that he is 
from the sou thern  state of A ndhra P radesh  ra ther than  one of the 
kingmaker states of the northern Hindi belt. Rao, a Brahmin, surprised his 
critics by announcing this radical departure in economic policy in the July 
1992 policy statement only days after his 21 June swearing in ceremony. By 
boldly asserting himself, Rao sought to debunk the perception that he was an 
unam bitious m an and that he w ould serve only as a transition Prime 
M inister.
Although former Prime M inster Rajiv Gandhi promised to take India 
into the twenty first century, he was unable to give the boost that India's 
half-developed industry badly needed. The poor performance of the Indian 
economy, the crisis mentality of the Gulf War and the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi made it possible for Rao and Finance M inister M anm ohan Singh to 
embark on a radical departure from the Nehruvian-Socialist model. The old 
policies were perceived to be increasingly ineffective in addressing the ills of 
the Indian economy. The bloated public sector, a manufacturing sector only 
two thirds the size of Australia’s and uncompetitive exports all were in need 
of reform.
Rajiv Gandhi witnessed both the growth of the Indian middle class to 
well over 100 million and the beginnings of the reorientation of the Indian 
economy. What he was unable to affect was the com prehensive reforms 
which became possible in the desperate times following his assassination. 
Attachments to the socialist conception of a centrally planned economy had
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slowed the process of transition. Despite such attachments, India is shifting 
its economic ideological orientation.
Control of the commanding heights of the debate on political- 
economic policy has changed: now it is those who believe that 
the state is the vanguard institution for economic development 
... and social change who are on the defensive.36
In dism antling the licensing structure, India has m oved tow ard a 
more liberalized economy in an effort to find solutions to its economic woes. 
This process of change will begin by circum venting the complex licence 
structure. Initially those employed in the structure were left in place despite 
being made redundant by the new legislation.37 In such cases it is thought 
that by not putting bureaucrats out of w ork there will be less opposition to 
the proposed reform.
Under the licence Raj, new businesses and industrial expansion had 
been dependent upon the government in order to obtain the required perm it 
to proceed. While established as a m easure to prevent the dom ination of 
industry by a small industrial elite it has had the effect of slowing economic 
growth and encouraged corruption. It has been estimated that between 5% 
and 7.5% of project costs were skimmed off by corrupt bureaucrats.
The reform s to Novem ber 1992 had  liberalised trade practices by 
reducing tariffs and increasing foreign ownership to 51% in joint ventures, 
opened the stock market to overseas investm ent, made the rupee partially 
convertible and reduced the controls on Industry that were the legacy of the 
licence Raj. The future of the reform program  was placed in doubt by the 
weakening of the Rao governm ent as a result of the destruction of the 
Mosque at Ayodhya.
Rao began his reform s by proposing  that the M onopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices asset limit be totally removed while abolishing 
industrial licensing for all but 18 industries and allowing an expansion of
36 Leonard Gordon and Philip Oldenburg, India Briefing, 1992, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992), p. 10.
37 This manner of introducing reforms was also used in the attempt to implement national 
security decision making reforms.
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foreign equity holdings to a controlling interest of 51%. It was hoped that 
these m easures w ould create a new and relatively unfettered  economy 
where Indian industry could increase its performance. By raising the ceiling 
on foreign equity it was hoped that India could increase its share of foreign 
investm en t.38 There was a realization that a global recession, European 
in tegration and the opening of Eastern Europe w ould all necessitate a 
significant readjustment of India’s economy if it were to successfully engage 
the new environment. In 1989, foreign investm ent in India totalled a mere 
$425 million as compared to investments in Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand 
equal to $2,241, $1,846, and $1,650 million respectively. Reforms in the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act sought to change perceptions abroad and 
attract invest to India.
In addition to the new industrial policy, M anm ohan Singh presented 
an innovative budget to Parliament in 1992. The budget had the political 
benefit of being perceived as a tax the rich budget. This was achieved 
through the increase of the cost of consum er goods such as VCR's, cars, 
petrol and air fares. To offset this it did not antagonise the rising middle 
class by raising wealth and personal income tax. Rao fu rther stem m ed 
opposition from the coterie of Rajiv Gandhi by allocating a substantial sum 
to the Rajiv Gandhi foundation.
The 1992 budget was allowed to cut deficits while raising expenditures. 
This was done through the devaluation of the rupee. The devaluation 
raised revenues which were generated by increased custom s duties on 
im ports whose cost in rupees term s have increased due to the 18% 
devaluation of the currency. The devaluation of the Rupee to Rs. 25.7 to the 
American dollar was the first step tow ards making the rupee a convertible 
currency.
A further source of creative financing of the 1992 budget was a plan to 
tap into "black money" which constitutes betw een 18 and 21% of GDP. The 
plan allowed Indians to deposit these funds into the National Housing Bank
38 The wave of unrest during 1992-3 did much to counter these incentives for investment.
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w ith no questions asked. In this way these funds can be reintroduced into 
the taxable economy.
Through their swift action Rao and Singh initially outm anoeuvred 
their opposition. It was thought by both  the coterie of deceased Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and by the growing power of party boss Sharad Pawar 
of M aharashtra that Rao would be cautious, colourless and susceptible to 
m an ipu lation .39 Before these recent reforms Rao was chiefly known for his 
loyalty to the Gandhis. In 1992-3, Rao staked his political fortunes on the 
panacea of economic reform.
One decisive turning point in the long term prospects of the reform s 
came on 9 M arch 1992 w hen Rao was able to fend off Parliam entary 
opposition attacks on his 29 February budget. After winning by a margin of 
38 votes, it was apparent that his governm ent’s economic policies had 
support from outside.40 Support from the BJP was expected for two reasons. 
In the first place, to oppose the budget could have led the nation to another 
election which no party  deem ed necessary or desirable at that point. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the BJP was itself behind reforms of the 
economy in certain areas. Specifically the BJP supports deregulation and a 
dism antling of the licence Raj as well as opening a w ider role for domestic 
p riva te  industry . W hat the BJP does oppose is the "w ooing of 
m ultinationals."41 The BJP may seek concessions by Rao over domestic 
concerns for continued non-opposition of his economic reforms or they may 
go further and make an election issue out of the reform process.
The readjustm ent of the Indian economy in line w ith the United 
States and the W est may then bring the reform s under scrutiny and 
criticism. This would primarily be done for political gain on the domestic 
stage. Only the left are fundamentally opposed to the reforms, and they are 
not in an electoral position to m ount any substantive opposition to the
39 The tactic of placing what was perceived to be a malleable candidate in the Congress 
leadership role was unsuccessfully tried previously in 1966 when after the death of Prime 
minister Shastri Indira Gandhi was installed. Indira Gandhi proved most definitely to be her 
own master. It would appear as though Prime Minister Rao will as well.
4° "India: From Minority to Majority," The Economist, 3/14/92, p. 24.
41 The Economist, 3/14/92, p. 24.
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reforms. While the BJP may differ w ith aspects of the reform package, they 
do not pose a real threat to the general direction of the reforms as Congress is 
unlikely to be influenced by their rhetoric as they have been with regard to 
com m unal issues. As such, the reforms are in all likelihood to go forward, 
though the transition from the centrally planned economy to a more market 
oriented one will be far from smooth.
As India emerges from its current transitional phase a num ber of 
realities are becoming self apparent to the elite. The most im portant new 
reality which India must reconcile is the evaporation of the bi-polar conflict 
and its implication for India’s development. W ithout the centrally planned 
economy of the former Soviet Union to turn  to, Indian elites are having to 
come to terms with the reality of a policy shift which will, of necessity, have 
to shed the Non-Aligned posture. The elites will have to adopt a policy 
which seeks to integrate India, in both  strategic and economic terms, more 
closely within an American designed structure. ”[T]here has been a major 
change in the elite's perceptions of its country 's place in the w orld, 
determ ined partly  by dom estic considerations and partly  by external 
factors."42
This policy shift will be resisted by those who have come to perceive 
Non-Alignment in reified terms and who have forgotten that it was a policy 
tactic to maximise the strategic goals of India rather than an objective in and 
of itself. At the meeting of the NAM in Septem ber of 1992 India took a 
in te rm ed iary  position  betw een  the p ragm atists , rep resen ted  by the 
Indonesians, and the more radical traditionalists of the movement. It was 
fitting that the movement should meet in Indonesia, the site of the Bandung 
Afro-Asian Conference of 1955, at a time when the movement had come full 
circle. The meeting took place when India was having some trouble coming 
to term s w ith the post Cold War w orld despite the ambitious economic 
reform programmes which it had undertaken. Fear of "what amounts to a 
revival of the old W estern colonialism." were expressed by Malaysian Prime 
Minister M ahathir. President Suharto of Indonesia called for "constructive
42 Praful Bidwal, "Non-Aligned No More? India’s Passage To Washington," The Nation, 
1/20/92, p. 50.
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d ia lo g u e  b e tw een  d ev e lo p ed  an d  d ev e lo p in g  countries."43 In d ia ’s re ticence 
to  a b a n d o n  the  o ld  ra d ic a l N A M  id eo lo g y  a n d  fu lly  jo in  In d o n e s ia  in  
a ttem p tin g  to redefine  the N A M  as a fo ru m  for N orth -S o u th  d ialogue can be 
in te rp re te d  as a sign th a t Ind ia  is u n su re  of its po sitio n  in  the  p o st C old  W ar 
w o rld  d e sp ite  re fo rm  m easu re s . T h is te n s io n  b e tw e e n  th e  eco n o m ic  
im p e ra tiv e  of s trik in g  a m o d u s  v iv e n d i w ith  th e  w o rld  eco n o m y  an d  an  
ideological p rocliv ity  to  oppose, or a t least v iew  w ith  suspicion , the  W est is 
one a sp ec t of the p a rad ig m  sh ifts  th a t In d ia  w as u n d e rg o in g  in  the  early  
1990s.
N a tio n a l d ev e lo p m en t an d  in c reas in g  m a te ria l w e a lth  a re  p rim ary  
concerns for the  Ind ian  elite and  m idd le  classes. As such, Ind ia 's  b est choice, 
g iv en  its  p re s e n t re la tiv e  eco n o m ic  u n d e rd e v e lo p m e n t, is to  "becom e 
A m erica 's  ju n io r p a rtn e r"  w ith in  the  S o u th  A sian  R egion.44
The u rb an  m idd le  class Ind ians, ... n o w  believe th a t those w h o  do  
n o t follow  the s tan d a rd  d e fin itio n  of n a tio n a lism  are  d o o m ed  to 
be d o m in a ted  and  m arg inalised  in  in te rn a tio n a l affairs.45
W ith o u t the  o p tion  of tu rn in g  to  the  Soviet cam p  for a lte rn a tiv e  assistance, 
In d ia  has little  choice b u t to seek  acco m o d a tio n  w ith  th e  W est u n til su ch  
tim e  as it is tru ly  self su ffic ien t. T h is t re n d  can  be d e te c te d  in  In d ia 's  
a rm a m en ts  p ro cu rem en t an d  p ro d u c tio n  s tra teg y  to  w hich  the ch ap te r now  
tu rn s .
50.4 India's defence industry
D uring  the 1980s In d ian  defence ex p en d itu re  has been  fairly  co n stan t 
a t ju s t o v e r th re e  p e rc en t of G N P .46 T he  In d ia n  g o v e rn m e n t m ay  again  
ach ieve  increased  defence b u d g e ts  w h en  its econom y recovers . If w e can 
assum e con tinu ing  consensus on  this level of ex p en d itu re , then , sho u ld  the 
econom y  re sp o n d  s tro n g ly  to the  re fo rm s w h ich  are  n o w  being  effected,
43 Charles Smith and Suhaini Azam, "The NAM Summit: Reason and Rhetoric," The Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 9/17/92, pp. 10-11.
44 Praful Bidwal, "Non-Aligned No More?" pp. 47 - 50.
45 Ashis Nandy, 'The Political Culture of the Indian State," p. 12.
^  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Year-book 1990: World 
Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 196-7.
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India could once again expand military capabilities in real as well as nominal 
term s. To project significant econom ic recovery and higher rates of 
economic growth for India in the five to ten year period is not an unrealistic 
projection. If India follows the economic course charted by the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) India could obtain significantly better rates of 
growth than it has been. During the period 1961 through 1990, India realized 
annual rates of economic grow th  of roughly  four percen t while the 
Association of Southeast Asian N ations (ASEAN), China and the NICs 
realized annual grow th figures closer to six, seven and eleven percent 
respectively.47
India has developed its m odern  defence industry from its hum ble 
origins in 1801 w hen the British East India Com pany established a gun 
carriage production facility near Calcutta.48 Since the 1960s India has realized 
that dependence on a single, externally sourced, arsenal provides the 
supplier, with a great degree of leverage 49 India as such has sought both to 
diversify its sources for imported arms and to m ove from arm s im ports to 
production under licence. This has been done to achieve India’s ultim ate 
aim of arms self sufficiency in both design and production.
W eapons procurem ent decision m aking highlights the differing 
priorities of the actors who have an impact on Indian national security and 
defence policy.50 The military, w ishing to operate the best equipm ent as 
quickly as possible, has a natural tendency tow ard "off the shelf" purchases 
from abroad. The politicians, seeking to maximise Indian independence and 
self sufficiency, have advocated the developm ent of indigenous production
47 "Singh Steers a Brave Course," The Economist, 3/7/92, p. 27.
4  ^ It should be noted that despite its relatively underdeveloped armaments industry, even at 
this early stage, the subcontinent was not wholly without superior weapons technology. The 
British discovered during the Afghan wars the effectiveness of the longer range Afghan rifles. 
R.G. Mathews, "The Development of India's Industrial Base," The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 12/89.
49 Soviet hesitance to come to India's aid in 1962, the Soviet/ Egyptians arms relationship 
and the UK and US cut off of aid to India and Pakistan during the 1965 war served as examples 
of the problematic of external reliance for the recipient country.
50 This theme has been developed by Raju Thomas in "Strategies of Recipient Autonomy: The 
Case of India," in Kwang-il Baek, R. D. McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, The Dilemma of Third 
World Defence Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989).
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capabilities to break the ties that bind India to greater pow ers. The 
economists, seeking the m ost efficient avenue to develop an industrial 
infrastructure and to stem the flow of hard currency out of the country, have 
supported the licenced production in India of weapons systems. As India 
increasingly acquires the necessary expertise, initially through its production 
under licence arrangements, it will improve the efficiency of its production. 
The history of defence production decision-making is one of the politicians 
taking the upper hand and forcing In d ia ’s Defence and Public Sector 
Undertakings (DPSUs) to operate beyond their actual level of competence 
and expertise. This has at times resulted in failure.
Efforts to more effectively coordinate indigenous defence production 
were initiated in the 1960s w ith the establishm ent of the D epartm ent of 
Defence Production in 1962 and the Departm ent of Defence Supplies in 1965. 
These two organisations were integrated into the D epartm ent of Defence 
Production and Supplies (DDPS) in 1985. DDPS is headed by a secretary and 
has an additional secretary and five joint secretaries heading the five 
D irec to ra te s  of P lan n in g  and  C o o rd in a tio n , Q uality  A ssurance, 
S tandard ization , Defence Exhibition and Technical D evelopm ent and 
Production. The DDPS is responsible for the defence ordnance factories 
u n d er the O rdnance Factories Board and the Defence Public Sector 
Undertakings. The ordnance factories gross production rose from Rs 1356 
crore in 1985-6 to Rs 1598 crore in 1986-7 while the DPSUs production rose 
from Rs 1810 crore to Rs 1954 crore over the same period. Beyond these 
governm ental bodies the DDPS also coordinates private sector procurem ent 
th rough  the Supplies W ing of Defence P roduction  and Supplies. To 
coordinate this a Central Technical Committee, under the Chairm anship of 
the Secretary of DDPS, has been established.51
As of 1989 there were 36 ordnance factories, nine DPSUs and 40 
defence research laboratories handling dom estic and joint venture arm s 
production. The following is a list of DPSUs as of 1987 and a chart of Indian 
defence industry output between 1963 and 1986.
51 S.P. Barnawal, Military Year-book 1987-88, pp. 206-8.
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Defence and Public Sector Undertakings
1. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
2. Bharat Electronics Ltd.
3. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd.
4. Mazagon Docks Ltd.
5. Goa Shipyard Ltd.
6. Garden Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd.
7. Bharat Dynamics Ltd.
8. Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd.52
The ordnance factories produce a variety of products such as tanks, field 
guns, trucks, small arms and ammunition. Administration of these factories 
is the purview of the Ordnance Factory Board in Calcutta.
2000 . 0-1
Indian Defence Industry Output 1810.0
1356.0Ordnance
DPSUs
1000.0 -
1973-4 1979-801963-4 1985-6
Source: S.P. Baranwal, M ilitary Yearbook 1987-88,
Some of the under licence, Indian produced, successes have been the 
British Chieftain (Vijayanta) and Soviet T-72 tanks, the British Gnat (Ajeet) 
and Jaguar, French Mirage 2000, Soviet MiG 21 and 23 fighters, the British 
Leander Class Frigates, Avro military transport, German SK-1500 Type 209
52 S.P. Baranwal, M ilitary Year-book 1987-88, p. 214.
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Subm arines and  S haktim an  trucks.53 The DPSUs h a n d le  m ore 
technologically complex projects and larger scale projects, such as the 
production of the Jaguar aircraft by H industan Electronics, the Godavari 
Class Frigates by Mazagon Docks and the augmentation of warship building 
facilities by Goa Shipyard Ltd.
The decision to purchase the Jaguar aircraft is an exam ple of the 
im pact of politics on the w eapons procurem ent and strategic decision 
making process. The timing becomes a decisive factor for understanding this 
decision. In 1978, the Janata governm ent sought to put India back on the 
path of "true Non-Alignment." The supposition was that Indira Gandhi, 
through the 1971 Treaty of Peace and Friendship w ith the Soviet Union, had 
taken India too far into the Soviet camp. To m aintain India's independent 
posture w ithin the Non-Aligned nations, the Janata G overnm ent did not 
wish to become too reliant upon the Soviet Union. This led to a political 
decision by Morarji Desai to buy from the West, despite the attractive price of 
only $4.1 m illion for the MiG-23, w hich w as a rough  equivalent in 
perform ance to the Jaguar. The economic justification of the MiG-23 is 
undeniable. The Soviets offered 2.5% financing over 17 years following a 
seven year grace period. This was further payable in Rupees which would 
have conserved valuable foreign exchange.54 It was also found that it cost 
twice as m uch to produce the Jaguar in India as to buy it outright. The 
Soviets had attached a no export clause to the MiG 23 which the British did 
not. This would have been perceived as another undesirable constraint on 
India's independence. Reportedly the Saab-37 was the plane of choice of the 
Air Force but was similarly disqualified because it used an American made 
Pratt and Whitney engine which would have given the Am ericans similar 
influence.55 Despite this emphasis on retaining the independence to re­
export Indian arms, Indian arms exports rem ain at the almost negligible 
level of US $10 million though there are signs that they may increase 56 The 
choice of aircraft was based prim arily on political considerations of non-
53 Raju Thomas, "Strategies of Recipient Autonomy: The Case of India," pp. 193-4.
54 R.G. Mathews, "The Development of India's Industrial Base," The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 12/89, p. 411.
55 Raju Thomas, "Strategies of Recipient Autonomy: The Case of India," p. 196.
56 Amit Gupta, "India's Mixed Performance," Defence and Diplomacy, 5/89, p. 48.
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alignm ent aim ed at autonom y and independence w ith  econom ic and 
military considerations being of secondary consideration.
India's efforts to develop a state of the art combat aircraft is indicative 
of the incongruence between its self perception and its existing capabilities. 
That said, India is quickly narrow ing the gap betw een its objectives and 
capabilities. Years of production under licence program s have begun to 
establish in India the necessary technological and engineering base for 
successfully developing an indigenous high tech arms industry.
India has sought to move away from purchases to production under 
licence arrangem ents, and ultimately indigenously designed and produced 
systems. Despite this, India has yet to obtain independence in its arm am ents 
industry. This is due to continued reliance on foreign technology and 
design. The history of the M arut aircraft programme is illustrative of India's 
impatience in making this transition from dependence to self reliance. The 
HF 24 M arut was outdated by the time it got off the ground in 1961. In 
retrospect, Defence Minister Krishna Menon adm itted that it had been over 
ambitious from the start. This was due to the lack of industrial infrastructure 
at H industan Aeronautics Ltd., which necessitated the reliance on imported 
parts and materials, and led to the plane being more costly to produce in 
India than it would have been to import.57
The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has met with similar problems as the 
Marut. The LCA project began in 1980 when HAL did a feasibility study of 
the proposed requirem ent for an indigenously  p roduced  200 km air 
superiority fighter with ground attack capabilities. In its feasibility study, 
HAL stipulated that key components such as "radar, fly by wire and fibre 
composite materials-would have to be im ported."58 Since the program s 
approval in August of 1983, further reliance on im ported components, such 
as the General Electric F-404 power plant, as opposed to the HAL RB-199, 
have ren d ered  the indigenous com ponent increasingly insignificant. 
Progress on the LCA has been slow. From its approval in 1983, to September 
1990, only $176 million had been expended on the project. Despite following
57 Amit Gupta, "India's Mixed Performance," p. 44-5.
58 Amit Gupta, "India's Mixed Performance," p. 46.
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a sim ilar pa th  to that of the M arut, the LCA experience will, albeit 
inefficiently, help move the Indian air industry closer to its goal of true 
indigenous production. This will be so even if an interim  fighter from 
abroad is purchased due to delays of the LCA. The more efficient, though 
longer term, approach for India to reach the level where it could be confident 
in its ability to produce a first rate combat aircraft is to first produce all of the 
components to the aircraft which it currently produces under licence. India 
still imports components to the MiG-27.59
From the performance of the M arut and the LCA, as well as the main 
battle tank (MBT), advanced light helicopter (ALH) and the light attack 
helicopter (LAH), it is evident that India has out-stripped its present 
capabilities. By 1990, India had already begun production of the ALH at 
H industan Aeronautics Ltd. under licence from the West German Co. MBB. 
The Defence Ministry decided in September of 1990 to give HAL the go ahead 
for development of the LAH.60
This chapter has viewed the economy as determ ining the resource 
pool upon which India’s posture is built. In this way its slow to m oderate 
rates of growth have acted as limiting factors to India’s expanding posture. 
T hough the transition  will be difficult, India will continue w ith its 
programme of economic reforms. Over time this is likely to yield increased 
rates of grow th of betw een 4% and 6%. If the previous trends are 
maintained, defence expenditure will rem ain at an average of 3.5 to 4% of 
GNP. Based on these two projections it is assum ed that Indian defence 
expenditure will return to the levels of the late 1980s by the mid to late 1990s. 
The purposes to which the defence budget will be used will be determined by 
dom estic and geopolitical considerations th rough  the decision-making 
process. This study speculates that as the middle class grows it will come to 
exert an influence on India's external orientation. If this group is mobilised 
by the BJP it may lead to a more assertive India. The study now turns to 
examine the decision-making process.
59 "India," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Sept. 1990, p. 27.
60 "India," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Sept. 1990, p. 27.
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Source: From 77ie Business and Political Observer as reprinted in India Today, 5/31/92, 
p.19, R.K. Laxman, The Illustrated Weekly of India, 7/8/90, R.K. Laxman, The Illustrated 
Weekly of India, 3/9-10/91, p.45, Abu Abraham, The Penguin Book of Indian Cartoons,
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CHAPTER SIX
With the body of ministers proved upright by means of secret tests, 
the King should appoint persons in secret service, the sharp pupil, 
the apostate monk, the seeming householder, the seeming trader 
and the secret agent, the bravo, the poison giver and the begging 
nun ...
-Kautilya's Arthasastra, Fourth Century BC1
60. Decision-making as the process whereby India's external posture is 
articulated
The following chapter will focus on the decision making structure as 
circumscribed by the domestic, geopolitical and economic param eters as 
previously discussed. This inquiry will additionally seek to develop an 
understanding of the world view of the key members and groups within the 
decision  m aking elite w ho are invo lved  in the fo rm ula tion  and  
implementation of national security, defence, intelligence and foreign policy. 
In doing so, this chapter draws on the theoretical joint work of Snyder, Bruck 
and Sapin and the more recent extention, and application of decision­
making theory to the Third World context, of Bahgat Korany.2
The above quote is drawn from Kautilya's Arthasastra, a treatise on the art of government 
written circa fourth century B.C. chapter 11, section 7. This work represents the most 
comprehensive work on the ancient’s theory of statecraft and is part of a tradition that goes 
back further, than as is popularly believed, the work of Tsun Tzu. R. P. Kangle, The Kautilya 
Arthasastra Part 11: An English Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes, (Bombay: 
University of Bombay publishers, 1963), p. 23.
2 While the theoretical literature on decision making is not specifically dealt with, more 
notable works which have influenced the general perspective are;. R. Snyder, H. W. Bruck 
and B. Sapin, Foreign Policy and Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International 
Politics, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), G. Allison, Essence of Decision, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1971) G. Paige, The Korean Decision, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 
Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), Richard Snyder, Fl. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision 
Making as an Approach to International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington: The Brookings 
Institute, 1974), David Kozak and James M. Keagle eds. Bureaucratic Politics and National 
Security: Theory and Practice, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988) and John Steinbruner, 
The Cybernetic Theory of Decision Making: New Dimensions of Political Analysis, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974).
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60.1 The structure of national security, defence and foreign policy decision­
making in the Indian context
Before proceeding, a brief discussion of the existing literature is in 
order. In the literature of com parative defence policy, India is often 
perceived to be one of a num ber of em erging regional powers. As such 
India, and other states which have been identified as emerging regional 
actors, such as Nigeria, Argentina and Egypt, are often included in W estern 
studies which either seek explicitly to identify emerging powers, or which 
have the alternative aim of comparative analysis of security doctrine.3 Many 
of these studies call for the construction of a common framework of analysis 
for assessments of the security positions of states. This inquiry proceeds 
from the assum ption that such studies serve the heuristic purpose of 
defining the param eters for further research. While a num ber of studies 
have been conducted within the decision m aking fram ew ork they have 
tended to concentrate on a specific issue or event, such as Indian nuclear 
policy or the 1962 debacle.4
To dissect the causal factors behind India's strategic and international 
posture it is necessary, first to identify the locus of decision making within 
the government and then to assess those factors which exert an influence on 
the decision making process. Specific problem s w ith  the rational actor, 
organisational and governm ental politics m odels as outlined by Allison, 
have been identified  by the critical analysis of J. Bender and T.H. 
H am m ond.5 While acknowledging the "enorm ous impact" of A llison's 
models on the study of bureaucracy and foreign policy making they call for a
3 Rodney Jones and S. Hildreth eds. Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third 
World, (New York: Preager Publishers, 1984), Stephanie Newman, Defence Planning in Less- 
Developed States, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984), D. Murray and P. Viotti, eds. The 
Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989), O. Marwah and J. Pollack, Military Power and Policy in Asian States, (Boulder: 
VVestview Press, 1980) and E. Kolodziej and R. Harkavy eds. Security Policies of Developing 
Countries, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1982).
4 Two excellent studies of this nature are; Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic 
Diplomacy and Decision Making, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) and Neville Maxwell, 
India's China War, (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1971).
5 J. Bendor and T.H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," Amercican Political Science 
Review, June 1992, pp. 301-322.
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reform ulation of the models. This chapter will proceed in a general way 
from the decision-making literature to analyse India while acknowledging 
the need for more theoretical inquiries into decision-making theory.
Despite the presence of some interesting and inform ative works, 
which take into account the decision m aking perspective in a broader 
context, the existing literature provides an incomplete picture of a constantly 
evolving system .6 This inquiry will seek to explore the Indian national 
security policy process, with emphasis on the decision making structure and 
the potentiality that the national identity of the decision making elite, will 
evolve as India emerges from its current transitional state and that this will 
effect India's external posture. The decision making perspective here taken 
firstly stresses the structural organisational setting within which decisions 
are made and secondly the perceptive aspects of the decision makers. In this 
chapter the decision making process will be assessed, to the extent to which it 
is possible, from a perspective which seeks to expand understanding of the 
Indian decision making elites perceptions and their bureaucratic structures 
and behaviours.
The particular socio-historical experience of India w arrants a country 
specific study approach. While the civil and military institutions of India are 
rooted deeply in the British im perial past these institu tions have been 
changing and have adapted to the particular circumstances of Indian society 
and culture. There are a growing num ber of Indian, American, Canadian, 
British and Australian academics who have more recently been developing a 
wider understanding of India's geopolitical situation .7
6 Jeffrey Benner, The India Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) Raju 
Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics, (Meerut: 
Macmillan Company of India, 1978) Michael Brecher, Succession in India: A Study in Decision 
Making, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) and Sankaran Krishna, The State, Autonomy 
and Foreign Policy: An Analysis of India, 1947-87, PhD dissertation, (Syracuse: Department of 
Political Science, Syracuse University, 1989) For a further review of the literature on national 
security policy in India see; K.M. Kamath, "Trends in the Study of National Security, Policy 
Making and Implementation," Strategic Analysis, July, 1991.
7 K. Subramanyam, Security in a Changing World, (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Co. 1990), Surjit 
Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-82, (Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1984), Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), Stephen Cohen, The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives,
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The Indian military build-up in the 1980s was the source of much 
concern and speculation by states of the region. If the critical junctures of the 
decision making process are identified an understanding of India’s changing 
posture, and future direction w ithin a geopolitical context, will be more 
apparent.
To limit the scope of inquiry to the official foreign policy, or existent 
force structures, would severely limit the a ttem pt to gain a m eaningful 
understanding of India as an actor in the international sphere. Other factors 
associated with India’s place and role in world affairs which have an impact 
on the perceptions of India's decision making elite, such as the political 
parties and other socio-economic or sub-national groupings as previously 
discussed, can not be excluded if one is to attempt a holistic understanding of 
India's international posture.
The locus of Indian governm ent policy decision making in strategic 
and international affairs is extremely centralised. Its centres can be located in 
a lim ited num ber of governm ental m inistries, departm ents and bureaus. 
The extent to which the driving forces behind the external outputs are 
centralised is dependent on the nature of the political and bureaucratic 
leadership who occupy the key positions w ithin the structure and more 
specifically their relationship with the Prime Minister. The organisational 
structure of strategic and international affairs decision m aking generally 
involves the M inistry of External Affairs, The M inistry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Cabinet Committee 
of Political Affairs (CCPA), the N ational Security Council, and the 
intelligence organisations.* 8 Decision making is necessarily influenced by the 
structure w ithin which it takes place as well as by the m ind sets of the 
officials who comprise these bureaucratic organisations. There are obstacles 
to developing an impression of the values of large num bers of individuals,
(Chicago: University of Illionois Press, 1987) and Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon eds. India's
Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Powei ? (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1992).
8 The exact status of the National Security Council introduced by the National Front 
Government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh was, under the Congress Government of Narasimha 
Rao, undetermined. It is likely that it will remain in disuse.
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who also operate as groups with bureaucratic organisational interests, due to 
the difficulty of gathering more than anecdotal information. Despite this, 
such inquiry  is necessary to a ttem pt a m eaningful explanation. The 
governm ental role in determ ining how and why Indian policy emerges in 
the m anner in which it does will be assessed first and then a discussion of 
the influence of outside groupings will follow.
60.11 The Prime Minister, the President, Cabinet and the role of Parliament
One of the more salient points to bear in m ind w hen analysing the 
Indian decision making structure is the wide disparity between the formal 
and informal channels of power. The whole process, however, is m uch 
more informal than any flow chart would suggest. For the most im portant 
decisions, "form al in s titu tio n s  give w ay to personalism ."9 A ll 
governm ental systems have this distinction but w ithin the Indian system 
they are m ore d ivergent than  is typical of o ther dem ocratic regim es. 
Moreover, to minimise opposition to new bureaucratic structures old bodies 
are allowed to remain despite their redundancy by new organisations and or 
policies .10
Excessive secrecy on the part of the Prime Minister, his closest advisers 
and the CCPA in national security matters is used by the Prime Minister to 
m ain tain  the subo rd ina tion  of the P arliam en t and the bureaucratic 
organisations which play a role in the form ulation of national security 
policy .* 11 The absence of meaningful political opposition has led to the lack 
of substantive debate. W hen alternative  v iew poin ts em erge a m ore 
informed and more meaningful debate of India's national security planning 
and posture will ensue. A lessening of the stature of the Congress party, 
internal strife, and a changed geopolitical environm ent may also contribute 
to a larger debate over external policy.
9 Robert Hardgrave, India Unider Pressure: Prospects for political Stability, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), p.136.
10 As noted above the dismantling of the licence Raj, beginning in 1992, did not initially 
involve the laying off of any personnel involved in the administration of those regulations.
11 This has been facilitated by the high degree of concensus within India of its perception of 
place in the international order. This consensus seeks increased independence and status. This 
consensu desires increased independence and status.
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Though largely form al, the pow ers of the p residen t are quite 
significant under the Indian C onstitution. In exercising his executive, 
legislative and financial powers the President is to act in accordance with the 
Council of Ministers. The Council of M inisters includes Cabinet Ministers, 
Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers. The 42nd Am endm ent eliminated 
any ambiguity as to whether the President was bound to heed the advice of 
the Council of Ministers. In practice the President is subordinate to the 
Prime M inister and Cabinet, though there are a num ber of diplomatic, 
m ilitary and national security functions in which the President figures 
prominently. It is the President's duty to m aintain positive relations with 
other states. In fulfilling this function the president receives diplomatic 
credentials and makes diplom atic appoin tm ents. W ith regard  to the 
military, the President technically, as suprem e commander, is responsible for 
the appointm ent of the Chiefs of Staff and the "movement of army both in 
the disturbed areas to crush anti social elements or to repulse those who 
have an eye on our national borders, takes place under his instructions."12 
In reality these formal powers fall to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, (see 
chart at end of chapter)
The president’s most significant powers come under articles 352 and 
356 of the C onstitu tion. These two A rticles perta in  to Presidential 
declarations of emergency both in the country at large and in specific states. 
Originally under Article 352, the President could declare a national state of 
em ergency for th rea ts  of "war, or ex ternal aggression  or in te rn a l 
disturbance."13 In the 44th co n stitu tio n a l am endm ent the in ternal 
disturbances clause was changed to read  "arm ed rebellion."14 This 
am endm ent was in reaction to the abuse of the internal disturbances clause 
by Indira Gandhi in the emergency declared while she was Prime M inister in 
1975. General states of emergency have also been declared during the wars of 
1962,1965 and 1971.15 Similarly under Article 356 the President can, w ith the 
backing of the Council of Ministers, declare a state of emergency in particular
12 Hans Raj, The Indian Political System, p. 130.
13 Article 352 of the Constitution of India, as unamended.
14 Article 352 of the Constitution of India, as amended by the forty forth amendment. 
13 Hans Raj, The Indian Political System, p. 133.
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states. In such cases the governor, who is appointed by the President, rules 
on behalf of the President.
Theoretically the Parliam ent can exert control over the Council of 
M inisters through questions, blocking legislation, adjournm ent m otions, 
and no confidence votes .16 Because of the traditional streng th  of the 
Congress Party in India, and the Parliamentary structure itself, this has in  
reality had little effect on the workings of the Council of M inisters or the 
Cabinet. Party control of Members of Parliament was greatly strengthened by 
the Anti-Defection Act "which entails disqualification from the m em bership 
of the H ouse ."17 The Parliament is further subordinate to the Prime M inister 
through his powers over the control of the Parliam entary agenda. "All 
resolutions and bills can be moved only with his approval."18
Parliamentary oversight is minimal at best and tends to focus on those 
defence issues, like the Bofors scandal, which can be of political v a lu e .19 The 
lack of m eaningful scrutiny over the process is increasingly becoming a 
liability for India. Scrutiny, as it exists, emerges through Parliam entary 
debate, or, more significantly, through the m edia who are operating at the 
periphery of the decision making structure w ith little direct influence over 
policy. Though estimates of popular acceptance of high profile issues is 
taken into account, many defence and foreign policy decisions are not raised 
to the level of awareness in the public forum  to exert an influence on the 
political decision makers. There has been little expansion of legislative 
oversight, in the areas of defence and foreign affairs. The Ind ian  
Parliamentary system lacks an effective committee system for articulating
16 Hans Raj, The Indian Political System, p. 167.
17 While prohibiting individuals from defecting it does not stop party splits. Hans Raj, The 
Indian Political System, p. 168.
I® Hans Raj, The Indian Political System, p. 185.
19 In 1988 only 36 of 516 members of the lok Sabha were present at the opening of debate on the 
defence appropriation. In 1989 demands totaling 54,000 crore rupees that included defence 
appropriations, were passed in three minutes. Most MPs are reliant on the media for their 
information on defence issues. See K. Kunju, "Defence Spending: MPs Not Consulted Only 
Briefed,” Link,8/20/89.
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views in the defence and foreign policy areas. The w ritten submissions to 
Parliamentary inquiries are brief and the debate minimal.20
Through the domestic constraint of public opinion the input of public 
perceptions of the national image joins elite perceptions of the states image 
in influencing the decision making process.21 The outrage and indignation 
m ounting over cross border support for Indian insurgents continues to have 
an effect on the way both the elite and the masses perceive India’s relations 
w ith its neighbours. As a siege mentality mounts, the im petus to lash out 
will increase. This is already manifesting itself internally as demonstrated by 
the lack of outrage over extreme and brutal measures being taken against 
Kashmiris. A closer look at the input of the MEA is in order.
60.12 The Ministry of External Affairs
The Indian foreign policy bureaucracy is largely organized to assist in  
the im plem entation of foreign policy as articulated by the Prime M inister 
and his or her personal advisory group through the Prime M inisters office. 
The intelligence and assessment input of the MEA to the process through 
the JIC has been described as insignificant 22 The extent to which there exists 
any input into the formulative stages of the process rests on the personal 
rapport of the political Ministers, or the relatively junior Foreign Secretary, 
w ith the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary, as adm inistrative and
20 Parliamentary debates on the defence budget are one of the most poorly attended 
legislative activities. J. Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India," p. 526.
21 As domestic pressure built over the nature of India's relationship with China in the lead up 
to the 1962 conflict, Nehru, to protect his political position from accusations that he had been 
soft on the Chinese, relinquished much of his control over the conduct of the mounting conflict 
to the Lok Sabha when he decided to make all communications between his government and 
the Chinese public. In this way domestic pressure asserted itself and began to more narrowly 
circumscribe the parameters of decision making as public concern mounted over the issue. This 
was more recently paralleled in the mounting tensions between India and Pakistan in the 
spring of 1990. Public frustrations over the reinfiltration of Indian Kashmiris, who had been 
across the border in Pakistani Kashmir for training and assistance, led to a position where 
Prime Minister V. P. Singh felt obliged to call for the country to be prepared for war based on 
the assumption that hostilities were imminent. These seemingly bellicose pronouncements are 
not consistent with V. P. Singh's avowed desire to establish India's relations with its South 
Asian neighbour on a more amicable basis. In this way he became a captive of the public eye.
22 Maj. Gen. M.L. Popli, "National Intelligence Assessments and Estimates: Whither our Joint 
Intelligence Comittee?" Indian Defence Review, 1991, p. 27.
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coordinative head of the Ministry, has, due to his career expertise, become 
increasingly relied upon by the Prime M inister for his opinions as to the 
feasibility of policy ideas.
The structure and functioning of the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy 
has been most articulately described by Jeffrey Benner in the following terms.
The Cabinet, which in the British system is a decision-making 
body, is used in India as a platform  for the dissem ination of 
policy decided by the Prime Minister and his or her inner circle 
of advisers. Therefore, w hen looking at the M inisterial 
contribution to foreign policy below the Prime Minister, we are 
looking at the implementative and interpretative side of policy 
rather than the stage of its initial form ulation .23
Benner has comprehensively applied the bureaucratic model to the Indian 
foreign policy process with em phasis on the M inistry of External Affairs. 
W hat emerges from this work is a useful schematic of the adm inistrative 
structure of Indian foreign policy. Benner set out to try to answ er the 
broader question of the nature of the causality of bureaucratic politics and 
foreign policy. This perspective, while informative on its own, tells only 
part of the picture. What is left out are the cognitive maps of the decision 
makers and the broader setting, which set the param eters w ith in  which 
foreign policy is created .24
60.13 The Ministry of Defence, the armed services, and civil-m ilitary  
relations
It is inevitable that those responsible for a state's national security will 
at times observe the external security environm ent in such a m anner as to 
ascribe intentions and desires to potential adversaries that are m ore a 
function of their insecurities than the intentions of the other. This is a 
result of the necessity of worst case scenario planning on the part of strategic 
planners 25 The danger lies in the self-fulfilling tendencies of such plans.
23 J. Benner, The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, p. 66.
24 Bruce Vaughn, "National Security and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making," 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 259, 1992).
23 By briefly discussing the evolution of the national security and defence decision making 
structure, this discussion will be set in its historical context. While recognising the
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A United States D epartm ent of Defense docum ent entitled Defence 
Planning Guidance, which was leaked in March of 1992, indicates that India 
has been identified as aspiring tow ards global power status and as having 
’’hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean."26 While it is unlikely that this view is shared by other policy 
making bodies of the American governm ent it is unsettling. The end of the 
cold w ar has allowed the disengagem ent of the superpow ers from the 
subcontinent. India, as the world's largest democracy, shares a democratic 
tradition w ith the West and is potentially in a position to foster regional 
stability, peace and democratic values in South Asia. Concomitantly beset by 
fissiparous tendencies, India is itself threatened and as such is suspicious of 
external influences. Given India's emerging position as a great power it is 
crucial that it not be unnecessarily alienated by alarm ist analysis of its 
national security posture. India's lack of pronouncem ents as to its defence 
posture stems not necessarily from its desires to keep hidden a secret agenda 
of territorial expansionism but more im portantly from a sense of insecurity 
as to its susceptibility to m anipulation by external influences.27
On 24 August 1990, the Cabinet Secretariat issued a resolution from 
Rashtrapati Bhavan calling for the establishm ent of a N ational Security 
Council. The intent to do so had been outlined in V.P. Singh’s N ational 
Front election manifesto for the 1989 Lok Sabha elections. The manifesto 
called for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) to address the 
”[t]otal absence of a national security doctrine, ad hoc decision making, and 
easy resort to importing arms ..." which had "adversely affected the nation's 
security." In asserting this V. P. Singh accused Rajiv Gandhi's governm ent
difficulties of separating national security policy from foreign policy, the contribution to the 
formation of national security policy made by the Ministry of Defence, the armed services and 
intelligence organisations is here emphasised over other actors such as the Ministry of 
External Affairs and Finance.
26 Susumu Awanohara, "Defence: The Lone Ranger,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 
3/26/92, p. 11. This document was disclaimed as a product of midde level officers.
27 During the Janata period Charan Singh accused Jagjivan Ram of being a CIA opperative 
while Seymour Hersh has alledged that the CIA contact within the Janata Government was 
Morarji Desai himself. Tariq Ali, p. 208.
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of making India "vulnerable to outside pressures ."28 This assessment of the 
present functioning of the form ation of national security policy has been 
echoed by defence analysts. "We find the defence planning process has yet to 
get off the ground ."29 Working from this perspective, V. P. Singh first raised 
the issue of reform  in the Parliam entary Consultative Com m ittee and 
Cabinet.30
As proposed in the August resolution, the National Security Council 
was to be comprised of the Prime Minister as Chairm an and the Ministers of 
Defence, Finance, Home Affairs and External Affairs as members. It was to 
"serve as a perspective for the shaping of G overnm ent policy" in the 
geostrategic and internal security areas.31 The NSC, as proposed, was to be 
assisted by the establishment of a Strategic Core Group, to be chaired by the 
Cabinet Secretary and to include representatives of the relevant services and 
M inistries, who w ould oversee the "subm ission of appropriate studies, 
papers and reports to the National Security Council from the Ministries or 
other agencies of the governm ent, or from Special Task Forces..." as the 
Chairm an of the council deem ed necessary. The special task forces would 
administratively be attached to the independent secretariat of the NSC and 
w ould not be restricted to governm ental agencies or departm ents for
This and the previous two quotes are drawn from the 1989 election manifesto. V. P. Singh 
convener, National Front, Lok Sabha Elections 1989 Manifesto: Dignity to Nation Commitment 
to People, (New Delhi: Poly Print, 1989), pp. 34-6.
29 Manoj Joshi, in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, p. 77. See also K. Subramanyam, "Planning for 
Security: Blueprint for An Apex Body," The Business and Political Observer, 12/20/89 see also 
Interview with retired Lt. General S.K. Sinha, Times of India, "Sinha for Broad Based NSC," 
1/6/90 and Manoj Joshi, "Framework for Security Planning," The Hindu, 1/29/90 among others.
30 V. P. Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha unedited notes, p. 12054.
31 The Cabinet Secretariat Resolution outlined the subject areas to be considered by the 
Council as follows; (a) external threat scenario; (b) strategic defence policies; (c) other 
security threats, especially those involving atomic energy, space and high technology; (d) 
internal security covering aspects such as counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter­
intelligence; (e) patterns of alienation likely to emerge within the country, especially with a 
social, communal or regional dimension; (f) security implications of evolving trends in the 
world economy on India's economic and foreign policies; (g) external economic threats in areas 
such as energy, commerce, food and finance; (h) threats posed by transborder crimes such as 
smuggling and the traffic in arms, drugs and narcotics; (i) evolving a national consensus on 
strategic and security issues. V. C. Pande, Cabinet Secretary, Government of India (Bharat 
Sarkar) Cabinet Secretariat (Mantrimandal Sachivalaya) Rashtrapati Bhavan Resolution 
No. 50/4/18/88-TS (New Delhi: August 24th, 1990 ).
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assistance. Furthermore, the head of the newly established NSC Secretariat 
would have the rank of Secretary to the Government of India .32
An additional task of the proposed National Security Council was to 
"increase public awareness on im portant national security problems with a 
view to prom oting the w idest possible consensus w ithin the country on 
issues affecting the nation's security ."33 To assist in this task the National 
Security Advisory board was to be established. It was to draw its m em bership 
from "among Chief Ministers, Members of Parliament, academics, scientists 
and persons having rich experience in the adm inistration, arm ed forces, 
press and the m edia ."34 Singh's consultations w ith the Cabinet and the 
Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs prior to the establishment of the NSC 
would seem to indicate that he was aware of their possible sensitivity to the 
prospect of a new decision making structure being established which m ight 
underm ine the C abinet’s influence in the security area. In a statem ent 
before the Lok Sabha Singh further explained that
In our system of the Cabinet way of functioning I want to make 
it clear that we do not w ant to make a body which m ilitates 
against the Cabinet system ... So retaining the Cabinet system, 
retaining the position of the CCPA, we will w ant to build this 
NSC .35
These proposals indicated a desire on the part of the National Front 
Coalition government of V. P. Singh to redress perceived inadequacies in the 
national security policy and decision m aking process w ithout disturbing 
existing vested interests and thereby jeopardizing the proposal's success.36 
His reforms may even have been aimed at establishing a Cabinet decision 
making system that would have allowed for more than an implementative 
role for the various governm ental organs involved in national security
32 The Prime Minister's Statement on National Security Council (New Delhi: Press and 
Information Bureau, Government of India, August 24th, 1990). This is virtually the same text 
as the Cabinet Resolution V. C. Pande, Cabinet Secretary.
33 Prime Minister's Statement on National Security Council. 8/24/90.
34 Prime Minister’s Statement on National Security Council. 8/24/90.
33 V. P. Singh s statement in the Lok Sabha unedited notes, p. 12054.
36) National security policy is discussed as an area separate from defence policy as it takes a 
more macro level approach to analysis of the overall security of the state.
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policy.37 Singh had been closely involved in the national security decision 
making process. It was from this position w ithin  the decision m aking 
structure that he resigned from the Congress governm ent of Rajiv Gandhi 
in order to form the Janata Dal to contest Congress' control of the centre. As 
such, he had been well placed to perceive its deficiencies and to subsequently 
make reform s after becoming Prime M inister on the second of December 
1989.
The emphasis placed by the National Front on the establishm ent of 
the National Security Council in the 1989 election manifesto was dropped in 
the 1991 manifesto. While the 1991 docum ent is an extension of policies 
outlined in 1989, it is noteworthy that the National Security Council is not 
listed as one of the achievements of the first 11 m onths of office.38
The proposed NSC found support in the Bharatiya Janata Party. In 
their 1991 election manifesto, Towards Ram Rajya, the BJP stated that it 
sought to "[e]ncourage an educated debate on national strategy as a route to 
national security strategy” and that it w ould ”[s]et up a National Security 
Council to institutionalise forward planning” in addition to establishing a 
"[pjolicy planning comm ittee of experts to form ulate long term  foreign 
policy."39 As the proposed NSC was deleted from the 1991 manifesto by the 
National Front, (the initial architects in 1989), and was proposed yet again in 
1991 by the Bharatiya Janata Party the question of concurrence w ithin the 
opposition  on this m atter is raised. An exam ination of the current 
deficiencies of the system  becomes a prerequisite  in o rder to gain an 
understanding of the fate of V. P. Singh's efforts to reform  the national 
security policy process.40
37 V. P. Singh, having become a member of Parliament in July of 1983, took over as Union 
Finance Minister in December of 1984 leaving in February of 1986 to become Defence Minister.
33 Dignity to Nation, Commitment to People: Natiotial Front Manifesto, Lok Sabha Elections, 
1989, (Delhi: V.P. Singh Publisher, 1989), An Agenda for the 90s: The National Front 
Manifesto, Lok Sabha Elections 1991, (Delhi: V.P. Singh Publisher, 1991).
39 Towards Ram Rajya: Mid-Term Poll to Lok Sabha, May 1991: Our Commitments, (New  
Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party, 1991), pp. 36-7.
40 For a discussion of the preindependence background to defence decision-making see Bruce 
Vaughn "National Security and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making,"
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60.131 The post independence decision making structure
The locus of Indian national security policy formation, and indeed all 
governm ental decision-making, is w ith the Prime Minister and Cabinet.41 
The high degree of centralization in defence and foreign policy decision­
making followed the general trend tow ards centralized governm ent under 
Indira in the aftermath of the 1977 split betw een Indira and other Congress 
leaders. It was as a result of the emergency of 1975 that many leaders turned 
from Indira. This led her to rely more heavily on her son Sanjay and her 
personal control of both the party and the governm ent. At this point the 
democratic organs of the Congress Party, such as the All-India Congress 
Committee and the Congress Working Committee, began to atrophy.42 In 
this way she im posed a centralized decision-m aking structure that was 
responsible to her person directly. This was similarly followed by her son 
Rajiv. 43
Following Indira G andhi’s core group an apex group, known as the 
Inter Discipline Group (IDG), was formed from the Cabinet. The group was 
established to deal with intelligence organisations and relevant Ministries as 
they acted on security issues and, as such, reflected her personalized manner 
of governance. Indira Gandhi presided over the governm ent of India as 
though it were her darbar, or court. "This darbar had a stultifying effect on 
the institutions and adm inistration of India. All power derived from the 
c o u rt in D elh i, b u t the  co u rtie rs  o ften  exercised  th e ir pow ers 
independently."44 In an attem pt at reorganisation in 1986, the IDG was 
superseded by the Policy Advisers G roup (PAG) w hich Rajiv G andhi
41 The role of the Cabinet has been in decline since June 26th, 1975 when under Article 352 of 
the Constitution the President declared a state of national emergency at the behest of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi without the advice of the Cabinet or the Council of Ministers for fear 
of opposition to the move.
42 Yogendra Malik, "Indira Gandhi: Personality, Political Power and Party Politics," in Y.K. 
Malik and D.K. Vajpeyi, India the Years of Indira Gandhi, (Leiden: E.J. Brill Publishers, 
1988), p.15.
43 At the time of writing not enough information had come to light as to whether or not PM 
Rao would similarly follow this style of decision-making. His many years of loyal service to 
the Gandhis may in itself be an indication of the style that he will pursue.
44' Mark Tully, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle, (London: Jonathan Cape Publishers, 
1985), p. 219.
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subsequently dropped in preference of a more informal ad hoc approach to 
decision m aking .45 Beyond these lapsed centres of decision making there are 
three key committees operating at three distinct levels, or tiers of decision 
making within the governm ent where security concerns are addressed and 
responses conceptualised. The structure  relies on the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) to identify possible threat scenarios. Beyond identifying the 
agenda, the JIC is intended to serve as a channel of communication between 
the Defence and Foreign Ministries and the intelligence organizations. The 
com m ittees are, in ascending o rder, the uniform ed-m ilitary level, the 
bureaucratic-secretarial and the po litico-m inisterial .46 Follow ing an 
overview of the three tier system as it operated during the Indira - Rajiv 
period will be a discussion of the evolutionary background of the decision­
making structure and finally, an assessm ent of how  the proposed NSC 
would fit within the existing structure.
The lowest, or third tier of Indian defence policy decision making is 
the uniformed-military level. The Chiefs of Staff Committee acts as the co­
ordinating body for the three Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff function in 
two separate roles. When presiding over their respective services they act as 
largely autonomous operational chiefs of staff. W hen attending the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee they act in a m ore integrated fashion, in an advisory 
capacity to the Minister of Defence. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is chaired 
by the most senior of the three Chiefs.
The next tier on the decision m aking ladder is the bureaucratic- 
secretarial level. The central committee at this level is the Committee of 
Defence Planning (CDP) which is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. An 
additional six civilian secretaries and the three Chiefs of Staff attend the CDP. 
The following civilian secretaries attend: the Secretary of Defence, the
4  ^Lt. Gen. E. A. Vas (retd.), "Why We need a Security Council," Indian Express, 3/9/90.
46 These conceptualizations, and the basis of the diagram at the end of the chapter, are drawn 
from the three levels of analysis of the defence decision making structure outlined in Raju 
Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," pp. 248-52. See also Raju Thomas, The Defence of India: 
A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics, (Meerut: Macmillan Company of India, 
1978), pp. 66-100 and Jerrold Elkin and Andrew Ritezel, "India," in D. Murray and P. Viotti, 
The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989) p. 534.
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Secretary of Defence Production, the Secretary of External Affairs, the 
Secretary of the Planning Commission, the Secretary of Finance and the 
Secretary to the Prime Minister. The ratio betw een civilian secretaries and 
military chiefs places the latter at some disadvantage. This is accentuated by 
the fact that decisions made at the second level must be approved at the first 
tier where the attendance by the Chiefs is discretionary.
The highest tier is the politico-ministerial level. The Prime Minister 
chairs the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs. At this highest level the 
attendance of the three service Chiefs is by the request of the Prime Minister. 
In regular attendance are the M inisters of Home, Finance, External Affairs 
and Defence. As currently operating the CCPA and the Prime M inister’s 
personal advisers have the greatest influence on national security planning.
The decision making apparatus for the form ation of national security 
policy has undergone a series of transform ations which have sought to 
rearrange the organisational structure. These rearrangem ents have been 
initiated at times when perceptions indicated that the strategic environment 
was undergoing, or had undergone, change and that as a result the existing 
structure was no longer the optimal system.
The political M inisterial struc tu re  developed  from  the Defence 
Committee of Cabinet (DCC) to the Emergency Committee of Cabinet (ECC) 
and then on to Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs. The im portance of 
position w ithin the structure should not be underestim ated. It is ”[t]he 
organisational fram ework of the Indian defence decision-making system 
[that] tends to determine the importance and influence of the actors in the 
various policy outcomes.”47
The DCC had fallen into disuse by the 1950s, partly  due to the 
perception that peaceful coexistence w ith India's neighbours was possible. 
This perception was shattered by the 1962 border war w ith China. In 
response, the Defence Committee of Cabinet was resuscitated and renamed 
the Emergency Committee of Cabinet (ECC), a m orning m eeting of the
47 Raju Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," in S. G. Newman, Defense Planning in Less 
Developed States, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 248-9.
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Defence Minister, civil servants in the M inistry and the Service Chiefs was 
established by Defence Minister Krishna Menon's successor Y.B. Chavan, to 
p rovide for regular inform al contact on defence issues. One of the 
substan tive  changes im plem ented  at th is tim e w as m ore effective 
integration of the Chiefs of Staff who had previously "been given little role 
in the m aking of defence policy, [and] w ere now  allow ed greater 
participation."48 The ECC was m aintained through the 1965 w ar w ith 
Pakistan. By 1967, the 1962 and 1965 wars had begun to take their place in 
history and the Emergency Committee m erged into the newly formed CCPA. 
This transpired out of a recognition of the interrelationship between in ternal 
and external threats to security as was evidenced by Pakistani m oves in 
Kashmir and by Chinese connections to the Nagas, Mizos and Naxalites. It 
was also at this time that defence plans were integrated with economic plans 
in one comprehensive national plan.
Strategic issues continued to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis until the 
C om m ittee of Defence P lanning was estab lished  in 1979 un d er the 
Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary. In this way it was hoped that a more 
diverse range of views would be brought to bear in the form ulation of policy 
while at the same time it would be kept closely under the political control of 
the Cabinet.
The em phasis placed on the subo rd in a tio n  of the uniform ed 
personnel in the form ulation of security policy is further reinforced by a 
num ber of structural factors. The Ministry of Defence is m anned by civil 
servants and not uniform ed personnel and  is separate from  the three 
Service Chiefs. In the period after the DCC was renam ed the Emergency 
Committee in 1962, the secretariat providing support was draw n from the 
civilian w ing of the Cabinet Secretariat and not the m ilitary wing as 
previously.49 Civilian control of the services is also symbolic. The warrant 
of precedence is such that ranking generals are below Cabinet officers.50 The 
adm inistrative channels place the Defence Secretary betw een the Defence
^  Raju Thomas, "Defence Planning in India," p. 249.
49 A. L. Venkateswaran, "Cabinet Must Have a Defence Panel," Times of India, 4/86.
50 J. Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India," p. 535.
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M inister and the Service Chiefs. In this way the control of the flow of 
inform ation  and decision m aking is channelled  th rough  the civilian 
Ministry on its way to the Minister and Cabinet. Chief of Staff papers are 
scrutinized by civilian U nder Secretaries as they make their way to the 
M inister.
There exists some opposition to the near exclusion of the uniform ed 
point of view at the higher levels of decision making am ongst elements 
w ithin the military.
It is undesirable in a m odern defence organisation at the 
n a tio n a l leve l to d iv id e  po licy  m ak ing  and  po licy  
im p le m e n ta tio n  in to  separa te  w atertigh t com partm ents. 
Political policy  m akers of D efence and  the m ilita ry  
establishm ent should have an in teg ra ted  m echanism  for 
decision making available to them .51
Lt. General Sinha goes on to describe the relationship  as a "m aster - 
supplicant" one in which "military officers have become progressively more 
isolated from the process of decision making."
W hile the subord ina tion  of the m ilitary  staff to the civilian 
m inistries, w hen taken to the extrem e of excluding or minim ising their 
input, may be detrimental to the effective form ulation of national security 
policy, it is understandable in the context of the fate of democracy in other 
South Asian states. That said, a distinction should be m ade betw een the 
bureaucratic and the political.
While the Indian military's reputation for not m eddling in the realm 
of politics is laudable, there are some indications that this record is less than 
impeccable. It has been suggested in Pakistan, and by at least one significant 
Indian strategic analyst, that India was close to being involved in a war 
which its political leaders had no intention of initiating. This Ravi Rikhye 
has labelled the war that never w as .52 Rikhye has proposed that General 
Sundarji, then Chief of Army Staff, staged the massive m ilitary exercise
51 Lt. Gen. S. K. Sinha, "Higher Defence Organisation in India," p. 29.
52 Ravi Rikhye, The War That Never Was. It should be noted that this theory is a 
contentious one.
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Operation Brass Tacks in D ecem ber of 1986 in such a way as to be 
indistinguishable from an actual m obilization for an attack on Pakistan53 
and that this was done w ithout sanction from the political authorities in 
Delhi.
W hether out of a fear of the military or out of a desire to directly 
control the process, the trend in national security planning has been away 
from  uniform ed input into the decision m aking process and towards 
continued subordination of the overall process to the will of the Prim e 
Minister and Cabinet. After independence, the service Chiefs were regularly 
involved in the DCC. After 1962 this began to decline. This trend has 
c o n tin u e d  w ith  th e  c u r r e n t  in c a r n a t io n  of th e  Defence 
C om m ittee/Em ergency Com m ittee as the CCPA. Proposals from  the 
Defence Ministry thus do not have to originate or be channelled through the 
service staffs. Under this system, the committees set up at independence, 
which had service representation, have largely been cut out of the loop of 
decision making in strategic matters. At its conception the locus of defence 
decision making was in the Defence Com m ittee of the Cabinet and the 
Defence Ministers Committee. Now defence decision making is primarily 
located with the Prime Minister's Office, the CCPA and w ithin the civilian 
controlled Ministry of Defence.
At various times proposals have been m ooted for reform at each of 
the three levels of defence decision making. At the third tier, the proposal 
that Chief of Defence Staff be established to provide increased input to the 
military perspective in the form ulation of defence plans and also to more 
effectively co-ordinate operations and relations between the services, has not 
met with success. There is a lack of integrated force employm ent doctrine 
betw een the services with co-ordination often depending on the personal 
rapport between Chiefs. In the lead up to the 1965 war with Pakistan, the 
Chairm an of the Chiefs of Staff Com m ittee had anticipated an attack but
53This thesis is supported by Seymour Hersh "... there was evidence that General Sundarji, 
with the encouragemement of some of the more hawkish elements in the Indian government, 
had toyed briefly with the possibility of simply moving his armies, which had gone into the 
field with extra fuel and ammunition, across the border and dismembering Pakistan." "On the 
Nuclear Edge," p. 59.
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thought it unnecessary to inform the other services because he perceived it 
to be an army matter. Likewise, the airforce is more interested in counter air 
operations than in ground support sorties.54 Each of the services is 
independently responsible for the developm ent of its own doctrine. As a 
result, there is a problem of coordination.55
To keep the m ilitary itself d ivided is to lessen the possibility of a 
military coup. This said, the tradition to uphold  dem ocratic values runs 
high in the Indian military. The m ilitary has generally only reluctantly 
becom e involved in dom estic actions, such as Operation Blue Star,56 
preferring to let the increasing numbers of paramilitary forces deal w ith such 
domestic threats to security as arise. It has been recognised that the defence 
budget is structured to allow the Finance Ministry a measure of control over 
the Defence M inistry and the service chiefs. The Directorate of Defence 
Planning was originally established to reconcile the services wish list with 
the budget. 57
Despite the revisions of the national security policy structure, it is still 
felt by many that the planning process lacks expertise, long range vision and 
the ability to discuss India's security needs in a timely and m eaningful 
manner. The proposal for a NSC was first unsuccessfully suggested to Indira 
Gandhi in 1980. Since, the National Security Council has increasingly been 
proposed as that body which can act as an integrative and centralized 
repository of strategic thinking for the country and thereby redress the ills of 
the present system. The reason why the National Front was unsuccessful in 
its attem pt to reform national security policy form ation stems from both 
bureaucratic and political opposition to the proposal.
54 J. Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India,” p. 534.
J .  Elkin and A. Ritezel, "India," p. 531.
56 As a result of the storming of the golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984 five battalion sized 
units of Sikhs mutinied. This caused some to call for the disbanding of such regionally formed 
regiments. Ironically it was the Sikhs' loyalty to the British that had led to the large 
disproportionate numbers in the army after the mutiny of 1857.
5^ *7 Former head of Defence Production and Head of the Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis, K. Subramanyam, as put forward in Raju Thomas, "Defense Planning in India," p. 
251. See also Manoj Joshi, "Direction in India's Defence and Security Policies," in R. Babbage 
and S. Gordon, India's Strategic Future, p. 77.
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What does seem to be agreed on by those w ithin the security policy 
decision making elite is that, as currently constructed, the structure  of 
decision making does not allow for integrated planning until issues are 
articulated at the highest decision making levels. The dynamics of Cabinet 
Com mittees reflect this. In the Cabinet Committee "officials speak only 
w hen spoken to ."58 The tradition of the Cabinet Committee on Defence 
issues has been to deal "with just one proposal and wait for its aye or nay ."59 
In this way the expertise of subordinate planning secretariats, ministries and 
staffs are not utilised as effectively as they might otherwise be, with their role 
being increasingly relegated to post decision planning for im plem entation 
ra ther than  pre-decision planning in the sense of identifying possible 
op tions .60
60.132 National security policy and defence plans
There are those who challenge the very idea as to w hether or not 
India does in fact have a macro level national security policy .61 The general 
dearth  of debate or governm ent pronouncem ents on the topic do little to 
dissuade analysts otherwise 62 Despite the lack of explicit policy or the
58 K. Subramanyam, Planning for Security."
59 Inder Malhotra, "Policy Making on Defence," Times of India, 1 /26/84.
60General Sundarji proposed a Cabinet Committee for National Security to address many of 
the same problems that the National Security Council was to rectify. The key difference with 
his proposal is that it does not appear to pose the same threat to the control of the process by 
the Cabinet while managing to bring uniformed and other expertise closer to the centre of 
decision making. In light of the existing intransigence to the currently conceived NSC, a 
proposal such as Sundarji's', which takes care not to offend existing political and bureaucratic 
interests, may succeed where the NSC proposal has failed.
61 ’There has never been any such thing as a national security policy or a national security 
doctrine in India ... In the system prevailing there has been a tendency to avoid strategic 
planning." Manoj Joshi, "Framework for Security Planning," The Hindu, 1/29/90. Air 
Commodore Jasgit Singh has in a similar vein posed the question "... it does seem surprising 
that after more than four decades of independence we are faced with the question do we 
actually plan for our national security?" Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Holistic Approach to 
Security," The Hindu, 2/20/90. Further adding to the discussion is K. Subramanyam, "There 
has never been a white paper on defence issued in India in the last 37 years. The Cabinet is not 
known to have discussed a long term strategy at any time. The two groups set up to review 
defence requirements in 1972 and 1974 carried out mostly budgetary exercises." K. S. 
Subramanyam, "Commentary: Evolution of Defence Planning in India," in Stephanie Newman, 
Defence Planning in Less Industrialised States, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 273.
62 There are a few significant non-governmental publications in India that deal in a 
substantive manner with defence and security issues which, due to the high percentage of
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presence of an efficiently operating decision m aking structure, a m inim al 
apparatus for the articulation of national security policy does exist. W hat 
seems to be the case is that, w ith the exception of the Defence M inisters 
m orning meeting, these m inimal structures have been allowed to lapse to 
the extent where the above proposition, that India does not have a national 
security policy, is in actuality the case .63 This is not to say that threat 
identification or defence planning is not conducted but that there is very 
little co-ordination or focussed thinking in the macro perspective of national 
security policy.
As m entioned above the instrum ents of Cabinet decision making on 
national security policy have become increasingly informal. This informal 
process has led, to a large extent, to the ad hoc approach operating within the 
CCPA .64 The effective operation of an organ for national security policy 
planning such as the NSC, w ould threaten this existing arrangem ent by 
handling issues effectively. What exists beyond the CCPA and its handling 
of national security issues is defence planning, w here the JIC identifies 
threats for which the service headquarters establish operational contingency 
plans. Even these defence planning structures are very small.
The form al o p era tiona l channels ho ld  the Joint In telligence 
Committee responsible for identifying the national security policy agenda. 
The agenda, as presented to the CCPA, seems in actuality not to follow the 
formal lines but to be set in an ad hoc fashion by the directors of the 
Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing through their 
direct access to the Prime Minister. The Joint Secretary, who chairs the Joint 
Intelligence Com m ittee, has not enjoyed sim ilar access to the Prim e 
M inister .65
former defence personnel and/or sequestered active military personnel, can be seen as having 
insight into official thinking on the defence debate. These are the long established Journal of 
the United Services Institute, the journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, 
Strategic Analysis, and the more recent Indian Defence Revieu\
63 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Holistic Approach to Security," The Hindu, 2/20/90.
64 Lt. Gen. E. A. Vas (retd.), "Why We Need a Security Council," Indian Express,9/3/90.
65 Within this context of a seemingly reactive security policy, which one might arguably 
assert does not constitute a policy at all, the extent to which a forward thinking on national
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National security policy planning w ithin the Ministry of Defence is 
handled  by the Strategic Planning G roup w hich has been described as 
"an o th e r of the n u m ero u s h igh  so u n d in g  m echan ism s of little  
consequence ."66 Though commentators seem to be unified in their criticism 
of the ability of the Indian national security policy process to provide 
proactive thinking, the extent and dep th  to w hich the national security 
policy is articulated is unknown. This is due to the lim ited debate, the ad 
hoc personalized nature of the Prime Minister and national security policy, 
and the high levels of secrecy surrounding defence related issues. It is 
therefore difficult to guess whether the process produces national security 
thinking which is ineffectual or w hether it simply is a reactive process 
responding to the national security problems of the day.
The extent to which the governm ent does attem pt to articulate a 
public national defence policy is presented periodically in its Ministry of 
Defence Annual Reports. This is of lim ited value as a m eans of gaining 
insight into the content of the larger national security policy. Indeed even at 
the level of defence planning, issues are discussed only in very general 
terms.
India's overall policy is of building friendly relations with all 
countries, and especially her neighbours, on a basis of m utual 
respec t for te rrito ria l in teg rity , so vere ign ty , and  n o n ­
interference in each others internal affairs. Our defence policy 
is aimed at protecting our borders from any external aggression 
or threat of aggression. We have no designs on the territory of 
any other country and have not ever in the past com m itted 
aggression against any country. 67
The utility of these general announced objectives for ascertaining the 
substance of Indian national security policy is marginal. Further inquiry in to  
the nature of national security policy in India, beyond an analysis of the
security exists, to which the defence plans are designed, is uncertain, though one would assume 
that the service chiefs would be given some indication of national security perceptions by the 
political leadership. Further their plans would reflect a degree of their own perceptions.
66 B. S. Raghavan, "Security Policy Planning."
67 Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1969-70, (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1970), p. 1.
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structure of decision making, must then stem from an analysis of Ind ia’s 
evolving d em onstra ted  posture  w hich has undergone  a num ber of 
transitions since independence that have adjusted to, or sought to adjust, to 
changes in its international position. At this second level of inquiry it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to w hich the decision m aking structure, 
below  the office of the Prime M inister, has had an im pact on India 's 
behaviour. The picture that does emerge is one dom inated by the Prime 
Minister and his or her close advisers.
Former Defence Secretary Shri P.V.R. Rao, pointed out in a lecture at 
the United Services Institute
There has been a correspondingly increasing realization of the 
importance of a study in depth of defence policy proper, but the 
veil of secrecy, which surrounds defence preparations and the 
consequent dearth of data, has acted as a handicap.68
While the strategic situation has additional layers of complexity since P.V.R. 
Rao's rem arks in 1973 the same problems persist. Defence correspondent 
and  stra teg ic  analyst Manoj Joshi has recen tly  p o in ted  ou t th a t 
"[trad itionally  the public and even the Parliam ent have tended to ignore 
issues relating to national security, content to allow the executive to take the 
lead."69
It is possible that this lack of substantive debate over security and 
defence issues can be explained by a high degree of consensus on defence 
issues, though the departures of the Janata period and the more recent shifts 
in India's external orientation would indicate that it has been the Gandhi- 
Nehru dynasty's Congress party control of governm ent which has led to the 
lack of meaningful discussion of strategic issues. During the Janata period 
India's strategic outlook was modified som ewhat on at least three levels.70
P.V.R. Rao, India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since Independence, (New Delhi: The 
United Services Institution, 1977), p. 8.
69 Manoj Joshi, "Framework for Security Planning,” The Hindu, 1/29/90.
70 A number of debates in the lok Sabha highlight out the differences in the Janata 
governments approach to security issues in the international context. For an example see the 
commentsof External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee Lok Sabha Debates,3/20/79  
cols. 274-99.
309
These were the areas of the proper interpretation of non-alignment, and its 
implications for strategic planning, nuclear policy and arms procurem ent 
strategies.71 During the Janata period it was felt that India tilted too far to the 
Soviet camp for a policy of true non-alignment.
The defence plans and national security  are discussed by the 
governm ent only in the most general terms in the open literature in the 
Ministry of Defence Annual Report and the annual Military Yearbook, 
though further information can be obtained from the Lok Sabha Debates and 
the Defence Service Estimates. The Year-book describes the p lans as 
"projecting future probable scenarios w ith a greater m easure of reliability 
and seeks to harm onise and integrate the activities of the various units.." 
w ith  em phasis being placed on "strategy, opera tiona l im peratives, 
intelligence appreciation, and political judgem ent."72 India has yet to issue 
a white paper on defence 73 The operational plans take on two key tasks. The 
first is a determination of the national defence resources. The second task is 
the assessment of how those resources will be allocated. As stated in the 
Ministry of Defence Annual Report: 1981-83 ”[t]hese plans are draw n up on 
the basis of projected requirem ents of the services w ith reference to an 
overall assessm ent of the strategic environm ent, national policies and 
available resources."74 Further detail is generally not forthcoming.75
Systematic defence planning was initiated w ith a five year defence 
plan in 1964. This first five year plan effectively doubled the army and air 
force to 825,000 troops and 45 squadrons respectively. The construction of
71 Raju Thomas, "Indian Defence Policy: Continuity and Change Under the Janata 
Government," Pacific Affairs, summer 1980.
72 Sukhdeo Prasad Baranwal, ed. Military Yearbook: Twenty-first Year of Issue, (Delhi: 
Guide Publications,1989), p. 197.
73 As of mid 1992 the last security review reported took place in 1980 in reaction to the 
invasion of Afghanistan. Manoj Joshi, Seminar on Nuclear and Missile Capabilities given at 
the Australian National University, 12/92. Defence planning has been described as nothing 
more than "... a farce: ... Each defence plan is nothing but an aggregate of the maximum, and 
often deliberately inflated, demands of each of the three services." Inder Malhotra, "Policy 
Making on Defence," Times of India,!/ 26/84.
74 Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1982-83, (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1970), p. 4.
73 S.P. Bamawal, p. 197 The information contained in the Military Yearbook can generally be 
obtained from a reading of the annual Ministry of Defence Reports..
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border roads and efforts to improve the structure of defence organisation and 
the self sufficiency in arms production were also undertaken. It is estimated 
that the cost of this build-up totalled some $US 10 billion.76 This effort was 
directed by the DCC with responsibilities being
... shared functionally betw een the N ational Defence Council 
and  the specialized Defence Research and D evelopm ent 
Council. By 1965, a high level Defence Planning Cell was 
created to deal w ith all w ider aspects of planning that have a 
bearing on defence in bo th  the m edium  and long term  
aspects.77
The 1964-69 plan was followed by the second five year plan to cover 
the period 1969-74 which was funded at the same rate of $US 10 billion. 
Changes in defence planning caused this second five year plan to be revised 
in 1970 with a third five year plan to cover the period 1970-75. Further this 
was adapted after the 1971 war for the period 1974-79 78 This third defence 
plan of 1974-9 was also funded at the level of $US10 billion 79 The changed 
strategic situation after the 1971 war led to a revised plan for 1974-79. The 
1974-79 plan was in turn replaced by the 1979-84 plan, itself reviewed in 1981- 
2. At this point it was thought a good idea to make the defence plans 
coterminous with the National Plan of 1980-85. This plan was superseded by 
the 1985-90 plan. 80
The Defence Plan is presided over by the Defence Secretary through 
the Defence Plan C oordination  and Im plem entation  Com m ittee. This 
comm ittee also acts as the m iddle ground betw een the services and the 
departm ents in the Ministry itself. The plan is up-dated annually. The staff 
of the Defence Planning Committee is draw n from the three services, the 
Defence Research and Developm ent O rganisation and the M inistries of 
External Affairs and Finance. The degree of expertise in establishing realistic
76 Onkar Marwah, "India’s Military Power and Policy," in O. Marwah and J. Pollack eds. 
Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India and Japan, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980), p.124.
77Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," p. 124.
7® S.P. Baranwal, Military Yearbook, p. 197.
79 Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," p. 125.
S.P. Baranwal, Military Yearbook, p. 197.
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expectations is put in doubt by reports emanating from within the arm ed 
forces. There are leaks that the Navy is, as of 1992, still trying to meet goals 
set forth in the first plan.81
60.133 Civil military relations
The interplay between the civil authorities and the military hierarchy 
is an im portant dynamic of the overall functioning of the decision making 
process as it establishes the country’s national security posture. As India has 
in the last decade been beset by a multiplicity of fissiparous tendencies two 
particular dynamics have arisen w ith regard to the relationship between 
civil and military authority. The political leadership has, as a result of the 
increase of internal tensions, found itself m ore reliant on the military to 
m aintain law and order w ithin the country. As the civil authorities have 
developed this dependency they have sought to increase their political 
control out of a fear of losing that control. The following section will 
examine the dynamic of civil-military relations. The first, and most salient 
issue is an assessment of the relative degrees of influence between the civil 
and m ilitary authorities. An attem pt to identify some of the various 
structural decision making factors that influence planning will also be 
undertaken.
India was fortunate at independence to have the stability provided by 
the Congress party, N ehru’s individual stature and the Indian Civil Service. 
These three institutions created the crucial space for democratic traditions to 
establish themselves in India without falling prey to a military coup as they 
so often did  in newly independen t countries. Indeed  ”[a]lm ost no 
governm ent on the m arrow  of independence was institutionally as well 
prepared as India was for self governm ent."82 An additional factor that 
served to minimise the Army's status at partition was their involvement, 
not as part of the freedom struggle, but as part of the state apparatus that was 
trying to m aintain  o rder under the old regim e. The m ilitary 's early 
participation in the actions in Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, and its
Manoj joshi, in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, India's Strategic Future, p. 77.
82 Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1991), p. 186.
312
unquestioned  support of independen t India's objectives, d id  m uch to 
rehabilitate their image.83 The Indian Navy had established its nationalist 
credentials on 19 February, 1946 when 20,000 sailors on 74 ships and 20 shore 
installations in Bombay m utinied.84 As a result of these factors India has 
been a less militarized society than other developing nations. India's regular 
m ilitary participation percentage is .16% as opposed to Pakistan's .48%. 
India's defence expenditure has, at less than 4% of gross domestic product, 
been considerably lower than other states.85
The particular martial values of H induism , which are to protect the 
existing order rather than to establish or to define what that order is to be, are 
not defined by the military. That function is left to other segments of society. 
Veena Kukreja has posited that "military interventions look as absurd 
against a H indu background as they look natural in West Asia where ... the 
m ilitary coup becomes a holy m ission"86 acting as the guard ian  of the 
religion as well as the state. That said, H indu fundam entalist groups may 
wish to bestow upon the military greater status. The BJP's pro nuclear stance 
and and support for reform of the National Security Council initiative w hen 
coupled with their militant rhetoric could produce such a result.87
The tension set betw een the political and m ilitary control of the 
arm ed forces of the m odern Indian state has its origins in colonial India. 
The issue of civilian control over the armed forces was blurred by the private 
nature of the army of the East India company. As crown forces and presence 
increased the issue became more critical. This tension culminated with the
83 Glynn L. Wood, "Civil Military Relations in Post Colonial India," in Edward Olsen and 
Stephen Jurika, Jr. The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1986), p. 271.
34 Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty: The Story of the Nehru-Gandhi Family, (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1985), pp. 71-2.
33 V. Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia, pp. 199-200. During the period 1962- 
1986 Indian defence spending averaged 3.256% of GDP.
33 V. Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia, pp. 206-7.
37 While this seems to be the more likely policy direction it should be noted that Jan Sangh 
Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee did not introduce such a policy direction. See also Stephen 
Cohen, "Civilian Control of the Military in India," in Claude Welch, Jr. Civilian Control of 
the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, (Albany: State University of New  
York, 1976) p. 55.
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establishm ent of political control over the m ilitary as a result of the 
Kitchner-Curzon dispute of 1905. In this d ispute Kitchner displaced the 
civilian C urzon thereby triggering a reaction that ensured an ascendant 
position of the civilian over the military authorities.88
Despite operational defence planning having been the domain of the 
Chiefs of staff (while the form ation of national strategy has increasingly 
become the dom ain of the Prime M inister and Cabinet) "politicians and 
civilian bureaucrats have not hesitated to ignore military advice in specific 
instances."89 Increasingly the m ilitary planning staff's are losing their 
p lanning  role to the civilian M inistry of Defence and the politicians. 
W hereas the "operational directive is laid dow n by the political leadership 
the actual p lanning of operations [was] left to the chiefs of staff."90 
A pparently even this planning function has been som ewhat eroded from 
the Chiefs of staff and taken over by the Ministry of Defence. This is one of 
the m ore recent m anifestations of the political agenda which seeks to 
m aintain absolute control over the arm ed forces. Since this incident the 
level of influence and prestige of the military in India's strategic and foreign 
policy has steadily declined with its role being most significantly reduced 
after independence.
This devaluing of the institutional position of the arm ed forces in 
India has been an on-going process since independence. While India has 
suffered on the battlefield from a lack of effective uniformed input into the 
national security and defence planning process it has m anaged to save its 
democratic institutions and the rule of law from the ravages of prolonged 
m ilitary rule, as has been the case w ith Pakistan, th rough  its non­
involvement in political m atters.91
88 S. Cohen, "Civilian Control of the Military in India,” p. 45.
89 S. Cohen, "Civilian Control of the Military in India," p. 55.
90 P.R. Chari, "Civil-Military Relations of India," Link, 8/15/77 as quoted in V. Kukreja, 
"Civil Military Relations," p. 211.
91 During the Raj, the Commander in Chief ranked second behind the Viceroy in the order of 
precedence. The Constitution of 1950 formally made the President, and in actuality the PM, 
the supreme commander of the armed forces. By 1955 the office of Commander in Chief was 
eliminated and as a result the military lost its representation in Cabinet. The Chiefs of Air 
and Naval Staff were placed on an equal footing with the Army Chief of Staff as a further 
check on the power of any individual. Within this structure the role of the Ministry of
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The process of centralization of policy form ation in defence and 
national security areas is parallel to that with regard to foreign affairs and, as 
a result, is one of the most centralised national security decision making 
processes in a democratic country. The military does m aintain a larger 
degree of autonomy than the MEA due to its size and the necessity of more 
specialised expertise to understand the realm of the operationally possible. 
The military has also used such rearguard tactics as leaks to opposition party 
members to air its views.92
A no ther factor w hich m inim ises the m ilita ry 's  in p u t is the 
prominence which the Finance Adviser is given. Kukreja has observed that, 
in addition to expressing h is /h e r opinion as to the overall am ount of the 
budget which will be allocated to the m ilitary, the Finance A dviser is 
responsible for the preparation of the Defence Service Estim ates. The 
institu tional position of the Finance A dviser, who is a m em ber of the 
M inistry of Finance, is to do this w ith  "a single m inded devotion  to 
econom y.”93
Despite the centre's efforts to keep the m ilitary out of the political 
process, m ounting internal turm oil increasingly forces it to rely on the 
military to support its authority. It is this over reliance that may precipitate 
the politicisation of the m ilitary if it is allow ed to continue unabated. 
During the period 1951 to 1970 the military was deployed in support of the 
political authority on 476 occasions for an annual average of 25 times. 
During the years 1982-3, 1983-4 and 1984-5 they were deployed 82, 96 and 175 
times respectively 94 These deploym ents further have a detrim ental effect 
on morale and organisational integrity. Their increased use indicates that
Defence is dominant over the uniformed service Chiefs of Staff due to the Ministy's access to 
the relevant meetings of the CCPA and the increasing use of the Secretary in the defence 
planning area.
92 Krishna Menon's performance as Defence Minister was criticised in Parliament with 
information which was leaked from within the military bureaucracy. C.P. Bhambhri, 
Bureaucracy and Politics in India, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), p. 267.
93 V. Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations," p. 212.
94 Stephen Cohen, "The Military and Indian Democracy," in Atul Kohli, India’s Democracy: 
An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), p. 124 and V. Kukreja, "Civil Military Relations," p. 200.
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the param ilitary forces are not able to deal w ith the m ounting tensions 
alone.
One of the ironies is that while the military has exercised restraint and 
rem ained aloof from a desire to becom e em broiled in politics it has 
s im u ltan eo u sly  been  d e leg a ted  a d ram atica lly  increased  politico- 
administrative role by the political authorities in the disturbed areas such as 
Punjab, Assam and Kashmir. Military rule has been established in these 
areas under several pieces of legislation including the Armed Forces Specials 
Pow ers Act of 1956, the N ational Security Act of 1980, the U nlaw ful 
Activities Prevention Act of 1967 and the Terrorists Affected Areas Act of 
1984. While the existing subordinate relationship of the military to the civil 
authorities does not pose a direct threat to the civil liberties of India's 
citizens that would result from a military coup, it does threaten civil liberties 
in that the inability of the civil adm inistration is increasingly leading to 
situations of de facto marshal law. Part of the professional duties of a District 
Commander are now to have a
complete knowledge of local politics ... to recite with precision 
the functions, interests, and objectives of each local political, 
religious, or other interest group. In this he is supported by the 
m ilitary 's ow n intelligence services and close liaison w ith 
police and civilian bureaucracies.95
Despite the evolved structure, which has effectively subordinated the 
m ilitary to political authority, a num ber of factors are raising discontent 
w ith in  the m ilitary. D ecreases in status, pay, housing, post service 
employment and political interference in appointm ents, in addition to the 
increased use of the army in internal disturbances have all had a deleterious 
effect on morale and have adversely affected the m ilitary’s perception of the 
politico-bureaucratic structure to which it is subordinate. Over 75% of the 
60,000 servicemen that retire each year are unem ployed.96 F rustra tion  
continues w ithin the m ilitary over the lack of interest among politicians 
over the proposal for the creation of the position of Chief of Defence Staff.
95 S. Cohen, 'The Military and Indian Democracy," p. 124.
96 Amar Zutshi, "The Indian Military: Justice Denied," India Today, 6/29-7/5/91 p. 17.
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This was exacerbated by the proposed NSC which equated the Service Chiefs 
w ith the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau. Much of the m ilitary’s frustration 
stem s not from  being subordinate to political au thority  bu t to being 
subordinate to bureaucratic authority.
Wing Com m ander Amar Zutshi has expressed the view that ”[t]he 
resen tm en t w hich  is ga thering  m om en tum  and assum ing  serious 
proportions, could destroy the apolitical character of the m ilitary."97 The 
politicisation of the military may also be effected by the differing recruitm ent 
base of the officer corp. In the early period following independence the 
existing status of the military attracted the sons of the elite into its ranks. 
W ith the decline of status and conditions the elite now seek to enter the 
private sector or the Indian A dm inistrative Service which afford greater 
chances of material success and advancem ent than the military. Currently 
less than ten percent of commissioned officers sons follow them  into the 
military. The largest source of recruits into the National Defence Academy 
and the Indian Military Academy are the sons of non-commissioned officers 
and junior commissioned officers. This has had the effect of broadening the 
socio-political background. While minimising the political implications of 
this shifting recruitm ent base Stephen Cohen has speculated that "... w hen 
the officer corp is both professional and draw n from the lower middle class, 
the m ilitary becomes increasingly sensitive to la tera l pressures from  a 
materialistic society and to pressures from above."98 The one group which is 
resisting this trend, due to their trad ition  of m artial values, is the Sikh 
community. Sikhs constitute 20% of the officers and roughly two percent of 
the total armed forces.99 The disproportional recruitm ent of Sikhs into the 
military is being curtailed as a result of suspicions of their loyalty in the wake 
of Operation Bluestar.10° Overall, the m ediocritisation of the calibre of the 
officer corp will lead to an officer corp that will be less motivated by ideals of
97 Amar Zutshi, 'The Indian Military," p. 16.
98 S. Cohen, The Military and Indian Democracy," p. 107.
99 See The Economist, 6 /1 6 /8 4  as referenced in S. Cohen, "The Military and Indian 
Democracy," p. 133.
199 In that operation the primary Sikh holy temple, the Golden Temple, was stormed by the 
Indian Army to rout Sikh militants. In reaction about 2,000 Sikhs mutinied.
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nation building which its predecessors had. This will make it more open to 
outside pressures.
A certain degree of debate about the position and future direction of 
the military in Indian society and politics remains. In contrast to Cohen and 
Kukreja, Wood perceives that "[p]oliticians and bureaucrats appreciate fully 
the utility of a strong military in m aintaining India's position in foreign 
affairs.” Wood continues by asserting that as a result "the military is treated 
rather well in perquisites, budgeting, and sta tus ."101 The notion that the 
m ilitary is appreciated and that they will rem ain content is discredited by 
Cohen and Wing Commander Zutshi, among others.
A further debate rem ains as to w hether the issues of contention 
concerning the m ilitary 's status and influence in the decision m aking 
structure will, w hen coupled with the dram atically increased use of the 
military in support of the civil authority, have the effect of politicizing the 
military to the degree that it degenerates to the point that it sees itself as a 
more viable alternative than corrupt and ineffectual governm ents. This is 
contingent on the am ount of social dislocation and frustration that will 
develop as India undergoes economic reform, continued social change and 
secessionist and autonom ous pressures. If these stresses have the effect of 
further weakening the centre, the opportunity  for the politicisation of the 
military will rise dramatically. Given that the necessity of using the military 
to assist the paramilitary forces in support of the civilian authorities is not 
likely to diminish, addressing the other issues of political interference in 
command appointm ents, status, pay, pensions, housing, and influence in 
the form ation and implem entation of defence doctrine will serve to make 
the Indian military more robust in resisting m ounting pressures to become 
involved in politics. In this way the policies of extreme subordination of the 
military to preserve democracy in India may be counter-productive if taken 
too far.
101 Wood, "Civil Military Relations in Post Colonial India," p. 276.
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60.14 The Intelligence Community
The use of espionage was codified and accepted in ancient India. The 
word spy is itself a cognate of the Sanskrit w ord spas "one who beholds, a 
watcher, a spy ."102 Espionage is discussed in the revered ancient texts 
including the Rgveda, Ramayana, M ahabharata, Puranas and Artha-vedas as 
being necessary to maintain the rta and dharm a of H indu society.
W hile N andan  loyalists and M acedonian sym pathizers threatened 
C handragupta M aurya's rule103 a new set of internal and external threats 
faces India today. It is unfortunate that the m odem  Indian state seems to be 
re turn ing  to the Kautilyan m onarch's position that suspicion of public 
servants and citizens necessitates their scrutiny by an intelligence apparatus 
which is increasingly focused on its own people.
Concern has been expressed over a range of issues that are threatening 
the con tem p o ra ry  In d ian  po lity . C om m unalis t v io lence, H indu  
fundam entalism , centre-state tensions, inter-caste disharm ony, economic 
reform , secessionist and autonom ous m ovem ents and threats emanating 
from beyond India's borders are all underm ining India's security by pulling 
apart India's social cohesion. A nother equally disturbing threat to the 
security of Indian citizens is the way in which India’s intelligence agencies 
are functioning. A survey of the developm ent of India's intelligence 
agencies and  a d iscussion  of the ir o p e ra tio n  w ith in  a b roadened  
con cep tu a liza tio n  of security , evaluating  the in te lligence agencies 
perform ance, not only from the perspective of their role in prom oting 
India's legitimate national interests vis a vis other states, but also within the 
context of how they are increasingly utilized by the vested interests of the 
political authorities, will highlight the intelligence organs role in the 
decision making process. There are signs that through their operations and 
recom m endations the intelligence agencies are seeking to set policy rather
102 S.D. Trivedi, Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniques and Operation, (Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1984), p. xi.
103 Bhasker Anand Saletore, Ancient Indian Thought and Institutions, (London: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963).
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than merely im plem ent or provide policy alternatives. This represents a 
fu rther substantial threat to Ind ian  ind iv idual's  civil liberties and the 
democratic process itself.
An appreciation of the need for an effective intelligence network did 
not emerge until after India had suffered for its ignorance at the hands of its 
rivals in both the 1962 conflict w ith China and the 1965 w ar w ith Pakistan. 
In bo th  cases India had extrem ely poor intelligence on C hina’s and 
Pakistan 's designs and capabilities. W hile some reform s have been 
im plem ented in an effort to im prove India's collection and analysis of 
strategic intelligence, intelligence efforts continue to be d iverted  from  
external threats to the domestic purposes of the politicians who control the 
intelligence apparatus.
Unfortunately the political masters have been happiest using or 
m isusing  the in telligence agencies against their political 
opponents in a m anner that w ould be considered not just 
scandalous but treasonable in most democratic countries.104
The legitim ate functioning of the intelligence agencies has as a result 
suffered due to their redirection to illegitimate duties.
In recent years India has been expanding its intelligence organisation 
network, (see chart at end of chapter) In addition to the Joint Intelligence 
Com m ittee, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Intelligence 
Bureau, and the Research and Analysis W ing there are now  also the 
National Security G uard (NSG), the Special Protection Group (SPG), the 
Directorate of Enforcement (DE) and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 
(DRE).105 RAW was established in 1968 w hen it was decided to split the IB
104 Manoj Joshi in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, India's Strategic Future, pp. 87-8.
The precursor of the existing Indian intelligence organisations, the British Special 
Branch, was established in 1887 to deal with thugeree. The Thugs were a religious 
organisation of robbers and assassins. The NSG was established as a special anti-terrorist 
commando force which has subsequently been diverted to the protection of VVIPs. They have 
been deployed in such operations as Operation Black Thunder at the Golden Temple in 
Amritsar. See MarkTully, No Full Stops in India, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 153 - 
180. The SPG is delegated the responsibility of protecting the Prime Minister and was based 
on the American Secret Intelligence Service. The exact position of these more recent 
organisations within the overall structure is not clear.
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into internal and external operational sections. RAW, which at its inception 
in 1968 had a budget of two crore,106 has more recently been estimated to 
have a Rs 500 crore budget while the IB has been allocated Rs 20 crore.107 
RAW's external operational sphere seems to include areas such as Assam 
and Tamil N adu as well as internal political intelligence support for the 
Prime Minister. The implications of the expanded profile of the intelligence 
organisations indicate m ore governm ent in trusion  into the affairs of its 
citizens and the increased use of the intelligence services for the purposes of 
their political overlords. RAW has been described as the "personal 
instrum ent of the Indian Prim e M inister."108 The use of intelligence 
agencies for domestic political purposes has detracted from their role in 
intelligence collection, analysis and counter espionage. This view is based 
on a relative assessment of RAW's operations in Bangladesh in 1971 in 
com parison w ith its subsequent perform ance in Sri Lanka and o ther 
operations in the 1980s.
The actual locus of Indian intelligence tasking is w ith the Prim e 
Minister, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing. In 
1982-3 a core group was established at the insistence of Indira G andhi’s 
security adviser and form er Chief of RAW Ram N ath Kao109 The core 
group was made up of the principle secretaries involved, the Directors of 
RAW and the IB, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This 
apex body form ed w ith in  the Cabinet to deal w ith  the intelligence 
organisations and ministries acting on security issues later evolved into the 
IDG. As mentioned above, an attem pt at reorganisation was m ade in 1986. 
The IDG was superseded by the Policy Advisers Group, which Rajiv Gandhi
106 yhe funding for the Cabinet Secretariat, the IB and RAW, excluding the service 
intelligence agencies and overhead collection, was estimated at US$270 million per year in 
1990. See "Intelligence: The Making or Breaking of India's Singh Administration," Defence 
and Foreign Affairs, August, 1990, p. 25.
107 Asoka Raina, Inside Raw: The Story of India's Secret Service, (Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House, 1981), p. 12. See also Major General M.L. Popli, "What Ails Our Intelligence System?" 
Indian Defence Review, p. 65.
10® Ken Aldred, "India-The RAW Truth About its Military Might," The Herald, Melbourne 
8/10/89.
109 In the assessment of Manoj Joshi, "The principal decision making and coordination 
functions have drifted into the hands of the prime minister s office (PMO), at the expense of 
the Cabinet." in Babbage and Gordon, p. 87.
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subsequently dropped in preference for a more informal ad hoc approach to 
decision making.110 Beyond these lapsed centres of decision making there 
are the three main intelligence agencies, (RAW, IB and CBI) of which RAW 
is the most significant. The formal structure is such that the responsibility 
for the identification of threats rests w ith the Joint Intelligence Committee. 
In actuality the JIC is subordinate to the influence of the directors of RAW 
and the IB. This is due to the w ithholding of inform ation by those very 
organisations upon which the JIC is dependent for its information. The 
inform ation is instead passed directly to the PM rather than  channelled 
through the JIC which is formally responsible for developing integrated 
assessments. The reality is that the JIC chairman has rarely engendered any 
confidence in the Ministries and departm ents dealing with national security 
m atters.* 111
The JIC has a sm all perm anen t secretariat under the Cabinet 
Secretariat. It is generally recognised that this body, like so many others in 
the formation of national security, is "a body w ith responsibility devoid of 
any power."112 M embership of the JIC includes representatives from the 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, the Home Ministry, RAW, 
the IB and the service intelligence agencies. It is headed by a secretary of 
Brigadier or equivalent rank. The JIC’s ability to analyse and process 
intelligence is inadequate.
Prior to the JIC's assessments reaching the CCPA they are vetted by the 
Steering Com m ittee w hich was sim ilarly constitu ted  in 1965.113 The
Steering Com m ittee is also situated  in the C abinet Secretariat. The 
composition of the Steering Committee includes the Cabinet Secretary as 
Chairman, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary,
II® Lt. Gen. E. A. Vas (retd.), "Why We need a Security Council," Indian Express, 3/9/90.
111 Maj. Gen. M.L. Popli, "National Intelligence Assessments and Estimates: Whither our 
Joint Intelligence Comittee?" p. 27.
112 See the reference to articles in the Indian press by Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh. Singh 
was a member of the JIC for seven years. Major General M.L. Popli, p. 65.
113 Because decisions are "based on a perfunctory look at the issues involved [with] Ministers 
neglect[ing] to even read their agenda papers" actual decision making has been taken away 
from the CCPA "more often than not, approvals are given without discussion and in many 
cases." Manoj Joshi in R. Babbage and S. Gordon, India's Strategic Future, p. 86.
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the Director of RAW, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the 
Chairm an of the JIC. As w ith most of the intelligence hierarchy, it is not 
uncom m on for the Cabinet Secretary to liaise directly w ith  the Prim e 
M inister, rather than to go through the form al structure of the CCPA. 
Personal relationships are im portant here, and elsewhere in hierarchies in 
the Indian Government, in determ ining the actual flow of information and 
decision making.
The collection of domestic intelligence is officially the purview  of the 
IB, w hile RAW is responsible for external intelligence. These tw o 
organisations are highly influential as they are expected to brief the Prime 
Minister daily.114 The heads of these two organisations are expected to have 
unquestioned loyalty to the Prime Minister. As a result the positions have 
thus become politicized. Ostensibly it is the JIC, under the control of the 
Cabinet Secretariat, that is responsible for the assimilation of intelligence for 
the PM but in actuality the lesser influence of the JIC places it in subordinate 
position to the individual heads of the RAW and IB. (see chart at end of 
chapter) After Rajiv G andhi lost the Prim e M inistership in the 1989 
elections, his director of the IB, M.K. N arayanan, was m oved from the 
Directorship of IB to the "largely ceremonial post of the Joint Intelligence 
Com m ittee."115 The IB has been used to underm ine the positions of 
political opponents to the government. Former IB director Jayaran testified 
before the 1977 Shah commission hearings that inform ation on opponents 
was included in the PM's m orning briefings. Thus the IB seems to be an 
extension of coercive power of not only the state but more specifically of the 
leadership of the ruling party.116
This phenom enon  is not confined  to the n a tio n a l level of 
governm ent or to the Congress party. Former Chief Minister of Karnataka,
114 Coomi Kapoor, "Our Intelligence Agencies," Illustrated Weekly, 10/14/90, p. 16.
Coomi Kapoor, "Our Intelligence Agencies,” p. 13.
116 Other documented examples of IB intrusion include the ouster of Andhra Pradesh Chief 
Minister N. T. Rama Rao and circumvention of the farm leader Mahendra Tikait's mass rally 
at the boat club in Delhi in 1988 and Devi Lai’s in 1990. IB also conducts surveys of political 
opposition groups strengths and does opinion polls in the lead up to elections. RAW has also 
been involved in undisclosed arms deals which have subsequently surfaced. See Coomi 
Kapoor, 10/14/90, p. 13.
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R.K. Hedge, of the Janata Party, was forced to step down following allegations 
that the Karnataka intelligence apparatus had been engaged in w idespread 
telephone tapping of H edge's political opponents and businessm en .117 
Denying knowledge of these activities Hedge made counter accusations that 
the ruling Congress party  had tapped present and form er Presidents R. 
V enkataram an and Zail Singh's te lephones as well as m em bers of 
Parliament and state legislatures, journalists and businessm en .118
The military and the intelligence services inherited m uch from the 
Raj. British intelligence in Simla kept files on the various M aharajas and 
Congress leaders as a means of m aintaining law and order and gaining 
leverage. The other two key intelligence areas for the British were the earlier 
m ovem ents of the R ussians and  C hinese along the n o rth e rn  and  
northw estern frontiers119 and the later threat posed by the Japanese and the 
Indian National Army of Subash Chander Bose during World War II.
In one of the more recent influential cases, two Haryana intelligence 
officers were apprehended outside the residence of Rajiv Gandhi by Delhi 
police .120 They may well have been despatched there to provide intelligence 
regarding Janata Dal (S) MPs suspected of contemplating defection from the 
party. This incident was used by the Congress party  as the reason for 
w ithdraw ing support from the minority governm ent of C handra Shekar in  
1991 121 n  is 0f note that the intelligence organs are neither accountable to 
Parliament, nor do they have a charter.
117 Salamat Ali, "Indian Chief Minister Quits Over Tapping," The Far Eastern Economic 
Review ,8 /25/88.
11® Salamat Ali, "Bugging Ploy Backfires,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 /9 /8 8 ,p .30.
119 For lively and intriguing accounts of the Czar’s and the Raj’s intelligence activities and 
geopolitical manoeuvring in Central Asia see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret 
Service in High Asia, (London: John Murray Publishers, 1990), D.S. Richards, The Savage 
Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars, (London: Macmillan, 1990) and C.P. Skrine 
and Pamela Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar: New Light on British, Chinese and Russian 
Activity in Sinkiang, 1890-1918, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987).
120 The former Deputy PM Devi Lai is from Haryana. He was intricately involved in the 
political machinations surrounding the shifting power base in 1990.
l^lp/ie Business and Political Observer, "Surveillance a Minor Issue: Intelligence Officials," 
3/7/91. Both former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar of the Janata Dal, and Bharatiya 
Janata Party leader L.K. Advani have claimed that their telephones have been tapped.
324
Use of the IB and RAW for the Prime M inister's personnel political 
purposes is m irrored by the state Chief Ministers in their use of police and 
state intelligence organs.122 This corruption of authority at the state level 
has been most egregiously indulged in by Devi Lai in Haryana. T hrough 
investigation into surveillance of Rajiv G andhi by the H aryana police, it 
came to light that such surveillance had been com m onplace since the 
Congress rule of Bansi Lai in 1968.123 Surveillance of political figures is part 
of an increasingly corrupt state that frequently resorts to the intim idation 
and beating of journalists and political opponents. Booth capturing also 
occurs at the local level during  elections. The politicisation of the 
intelligence agencies at the national level has been paralleled by the state 
Chief Ministers use of police in political roles to counter the power of the 
centre to subvert their control of state government. What is emerging is a 
system of petty kingdoms, increasingly reliant on the coercive powers, at the 
state level, to resist the power of the state at the national level.
Indian intelligence organisation, bo th  in ternal and external, was 
centralised in the Intelligence Bureau in 1947 under the directorship of 
Sanjivi Pillai. The directorship passed from Pillai to B.N. Malik in 1950 and 
then on to S.P. Verma and M.M.L. Hoja during the period 1965-68. U nder 
these successive directors the dep th  and b read th  of India 's external 
intelligence collection gradually expanded within India's im m ediate region 
as well as Europe. In 1965 both the JIC and the Chiefs of Staff Committee lay 
w ithin the adm inistrative param eters of the Ministry of Defence while the 
IB was under the Home Ministry. Prior to the 1968 reorganisation, the IB 
was responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence. As a result, the 
tasking and collecting divisions were located in separate ministries. There 
was little coordination of effort as "the Joint Intelligence Committee, the
122 Politicians, when pressed, have been found to be far from hesitant to use all forces at their 
disposal, including the intelligence agencies, to remain in power. It is estimated that 70% of 
the IB s work is dedicated to gathering political intelligence as opposed to its more legitimate 
function of domestic counter espionage. It has not been a matter of great difficulty for 
politicians to associate their own political survival with the security of the nation and 
thereby rationalize this effort. Coomi Kapoor, "Our Intelligence Agencies," p. 17.
123 Sukhmani Singh, "Big Brother is Watching," The Illustrated Weekly of India, 3/30- 
31/91, pp. 20-21.
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Military Intelligence D irectorate and the Intelligence Bureau functioned in 
w atertight compartm ents."124
In his discussion of the role of the m ilitary in political succession in 
Indian politics, Michael Brecher discusses the personal dynam ics of the 
rivalry betw een the IB and the m ilitary.125 General C haudhuri, Chief of 
Army Staff, ordered 6,000 troops into the capital on 28 May 1964, the day of 
N ehru 's funeral. This move, which was taken w ithout consultation w ith 
the Minister of Defence or the Defence Secretary, both of whom were out of 
Delhi at the time, aroused the suspicions of sections of the government up to 
the Cabinet level. Certainly, there was a degree of concern. The loss of 
N ehru led to a sense of national insecurity. It is not difficult to visualise 
how those at the time could fear that C haudhuri was about to take India 
dow n a similar course to that of General Ayub Khan of Pakistan who seized 
power from the political authorities on 5 October 1958.
In retrospect it appeared that concern for a military coup was centred 
in the IB. Malik, Director of the CBI, had personal reasons to spread the 
rum our that Chaudhuri was about to foment a coup. Chauduri had accused 
Malik "of serious errors in his assessm ent of Chinese strength and troop 
m ovem ents" previous to the 1962 border w ar.126 M alik was therefore 
seeking to discredit both Chaudhuri and the military. In its inquiry into the 
fa ilu res w hich  led up  to the 1962 debacle, the Henderson-Brooks 
Commission reportedly did not address the role of the IB in the affair. In 
1971, in his book The Chinese Betrayal, M alik claim ed tha t A rm y 
headquarters had been warned of the Chinese situation.127 By the 1965 War 
w ith Pakistan it had become apparent that the system was failing India. 
Although it is unclear whether the fault at that time lay in the interpretation 
of analysis or with its collection.
124 Lt. General P.N. Kathpalia, "Intelligence: Problems and Possible Solutions," Indian 
Defence Review, January 1986, pp. 133-5.
125 At this point the IB retained control over domestic and external intelligence.
126 Michael Brecher, Succession in India: A Study in Decision Making, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), pp. 85-7.
127 This has been pointed out in Raju Thomas, The Defence of India, (Meerut: Macmillan Co., 
1978), pp. 85-6, 97.
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A two man inquiry was formed to retrospectively assess the causes 
behind the insufficient intelligence in the lead up to the 1965 w ar w ith  
Pakistan. P.V.R. Rao, a former Defence Secretary and L.P. Singh, the H om e 
Secretary together concluded that it was not the lack of collected intelligence 
b u t that "intelligence was available bu t not in te rp re ted  properly ."128 
Following these findings it was decided to establish a separate foreign 
intelligence section distinct from the IB w hich w ould retain the internal 
intelligence function. This led to increased rivalry between the Ministry of 
Defence and the Home Ministry for control of the new organisation.
The prim ary architects of the Research and Analysis Wing, were 
Indira Gandhi and her private secretary P.N. Hasksar. On 21 September 1968, 
RAW was formed under the Cabinet Secretariat, thereby settling the dispute 
between the Ministry of Defence and the Hom e Ministry and ensuring the 
direct control of the PM and Cabinet.129 P.N. Rao was to be its first head. 
Subsequent to RAW's creation, the rivalry established by the IB with the 
military and its intelligence organs and the MEA was to continue. Despite 
the on-going rivalry, RAW's influence is likely to continue due to its direct 
contact with the PM by the RAW director.
In an effort to facilitate coordination of tasking and collection, the JIC 
was also located within the Cabinet Secretariat. Limited resources continue 
to be wasted in duplicating effort, due to the inability of the JIC to effectively 
coordinate the intelligence organs. "Unlike the JIC in the UK which has a 
formal coordination character, the JIC in our set-up has no such role."130
In terms of organisation, RAW’s first level of division of labour places 
the Office of Special Operations, the Directorate General for Security and the 
A dditional Director under the overall Director's im m ediate control, (see 
chart at end of chapter) The Office of Special Operations conducts covert 
operations. The Directorate General for Security oversees the Aviation 
Research Centre and the Special Services Bureau. The Aviation Research
Asoka Raina, Inside Raw: The Story of India's Secret Service, (Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House, 1981).
129 Asoka Raina, Inside Raw, pp. 8-12.
Lt. General P. N. Kathpalia, "Intelligence," p. 135.
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Centre is tasked to conduct airborne reconnaissance. The Special Services 
Bureau trains border peoples in the art of c landestine operations in 
neighbouring countries. Beneath the A dditional D irector are five Joint 
Directors, four of which are area focussed. The regional desks are Pakistan, 
China and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and other counties. 
The fifth Joint Director is responsible for adm inistration, internal security 
and the electronic technical section. The latter responsibility involves the 
fifth Joint D irector in the m onitoring and decoding of foreign m ilitary 
broadcasts. Counter intelligence operations remain under the IB.
Glimpses of the a ttitudes and policy perspectives of the Ind ian  
intelligence organizations are, in light of the extreme preoccupation w ith 
secrecy, limited. In an interview, former Special Secretary of the RAW, R. 
Swaminathan, was of the opinion that RAW did not need a charter, w hich 
would be tantam ount to increased oversight. Sw am inathan argued that 
”[o]nly the Am ericans w ith their penchant for an ostentatiously open 
governm ent have a charter ."131 It is not surprising that a former member of 
the RAW would perceive a m easure of dem ocratic responsibility to be 
ostentatious. Swaminathan takes his views even further:
If the political leadership asks the bureaucracy to carry out orders 
which are clearly unlawful, as was the case in the Emergency, 
then the bureaucrat is not supposed to carry them out. But this 
is not a description which is applicable to intelligence agencies in 
relation to their coverage of activities considered to be of 
security interest to the government in pow er .132
It is unfortunate that this perspective on the role of intelligence in 
support of the maintenance of law and order, engendered by the British, has 
been sustained. The net effect is to significantly augm ent the power of the 
incumbency, provided that control over the intelligence chiefs is retained. 
The intelligence agencies influence in internal m atters is where they have 
the potential for considerable impact on the nature of the overall decision 
making process, albeit in an indirect sense. Increased m ulti-party politics
131 Coomi Kapoor, "Interview with R. Swaminathan," Illustrated Weekly, 10/14/90, pp. 14- 
15.
132 Coomi Kapoor, "Interview with R. Swaminathan," p. 14.
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may restrict the intelligence agencies in trusion into politics. During the 
Janata period, reform proposals at RAW which would have institutionalised 
an expanded staff, made up of seconded personnel w ith in-house staff, was 
suspended. Though these proposals were later im plem ented w ith the 
reversal of Janata rule, it is possible that reform  may follow the demise of 
centralised Congress rule. N evertheless the tem ptations to retain  the 
instrum ents of power may prove to be too tempting for future governments.
Internal efforts to limit corruption were initially endorsed by PM Rao. 
The recent case of the DIG of the CBI, O.P. Sharma, led to the first senior 
bu reaucra t to be suspended on charges of co rrup tion  under the Rao 
governm ent. Sharma was laundering money seized in CBI raids which had 
connections with the JKLF.133 Such cases hold out the possibility that at least 
a m inim um  degree of accountability wall be m aintained. In August of 1992 
Rao’s government seemed to be falling into the trap of corruption. An aide 
to PM Rao, Venkataram an Krishnam urthy, was arrested for his part in a 
billion dollar financial scandal on 22 August 1992. The controversy escalated 
as Central Bureau of Investigation Inspector Kollaikal M adhavan resigned in  
protest of governmental interference into his investigation of the case. In 
addition Commerce Minister Palaniappan resigned for his involvem ent in 
the investm ent scandal.134
Despite the general lack of information concerning RAW’S activities, 
its operations in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and elsewhere provide us w ith an 
indication of RAW’s effectiveness in prom oting Ind ia’s national interest. 
The value of the external intelligence which RAW provides has come under 
criticism since its involvement in the Sri Lankan expedition.135 The role of 
RAW will be discussed in greater detail below.
133 A. Mitra, "CBI Sleuth Slips," India Today, 7/31/91, p. 46. Based on the apparent success of 
Pakistan in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir it appears that India’s counter intelligence 
operations have been unsuccessful. The IB told V.P. Singh in December of 1989 that they 
would shortly have the situation in Kashmir under control without crisis. By the spring of 
1990 India and Pakistan were almost at war over the deteriorating situation in Kashmir. See 
Defense and Foreign Affairs, August, 1990, p. 24.
134 Sanjoy Hazarika, "Aide to Premier Held in Financial Scandal," The Neiv York Times, 
8/23/ 92.
135 The rivalry between RAW and the MEA over external relations is significant The 
differing personnel backgrounds of the two organizations exacerbate this. Indian Foreign
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60.141 Bangladesh
RAW was involved w ith the Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh at least a 
year before the 1971 w ar w ith Pakistan.136 The then Joint Director, P.N. 
Banerjee, and the Pakistan desk officer, Sankaran Nair, had, during the late 
1960s, established a netw ork of contacts inside East Pakistan to facilitate 
liaison w ith the emerging resistance groups. Among these contacts was 
M.A.G. Osmani w ho eventually led the M ukti Bahini. The 7 December 
elections and the decision of General Yayha Khan not to open Parliament, 
led to the pro Mujib Awami rally on 3 March and shortly thereafter the civil 
and international war.
RAW was instrum ental in getting Tajuddin Ahmed, later the Prime 
M inister of Bangladesh, and other Awami league elem ents out of the 
country before they were captured by the West Pakistani forces, as was the 
fate of Sheik M ujibur Rehman. This group formed the governm ent in exile 
in Calcutta. After the initial routing of the Mukti Bahini, RAW established 
border guerilla training camps w ith volunteers numbering 50,000 by July and 
100,000 by December of 1971. The presence of this force, of which 20,000 were 
used in the final operation, facilitated the Indian army's advance on Dacca in 
early January of 1972.
An assessm ent of the Bangladesh operation indicates that by 1971 
RAW was capable of organising resistance under favourable circumstances 
as in East Pakistan in the lead up to 1971. This reflects favourably on this 
organisation's effectiveness given its form ation only three years before. It 
has been argued, that as a result of RAW's favourable showing during the 
1971 war, Indira gave its reports equal consideration to those of the ME A. 
Another possible explanation of the rising importance of RAW under Indira 
would be its importance in domestic politics. It is probably a combination of
Service officers resent the presence of RAW officers, often in the number two position, in the 
Indian Embassies abroad. Many RAW officers, having been drawn from police backgrounds, 
are perceived to be ill-suited for the art of diplomacy by their Indian Foreign Service 
counterparts in the missions. Jeffrey Benner, The Indian Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, pp. 150-1. 
136 following information on the RAW involvement in Bangladesh in 1971 has been drawn 
from Asoka Raina, Inside RAW.
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the two factors, and the proximity of the office to the PM, that led to its rapid 
rise to prom inence in the Indian decision m aking structure. This was 
reversed under Janata rule as efforts were made to remove coercive cells of 
governm ent.137 D uring the Janata period, Sankaran Nair presided over 
RAW as it was deprived of its foreign responsibilities thereby gutting its 
reason for being. These were transfered to the MEA. RAW's external role 
returned w ith the Congress Party.
60.142 Sri Lanka
RAW involvem ent in the training of Tamil guerrillas was uncovered 
in M arch of 1984. RAW’s relationship w ith  Sri Lankan m ilitants was 
initiated some time prior to 1983.138 This included the training of Tamils at 
the Dehra Dun military academy.139 By May of 1987 the government of Sri 
Lanka had accused "Indian intelligence agencies of advising two m ain 
terrorist groups, providing them arms, [and] am m unition and declared it 
was the greatest obstacle to the peace process."140 Between 1984 and 1986 the 
central Indian governm ent sought to distance itself from direct support to 
the Tamil insurgents training in Tamil Nadu. As central assistance, which 
had been provided by RAW, NIB and para-military forces was reduced, the 
Tamil N adu State Governm ent intervened by providing assistance. This 
was evidently done with consent from the centre. W hen the LTTE did not 
respond positively to the peace proposal offered by Sri Lankan President J.R. 
Jayawardene, the decision was taken in Delhi to disarm  the insurgents. This 
was done on 8 Novem ber 1986. A partial estimate of the assistance being 
provided can be surmised from the take of weapons in this disarming.
Over 5,000 AK 47 (automatic self loading) rifles...surf ace to air
missiles (SAM), uzi machine guns, rocket launchers, rocket
propelled grenades, land mines, anti tank guns, RPG 7s, G3s
137 Jeffrey Benner, The Indian Foreign Polio/ Bureaucracy, p. 148.
133 Shelton Kodikara, "The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 1987: Retrospect," in Shelton 
Kodikara ed., South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1990), p. 160.
139 As reported in Kodikara, "The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 1987," p. 146.
140 Government statement from Sun, May 6,1987 as quoted in A. Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lankan 
Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis: The Tamil Nadu Factor," in Shelton Kodikara, South 
Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 146.
etc., along w ith  the ir am m unitions (their to tal worth, 
according to reliable m ilitant sources, works out at over Rs 40 
Crore) were seized.141
It should be noted that this was at the time w hen RAW, the NIB and the 
paramilitary forces were no longer directly involved.
Shelton Kodikara’s discussion of the role of RAW in the Sri Lankan 
situation indicates a certain degree of autonomy from the other Indian actors 
in the overall Indo-Sri Lankan relationship. "Given the prim acy of the 
strategic dimension in the Indian interest in Sri Lanka, it [RAW] can have its 
way w ith the governm ent of India on m atters which are d isputed in the 
proposals for the resolution of the conflict." He goes on to describe RAW as 
"a third force on the Indian side, apart from the Governm ent of India and 
the [Indian peace keeping force] IPKF."142 By being independen t of 
constitutional, legislative and at times Prim e M inisterial oversight and 
control, RAW represents a significant threat to the democratic process.
Criticisms of the intelligence provided to the IPKF, in Sri Lanka have 
been levelled by Former Foreign secretary S.K. Singh of the MEA as well as 
elem ents w ithin the army. General Sundarji stated that "estim ates of 
m orale and staying pow er of the [Tamil] m ilitants w ere not accurate 
enough."143 The intelligence provided to the Army by RAW on the quality 
of arms and the numbers of forces was alleged to be poor. This would seem 
to be a significant failure given RAW's p rev ious involvem ent in the 
training and supply of Sri L ankan m ilitants. It also h ighlights the 
inadequacies of military intelligence.
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141 The Island, 12/17/86 as quoted in A. Sivarajah, "Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and Sri 
Lanka's Ethnic Crisis: The Tamil Nadu Factor."
14  ^ Shelton Kodikara, Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 1987, (Colombo: University of 
Colombo, 1989) pp. 61-2 and Shelton Kodikara, ’The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 1987: 
Retrospect," in Shelton Kodikara ed., South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 166-7.
143 Interview with General Sundarji, "I Had To Aim for the Moon," India Today 5/15/88, p. 
83.
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60.143 Pakistan
RAW has represented the m ost haw kish views w ithin the Indian 
governm ent tow ard relations w ith Pakistan.144 These views stem from a 
f ru s tra tio n  w ith  In d ia ’s inab ility  to effectively  coun te r Pakistani 
intervention in India’s border regions. It is beyond doubt that insurgents in 
Kashmir and in Punjab are receiving weapons and training from Pakistani 
territory. This is at least supported by the Jamat-i-Islami and Inter Services 
Intelligence if not by a larger segment of the Pakistan governm ent. As the 
level of fighting in Afghanistan has abated in the past few years the arms 
producers in Dara and elsewhere in Pakistan have been thankful for the on­
going arms trade in support of the Kashmir insurgency. It is also reported 
that RAW holds Pakistan responsible for the assassination of Indira Gandhi 
and an attem pt on Rajiv Gandhi’s life on 2 October, 1986.145
In an incident in Srinagar, Kashmir, six Israelis who were abducted in 
June of 1991 were accused of conspiring with India in a plot to destroy the 
Kahuta nuclear reactor, the central facility in Pakistan's nuclear programme. 
Prime M inister Nawaz Sharif threatened to go to w ar if the facility was 
attacked stating that ”[w]e will be at open war with any country whose soil is 
used ... for attem pting to destroy our nuclear capability."146 Such an attack 
w ould be in direct contravention of the agreem ent form ulated by Rajiv 
G andhi and Benazir Bhutto in 1988 which specifically ruled out attacks 
against each others' nuclear facilities. Four of the Israelis escaped, while one
144 7 hat said, there are exceptions such as M. Bhaskar. Bhaksar spent six years languishing 
as a captured spy in Pakistani prisons. Reflecting on the mercy shown him by a Pakistani 
interrogation officer Bhaskar stated that "I wished I could bring the Hindu fanatics to show 
then that even among the Muslims there are pious souls whom they do not know...Such souls 
are even nobler than angels...Nobody knows how long these walls of hatred will stand 
between the Hindus and the Muslims. It is the doing of the Pandits and the Mullahs who 
disgorge their venom through vicious propoganda. The leaders of the the RSS and the Muslim 
League inflame our passions in order to hold on to their seat of power." Mohanlal Bhaskar, 
Under the Shadow of Bayonets and Bars: An Indian Spy in Pakistan, (New Delhi: National 
Publishing House, 1990), p. 29.
14  ^ Ravi Rikhye, The War That Never Was, p. 21.
146) Raja Asghar, "Pakistani Premier Threatens War if Nuclear Sites are Attacked," Reuters 
News Service, 7/11/91 Ravi Rikye has also alleged that there was a contingency plan in 
December of 1986 to strike the Kahuta Facility. The War That Never Was, p. 12.
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was killed and the sixth was recaptured by another militant group. Pakistan 
has alleged that the Israelis were com m andos training the Indian forces in 
counter insurgency tactics and for a strike against the Kahuta facility near 
Islamabad.147 Despite the absence of diplomatic relations at the time, Mossad 
and RAW established a relationship based on their common concern over 
Pakistan's nuclear program m e.148 Given the unlikely probability of tourists 
disarming armed guards, and the previous history of Israeli involvement in 
South Asia, the Pakistani allegations may be at least partly true.
There have been num erous allegations in Pakistan that India has 
supported m ilitant elem ents in Sindh to fom ent rebellion. Sindh Chief 
M inister Jam Sadiq Ali has alleged that there are 5,000 Indian trained 
saboteurs active in Sindh. Sindh holds 147 prisoners which it asserts were 
trained in India.149 M inister of State for Science and Technology, Senator 
Javed Jabbar, has also accused India of extending a "foreign hand" into 
S indh.150 During the political turm oil in Sindh in 1983, Indira Gandhi is 
reported to have made a statem ent to the effect that Sindh would soon be 
free.151
The Jiye Sindh M ovem ent, led by G.M. Sayed and based in the 
countryside, seeks autonom y and sovereignty for Sindh. The m ovem ent 
has fractured into a num ber of factions and is opposed by both the Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP) and the Mohajir National M ovem ent152 which together
147 fhere have been previous incidents of Israeli intelligence efforts in South Asia. In May of 
1984 the American Embassy in Colombo opened an Israeli interests section to accommodate a 
contingent from Israel s internal security service, Shin Beth. While India expressed its 
dissatisfaction to the Sri Lankan Government over the Israeli assistance with counter 
insurgency training, Sri Lanka pointed out that India itself had granted the Israelis a 
consulate in Bombay, ostensibly equating the two arrangements. Israel and India have a 
shared interest in preventing the proliferation of atomic weapons in the Muslim world. 
Shelton Kodikara ed. South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, (New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 20, 153, 104.
14^  Jeffrey Richelson, "India's Intelligence and Security Services," unpublished paper, p. 23. 
14  ^Reuters News Service, "Indian Trained Saboteurs Active in Sindh," 8/9/91.
150 N. D. Khan, "Foreign hand Involved in Sindh Crisis-Jabbar," The Pakistan Times, 2/9/90.
151 Ravi Rikhye, The War That Never Was, p .l7.
132 Mohajirs are those Muslims who fled what is now Indian territory at the time of partition 
and are therefore of other than Sindhi ethnic identity.
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control the im portant Sindhi cities of Karachi and Hyderabad.153 The PPP 
has accused the Sindhi ethnic parties of collusion with RAW. The MQM has 
accused both the PPP and the Jiye Sindh of collaboration. Nawaz Sharif has 
also accused the PPP of collaboration with RAW through its terrorist arm the 
Al-Zulfiquar.i54 While these claims are often m ade out of an obvious effort 
by the various parties to discredit their opponents it is likely that RAW 
assistance is being provided. Further RAW would be motivated by a strong 
desire to counter the destabilisation Pakistan is fueling in Punjab and 
Kashmir. For these reasons it does appear that "the ubiquitous Indian hand 
in the fast deteriorating situation [in Sindh] is present. It cuts across party 
lines and becomes the least common denom inator."155
Allegations of RAW involvem ent in Operation Trident, which it is 
speculated was a plan to escalate Operation Brass Tacks to war between India 
and Pakistan in 1987,156 when taken in conjunction with events in Kashmir 
in 1990, also suggests that the hawkish attitudes inside RAW are pushing for 
another war w ith Pakistan. In May of 1990, am idst m ounting tensions in 
Kashmir, Pakistan suggested Foreign Secretary consultations to diffuse the 
crisis. RAW advised the Prime Minister that Pakistan had begun a major 
forw ard deployment of troops to the border and that India should begin a 
counter mobilisation and refuse the talks. The governm ent agreed and 
began redeploying troops to the border. The reality, confirmed by bo th  
American and Soviet technical intelligence and passed on to India, was that 
Pakistan had not increased its deployments at the border. The deploym ent 
and stand down cost India US$250 m illion .157 W hen asked by General K.M. 
Arif in 1986 why India had mobilised under the guise of the m ilitary 
m anoeuvre Brass Tacks General Sundarji responded that it was because 
Indian intelligence had reported that Pakistan had  m oved an arm oured 
division up to the border. Arif responded that this was not the case.158
Reuter News Service, "Pakistani Separatist Politician Says Kidnappings Justified," 
6/27/91.
Abha Dixit, 'The Backlash in Sindh," The Telegraph, 6/22/90.
155 Abha Dixit, "The Backlash in Sindh,"
156 Ravi Rikhye, The War That Never Was, p. 2. 
l^7 Defense and Foreign Affairs, August 1990, p. 24.
158 "Where politicians fear to tread," Asiaweek, 6/19/92, p. 28.
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T hese  tw o in c id en ts  m ake for s trong  sp ecu la tio n  abou t RAW's 
recom m endations on how  India should resolve its outstanding disputes 
with Pakistan, and that RAW believes in pushing this avenue of resolution 
irrespective of the political leadership of the country.159
W hether the ultimate aim of RAW is a second bifurcation of Pakistan, 
as has been asserted by Ravi Rikhye, or w hether it is m otivated out of the 
m ore conservative objective of having a counter to the leverage which 
Pakistan has built up in Punjab and Kashmir is not clear. W hat is clear is 
that high degrees of cross border insurgency support make for a destabilised 
environm ent which is vulnerable to m anipulation should the intelligence 
agencies seek to implement their own agenda. A situation where the affairs 
of state are being taken away from  legitim ate governm ental control is a 
disturbing development of the 1980s in India.
60.144 Fiji
While RAW's activities have been m ost notable in India's border 
regions, there is evidence to suggest that India may be seeking to extend its 
reach to cover Indian interests farther afield. In identifying the objectives of 
RAW, Asoka Raina has highlighted the role of NRIs. ”[T]he presence of a 
large ethnic Indian popu la tion  in foreign countries, a ttracted  RAW's 
attention, for in many countries they present a powerful lobby.”160 In 1988 
RAW is believed to have played a role in at least two arms shipm ents to Fiji, 
one of which was interdicted in Sydney.161 The ethnic composition of Fiji is 
roughly half Indian. The attem pt to arm  NRIs would be in keeping with 
Raina’s assertion that RAW has connections w ith these groups.162 RAW
159 Acording to Seymour Hersh American intelligence reports showed that "in a crisis, both 
RAW and 1SI were eager to provide incendiary intelligence without being sure of its 
reliability." "On the Nuclear Edge," p. 60.
16,0 In addition, Raina has identified general intelligence activities in India’s neighbourhood. 
Asoka Raina, Inside Raw, p. 16.
161 Ken Aldred, "India-The RAW Truth About its Military Might," The Herald, Melbourne, 
8/10/89.
16,2 See Asoka Raina, Inside Razo, p. 16.
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has reportedly conducted a feasibility study for the "overthrow of the Fijian 
governm ent."163
The discovery of a covert arms shipm ent bound for Fiji on 24 May 
1988 at Sydney's Port Botany has led to speculation over the weapons origin 
and destination. India, the A ustralian Secret Intelligence O rganisation 
(ASIO), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an unknow n M iddle East 
country and the ethnic Fijian com m unity in A ustralia have all been 
identified as possible sources of financing and planning the operation.164 
Given the degree of tension over the possibility of the ethnic Indian 
population of Fiji gaining political clout as a result of the 1987 elections, and 
the subsequent racial discrimination which that community has been subject 
to, RAW would have the most plausible motive to intervene.
The arms shipm ent uncovered in Sydney, was found to have been 
loaded onto the container ship Arno Australia. The container made its way 
to Singapore aboard a ship which originated in Yemen and m ade a port call 
in Trincomalee. Both of these places are likely sources of arms. India was in 
control of Trincomalee as part of its operations in Sri Lanka at that time. If 
India was the source of the arm s this w ould have facilitated their being 
loaded onto the ship.165
Dr. Bavadra’s Labour Coalition victory of 1987 was shortly overturned 
by the coup of 14 May which returned Ratu Mara to power. The second coup 
of Sept. 1987, which more firmly asserted Colonel Rabuka's position over 
that of Ratu Mara, reflected a readjustm ent of the pow er distribution among 
the ethnic Fijian elite.
163 Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aug. 1990, p. 25.
164 The arms shipment induded 140 Czech assault rifles, mortars, mines and large quantities 
of ammunition. The first shipment reached Fiji in April of 1987. It was the second shipment 
made to Fiji by the arms dealer Mohammed Kahan which was discovered by the government 
and resulted in the arrest of the Latoaka 21. Many of those arrested were staunch Mara 
supporters. See Reporter, Tony Jones, Producer, Steve Warne, "The Smarmy Swami (Fiji 
Arms)," Four Corners, Australian Broadcast Corporation, 8/21/89.
165 peter Game, "New Delhi Connection Suspected in Fiji Arms Intelligence Probe," The 
Herald,6/20/88.
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The F ijian  responsib le  for over-see ing  the  arm s sh ipm ent, 
M oham m ed Kahan, has m ade a num ber of statem ents concerning the 
origins of the $US 28 million which he reportedly was given to procure 
arms. "Asian people living outside India and outside Fiji, felt for their 
brothers in Fiji, and so it wasn’t much of a difficult ... [task] for us to raise 
funds." When asked about his backers M ohammed Kahan further stated 
that,
Well, not only to back me but back the Asian people in Fiji. I 
mean the real question is, how long are we going to be subjected to 
this kind of nonsense what you call it? Everywhere we are kicked 
out. There is 55% Asian people living in British Guiana and the 
power was taken away from them by Bona, and the people were 
kicked out er... and of course a lot of other things happened before 
that in Uganda, and South Africa, and it happened now in Fiji. 
Which country next we going to suffer?166
The deposed Prim e M inister, Dr. B avadra, claim s that K ahan 
approached him to initiate an arm ed struggle for Fiji, bu t that he refused. 
One issue which m ust be established before conclusions are draw n, is the 
reason for Kahan's desire to speak out. Despite the lack of an apparent 
m otive for K ahan’s openness on the m atter his statem ents are in part 
supported by others.
After interviewing Mr. Saheed, who had been arrested in Fiji in 
connection w ith  the governm ent seizure of a reported  ten tonnes of 
w eapons, ostensibly sent by K ahan in  the A pril Shipm ent, Chief 
Superintendent Allen Sing, of the Australian Federal Police, concluded that 
it was the Fijian com m unity in A ustralia which were behind the arm s 
shipm ents. "There is certainly a strong netw ork here, part of which we 
suggest supported the arms sh ipm ent."167 Kahan has claimed that a former 
Australian defence intelligence officer helped him leave the country w hen 
the customs departm ent discovered the weapons.168 If this is true it could
166 ”j h e Smarmy Swami," transcript, p. 16.
167 "yhe Smarmy Swami," p. 11.
168 yhjs is supported by the fact that when Kahan was being held in custody in the United 
Kingdom, Australia did not seek to extradite him despite the recommendation from Scotland 
Yard to do so. "The Smarmy Swami," p. 13.
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im ply a possible Defence Intelligence a n d /o r  A SIO /A ustralian  Secret 
Intelligence Service (ASIS) involvem ent.169
Ratu Mara had associates within the Indian business community that 
may have been involved in efforts to support his faction against that of 
Rabuka, believing that their interests w ould fair better under Ratu Mara 
than Colonel Rabuka. A form er Member of Parliament in M ara's Alliance 
Government, K.R. Latchin, has been implicated in the arms shipm ent by a 
former Taukei activist and Fijian businessman, Tony Stephens. Kahan has 
also indicted that the destination of the arms was to Ratu Mara's faction and 
that it was organised by the Indian community. "And Ratu M ara’s position 
was threatened. These Indian people w ho were backing Ratu Mara, and 
these are business people, people with a lot of influence, people w ith a lot of 
money, they got afraid too. Ratu Mara was afraid as well."170 W hether these 
businessm en would com m and the economic resources to provide $US 28 
million or would themselves be capable of coordinating the arms purchase 
without external support leads to speculation about who was assisting them.
The presence of a large ethnic Indian com m unity, which has been 
systematically denied its political freedom on racial grounds, does provide a 
sufficient motive for Indian involvem ent. The form er chairm an of the 
opposition defence committee in Australia, Ken A ldred stated that India’s 
"motive in interfering in Fijian affairs w ould be to justify in tervention there 
if not by herself, then by a Pacific country such as Australia."171 The scale of 
the shipm ent w ould also be w ith in  India 's capabilities. While other 
individuals or organisations could equally have been involved w ith the 
shipment their motives are not as clearly discernible as India's. It is unlikely 
that an alternative to the Rabuka regime would have been more favourable 
to American or Australian strategic interests.
169 Knowledgeable sources in Australia have discredited the view that there was any 
official Australian involvement. This leads to further speculation over the identity of the 
individual that apparently helped Kahan leave Australia after the arms were discovered.
170 Smarmy Swami," p. 29.
171 peter Game, 6/20/88 A high degree of activity was also reported at the High Commission 
in Canberra on the day of the shipments discovery in Sydney.
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60.145 Other Operations
Independence w as equally  u n fav o u rab le  to In d ian  m ilita ry  
intelligence as it was to political intelligence. The British Intelligence Corps 
(India) was increasingly "Indianised" previous to partition. As with political 
intelligence there was a d isp ropo rtiona te  num ber of M uslim s w ho 
subsequently opted for Pakistan, thereby denying India continuity from the 
British system. The Corps intelligence depot was located in Karachi and as a 
result India had little on which to build. At partition the Indian section of 
the intelligence Corps moved to Mhow and subsequently on to Pune in 1952 
where it remained. In 1952 an attem pt was m ade to establish the Defence 
Intelligence Organisation (DIO). Though the initial aims were high, the 
organisation remained little more than a feeble field security body with no 
external intelligence role. Further it was inadequate for analysing the 
information which it received from the external intelligence section of the 
IB.172 M ilitary intelligence im proved in the late 1970s as it began to 
m eaningfully focus on the three core areas of intelligence, counter 
intelligence and field security. Despite these im provem ents "... no serious 
effort has been made to establish an integrated intelligence agency in the 
Defence services."173
A num ber of military intelligence blunders have been reported. One 
of the more interesting examples occurred during Operation Cactus. In 
planning the relief of the Maldives in 1987 planners confused Mauritius for 
the Maldives and came to believe that it was M auritius to which they were 
to be deployed. During the planning stage they thought that they would 
have to refuel in the Maldives. At this point the error was picked up. In Sri 
Lanka the army had to rely on antiquated m aps and was not effective in 
utilizing Tamil speakers from within its ranks. In another incident an IAF 
plane which had crash landed in Pakistan on reconnaissance, was flown back 
across the border repeatedly by a Pakistani pilot who used the aircraft 
unm olested in a reconnaissance role. G round observation posts on the
17  ^ Major Genera] M.L. Popli, "What Ails Our Intelligence System?" Indian Defence Review, 
pp. 57-66.
173 Major General M.L. Popli, "What Ails Our Intelligence System?" p.58.
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border did not report the plane due to its make and its markings despite its 
repeated border crossings.174
RAW played an im portant role in the annexation of Sikkim. The 
action of 9 April 1975 was triggered by India’s displeasure over the Chogyal's 
desire to revise the India-Sikkim Treaty of Peace which had been signed on 5 
December 1950. The treaty had signed away Sikkim's control of its defence 
and foreign affairs. After going over the files pertaining to the absorption of 
Sikkim, Prime Minister Desai gave his opinion that while he supported the 
inclusion of Sikkim into India he did not approve the means which were 
em ployed.175 The last Political Officer to Sikkim, Gorbachan Singh came 
from  RAW.176 It is reported  that plans to take Sikkim w ere initially 
form ulated in the afterm ath of RAW's successful operations in Bangladesh. 
In preparation for the eventuality of the absorption of Sikkim, RAW had 
established a network of contacts and operatives in the districts of Ganagtok, 
M angan, Namche and Gyalzing in Sikkim to gather operational data for 
RAW contingencies.177
From reports of the sequence of events, it appears as though  RAW 
had initiated the operation some 18 months prior to Prime M inister Indira 
Gandhi's knowledge. "The Prime Minister is reported to have asked w hen 
RAW would be in a position to go ahead and is said to have been surprised 
w hen  told that the opera tion  w ould  com m ence w ith in  tw enty-four 
hours."178 From this it seems that Indira Gandhi was beginning to lose 
control of RAW within eight years of its creation.
After assessing the capabilities and uses of the JIC, the IB, RAW and 
m ilitary intelligence, it becomes apparent that their efforts in support of 
India's national security and foreign policy have yielded mixed results. The
174 Lt. Col. Dalit Singh retd. "Military Intelligence Not Up to the Mark," Illustrated Weekl y  
of India, 10/14/90, pp. 30-32.
175 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 
1970), pp. 245, 339.
17  ^Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim, (Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House, Pvt Ltd, 1984), p. 78.
177 Raina as cited in S. K. D.Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab:, p. 171.
17  ^ Raina as cited in S. K. D.Datta-Ray, Smash and Grab:, p. 185.
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relegation of the intelligence agencies to a predom inantly  operational 
orientation, for the most part in domestic and border areas, would indicate a 
relatively minor analytical capacity compared w ith First W orld intelligence 
organisations. In his discussion of Indian national security policy planning, 
Major General Popli has stated that it "suffers from the total lack of long 
range intelligence perspective ."179 It appears that RAW has been deficient in 
this regard as m uch as by design as because of the relatively inferior 
capabilities of its staff compared with military or foreign affairs personnel. 
The diversion of intelligence assets to support domestic political concerns 
d iverts resources away from operations in and assessm ents of India's 
strategic environment. In this way both civil liberties and India's national 
interest are subverted.
The use of RAW by the Prime M inister for the prom otion of his or 
her political fortunes, presents the po ten tial for subverting the Indian 
democratic process. RAW possesses a further threat through its desire to act 
independently  and to influence policy by acting ahead of the decision 
making process in areas such as Sikkim, Sri Lanka and Kashmir. RAW is 
not balanced by a diffusion of intelligence agencies, as in the United States, or 
to a lesser extent as in the form er Soviet system. If RAW initiated  an 
operation aimed at absorbing Sikkim w ithout the prior approval of the 
Prim e M inister then there is at least room  for speculation that RAW , 
wishing to im plem ent its second bifurcation of Pakistan, had allied with 
sympathetic elements within the military in an effort to get the Pakistani's to 
present them  w ith the opportunity  to do w hat the Indian governm ent 
would not. There appears to be no formalised procedure, such as the signing 
of findings in the United States for the approval of covert operations.
One m easure w hich w ould im prove India's strategic intelligence 
capabilities would be the establishment of a integrated military intelligence 
department. The separate military intelligence branches, and the ineffectual 
Defence Intelligence Organisation, are not currently  in tegrated  into an 
effective service-wide umbrella organisation. In addition, the relative degree 
of professionalism and a reluctance to enter into politics, in the armed forces
179 Major General M.L. Popli, "What Ails Our Intelligence System?" p. 62.
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w ould exert a positive influence on the conduct of intelligence operations. 
Such a military organisation could act as a potential counter to RAW’s 
influence. The prospect for the creation of such a body is not likely as the 
political authorities are likely to be suspicious of establishing an organisation 
w hich could potentially be used to underm ine  its political use of the 
intelligence apparatus. India, with its lack of built in checks and balances, is 
vulnerable to excess by over zealous elements inside intelligence agencies. A 
sum m ary assessment of Indian intelligence operations is outlined below.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Internal
-Counter espionage
-Counter insurgency intelligence in support of military and paramilitary
forces in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Tamil N adu
-Domestic political intelligence in support of individual politicians
External
Effective
Bangladesh
Sikkim
Sindh
Failed
Brass Tacks/Trident
Sri Lanka
Fiji
Kahuta
Loss of control 
Sikkim  
Trident 
Sri Lanka 
K ashm ir
A more open national security debate could both improve the intelligence 
agencies performance and limit their abuses. In this way the media could 
play a special role in the process.
60.2 The media and public opinion
There are contending interpretations as to the extent to which public 
opinion plays a part in the form ation of foreign policy in India. Ashok 
Kapur, writing in 1976, described the degree of influence of public opinion as 
m arginal and opted for the view that external strategies of the state were 
instead, a product of "conflicting views am ong the policy elites and to 
am biguous international developm ents rather than to electoral or party 
politics."180 W ith the majority of the population living in dispersed rural
180 Ashok Kapur, India 's Nuclear Option, p. 12.
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villages, w ith rates of illiteracy exceeding 50%, the extent to which the 
general public can participate in the foreign policy process is certainly 
suspect.
That said, public opinion should not be overly discounted either in 
assessments of its input in the past, or even m ore so in the present, or 
future. The decision to take Portuguese held Goa by force in 1961, in the lead 
up to the third general election, was urged by then Defence Minister Menon 
whose constituency in Bombay was located close enough for the action to 
play almost as decisive a role in his reelection to Parliament as India's defeat 
at the hands of the Chinese the next year did in his later demise.181 During 
the 1991 Gulf War, Rajiv Gandhi was vigorously trying to be perceived as 
more sympathetic to the cause of Sadam Hussein of Iraq, as a leader of a 
small developing state, in an effort to carve out solidly the Muslim vote 
bank for the upcoming elections that year.182 The growing ranks of the 
m iddle class, now  estim ated  betw een 100 and  200 m illion ,183 w ill 
increasingly take an interest in the conduct of the nations external relations. 
Current domestic debate over the secular orientation of India can not help 
b u t have an in fluence in the w ay in w hich Ind ia  engages her 
neighbourhood.
Because of its relative freedom from governm ent control the printed 
media serves an essential role of providing a platform for alternative views 
to the government. English language daily newspapers in 1986 circulated 
3,661,000 while non-English dailies totalled 18,680,000 copies.184 The average 
growth rate of papers and periodicals for the period 1983 to 1987 was 5.2%. 
Only the m ain new spapers of the big cities have the resources to 
independently cover international events. During the lead up to the Gulf 
War of 1991, English language papers, who occupy 13% of total circulation, 
were slow to respond to the evolving conflict. Only The Times of India,
181 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Allied  
Publishers, 1987), pp. 130-1.
182 Rajiv Gandhi, "The War in West Asia: A Statement issued by the Indian National 
Congress President," (Delhi: Congress Party Headquarters, 2/7/91).
183 por a definition of middle class in the Indian context see Chapter Five.
18  ^ m .V. Desai, "The Indian Media," India Briefing, 1989, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) p. 
110.
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Indian Express, The Statesman a n d  The Hindu  w ere able to send 
correspondents to the Gulf prior to October of 1990.185 One w ould have 
thought that with 170,000 non resident Indians in Kuwait and 10,000 in Iraq 
that it would have been a high enough priority to justify m ore intensive 
coverage. Given India's total population of 843,000,000, the reach of the 
papers is limited, but includes the more educated and influential segment of 
the society which is itself expanding.
Freedom of the press is under fire from both the governm ent and the 
m ilitants in strife ridden areas such as Punjab and Kashmir. In the Punjab, 
Sikh militants have dem anded the closure of papers whose ideology was not 
consistent with their cause and also have called for boycotts of governm ent 
news. It has also been announced that the insurgents dislike the label 
terrorist and that they prefer to be called m ilitants. These decrees are 
enforced by killings of those who defy them ; from publishers to news 
vendors. Editors, such as Barjinder Singh of Ajit, have attested to systematic 
vetting by police of new spapers in Punjab.186 The governm ent has also 
confiscated newspapers containing articles based on militant's press releases 
as was the case with the Chandighar Tribune .187 Officially the foreign press 
have at times not been allowed into Kashmir though access to the region has 
not been denied. It is also of interest that the situation in Kashmir is not 
covered more extensively.
The governm ent has dem onstrated its contem pt for the freedom of 
the press through its liberal application of the Official Secrets Act. As a 
m eans of preventing journalist access to the site of the proposed Sardar 
Sarovar dam the government declared it a "work of public character" there 
by making it an offence to trespass under the Official Secrets Act. A further 
example of governm ent interfearence is the a ttem pt to prosecute A run 
Shurie of the Indian Express new spaper. This was done because he 
p u b lish ed  excerpts of the T hakhar C om m ission Inqu iry  in to  the
185 Nihal Singh, "Misplaced Priorities," India Today, 10/15/90.
Akhil Gautam, "Punjab Media Divided Over Militants Threat," Business and Political
Observer, 3/8/91.
187,,Codes of Conduct," India Today, 2/28/91 p .ll.
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assassination of Indira Gandhi.188 The Indian Express has had a tradition of 
keeping the Congress party honest dating back to the emergency.
When trying to assess the potential impact of the general population 
on the political process, and by derivation the formation of foreign policy, it 
is necessary to discuss not only the degree of control which the government 
retains over the printed media, bu t more im portantly over the non-print. 
Non print media is the primary source of information for a majority of the 
population. The two governm ent m edia bodies are All India Radio (AIR) 
and the television netw ork Doordarshan (DD). The existence of these two 
governm en t m onopolies is en su red  by the In d ian  T elegraph  Act. 
Considering the level of illiteracy, the im portance of the estim ated 13.3 
million televisions, which reach an estim ated 75% of the population and 
AIR’s coverage of 90% of the population, is not to be underestim ated. 
Indians spent $US 261 million in 1988 on these two government organs.189
In response to criticism of governmental control of DD and AIR the 
Prasar Bharati Bill passed Parliament in September of 1990 thereby lifting in 
part, governm ent control. The areas affected were essentially confined to 
entertainm ent and so, in essence, the governm ent achieved the perception 
that it was liberalizing its control over the process without actually having to 
relinquish control over the news and current affairs program m es. The 
officials w orking in the Ind ian  Inform ation  Service and the C entral 
Secretariat Service who, prior to April of 1991, were responsible for handling 
the political aspects of broadcasting will, under the new legislation, be
188 M y. Desai, "The Indian Media," India Briefing, 1989, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 
123.
l^9 The importance of these two bodies in spreading the word on behalf of the ruling party 
was demonstrated in the lead up to the 1989 elections as the independent minded director of 
Doordarshan, Bhaskar Ghose, and the Delhi director, Jai Chandiram, were both displaced to 
facilitate increased centralised control from the Prime Minister’s Office. In addition the 
Congress party purportedly dispersed 100,000 television sets previous to the election that 
year. James Clad, "Radio and Television Help the Ruling Party,” The Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 11/9/89, p. 24.
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handling their old jobs from the newly established Broadcast Corporation.190 
Despite this effort by the government, debate continues.191
Increasing interest of the public in political affairs and their discontent 
with the censored product of DD is demonstrated by the increased popularity 
of independent video news tapes. Three of the leading tapes on sale are 
News Track, Business Plus and The Observer News Channel. The leading 
m onthly video News Track has an estim ated viewership of 5.6 million.192 
In its coverage of the Kar Sevak at the Ramjanmboomi-Babri Masjid in  
October of 1990 DD claimed that the governm ent had been successful in 
preventing any damage to the mosque. Footage, discrediting DD, of Kar 
Sevaks chipping away at the dome of the mosque emerged on video a few 
weeks later. Under section 7 of the Cinematography Act, police raided those 
shops carrying the footage.193 Further, representatives of the BJP were 
arrested at a public airing of the program  at Connaught Place in Delhi. The 
videos have further been a thorn  in the governm ent's attem pt to control 
reporting of the situation in Kashmir and the Gulf War.194 The governm ent 
has sought to minimise the visual reporting of the discontent in that region.
While these video program s presently have a lim ited view ership, 
they are indicative of a rising dem and on the part of the upper and m iddle 
classes for expanded access to unedited  or censored news. As of yet this 
interest has been largely limited to domestic affairs but given the newness of 
this phenom enon it prom ises to spread  into the foreign policy area. 
Government sensitivity to the influence of the Cable News Network (CNN) 
on Indian perceptions of the external environm ent was highlighted by 
CNNs coverage of the Gulf w ar. An in te r-departm en ta l com m ittee 
expressed its concern over the "adverse im pact of foreign television
19(^  Madhu Jain, "Prasar Bharati Bill: Ambiguous Autonomy," India Today, 9/30/90, pp.150- 
1 .
191 P. N. Bhagwati, "A Case for Liberty," Illustrated Weekly, 1/12-13/91, pp. 6-7.
192 Edward Desmond, "India's News Revolution," Time, 12/10/90, p. 45.
193 "Raids Continue on Video Shops," Hindustan Times Evening News, 12/7/90.
194 Ritu Sarin, "Dishing Out the News: National Antennae Reach Out to CNN's Coverage of 
the War," Sunday,2) 17-23/91.
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programmes" which expose the population to "foreign perceptions and alien 
social values.”195
In response to the partial subversion of the governm ent's ability to 
regulate  the in tru sion  of a lterna tive  b roadcasting  from  abroad the 
governm ent began a project in Jalna, M aharashtra to erect a 90 ton antenna 
to m onitor and possibly screen out foreign broadcasting. The cost of the 
antenna is estimated at US$ 6 million.196
The level of government control of the m edia in part explains the low 
level of public input into the form ation of foreign, and for that m atter 
national security policy. Despite the extensive controls, the direction of 
change is towards increased liberalisation and a gradual loosening of the 
government's grasp. This will most probably be facilitated and accelerated by 
the increasing multi-party composition of the Indian Parliament. The rising 
strength of opposition parties will seek to diminish the power of the ruling 
party. The single party and dynastic style of democracy which has dom inated 
m odern  Ind ian  h istory  allow ed the earlier B ritish trad itio n  of the 
suppression of the press to continue. W ith the advent of true m ulti-party 
democracy there will increasingly be m ore m eaningful inpu t from  the 
public. The role of academia is similar to that of the media, taking on a m ore 
im portant role in the decision-making process.
60.3 Think tanks , universities and intellectuals
Changes in Indian society at large are having an effect on, and being 
affected by, the nature of India's intellectuals in general. There are two key 
trends w orth note. The first is the increased politicisation of academe197 as 
intellectuals seek h igher profiles and  influence in governm ent and 
journalistic circles rather than confining their efforts to the "ivory towers." 
The popular press is critical of these perceived "intellectual hustlers"198 who
19  ^r . Srinivasan, "Cable TV, CNN: Mandi House in a Spot," Times of India, 3/14/91.
196 "Indian Government Building Earth Station 'to monitor foreign TV," The Straits Times, 
6/12/91.
197 K.P. Nair, "Rot in the System: Politicisation of Academic Institutions," Frontline, 1/19- 
2 /1 /9 1 ,p. 95.
19  ^ P.S. Sundaram, "Ph.Ds-At What Cost?" The Hindu, 12/24/91.
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congregate at such places as the Indian International Centre near Lodhi 
Gardens in Delhi. The second key developm ent is the shift away from the 
traditional leftist intellectual stance, or m ore recently of the governm ent 
apologists, to that of the Indian right. The decline of the communist bloc, 
destabilisation within India and the rise of H indu fundam entalism  have 
caused this shift.
The intellectual perspective of N ehru was passed dow n to Indira, 
albeit in a diluted fashion, and so on to Rajiv. Though dim inished, the 
appeal of the advice of the intellectual rem ained. In India "intellectuals 
have been a traditional institution-influencing policy, social movem ents, 
and political debate ."199 Reflecting a m iddle class bias thirty percent of 
governm ent expenditure on education goes into tertiary institutions .200 As 
these students graduate they are having difficulty finding jobs. This leads to 
the problem  of an increasing pool of educa ted  unem ployed  w ho 's 
expectations far exceed the reality that they find on graduation. As m any 
Indian intellectuals m irror trends in the West and seek to maximise their 
input into the political process, rather than rem aining aloof from it, they 
have, to a certain degree, lost their moral authority. Ashok Rudra has gone 
so far as to interpret the intelligentsia as having been co-opted by capitalists 
and landowners into the third pillar of the dom inant classes.201 As a result 
of these developments those espousing philosophies more firmly grounded 
in Hinduism have gained credibility. In the w ords of Girijal Jain "Instead of 
a healthy interaction we have a rootless intellectual class w ith borrow ed 
values and organisations and an Indian past w hich em erges from  the 
underground in distorted form s ."202 M adhu Jain sees this emerging H indu 
right intelligentsia, as represented  by K.R. M alkan, Jay Dubash, A run 
Shourie, and Girijal Jain, as defining a new Indian identity out of a need to
199 Madhu Jain, "Intellectuals: Neo, Pseudo, Natty," India Today, 12/31/90, p. 145.
200 jytfe Laursen, Trade and Growth in India," unpublished paper, The Australian National 
University, 1992.
201 Ashok Rudra, "Emergence of the Inteligentsia as a Ruling Class in India," The Economic 
and Political Weekly, 1/21/89, pp. 142-50. For a discussion of this proposition see Andre 
Breteille, "Are the Intelligentsia a Ruling Class?" and Pranab Bardhan, "The Third 
Dominant Class," from the same issue.
202 Madhu Jain, "Intellectuals: Neo, Pseudo, Natty," p. 147.
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assert itself on the in te rn a tio n a l arena. This reo rien ta tion  of the 
intelligentsia stems from the need for an identity based on national strength 
in the face of increased fragm entation. It is the new rightist intellectuals 
who are seeking to redress the breakdown of the N ehruvian consensus with 
a new sense of Indian nationalism  which equates it w ith Hinduism .203 In 
this there exists an intellectual trad ition  on which current views may be 
drawn.
In a less general vein the specific centres of intellectual concern w ith 
strategic, defence and foreign policy issues are largely centred in Delhi. 
Among these are; the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, the Centre 
for the Study of Developing Societies, the Society for Indian Ocean Studies, 
Teen M urti House at the Jawaharlal N ehru library, The Indian Council on 
World Affairs at Sapru House, the Centre for Policy Research, the National 
Archives, the historical section and library of External Affairs, the School of 
In terna tional Studies and its subdiv isions at the Jaw aharlal N ehru  
University and the United Services Institution. These centres all engage in, 
or provide the resources necessary for academic debate of national security 
issues.
A prime example of these is the Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis (IDSA). It is the m ost significant contributor to debate in  the 
national security and defence areas. In addition, IDSA is one of the most 
valuable sources of inform ation for those researching issues of Indian 
national security. It represents India's position at num erous international 
conferences. The institute, while self described as an "autonomous society to 
conduct study and research on problems of national security and the impact 
of defence measures on the economic, security and social life of the country," 
enjoys a close relationship w ith the governm ent. IDSA was established in 
1965 by Ministry of Defence funds.204 W ith its on-going publications and 
generally open debate, IDSA is one of the few conduits for debate of national 
security issues. The Indian Defence Review, and other publications put out
203 Madhu Jain, "Intellectuals: Neo, Pseudo, Natty," p. 147.
B.M. Gupta and V.K. Jain, Handbook of Libraries, Archives & Information Centres in 
India, Volume 8 Social Sciences Information Systems and Centres, (Delhi: Aditya 
Publications, 1990), pp. 118-23.
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by Lancers Publications, add to the information made available for debate of 
national security issues.
While the institu tionalisation in India of the think tank /p ressu re  
group is not developed to the extent as has becom e the norm  in most 
W estern societies, the trend is in that direction. Traditional affinity towards 
intellectuals will combine w ith increasing perceptions that expanded debate 
will facilitate the proper functioning of national security policy decision 
making. The coverage which V.P. Singh's NSC proposal received can be 
taken as an example. While the cult of secrecy and corrupt practices will act 
to keep the country's national security debate closed more and more actors 
will seek to influence policy and will, as a result, open debate to an extent. 
At this point the chapter shifts from its general discussion of the different 
decision-m aking struc tu res and  o rganisations to exam ine how  these 
structures functioned in response to the Gulf War.
60.4 The Gulf War and India's foreign and national security policy decision­
making
The evolution of the Indian reaction to the Gulf War illustrates the 
way which Indian strategic decision making transpires. The Indian response 
to the Gulf War indicates an uncoordinated and vacillating assessment of a 
situation of strategic importance for India. Further, this was com pounded by 
ad hoc responses which were held hostage to domestic politics. In the initial 
stages of the Gulf conflict India focused on extracting its nationals from  the 
area and m ounting an Indian led NAM perspective as an alternative to the 
US led coalition.205 V.P. Singh's External Affairs Minister, Inder Kumar 
Gujral tried unsuccessfully to establish a unified position w ith Algeria and 
Y ugoslavia in Septem ber of 1990. F u rther a C abinet C oordination 
Committee on the Gulf Crisis was established.206
205 Express News Service, "Gujral initiative to Solve Gulf Crisis," Indian Express, 9/2/90.
206 This body was chaired by External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral and had as its members 
Energy and Civil Aviation Minister, A. M. Khan, Surface Transport Minister, Unnikrishnan, 
Minister of State for External Affairs, H. K. Singh, and the Minister of State for Commerce, A. 
Sreedharan. This membership would seem to indicate that the body was established with 
the primary objective of the repatriation of the NRIs in the Gulf. Express News Service, 
"Steps to Evacuate Indians," Indian Expresss,9/2/90.
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Public sentim ent in India was split during the Gulf W ar. While 
Prime Minister Shekhar was seeking to support the United States, many felt 
that, while Saddam Hussein had transgressed international propriety by 
annexing Kuwait, this transgression paled in comparison to the exercise of 
force demonstrated by the United States and the West in the Gulf Region.207 
In this way, the issue was couched in terms of N orth vs South, rich vs poor 
and the strong vs the weak. This popular sentim ent was echoed by the 
initial diplomatic embrace of the Iraqis.
Initially India was predisposed not to oppose Iraq. Former Foreign 
Minister I. K. Gujral stated the "[i]f Iraq ceases to m atter in the region we will 
be left with fundam entalist regimes like Iran and Israel w ith the US ...”208 
Iraq's secular Bathist regime had supported India against Pakistan on the 
issue of Kashmir at the Chganisation of Islamic Conference and had sold oil 
to India at concessionary prices.209 Further, under Gujral, efforts were made 
to send food to Iraq and to m oderate calls for harsh condem nations of the 
Kuwait invasion. This neutralist tilting tow ards Iraq changed w ith the 
evolution of the conflict, and the change of government to Chandra Shekhar 
and the Janata Dal, to a US tilting neutralist posture. Efforts to retain 
elements of a non-aligned posture were retained as dem onstrated by the 22 
February shipment of one crore rupees worth of medical supplies to Iraq and 
by an Indian vote of abstention at the UN.210
As a result of the conflict, India's foreign currency reserves fell to 2,500 
crore, a mere three weeks' imports. This was in addition to an external debt 
of Rs 1,300,000 crore and a budget deficit of Rs 14,000 crore and a substantial 
revenue shortfall.211 To obtain IMF loans to shore up its financial position, 
India had no choice but to moderate its stance. Chandra Shekhar refused to 
insist on the linkage of the PLO/Israel dispute and the Gulf conflict and did
207 An example of the idealist position is portrayed in V. Mehta, "Baghdad Today, Bombay 
Tomorrow," Sunday, 1/27-2/2/91, pp. 8-9.
208 Shahnaz A. Aiyar, "Walking a Tightrope: India’s Gulf Policy," India Today, 2/15/91, p. 
31.
209 Shahnaz A. Aiyar, "Walking a Tightrope: India’s Gulf Policy," p. 31.
210 According to a Ministry of External Affairs spokesman the supplies were transhipped via 
Iran. "India Sending Medical Supplies to Iraq," The Hindu, 2/22/91.
211 "Dangerous Liaisons," The Illustrated Weekly of India, 2/16-17/91, p. 21.
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provide refueling and overflight services to the US, which the National 
Front G overnm ent had previously refused. In a volte face, Congress 
reversed its earlier policy of seeking im proved relations with the US, and 
pressured Shekhar to w ithdraw  the use of Indian airspace and facilities.
Under threat of w ithdrawal of Congress support for his governm ent 
Chandra Shekhar agreed to w ithdraw  American access to Indian facilities on 
17 February 1991. In responding to criticism of his handling of the Gulf War 
and American requests for refueling by M. L. Fotedar of the Congress party in 
the Rajya Sabha on 4 M arch 1991, PM C handra Shekhar responded that 
"[y]ou neither understand the nationally accepted policy, nor do you know 
w hat we should follow."212 From this statem ent Chandra Shekhar seems to 
have made a similar distinction to the one m ade by K. Subramanyam that 
"Non-alignment is an instrum ent of policy. Not an objective of policy."213 
W ith this perception, India moved further tow ard a new pragm atism  of 
striking a m odus vivendi with the US in the post Cold War world. These 
pragmatic policies continue to be pursued by Chandra Shekhar's successor 
Narasimha Rao. An example of such a policy reorientation is the 29 January 
1992 recognition of the state of Israel by Narasimha Rao's government.214
At some point prior to the outbreak of hostilities, India quietly granted 
the United States overflight and refuelling rights. This decision, it has been 
pointed out by K. Subramanyam, "by-passed all established decision making 
structures and processes."215 The subsequent reversal of the decision to 
p ro v id e  refueling  a ttes ts  to the  dom inance  of dom estic  po litica l 
considerations over the international realities, even in the m idst of a war 
w ith significant consequences for India. This was further dem onstrated by 
the continued absence of an effective Foreign Minister during most of the 
crisis.
212 Chandra Shekhar as quoted in K.T.R. Menon, "Govt Under Fire Over Refueling," Times of 
India, 3/4/91.
213 K. Subramanyam as quoted in "Dangerous Liaisons," The Illustrated Weekly of India, 
2/16-17/91, p. 22. Chandra Shekhar had been known as a leader of the "young Turks" that 
had favored collaboration with the CPI, CP(M) and the left of Indian politics.
214 Edward Gargan, "India Announces Full Israeli Ties," The Neui York Times,1 /30/92.
213 K. Subramanyam, "The Mistakes We Commit," The Business and Political Observer, 
3/18/91.
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K. Subramanyam, using the handling of the Gulf War as an example, 
has criticised the decision m aking process for its lack of institu tional 
character. He alleges that the structure was circumvented, and that the 
decision was "not taken in accordance w ith  norm al procedures." His 
criticism of the system was echoed by General Sundarji. "If we had a 
national security strategy working, crises like the Gulf, m ight have been 
anticipated or at least its impact on Indian interests and possible policy 
options, would have been known from the outset."216 Subram anyam  has 
called for more attention to be paid to the "structures and processes of 
decision m aking."217 Other defence commentators have similarly observed 
instances where the existing organizational structure for decision making 
has been circum vented.218 Subram anyam 's assertion, concerning the 
circumvention of the existing system, is supportable considering the extreme 
ambiguity as to whether it was an agreement struck by V.P. Singh, Chandra 
Shekhar or Rajiv Gandhi which had allowed the refuelling in and overflight 
of Indian territory.
The high degree of uncertainty over who was responsible indicates 
that it was a decision taken by a small and lim ited selection of the highest 
echelons of decision making and that it was probably made from the PM’s 
office with limited outside consultation. The earliest reference to a possible 
agreement with the US for Overflight and refueling rights dates to 15 May 
1973.219
As the controversy m ounted in the end of January 1991, accusations 
and counter accusations were rife as the politicians sought to disassociate 
themselves from a policy which had the political liability of alienating over 
100 million Indian Muslims in an election year. Congress, who at the time 
were allowing the existence of the Janata Dal (S) Government through their 
support from outside, were critical of its refusal to consult Parliament.
216 General Sundarji, "Myopic Strategy," India Today, 9/30/90.
217 K. Subramanyam, "The Mistakes We Commit," The Business and Political Observer, 
3/18/91.
218 Yir Narain, "Security Council: Need for Caution," Times of India,!/15/90.
219 Anonymous source in the MEA cited in "Dangerous Liaisons," The Illustrated Weekly of 
India, 2/16-17/91, p. 18.
354
Congress issued a statem ent claiming that "the decision m akers in South 
Block had no right to do what they had done."220 When issuing a statement 
that the refueling w ould continue Janata Dal (S) spokesm an, and then 
General Secretary, S.P. Malviya indicated that the decision to allow the 
refueling was undertaken by the National Front Governm ent.221 Form er 
External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral denied a N ational Front involvem ent 
in the decision to allow refueling. In response to this denial, Congress 
spokesman M.J. Akbar stated
I do not believe his denial. But I can u n d e rs tan d  his 
compulsions. He does not have as close a relation w ith the US 
as Mr V.P. Singh had ... It is possible that Mr. Gujral did not 
fully know what was going on in  his form er Ministry. It is 
more likely that it was a V.P. Singh decision .222
In February of 1991, V.P. Singh ad m itted  th a t the US governm ent 
approached him concerning the use of Indian facilities in August of 1990. "I 
had tu rned  dow n this offer w hen it came to me."223 N ational Front 
spokesm an J. Reddy clarified the statem ent by stating that betw een the 
outbreak of tensions, on August second and the fall of the National Front 
G overnm ent on 9 Novem ber 1990 no US aircraft were allowed access to 
Indian facilities 224
Evidently, a visit to the US by Chandra Shekhar’s Commerce Minister 
Subramaniam Swamy by-passed the M inistry of External Affairs again by 
persuading PM Chandra Shekhar to continue the existing agreement 225 Dr. 
Subramaniam Swamy was accused by MP S. Malik of secretly m eeting with
220 South Block is the governmental office building that houses the Cabinet Secretariat, and 
the head offices of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Inder 
Malhotra, "Political Commentary: Big Row Over Refueling,” Times of India, 1/31/91.
221 Times of India News Service, "USAF To Continue," Times of India, 2/1/91.
222 Times of India News Service, "Records Point to V.P.'s Complicity," Times of India, 
1/31/91.
223 V. P. Singh as quoted in, "Rajiv Had a Secret Deal with US: VP," Hindustan Times, 
2/6/91.
224 Special Correspondent, "US Sounded VP for Refueling Help," Delhi Mid Day, 2/1 /91 and 
also Times of India News Service, "NT Had Refused US Request: VP," Times of India, 2/1/91. 
22  ^ H. Shah and V. Makhjani, "Rajiv’s Govt. Agreed to Refuel USAF Planes in India," Times 
of India, 2/3/91.
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the US and Israel and of "serving up" India’s independence, by agreeing to 
refueling and overflight concessions, in return for IMF loans.226 In response 
to allegations that India had sold out its NAM credentials to the US for IMF 
loans Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Digvijay Singh, stated that "you 
can abuse us a thousand times but you can't call us American agents. We 
have only continued the same policy that was being followed by the V. P. 
Singh Government. It is not as if we have taken a new stand."227
After a solid round of accusations and denials by all three parties, the 
issue was settled by R. Grant Smith Charge d'Affaires at the US Embassy in 
Delhi, on February first 1991. In his briefing to the Indian Association of 
Foreign Correspondents he indicated that Rajiv Gandhi made an agreement 
for refueling in 1987 as part of an overall improvement of relations that 
stemmed from Gandhi’s two visits to the US in 1985 and 1987 228 Reportedly 
the agreement also covers ship visits 229 Under the agreement, only non- 
lethal cargoes were allowed. It is not clear as to whether this agreement had 
a provision for a case by case review of requests.230 The agreement most 
probably called for review on a case by case basis. This would explain the 
repeated approaches that the US made to the three governments concerned 
over the issue. The Congress pre-election strategy of trying to carve out the 
Muslim vote bank by being perceived as anti-US during the Gulf crisis is 
inconsistent with the quiet diplomacy that had been transpiring. This 
inconsistency is due to the lack of an alternative election strategy for Rajiv in 
the lead-up to the 1991 election.
226 "Swamy Met Israeli, US Officials," Times of India, 1/31/91. It is of interest to note the 
BJP's lack of comment on the issue.
227 Digvijay Singh as quoted in "Dangerous Liaisons," The Illustrated Weekly of India, p. 18. 
Singh reiterated these remarks at a seminar at the Jawaharlal Nehru University.
22  ^ H. Shah and V. Makhjani, "Rajiv's Govt. Agreed to Refuel USAF Planes in India," Times 
of India, 2/3/91.
229 HT Correspondent, "Rajiv Okayed Refueling in 87," Hindustan Times, 2/5/91.
230 improved tenor of Indo-US relations is being maintained by the Rao government. 
Defence Minister Sharad Pawar met with Defence Secretary Cheney, National Security 
Adviser Scowcroft and Vice President Quayle in April of 1992 where agreements were reached 
on joint naval exercises. He further stated that "there is better scope for drawing two nations 
closer." "Defence Ministers Visit to USA," India News, 4/16/92.
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Despite the US Embassy’s announcement, of 1 February, Natwar 
Singh, former Minister of State and a Senior Member of the Congress party, 
affirmed, on 5 February 1991, the statement of a Foreign Office spokesman of 
4 February , that "no general agreement had been entered into in 1985 or 1987 
-or at any other time- with regard to air-corridor overflights by American 
military planes."231 Evidently Congress felt that it could continue its 
position on the Gulf War despite the US disclosure. To do this, it seems that 
the MEA, at least up to the Minister of State level, would have been kept 
outside the decision making loop on the agreement with the US, thereby 
limiting those who could point out the differences between past and current 
thinking on the Indo-US relationship. This is not surprising given the 
significant departure that such an agreement would have represented in the 
mid 1980s prior to the collapse of Soviet power. Even in 1991, as the realities 
of the post Cold War world were becoming evident, Congress, Janata Dal, 
CPI-M and the National Front were all careful to distance themselves, 
though to varying degrees, from the US action in the Gulf.232
Despite the general assessment that the existing national security and 
defence planning system is deficient, the NSC proposal has foundered, and, 
like so many previous efforts to improve India’s process for national security 
policy formation, seems destined to lapse into disuse. The one truly 
innovative aspect of the NSC proposal, the independent secretariat, was 
initially obstructed by a rider to the cabinet proposal, attached by the backers 
of the Strategic Policy Group of the CCPA, which interposed the Joint 
Intelligence Committee as the body which would provide administrative 
support rather than the establishment of a separate independent secretariat. 
This effectively thwarted the NSC proposal by delaying its implementation 
long enough for the bureaucracy to mobilize elements against the idea. The 
plan to have the Joint Intelligence Committee function in the capacity of the 
NSC’s secretariat further blurred the distinction between intelligence and 
policy making. The Finance Ministry subsequently denied the NSC's
231 j-Q- Correspondent, "Govt Must Stop Refueling,” Hindustan Times, 2/6/91.
232 HT Correspondent, "Sathe Derides JD-S on Refueling issue," Hindustan Times, 2 / 14/91.
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secretariat funding .233 The Congress Party opposed the NSC fearing that it 
w ould establish institu tional arrangem ents lim iting the extent of direct 
political control over the form ation of national security policy that would be 
tantam ount to usurping the power of cabinet by a supra-cabinet body 234 It is 
this need on the part of politicians, which necessitates a reactive strategic 
policy, which is subordinate to the dominate political party and to the Prime 
Minister. Indeed, it appears that the extent that there was long range vision 
for India in a strategic context seems to have been the product of the ideas of 
the Prime Minister.
The announced N ational Security Council sparked only a lim ited 
debate in the press. Dilip Mukerjee of the Times of India speculated that the 
"NSC can perhaps provide a sharper focus for better coordination of political 
and security instrum ents ."235 Conversely, some criticism was levelled at the 
proposal from those fearing its diminution of the already curtailed influence 
of the military.
This council w ould, in fact, duplicate decision m aking and 
further confuse the issues at hand ... In the Cabinet Secretariat 
itself, there is today a Military Wing ... fully geared to work on  
perspectives both m ilitary and for in ternal security threats. 
Unfortunately, this wing has never been allowed to grow and 
function 236
O ther defence com m entators were positively disposed tow ard the 
concept bu t not the particu lar m anifestation 237 Lt. G eneral Sinha has 
po in ted  out the deficiencies of the existing com partm entalized and 
inharmonious approach to national security policy formation. In putting his 
voice behind  the p roposal, Sinha saw  the NSC as enabling "... the 
adm in istration  to take a m ulti-d iscip linary  and com prehensive view, 
anticipating events and being fully prepared for them rather than reacting to
233 T. R. Ramachandran, "NSC Likely to be Put in Cold Storage," The Business and Political 
Observer, 1/4/91.
234 Special Correspondent, "Cong(I) Opposes Proposed NSC," The Hindu, 5/17/90.
235 Dilip Mukerjee, "Not by Guns Alone," The Times of India,9 / 18/90.
23  ^ Lt. Gen. P. N. Hoon (retd.), "Who Formulates Defence Policy?" The Hindustan Times, 
Delhi, 11/12/90.
237 Interview with retired Lt. General S.K. Sinha, "Sinha for Broad Based NSC," Times of 
India, 1/6/90.
358
them  in an ad hoc m anner." W hen questioned on the reasons for the 
absence of a chief of defence staff, Sinha cited the resistance of the 
bureaucracy for fear of "loosening their grip over the services," as one of the 
key reasons, in addition to the politicians' fears of a "man on horseback ."238
M uch of the opposition to the NSC emanates, not from a lack of 
perception that the national security policy apparatus is deficient, or that it 
needs to be m ore effectively m anaged, b u t from  fears that in the 
reorganisation process the vested interests of the existing bodies will be 
dim inished or marginalised. K. Subramanyam identified the main obstacle 
of the NSC gaining acceptance as stemm ing from the separate secretariat 
which was to be created. There has been concern that the NSC could serve to 
justify centralised control by acting as a "super governm ent inside the 
governm en t ."239 The extent to which this could operate beyond the present 
capacity of the CCPA would be determ ined by the size of the support 
secretariat and the Strategic Core Group as, w ithout these, the NSC is in 
reality no more than a renam ed CCPA. As currently organised the CCPA 
draw s on the Cabinet Secretariat for its support. Resentm ent of the 
establishment of the NSC may also stem from the Cabinet Secretariat's fear 
of being eclipsed by the autonomous Secretariat of the proposed NSC. This 
explanation would account for some of the intransigence of the bureaucracy 
to the idea. Further, Ministerial anxiety, of those M inisters currently sitting 
on the CCPA, over the proposal, could stem from their fear that the NSC 
w ould eventually establish the position of a N ational Security Adviser 
similar to the position in the American model and as such, this indiv idual 
would have the effect of diminishing the weight of the Ministerial input on 
national security policy.
The substantive issues before defence planners in the coming years 
will increasingly involve India in the need for long term , integrated 
planning. Issues such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation, 
continuing low intensity conflict, the need to integrate internal and external
238 interview with retired Lt. General S.K. Sinha, 1 /6 /90 .
239 K. Subramanyam, "Planning for Security: Blueprint for An Apex Body," The Business and 
Political Observer, 12/20/89.
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intelligence in addressing the numerous insurgencies confronting India, as 
well as the need to restructure the armed forces to engage in an increasingly 
technological battle field on land, sea and in the air, will all be unmanageable 
without an effective decision making structure for strategic planning.
Despite the widespread agreement among strategic analysts that the 
structure of long term national security policy planning was woefully 
deficient bureaucratic opposition proved to be effective in obstructing the 
implementation of the NSC. This re-establishes the subordination of the 
military to the political process, the Congress party and ultimately the Prime 
Minister’s office. With the budget of 1988-89 figures concerning the total 
strength of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister's Office were 
omitted. In this way the "phenomenal increase in the staff strength of the 
Prime Minister’s Office has been hidden from public view.’’240
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The continuation of the centralised and personalized approach to 
national security policy places continuing emphasis on the Prime Minister
240 Madhu Limaye, Cabinet Government in India, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1989), pp. 
318.
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and his trusted advisers and the subordination of those who had sought to 
establish a more institutionalised process for the form ation of national 
security policy.
In this context those seeking deeper insight into the future progress of 
Indian security policy are forced to examine internal political developments. 
The lack of an institutionalised structure, the subordination of the military 
to the bureaucracy, and the continuing locus of control of the process in the 
hands of the Prime Minister, his personal office, the CCPA and Cabinet, 
establish an inextricable linkage betw een the domestic political milieu and 
the external strategic outlook and policy of India. These formal and inform al 
parallel structures justify the use of both the bureaucratic and great leader 
approaches to decision-making.
The policy direction which India is charting for the post Cold War 
w orld dem onstrates a desire for im proved relations with the West and the 
states of the Indian Ocean Region. India has recently held joint naval 
m anoeuvres with Australia, recognised Israel and held talks in January and 
April of 1992 with the United States under the auspices of the newly formed 
Indo-US Joint Steering Committee "for naval and military exchanges and co­
operation between India and US forces."241 Further Prime M inister Rao's 
am bitious program  for transform ation of its economy from the N ehruvian  
socialist model to a more m arket oriented approach has been reaffirmed 
through the endorsem ent received from the All India Congress Com m ittee 
in April of 1992.242 Given the signs that India is desirous of im proved 
relations, based on increased economic and military exchanges and Western 
recognition of its hightened status, it would be a strategic blunder to alienate 
India th rough  alarm ist projections of India 's fu ture strategic position. 
Ind ia 's current leadership is not dem onstrating  a proclivity for policy 
directions that will bring it in conflict w ith W estern interests and as such 
increased exchanges and understanding should be encouraged to minimise 
the potential for damaging misperceptions.
241 "India: Still in the Race for Arms?" The Sydney Morning Herald, 2/4/92.
242 David Housego, "Cautious Rao Silences Critics," Financial Times,4/15/92.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
So that, of all people who were then slain, done to death, or carried 
away captive in Kalinga, if the hundred th  or the thousandth  part 
were now to suffer the same fate, it would be a m atter of regret to
His Sacred M ajesty......  For His Sacred Majesty desires that all
animate beings should have security, self-control, peace of mind, 
and joyousness.1
-Asoka’s Rock Edict No. XIII, 261 BC
... the four castes, Brahm an, K shatriya, Vaisya, Sudra, are 
everywhere present at all times, in all civilised societies. By the 
m ighty hand of time, their num ber and pow er also vary at 
different times, in regard to different countries. In some countries 
the num erical strength or influence of one of these castes may 
preponderate over another, at some period, one of the classes may 
be more powerful than the rest.
-Swami Vivekananda, "A Theory of Political Cycles," 1899.
A summation of observations and conclusions
This inquiry into India’s aspirations to great power status has taken 
the position that India has been seeking a larger role in an expanding region 
and that this has been driven by a need for security, independence and status. 
W hile th is course has been charted by the decision-m aking elite its 
param eters have been defined by dom estic, geopolitical and economic 
considerations as discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five. This national 
elite desires a greater role for India both within South Asia and the northern 
reaches of the Indian Ocean. Though India is likely to continue to seek to 
expand its external posture its ability to do so will be limited by the pace of 
economic reform and growth. Because of the relative aspect of power the 
impact of India's expanded posture may well be offset by the increasing 
position of China in the Asia Pacific region. While Pakistan rem ains India's 
most imm ediate threat India’s desires for a larger international role will 
increasingly make it the rival of China.
1 The idea to explore the relationship between the Kautilyan and Asokan traditions was 
prompted by George Tanham. See also J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign 
Polin/, p. 69. and A. Appadorai, The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-72, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1981.
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If India's economic reform s do not bring fairly rapid  returns the 
Congress Party will be further weakened. This, coupled w ith its lack of 
vision, may lead to further gains by the H indu fundam entalist agenda. It is 
this agenda, with its challenge to the secular vision of India, that represents 
the largest threat to regional stability. If the H indu fundam entalist agenda 
becomes merged w ith the national agenda India’s desire for an expanded 
role could become destabilising. In the short term India’s need for economic 
assistance will prevent it from substantially antagonising Western interests.
During this process of economic reform  Indian society faces the 
problem  of how to reconcile the objectives of m odernisation while not 
becoming alienated from its socio-cultural traditions. Adherence to tradition 
is perpetuated through a complex interplay between the religious and social 
aspects of Hinduism.
Subservience to trad itional au thority  and allu rem ent w ith 
tradition, which have far from receded in post independence 
India, both among the dom inant and and the labouring strata, 
only defeat the most central processes of m odernisation .2
In this way a conflict of idiom is being played out on the Indian political 
stage. To engage the process of reform is to court a reaction from the 
traditional element within society. To ignore m odernity and the necessity 
for developm ent is to allow the frustrations of despair to build. These 
frustrations, as observed in Chapter Three, are them selves threats to the 
centre when coupled with ethnic or religious identities.
The sustained allegiance to the socio-religious structure  appears 
mystifying to the outside observer, given the profusion of deities and 
m ultiple centres of social authority. N ehru himself recognised India as a 
"palimpsest on which layers of thought and reveries had been inscribed, and 
yet no succeeding layer had completely hidden or erased w hat had been 
w ritten  previously ."3
2 Suren Navlakha, Elite and Social Change: A Study of Elite Formation in India, (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 26.
3 jawaharlal Nehru as quoted in Tariq Ali, An Indian Dynasty, p. 57.
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When discussing rational actor models of decision making the context 
of what is indeed considered to be rational behaviour m ust be taken into 
consideration. What to some may be irrational may to others seem natural. 
As might be expected, President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy were not 
alone in the world of politics in turning to the stars to gain insight into the 
course of future events. In India such recourse is not the stuff of scandal but 
is, within its context, an understandable step. While by no means universal, 
such belief in Gurus, astrology, palm istry and soothsayers is accepted not 
only by the lower classes but by segments of the middle and upper classes as 
well. It can be seen how some of the more peculiar aspects of the traditional 
society remain close to the identity of the educated-professional strata who 
are the ones who implement and inform the policies of the m odern state.
Retired Defence Ministry Official V.M. Sharma has become known in 
Delhi am ongst the "high and m ighty of India 's governing elite" as a 
soothsayer of renow n .4 Among those palms which Sharma has read are 
those of Jawaharlal Nehru, Lai Bahadur Shastri and Krishna Menon. In 
response to predictions of ill fortune prescrip tions of gem stones, the 
chanting of mantras or the donation of a cow to a Brahmin are prescribed as 
measures to alter negative future events. C handra Swami, who has been 
described as the "favourite high flying tantrik of Indian politicians, including 
Prim e M inister P.V. N arasim ha Rao," perform ed a yagna next to the 
Ashram  of Mauni Baba at Uijain during the Kumbh Mela. Baba is the 
godm an of Rao's political rival, Arun Singh. It is thought that black magic 
practiced here at this time is especially effective. Arun Singh also visited the 
Baba A shram  during  the cerem ony .5 At the sam e tim e Rao w as 
undermining Singh's position within the Congress Party. Rao m ade Singh's 
seat on the Congress Central W orking Committee a nom inated one even 
though Singh had obtained his through election .6
4 Hamish McDonald, "Next Year's News," The Far Eastern Economic Review,1 2 /23/91 ,pp.23- 
4.
5 N.K. Singh, "Tantrik Tantrums: Swami Takes on Arjun Singh’s Godman," India Today, 
6/15/92, p. 22.
6 Z. Agha, "Authoritarian Streak: Rao Goes from Glasnost to Loyalty,” India Today,6/15/92, 
p. 22. This rivalry continued to mount in 1993.
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Continuing notions of untouchability, the payment of dowry and Sati, 
while made illegal by the state continue to have a place in the Hindu social 
identity. Stories of local village head men executing inter caste couples 
continue to make headlines. Dowry, while outlaw ed in India since 1961, 
continues to be widely practiced.7 Just what the impact of m odernisation 
will be on these attachments to India's socio-cultural traditions is uncertain. 
W hat does seem to be evident is that rapid change will produce a strong 
reaction. This will hurt progressive political agendas.
The hope of a better life, access to economic prosperity and the ability 
to attain a greater degree of self realization, which m otivated the elite and 
masses alike to join in the freedom struggle have proven to be elusive goals 
to the lower ends of sociological spectrum . India is by no means alone, 
among post colonial societies, in this phenom ena. D uring the freedom  
struggle those attem pts to radically reorient the structure were subordinated 
and displaced by the more narrow agenda of rem oving the foreign class of 
overlords. They were replaced by a new indigenous ruling class, which, 
though modified by W estern values and ideas, had not departed from the 
traditional, hierarchical organisation. For this reason independence did not 
significantly alter the traditional social-strata of Indian society.
The caste system acts to limit the social mobility of those castes at the 
lower end of the spectrum to a greater degree than those closer to the top of 
the social strata. In this way the elite were not against the adoption of certain 
aspects of W estern ideology which were relevant to the Indian situation. 
W estern influenced segments of the elite led movements for positive social
7 The number of females per 1,000 males has declined from the 1981 level of 934, to 929 in 1991. 
The extreme financial burden of dowry has contributed to a declining sex ratio of females to 
males and lead to the recorded suicide or murder of over 3,000 women annually. Sati 
glorification, though an offence, did not dissuade Sati supporters from celebrating the 
anniversary of the Sati of Roop Kanwar at Deorala in September of 1990. The gathering was 
loosely veiled as a Ramayana recital to avoid prosecution by the authorities. Hamish 
McDonald, "Population Surge Forces Rethinking in Official Strategy: Paying for the Past," 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 12/26/91, pp.16-9. In 1988, 89 and 90, 11,259 dowry related 
deaths were registered. This would represent only a percentage of the overall numbers. These 
occur when the women's parents default on dowry obligations or when the groom or his family 
use the "accidental" death of the bride as a way to acquire wealth. Ruth Pitchford, "Brides' 
Fate Cash or Death," The Canberra Times, 8/9/91. "Sati Anniversary: Hundreds Flock to 
Deorala," Indian Express, 9/2/90.
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reform  in such areas as renunciation  of colonial subjugation and later 
against untouchability. Despite the influence of secular ideas the elite, as a 
group, were not about to allow entry to the lower levels of society.
Thus, while colonial subjugation released powerful new forces 
of change as well as reactionary and conservative elements, it is 
the nature of the native social structure which determ ined that 
the elements providing leadership to both these arose from 
basically the same dom inant groups and strata w ithout causing 
a split in their ranks ...8
That the m odern  Ind ian  state has not been fraugh t w ith  m ore 
disruptive and destabilising dem ands from the marginalised elements, who 
have not shared in the fruits of the freedom struggle, is a testam ent to the 
staying power of the traditional structure and the basically conservative 
nature of Hindu society.
With this understanding of the basic traditional grounding of society 
we can better understand the basis upon which the BJP, VHP and RSS can 
build their support. This is dem onstrated by their success in the m ore 
traditional northern  areas of U ttar Pradesh and Bihar, as opposed to the 
south, which had m ore w ide spread  non-Brahm in m ovem ents. Prime 
Minister Singh's lack of success in implem enting the M andal commission's 
recom m endations to advance low er caste groups through quotas, while 
largely of symbolic significance, attests to the continuing strength  of the 
existing social structure.
If the H indu fundam entalist elem ent is successful in occupying a 
more central role in redefining both the political agenda, and the identity of 
the ruling and educated-professional segments of the society, then there will 
be a significant transform ation of the guiding vision behind India. The 
H indu fundamentalists are sim ultaneously seeking to transform India from 
the top down, through political m obilisation, and from the bottom  up, 
through a resurgence of a reworked H indu identity. The relative degree of 
influence of the upper levels of Indian society is made clear by the secular 
nature  of the Indian governm ent. This is despite the overw helm ing
8 S. Navlakha, Elite and Social Change, p. 24.
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religious proclivities of the Indian people. This secular vision is being 
threatened by a new interpretation of national politics. One way in which 
the secular modernising agenda can be resuscitated is if it can be successfully 
wedded w ith a economic program  of m odernisation that im proves the 
material well being of the Indian people .9 If there is continued economic 
and political stagnation Indians will react by seeking an alternative to secular 
Congress rule.
The educated/professional elite are a product of the upper strata of 
Indian society. There are differing perspectives within this group as to the 
proper direction which India should take in the nation building process. In 
the lead up to the struggle for independence from British rule two key 
divisions among H indu nationalists developed. On the one hand there 
were the modernist, as typified by Nehru. These m en were bringing to the 
struggle a set of W estern values as well as their Indian traditions. In 
addition to the Modernists, were the revivalists .10 The revivalists drew on 
notions of H indu antiquity. They were them selves further divided into 
those who sought to preserve H indu traditions as they existed and those 
who sought to reform those traditions through re-interpretations of some of 
the sacred texts of Hinduism. The RSS, and its political affiliates, stem from 
this reformist strain of the revivalist tradition.
Many of the reform ists repud ia ted  the satyagraha m ovem ent of 
M ahatma Gandhi for its particular over-em phasis on ahimsa. As H indu- 
Muslim riots spread in the pre-independence period the RSS came to view 
Hindu passivity with scorn. They believed that H indus should draw  on the 
Kshatriya model w ithin Hinduism to regain strength to defend themselves 
and to assert their independence both from the British and the Muslims. 
"We can not afford to be so weak and imbecile as to encourage others to 
crush us, nor can we be so obsessed by the false ideals of ahimsa but at our
9 In 1992-3 PM Rao staked his political future on the success of the economic reforms rather 
than on a direct challenge of the rising BJP as was advocated by others in the Congress party. 
This indicates the strength of the Hindu fundamentalist appeal and Congress's lack of 
committment to its foundation ideology.
10 This distinction has been developed in, Walter Andersen and Shridhar Damle, The 
Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism , (New 
Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1987).
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peril .”11 Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on ahimsa was seen as including the 
Christian values of passivity into the m ovem ent which the reformists felt 
should draw  its inspiration  solely from  w ith in  H induism . For their 
ideological insp ira tion  and leadersh ip , the reform ists looked to Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak, Swami Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghose rather than to 
M ahatma Gandhi. Influential leaders of the reform ist movement, such as 
Vinayak Dam odar Savarkar in his Hinduvata,  sought to define India as a 
H indu nation through a more militant form of Hinduism  than had existed 
since the establishm ent of British control over India. Sarvarkar perceived 
the problem to be fundamentally "psychological and what was required was 
an inner transform ation to rekindle a sense of national consciousness and 
social cohesion ."12 If the H indu fundam entalists succeed, the ramifications 
for India's internal and external policies will be significant. W ith the secular 
basis of the Indian state rem oved, India will most likely become a more 
assertive state.
If the H indu identity is elevated and expanded from a parochial, 
lim iting ideology to a national and expanding one, then  a basis for 
su bo rd ina ting  those a lte rna tive  and dam aging  id en tities  could be 
established. The Hindu agenda's ability to offer a basis for the resolution of, 
as opposed to the m ere m anagem ent of, the m ultiple secessionist and 
autonom ous m ovem ents is unique in the current political arena. Congress 
and the Janata party failed to identify long term  solutions to problem s 
emanating from social division .13
The transform ation  of the C ongress party  from  a grass roots 
organisation into the instrum ent of its leader and their coterie, the
11 Lajpat Rai as quoted in W. Andersen and S. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron , p. 29.
12 W. Andersen and S. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 34.
13 It is the thesis of Mohammed Ayoob that the current difficulties are the result of the 
distortion and subversion of those factors that made India function after independence. The 
four factors which have kept the country together were; 1. the liberal-democratic and mass 
appeal values of the Congress party, 2. the recognition by the founders of independent India of 
the need to reconcile subnational identities to the larger state, 3. the assimilative nature of 
the power structure to allow access to the underprivileged while not alienating the privileged 
4. the government’s commitment to secular ideas. Mohammed Ayoob, "Dateline India: The 
Deepening Crisis," Foreign Policy, winter 1991-2. This is disputed by S. Navlakha. The point 
stands in agreement that the current inaccessability to the power structure by the lower strata 
has exacerbated intra societal strife.
373
hightened allegiance to sub-national identities, the resistance to demands for 
increased access to the corridors of power by the underprivileged and the 
wavering state support for secularism have all served to shake the very 
foundations of the m odern Indian state. The strains of economic reform 
will serve to compound these fissures.
This dynamic, of the existing social structure loosing its ability to 
command the uncoerced allegiance of the people is not isolated to India. It is 
a phenomena which is pulling at the fabric of multi-ethnic societies around 
the w orld as they are increasingly incapable of accom m odating various 
group's dem ands to place their sub-national identities and values above the 
national identity. "When values cease being allocated in an acceptable 
fashion by either one or another elite, loyalties fade, and the stage is set for 
their redistribution and a consequent shift in authority patterns ."14 It is on 
the edge of this phase that India finds itself today.
The alienation and insecurity brought on by the breakdow n of 
social, moral and political norms have become major political 
issues in the tw entieth century, particularly in the developing 
countries w here new economic and adm inistrative systems 
have rapidly underm ined institutions and m oral certitudes 
which traditionally  defined a person ’s social function and 
relationship to authority .15
If the existing pillars of Indian secular society, such as they are, can not 
reverse the process of malaise which has beset them then the people will 
look to alternative identities to find realization of their aspirations. In 
seeking to quell conflict in India the centre m ust address the underlying 
problems or else the insurgency will reem erge. Solutions relying on the 
force of arms alone will have transient success at best.
This turning away from the existing order will probably take two 
directions. On the one hand the desire to realise a hightened m aterial 
standard of living will draw  people away from  the N ehruvian-socialist
14 Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive 
Suggestions for Future International Theory," International Studies Quarterly, Dec. 1991, p. 
377.
15 W. Andersen and S. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 1.
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model and tow ard a m ore W estern oriented m arket economy. This, if 
attainable in the short to mid term, may serve as the catalyst to bring the 
people once again behind the secular state. At the same time there is the 
danger that it will provoke further reactionary tendencies. If the Congress 
party can deliver a level of economic prosperity, it may stem the defection of 
allegiances. If it can not, then the im plications will not be lim ited to 
economic ideology but will span the spectrum  and may lead to further 
defections to the H indu fundam entalist cause. H indu fundam entalism , 
through its reinterpretation of traditional H induism , is at the same time 
appealing for its familiarity as for its representing change. W ith change can 
come the hope that the needs of the people for a sense of community and 
security can be realized even in a world which has come to be perceived as 
one of degeneration.
The three dom inant identities, cu ltures or idiom s w hich were 
predom inate in the political milieu at independence continue today. These 
concepts have not rem ained static nor have they been insulated from 
change. The relationships between, and definitions of, these concepts have 
evolved over time. One was the W estern idiom whose influence is most 
significantly portrayed in the adop tion  of the W estm inster style of 
governm ent. The prim ary repository of the W esternized idiom  is the 
national elite at the centre. The second and com petitive idiom  is the 
traditional idiom which is "rooted in the kin, caste and communal relations 
of village, locality and province ."16 We can think of the traditional idiom as 
having tendencies towards pragmatism or realism. A third, and uniquely 
Indian idiom, is the saintly idiom. This idiom  is that w hich derives its 
inspiration from the Mahatma and the idealistic conceptions of selflessness 
and devotion which are "immune to the mimicking of foreign m odels or 
from contam ination by the archaic superstitions and feudal practices of 
In d ian  society." m ost usually  p e rp e tu a te d  an d  u tiliz e d  by the 
traditionalists .17 The conflict betw een these idioms continues today. The 
Congress Party’s emphasis on economic reform and the BJP's emphasis on
16 Paul Brass, The New Cambridge Histoiy of India: The Politics of India Since Independence, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.14.
17 P. Brass, The New Cambridge History of India, p.14.
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H indutva are examples of this. As a result of the conflict betw een these 
idioms a reinterpreted national culture will emerge which may alter India's 
external paradigm .18
Contemporary strategic thinking will evolve within the context of a 
politicized H indu majority which will continue to see itself, and its values, 
as besieged by subcontinental m inorities who, through their destabilising 
influence, open India to external threat. The lack of strategic culture was a 
corollary of the strength of society over the state. As the state begins to 
consolidate its position over society a strategic culture will emerge to defend 
and justify it.
The earliest notions of the "security state" in India are rooted in the 
dawn of the Aryan civilization. The lives of the Vedic Aryans were centred 
on their societal notions of the cosmic order of things. In this way they 
became prim arily concerned w ith the preservation of Rta, or the m oral 
order. The concept of Dharma replaced Rta as the dom inant conception of 
the cosmic order that led to an understanding of the privileges, obligations 
and duties of man in Vedic society. As threats to the society grew it codified 
and supplem ented its laws w ith political m eans of social control and 
defence.
George Tanham has identified four key factors of Indian strategic culture: geography, 
culture, discovery of India's history and the legacy from the British Raj. In his discussion he 
correctly identifies the core perceptions of India's strategy of seeking to deny regional states 
the ability to act against Indian interests or of external states from using regional states as 
platforms to gain influence within India's sphere. Tanham bases his explanation of the 
dearth of Indian strategist on the Hindu conception of time and the nature of man’s existence 
when he posits the question: "if in their minds the future is unknown and unknowable, why 
plan? In its early stages Hinduism did plan for its defence. One of the worlds most ancient 
texts on statecraft, Kautilya's Arthasastra, delt extensively with Hindu society's defence by 
the state. The explanation for the lack of subsequent strategists of note is to be found in the 
difference between threats to the state and to Hindu society itself. Conflict between Hindu 
rulers did not necessarily pose a threat to social values. The initial conquests of India by 
Southwest and Central Asian peoples, or the subsequent British invasion, primarily 
threatened political India rather than Hindu society, due to the minority status of the 
conquerors. George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," The Washington Quarterly, winter 
1992, p. 134.
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A recourse had to be taken to the physical manifestation of the
Divine Power in the form of danda which was carried out by
the king with the help of a security organisation .19
In this way the king and his security organisation were entrusted with both 
the defence of Vedic society, from internal and external threats, and punitive 
responsibilities against those who transgressed the moral law.
Prior to independence the dom inant conceptualisation of the state was 
post facto in that it "retrospectivly coped w ith  the heterogeneity and 
contradictions inherent in Indian politics ."20 The W esternised political elite 
of the freedom struggle changed this through their preconceived utopian 
ideas of a desired society for India. This im ported conceptualisation of 
politics was accepted based on the expectations that the new ideological 
orientation of politics would allow m odernisation and integration for India 
as a whole. For failing to meet these expectations, secularism is being 
a b a n d o n e d  as In d ia  is in c reas in g ly  seek ing  an sw ers  th ro u g h  
rein terpretations of H induism . Further, the hegem onic designs of the 
Indian state will further alienate a people who have a strong and vibrant 
society operating largely independent of the state structure per se. It is the 
excesses and corruption of the m odem  secular state that are to blame for the 
atavistic response embodied in the H indu chauvinist movement. The best 
hope for the benevolen t secular state  of N eh ru 's  v ision rests w ith  
w idespread  and  rap id  econom ic developm en t that could placate a 
disgruntled populace. Secularism is unlikely to survive unscathed the two 
fold attack from the cynical m anipulation of politics, by an elite who's 
fortunes are w edded to the centre, or from the H indu backlash which seeks 
to redefine a pan Indian consciousness. Secularism's best hope, that of the 
opiate of economic prosperity, will itself serve to expand the m iddle class 
which have proven themselves to be a stronghold of BJP support. In this 
way the objective of N ehru and M ahatm a G andhi of developing an 
integrative, hom ogenised nationalism  that w ould engender tolerance, is
19 S.D. Trivedi, Secret Services in Ancient India, p. 5. The codes of Manu and the Arthasastra 
being two key examples of the codification of societal values and their defence, see also R.K. 
Gupta, Political Thought in Smrti Literature, (Allahabad: Allahabad University, 1969).
20 Ashis Nandy, "The Political Culture of the Indian State," Daedalus, fall 1989, p.3.
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surely under threat of being hijacked by the orthodoxy of H indu chauvinist 
ideology.
But inquiry into India's aspirations to great power status must ask 
more specifically what are the implications of these largely domestic changes 
for India's regional security posture. As discussed in previous chapters there 
exists a large degree of consensus in the threat perception and form ation of 
national security policy at the centre.21 This was noted by Prime Minister 
Singh before the Lok Sabha
At least on Defence, it has been our strength  that we are all 
united. And distinctions of party or other distinctions do not 
hold. That has been our strength. And we have always adhered 
to it.22
It is of added  in terest to note I.K. Gujral, the Janata G overnm ent's 
Ambassador to Moscow, was retained in that position by Indira and that he 
was subsequently m ade Foreign M inister in N ovem ber of 1989 by the 
National Front Government of V.P. Singh.23
General K. Sundarji (retd.) has articulated India's national security 
strategy as being a com ponent of the overall national strategy,24 He 
highlights the interconnectivity between the internal and external elements 
of national security. General Sundarji describes the development of national 
strategy as proceeding along the following lines:
21 There have been departures from mainstream political thought on how India should engage 
her strategic environment. An example of this would be the Jan Sangh's reservations over the 
Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954 on Tibet. TheJanSangh disaproved of the Panchsheela agreement 
and characterized it as a grave blunder. There are further examples of slight divergences in 
strategic orientation in the brief Janata period. These involved modifying the Non-Aligned 
position of India to more fully reflect its original intent. One of the causal factors for the large 
degree of unity in India's national security policy may be the domination of the structure by a 
Congress dominated system which was further increasingly centrally controlled and 
dominated over time. See also Raju Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of 
Strategy and Politics, (Meerut: Macmillan Company of India, 1978), p.71.
22 V. P. Singh, Lok Sabha Debates, 4/10/90, p.12035.
23 R. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy, p. 90.
24 The Five Year Defence Plan and the overall national plan are now coterminous.
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National Strategy
- National aims and objectives
- National vital interests
- Threats to vital national interests
- Overall national strategy to neutralize threats and maximise chances
of achieving national aims25
General Sundarji does not limit the national security strategy to a 
reactive role. He has speculated that it could include "our own force 
projection capability in areas of our interest, either in response to requests 
from friendly countries, or to back up coercive diplomacy."26 The relevance 
of the current challenge to the secular vision is that the national vision 
determines the "national aims and objectives ... and interests." The military 
seeks to achieve the objectives but it is the strategic culture of the elite, as 
m odified by the larger socio-political milieu, that determ ines national 
values.
The strategic vision being outlined by BJP President, M.M. Joshi, 
Admiral Nayyar (retd.), K. Subramanyam, General Sundarji, Jasjit Singh or 
A. K. Banerjee of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, among 
others reflects the present debate in India.27 A comm on them e running 
through contemporary Indian strategic thinking is that India should be more 
fully engaged within its immediate and extended region. Just how and why 
this process of engagement should be undertaken is a matter of debate.
A past example of how politics comes to influence strategic thought is 
dem onstrated by the East/W est split in the navy. There has been a split in 
the Navy in the late 1980s reflecting the division over the extent to which 
India should tilt to the West or w hether it should  m aintain  its close 
relationship with the Soviet Union. To an extent this debate within the 
Navy over the proper interpretation of non-alignm ent and it implications
25 General K. Sundarji, "Change and National Security" Indian Defence Review, July, 1990 
p.144.
26General K. Sundarji, "Change and National Security" p.144.
27 These views are formed on the basis of interviews.
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for the orientation of the services echoes the political divisions of the Janata 
period. 28
As previously discussed threat perception in India is dom inated by 
Pakistan and China.29 These are the only two states with contiguous borders 
who can directly threaten India's territorial integrity. India will continue to 
have unresolved border disputes with both countries for some time to come. 
Border tensions were very high in the Sumdorong Chu area in 1986 and in 
Kashmir in the Spring of 1990. The instability posed by the num erous 
secessionist and autonomous groups that oppose the legitimacy of the state is 
the single m ost serious threat and is in tertw ined w ith India's external 
relations. In Chapter Three, the dom estic and international aspects of 
security were discussed. While domestic security threats have not been the 
prim ary responsibility of the military, the inability of the civil authorities 
and the param ilitary forces to deal w ith these threats has increasingly 
involved the military in domestic law and order situations.
The problem of extra-regional power involvement in the region is a 
further aspect of the Indian threat perception m ap which is being redefined. 
The often cited reaction to the USS Enterprise carrier battle group's presence 
in the Indian Ocean region in 1971 served to rekindle Indian fears of 
dominance from across the seas. India was susceptible to the dominance of
The policy of diversification of arms procurement between the East and the West was 
emphasised by the Janata government. The Indian Navy is a mix of both Soviet designed 
ships, primarily based out of Vishakhapatnam in the East, and Western designed ships 
operating out of western Indian ports. Officers routinely travel to Western and Soviet Naval 
schools for the appropriate training. As a result, they have tended to develop corresponding 
affinities. Rear Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, who had trained on Soviet ships, alleged that 
his promotion to the post of Commander of the Western Fleet had been scuttled by a clique of 
pro Western Officers lead by then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nadkarni who had 
undergone training at the United States Naval War College. Nadkarni has since retired and 
has been replaced by Admiral Ramdas of the Eastern Fleet. Ramdas reviewed Bhagwat's 
case which then opened the way for Bhagwat’s appointment to the Command of the Eastern 
Fleet. Hamish McDonald, "Scuttling Rivals: Promotion Controversy Indicates Division in 
Navy," Far Eastern Economic Revieu\ 10/10/91, p. 24.
29 China does not easily fit into either the category of a regional or a extra-regional state. 
China proper is an East Asian state though it is connected to South Asia through Tibet. The 
history of Tibet places it between the influence of India and China and not entirely in either. 
In this regard Tibet falls into the category of trans-regional area along with Burma and 
Afghanistan who are both closely associated with, though not part of South Asia.
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extra-regional power projection across the seas in the past and, as such, she is 
concerned to let neither that avenue of attack, nor the traditional overland 
invasion route from the northwest of the subcontinent, to be used against it 
in the future. The relative ease with which the Portuguese, French, Dutch, 
and British gained footholds in the subcontinent from their position of 
maritime superiority has not been forgotten in India.
In the Cold War, India hoped to minimise superpow er influence in 
the Indian Ocean region by m anoeuvring in the gap created by bipolarity. 
India will find it difficult to come to term s w ith its increasing economic 
dependence on the West. Developm ent considerations will force India to 
m oderate its independent stance in the short term though it will m aintain 
its independence on such issues as m issile technology and nuclear 
proliferation. The realization that a m odus vivendi must be reached with 
the West has been identified by the foreign policy and strategic policy elite for 
some time. The delay comes from the politicians who are not eager to depart 
from the old rhetoric of independence within the NAM.
In identifying w hat is new in the new w orld order, w riters of the 
Euro-American centre30 are presenting an agenda which does not reflect the 
priorities of what is being defined as the new periphery .31 Bipolarity allowed 
some states to gain a certain degree of leverage. As a multi-centred economic 
world emerges priorities and structures will be redefined which may or may 
not be an im provem ent from the perspective of those states occupying a
30 There are an increasing number of articles addressing the issue of the NWO. See Fred 
Halliday, "International Relations: Is there a New Agenda?" Millenium, spring 1991, pp.57- 
72, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Movement," Foreign Affairs, v. 70 (1), pp. 23-33 
and John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs, v. 70 (2), pp. 
102- 22.
31 Buzan argues that in the NWO the centre has subordinated the former third world, now 
better described as the periphery, as well as the ideology of communism. Buzan also 
speculates about the possible increased North-South conflict and the rising prominence of 
Islam in the South. Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first 
Century "International Affairs, v. 67 1991, pp. 431-51, John Chipman, "Third World Politics 
and Security in the 1990s: The World Forgetting, By the World Forgot?" The Washington 
Quarterly, winter 1991, pp. 151 - and Kurt Cambell and Thomas Weiss, "The Third World in 
the Wake of Eastern Europe," The Washington Quarterly, spring 1991, pp. 91 -108.
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more peripheral position .32 This may also be true in geostrategic terms as 
the United States remains the world's single remaining superpower.
India’s external posture is ultim ately dependent on the degree to 
which it is internally cohesive. If India is further divided by its multiplicity 
of fissiparous tendencies it will expend its energies inw ardly. If it is 
successful in thwarting subnational agendas, either through the use of force 
or through the panacea of economic development, it will expand and project 
itself outwardly. How it projects itself will be determ ined by India’s sense of 
vision. India in this way continues to move through its historical cycles of 
unity and disintegration and of tolerance and assertiveness.
Secularism and H indu fundamentalism are competing for the right to 
redefine India's vision and as a result its external orientation. Both idioms 
seek to colonise the mind sets of both the people at large and the decision 
making elite in particular. Just where this struggle will lead India will be the 
result of the complex in terplay of India 's dom estic, geopolitical and 
economic circum stances as they are hand led  by the decision-m aking 
structure. The national elite will continue to be in competition w ith sub­
national elites in this attem pt to reshape Indians identities. If the centre can 
continue to m anage the core issue areas it may successfully avert a 
reorientation of the national idiom . If it is unsuccessful, the H in d u  
fundam entalist agenda may increasingly become a part of India's vision as 
India strives to deal w ith m ultiple stresses on its society and external 
relations.
In addition to, and connected with, this idiom atic question, Ind ia’s 
military capabilities will continue to influence other states actions by forcing 
them to consider the consequences of decisions that may be counter to 
India's interests. In this way India's capabilities may not be used in a direct
32 For South Asia the emergence of trade blocs could present a significant problem as other 
regions may prove to be more attractive destinations for investment. Japan will continue to 
focus in East and Southeast Asian while Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will 
absorb European assistance and investment.
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coercive sense but in a much more subtle way. The essence of the value of 
status is the ability to influence outcomes without overtly seeking to do so.
With status derived from other states perception of India as a capable 
and powerful actor, India will be allowed a greater regional and global role. 
Incidents such as the 1971 war with Pakistan, the M aldives and Sri Lankan 
interventions and India's nuclear and missile program m es have done a lot 
to alter external perceptions of India's "status.” If India's aspirations are not 
in part acquiesced to, further demonstrations of power will be used to affect 
Ind ia 's  position . It is im p o rtan t to d raw  a d istinc tion  betw een  
acknowledging the legitimate position of the worlds largest democracy with 
appeasem ent. While India is not about to em bark on a cam paign of 
territorial expansion it does seek to have a preponderant influence within 
South Asia and the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. There are socio­
cultural and historical factors which legitimise a benevolent, dom inan t 
Indian influence within its South Asian sphere. What could be destabilising 
is if India comes to redefine its sphere in an expansion ists m anner. This 
may come about as a result of a change in the national idiom. It is for this 
reason that an understanding of India's external posture is so reliant on a 
firm understanding of India's internal developments.
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APPENDIX I 
Indian identity nodes
This appendix presents a more detailed overview of the nine key identity 
nodes that are viewed as the sources of allegiance and conflict in India 
and South Asia.
Religion
The pervasiveness of religion in the subcontinent is such that the 
secular world is encompassed by the religious.
The brave brothers are staunch lovers of their country, but 
they are Mussulmans first and everything else afterwards. It 
must be so with every religiously-minded m an.1
This is different from the dichotomised paradigm  of the W estern m ind, 
where religion and the secular are distinct. Nehru, when asked in 1958 
what had been his greatest difficulty since independence responded that it 
was "creating a secular state in a religious country."2 The religious 
composition of India, according to the 1981 census, subdivides the Indian 
population by its denom ination into the following percentages; H indu 
82.6%, Muslims 11.4%, Christians 2.4%, Sikhs 2%, Buddhist and Jains 
1.2% w ith  Z oroastrians and o thers m aking the balance.3 The 
demographic distribution of believers has been an additional source of 
conflict on the subcontinent for m uch of its history. Of the religious 
groups, the interrelationship betw een the H indu , M uslim  and Sikh 
communities are the most politically contentious.
H induism ’s differing levels of w orship  vary from devotional 
theism to the many popular deities, (Hanuman, Ganesha, Kali et al.), to a 
more ascetic mysticism which seeks the renunciation of the individual 
and a merging w ith the Brahman world spirit. These different aspects
1 Mahatma Gandhi, Septemeber 1921 as quoted in Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of 
Communalism, p. 233.
2 T.N. Madan, "Religion in India," Daedalus, Fall 1989, p. 139.
3 From the 1981 census as compiled in table 2.3 of Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: 
Essays in Indian Politics, (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 46.
384
reflect the polytheism  of the Vedic, the m etaphysics of Karma of 
U panishadic philosophy and the leg itim ation  of bo th  ritua l and 
knowledge through the latter Bhagavad Gita. The result is that within 
H induism  action (karma) intelligence (jnana) and devotion (bhakti) are 
acceptable paths to enlightenm ent (moksha). H induism  conceives of 
four stages of the cycle of man. The first is that of the student. This is 
followed by the life of the householder, the retiree and the sanyasan. 
Following the retirem ent of the householder there is the prospect of 
renunciation of worldly life through the path of the sanyasan who seeks 
to break the cycle of reincarnation through transcendence. Dharma is a 
multifaceted concept that represents the "cosmological, ethical, social and 
legal principles that provide the basis for the notion of an ordered 
universe."4 In this way dharm a is the design of H indu life as moksha is 
of transcendence.
To the W estern m ind there are some perplexing dichotomies in  
Hinduism . H indu individuals seek at the same time liberation and 
com m unity.5 The focus on the next world seems to de-emphasise life in 
this world though it is each ind iv idual’s conduct in this w orld that 
shapes his, or her, destiny in the next. H induism  is rigidly hierarchical 
through it’s pervasive and conservative caste structure though it is 
counterintuitively not a centralised religion. H induism ’s decentralised 
chaotic nature has been a source of H indu society's resilience. It has also 
been the source of subcontinental political organisation’s weakness. This 
is made evident w hen comparing the relatively inconsequential impact 
that successive waves of invasion over the centuries have had on India 
as opposed to, for example, the extensive impact which the United States 
had on Japan in a limited period after World War Two.6
Caste remains as a core identity of the people although M ahatma 
G andh i and B.R. A m bedkar spoke out against the no tion  of 
untouchability. In 1991 V.P. Singh's secular governm ent sought to 
extend the quota system of government employment to include backward
4 T.N. Madan, "Religion in India,” p. 118.
5 Rajni Kothari, "The Indian Enterprise Today," Daedalus, Fall 1989, p. 56.
6 Charles Correa, "The Public, the Private and the Sacred," Daedalus, Fall 1989, p. 110.
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castes, as well as scheduled castes and tribes. These moves provoked a 
backlash from those caste groups excluded from the quotas. The H indu 
majority is increasingly resentful of Islamic or other m inority groups. 
While Muslims constitute 25% of the subcontinent as a whole they are 
only 11.5% of the population of India. Though the Muslim minority is 
presently on the defensive, their history is one of conquest.
Islam first came to the subcontinent in 711 AD w ith  the Arab 
navies of M uhammad bin Quasim who established the first Arab enclave 
in the subcontinent in the Indus river delta. Islamic influence grew 
under the Delhi Sultanate of 1206 - 1526 which was founded by Central 
Asian Turkic peoples. Due to the lack of significant num bers of 
conversions before the Mughal period Islam was largely restricted to the 
ruling class of Persians, Arabs and Turks of predom inantly  Sunni and 
Sufi belief. W ith the reign of the M ughals, 1526-1858, w idespread 
conversion began to expand the ranks of Islam in the subcontinent. 
During this period Islamic rule varied in its treatm ent of the H indu 
majority. This ranged from the syncretic beliefs of Akbar to the religious 
intolerance of Aurangzeb.7
The frustration of Kashmiri Muslims in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir has led to increasing levels of tension and violence betw een the 
Muslim inhabitants of the state and the centre. The 64.2%8 figure for 
Muslim representation in the population of Jam mu and Kashm ir has 
been dramatically increased by the exodus of H indus from Kashmir in the 
wake of the turmoil of 1989-92.9 If Kashmir is considered independent of
7 Richard Eaton, "Islam," in Francis Robinson ed. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
339-43.
8 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox, p. 54.
9 It has been alleged that the government did little to stem the emigration of Hindus from 
Kashmir to facilitate military operations against the Muslim insurgents. The argument 
that the removal of the Hindu minority from the area was done to prevent their being 
caught between the armed frorces and the growing the opposition. Without Hindus in the 
valley, the armed forces can assume that all who remain are part of the problem. Implicit 
in this, is an attitude which, through its callousness in not making a distinction amongst 
the moderate and more extreme elements of the remaining Muslim populace, has polarised 
elements which would have otherwise been more moderate. Had the governement acted 
to keep the Hindu minority in the valley then the conduct of the security forces would
Jammu, and the security forces are not counted, the Muslim percentage of 
the population would be closer to 98 or 99 percent.
The on-going destabilised situation in Punjab stems from Sikhs, 
(m eaning "disciple" in Punjabi), alternative identity  to H indu India. 
Sikhism is based on the teachings of ten venerated gurus. The first, Guru 
Nanak (1469-1539), and the last, Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1539), are by far 
the most important for their impact on the faith. Guru Nanak developed 
Sikhism as a response to the degenerated position of those living in the 
northw est of India. The subsequent w aves of Afghan and Turkic 
invasions coupled w ith a rigid caste social structure had reduced the 
quality of spiritual and temporal life. Nanak descibed his age as "...like a 
knife. Kings are butchers. Religion has taken wings and flown. In the 
dark  night of falsehood, I can not see w here the m oon of tru th  is 
rising."1- In 1499 N anak was to begin his Teachings that integrated 
elements of Sufisim, Buddhism  and Hinduism  into a self empowering 
religion for the people of his community. Despite its roots, Sikhism is 
more than an amalgam of concepts derived from these earlier religions. 
Nanak's teachings were adopted by a people seeking to im prove their 
existence through a redefinition of their community as different from the 
larger Islamic and H indu communities around them. This struggle for 
an independent identity, and an improved quality of life, amid a hostile 
environm ent has led the Sikhs to develop a m artial and som ew hat 
m ilitant world view. The basic tenets of contem porary Sikhism were 
d raw n together and stabilized w ith the ten th  G uru Gobind Singh. 
Gobind Singh formed the Khalsa to protect the faith and established the 
outwardly distinctive aspects of Sikh appearance, the comb, dagger, steel 
bracelet, uncut hair and breeches, which the vast m ajority of Sikhs 
wear.11
The perception of the H indu majority, that too m uch has been 
done by secularist governm ents to accomm odate India’s religious and
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possibly have been more restrained for fear that in their excesses they would injure Hindus 
or Hindu interests.
Ram Narayan Kumar and George Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle, (Delhi: Chanakya 
Publications, 1991), p. 1.
11 John Noss, Man 's Religions, (New York: Macmillan Press, 1980), pp. 220-229.
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subnational groups, has lead to expanded interest in resurgent H indu 
groups within India. Such Hindu fundam entalist movements have been 
m obilised on the political arena to fu rther their dem ands for a 
uncontested  central position for H induism  in India. The role of 
H induism  and the emerging national identity will be explored at greater 
length below.
Territory
The notion of India as a unified territorial entity is an historically 
changing concept. While large parts of India had been brought under 
common titular rule under the Maury an, 313 - 226 BC, Vijayanagar, 1343 - 
1565, and Mughal, 1556 - 1707, empires, this was done through a diffused 
netw ork of alliances w ith more localised centres of power. Centralised 
control did not begin to extend over the totality of the territory now 
known as India until the latter stages of British colonial rule. This was 
conducted through an indirect style of colonialism that relied on local 
princes and caste and communal divisions to facilitate its rule. The 
m odern Indian state continues to attem pt to extend its authority and 
legitimacy throughout the land.
A centralised state could emerge only w hen governm ental 
institutions were established whose authoritative basis was 
normatively independent of Brahminical legitim ation, and 
whose regulatory and coercive capabilities penetrated down 
to the localities.12
The growth of ethno-nationalist dem ands to establish independent 
control over their traditional lands threatens India with breakup at the 
very juncture in its history when it is poised to take on a regionally 
preponderant position.
If the fragm entation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are an 
indication of the direction in which multi-ethnic states will move, then 
India and Pakistan may find their territorial configurations will be altered 
in the years ahead. Subnational insurgent movem ents are already firmly
12 Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline 
of a Social Order, (Bombay: Oxford university Press, 1989), p. 7.
entrenched in Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeast. There exists a further 
rift betw een N orth and South India which is reinforced by linguistic, 
racial and cultural factors.
An interesting discussion of man's regulation of access to territory 
and the relationship of individual allegiance to territory is explored in  
Jean Gottm ann's The Significance of Territory.13 At different junctures 
and in different places in history access to territory has been granted for 
some, and not others, depending on differing notions of allegiance. By 
the close of the first century AD, access to territory between the Caliphates 
and Christendom was restricted by the criterion of religion. Due to the 
political sensitivity of India’s Northeast, access to foreigners traveling in  
the country is restricted. In the case of Kashmir, non-Kashmiris are not 
allowed to own property. This policy is opposed by the BJP. W ithin these 
states the indigenous inhabitants are seeking to restrict access to territory 
on the basis of tribal allegiance and religious identity.
Conflict arises w hen the organisation exerting political control 
over a given territory establishes rules of access based on differing notions 
of allegiance and identity from those who inhabit the territory. In the 
N ortheast, the Indian state's priority is to establish more firmly the 
centre's control over its distant periphery. The centre dem ands that the 
people of the region more closely identify w ith India. Set against the 
backdrop of the 1962 border war with China, the centre's desire to control 
access to the region reflects the paramountcy of national perspective over 
the more localised tribal allegiances of the peoples who inhabit the 
region.
This concept of a zero sum game, with either loyalty to the centre 
or to the tribal identity, has led to centrist policies which suppress and 
subordinate alternative allegiances to the centre. It is the elite's 
perception of threats to the existing order, and their attendant anxiety, 
which posses a threat to pluralist democracy.
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1 3 Jean Gottmann, The Significance of Territory, (Charlottesville: The University Press of 
Virginia, 1973), pp. 27 - 33.
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... grounded in deep anxieties over recent violence which 
have created an appetite for statist solutions. It is argued 
that these anxieties, which have contributed to the growth of 
abrasive conflict and violence, pose a greater threat to open, 
rep re sen ta tiv e  politics and  to accom m odative social 
relations than does the violence itself.14
A policy dedicated to changing the perceptions of dissident elements, so 
that they perceive the centre as supporting their efforts of self realisation, 
w ould lessen conflict and enhance security. Such a policy w ould 
necessitate a fundam ental redirection of the perceptions of the centre 
which is unlikely to occur in the current political climate. Policies that 
allow for some degree of local control which protect minority rights, such 
as article 370 in Kashmir, could be extended to change the periphery's 
perception of the centre. The centre would gain through reduced levels 
of conflict.
The security of the Indian state continues to be underm ined by 
perceptions that exacerbate conflict w hich then loosens the centre's 
control of the periphery. This presents security problems for the state vis 
a vi its neighbours. If the com peting allegiances of the periphery, 
w hether religious, tribal, ethnic, etc., are allowed freedom  to express 
them selves w ithin the state structure then the various sub-national 
groups would come to meld their prim ary identities to that of India. 
India w ould in this way be perceived as pro tecting , ra ther than 
threatening, the subnational unit. Central attem pts to rectify these 
situations through economic incentives may have the effect of increasing 
the resentment of the H indu majority of autonom ous groups.
The weak linkages between higher orders of central control with 
the society at large have, over the course of Indian history led to the 
increased im portance of local control ra ther than  the regional or 
subcontinental authority. Consequentially the local principalities became 
the "basic building blocks of the political order."15 It has been the 
strength of m ultiple small actors that has kept Indian em pires from
14 James Manor, Conflict Studies 212.
15 Ravinder Kumar, The Past and Present and Indian Dialogue," Daedalus, Fall, 1989, p. 
38.
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consolidating their control of the subcontinent for long. This has led to a 
history of shifting regional and subcontinental empires while at the local 
level Indian civilisation has been upheld by society and petty kingdoms. 
The current peripheral turm oil may be the precursor to yet another 
devolution of power from the centre to the periphery. This tendency is 
already shifting in terms of the background and power base of the MPs.
Caste
The concept of caste is closely related to the H indu concept of 
dharm a and to Hindu society itself. Caste continues to play a pervasive 
role in establishing allegiances and legitimacy of governm ents in India. 
A partial explanation of the high degree of deference which has been 
traditionally allocated to political leadership in India stem s from the 
sociological implications of H induism .16 "Religious symbolism became 
attached to the notion of 'hierarchical collectivity' in which the use of 
concentrated politico-econom ic force w as circum scribed by m oral 
obligation."17 This sentiment appears to have contributed to the freedom 
struggles ability to mobilize the people. H induism 's prim ary basis has 
traditionally been in the locality or region. This is established through 
the profusion of jati and the localised source of legitimacy to the 
Kshatriya upholders of H indu society by local communities of Brahmins. 
Ex-untouchables, Harijans or scheduled castes, constitute 14.6% of India's 
population.18 The caste identity of the untouchable is not prim arily 
linked to territory as are many of the alternative identity nodes within 
India. The improvement of their status as a consequence of the ideology 
of secularism which became part of the freedom  struggle, potentially 
leads them to a more nationally based allegiance in the ideology of 
independence. The conservative aspects of H indu society exert a 
conservative pull on Indian society.
16 The caste background of India’s Prime Ministers is as follows: Jawaharlal Nehru 
Pandit Brahmin, Lai Bahadur Shastri Kayastha, Indira Gandhi Pandit Brahmin, 
Morarji Desai Brahmin, Charan Singh Jat, Rajiv Gandhi Parsi-Brahmin, V.P. Singh 
Kashatriya, Chandra Shekhar, Narasimha Rao, Brahmin.
17 Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, Dominance and State Power in Modern India, pp. 1-2.
18 M. Weiner, The Indian Paradox, p. 55.
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The continuing relevance of caste in India was dem onstrated by 
the pro longed and bloody rio ts over the decision by the Singh 
governm ent, in 1990, to implement the M andal Commission Report's 
recommendations for increased quotas for backward castes. The Brahmin 
reaction to the M andal Com m ission riots w as negative from  two 
perspectives. The upper castes, by occupying a majority of position in the 
secular governments bureaucracy, have a vested interest in that structure. 
Though only 5.5% of the overall population Brahmins have dom inated 
government. Their response attem pted to thw art the challenge to their 
legitimacy to occupy a dom inant position in society. The extensive 
coverage devoted to the self immolation protests by disillusioned youths 
of the M andal commission report's recom m endations by the Brahmin 
dominated media was an attempt to shift public sentiment away from the 
other backward castes (OBCs). The 1980 report recommended that 27% of 
governm ent jobs be reserved for OBCs. OBCs, w hile 52% of the 
population, have only ”12.5% of governm ent jobs and only 4.7% of jobs 
at officer level."19 This reservation, when added to the existing 22.5% of 
governm ent jobs that are reserved for untouchables would reserve just 
under half of federal jobs.
Politics
The Ind ian  governm ent has ad ap ted  its ad o p ted  W estern 
parliamentary system to fit its particular political m odus operandi. The 
dom inant feature of governm ent is the pragm atic approach to power. 
In d iv id u a l po litica l a llegiances, pa rty  coalitions, constitu tiona l 
amendments, declarations of state and national emergency are all effected 
under the dictates of the need to capture and retain power. This cynical 
m anipulation of the process for the benefit of those who are part of the 
system has begun to evoke a response from the electorate. The last two 
national elections w itnessed voter defections from traditional voting 
patterns.
The extension of politics beyond the ballot box to extra party 
political organisations, mass rallies, fasts, dham as, self im m olations and
19 "Caste Adrift," The Economist, 11/21/92, p.28.
rioting all expand the spectrum of political action and invoke repressive 
m easures by the state. Given the volatile nature of Indian politics the 
state has extraordinary powers at its disposal for the maintenance of law 
and order. The trend has been for expanded resources to meet increasing 
disturbances among the people. The police force has grown from 468,000 
in 1951 to 904,000 in 1981.20
The subordination of the lower castes by the dominant caste groups 
and the easy m anipulation of vote bank politics is slowly changing.21 
The death of the N ehru /G andh i dynasty and the rise of at least broad 
regional, if not truly national, political parties other than the Congress 
party will serve to bring more alternative voices into the political process. 
This will open the possibility for Indian dem ocracy to becom e less 
manipulable, and as a consequence, more stable. This may be possible as 
a resu lt of the diffusion of pow er th rough  a m ulti-party  political 
configuration. It may on the other hand throw  the country deeper into 
division if party politics follow and accentuate the social cleavages of the 
society 22 The former will allow increased open discussion of politics and 
may reinvigorate the system with a degree of idealism while the latter 
may throw the country into bloody and divisive conflict.
Class
Despite the presence of various W estern political ideologies which 
have a strong basis in class politics, and issues concerning the ownership 
of the m eans of production, class continues to be less prom inent than 
other identity nodes. It figures in the identity of the elites more than the 
m asses and dispossessed. A class basis has to an extent been  a
211 Paul Brass, "Politics in India," in The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, p. 181.
21 One of the earlier analysts to pick up this theme was Francine Frankie, "India's 
Democracy in Transition," World Policy Journal, summer 1990, p. 553.
22 India has been an interesting anomaly to the index of cleavage alignment and ethnic 
fractionalisation in that the Congress party has subsumed many diverse perspectives 
within its fold. This is not likely to continue due to the passing of the generation that 
went through the freedom struggle and the increasingly corrupt pursuit of power by many 
politicians and the international trend toward ethno-nationalist realisation. For a 
discussion of the Congress Party and the social cleavage theory see P. Chibber and j. 
Petrocik, The Puzzle of Indian Politics: Social Cleavages and the Indian Party System," 
British Journal of Political Science, April, 1989, pp. 192-5.
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determ ining factor for political party  affiliation in India. In general 
Congress has been the party of the lower levels of society, while the 
parties of the left have been led by the left leaning upper levels of the 
social strata. Since the em phasis has shifted away from issues of 
developm ent to inter-com m unal strife, class has been a less significant 
factor in political orientation.
Traditionally m odern Indian political elites have tended to lean 
towards leftist ideology. A study conducted in 1971 found Indian political 
elites self identification with the extreme left to be 2.3%, the left 30.6%, 
the centre 57.9%, the right 8.5%, and  the extrem e righ t .6%.23 
Interestingly the study found no strong evidence for correlation of 
caste and income with ideology along the lines of the usual class ideology 
linkage models..." These findings indicate a larger importance of political 
orientation to class, or even caste background, when dealing w ith issues 
of political economy. The five variables used to establish in ter­
correlations were economic control, bank nationalisation, ceiling on 
property, strikes and gheraoes and land grabs. All of these issues are 
fundamentally economic issues. Contrary to w hat one would normally 
expect in other societies, class did not dictate political orientation am ongst 
the elite.
Race
The basic racial divide in India, betw een the northern Aryans and 
the southern Dravidians is a blurred one. The Aryans are thought to 
have migrated into the subcontinent in the second millenium BC. Since 
they have mixed w ith  the darker skinned D ravidians, though there 
remains a visible difference between the lighter skined northerners and 
the darker southerners. In the north and east of India there are a number 
of peoples of Mongol descent. A dded to this are the few negroid 
inhabitants of the Andam an and Nicobar islands. While Dravidian and 
A ryan Indians are, to outsiders, b roadly  sim ilar in appearance a
23 Subrata K. Mitra and V.B. Singh, "Social Class and Belief Systems in the Indian 
Political Elite," Indian journal of Political Science, March, 1979, p. 43. The sample was 
compiled from the responses given by 800 political leaders at the state, district, 
parliamentary constituency and assembly constituency levels.
394
distinction is made by Indians based on skin colour. L ighter skin is 
considered to be more attractive. Beyond this, other factors such as caste 
(represented by the strength of the non-B rahm an m ovem ents of the 
south) or linguistic differences (southerners' resentm ent of attem pts for 
H indi linguistic dom inance) are of im portance in creating separate 
identities.
The history of the Dravida movem ent includes notions of race as a 
source of separate identity. The D ravidian m ovem ent started  as an 
attem pt to gain political and economic pow er for non-Brahmin, Tam il 
speaking, southern  Indian, D ravid ian  peoples. The identity  of the 
m ovem ent had race, caste, language, territorial, and racial components. 
During the 1920s Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, in articulating the 
objectives of the D ravida m ovem ent, called for the creation of a 
D ravidian state to be com posed of Tamils, Malayalis, Telugus and 
Kannadigas and to be named Dravida N adu. The Dravida Kazhagam 
(DK) saw independence as a victory for the Aryan Brahmins of the north. 
W ith independence the DK became the D ravida M unnetra Kazhgam 
(DMK) and shifted its emphasis from race and caste to class issues related 
to Tamil ethno-linguistic identity  and the n o rth /so u th  split of the 
country. The new DMK scored electoral victory’ by polling 15% of the 
vote in the 1957 general election. A constitutional am endm ent in 1963 
m ade successionism illegal. The need to capture H indu votes, and the 
independent Tamil identity, as opposed to a racial one based on Dravida, 
made the decision to abandon the objective of an independent Dravidian 
state a forgone conclusion. As a result of this more moderate position the 
DMK captured the Tamil N adu governm ent in 1967 and 1971.24 The 
Tamil ethnic identity became more central to the identity of the party. In 
this way the movement, with its origins as a racial-separatist movement, 
came to emphasise an autonomous ethnic identity.25
K.M. Panikkar has conceptualised India as in reality two Indias. 
The northern  India being "Aryavarta, w ith its centre in the Gangetic
24 P.K. Balachandran, "The Changing Face of the Dravida Movement," The Business and 
Political Observer, 12/19/90.
25 A.B. Mathur, "Dravidian Heritage: MGR and Tamil Nadu," The Indian Journal of 
Political Science, Jan.-March 1988, p. 121.
Valley and the other Deccan." Despite the unity of culture and religion 
he is of the opinion that "Any attem pt to impose a unification by the 
more populous North over the people of the South will be disasterous, 
for it will awaken the latent racial feelings of difference."26
Ideology
There are two general ideological traditions in m odern  India. 
Their origin is to be found either in the indigenous roots of the country 
or in im ported W estern perspectives. This ideological split is reflected 
demographically. The urban, educated, upper and m iddle classes have 
m ore readily adopted W estern ideologies. The Congress m ovem ent 
initially found its support among these educated classes. It was only after 
M ahatm a Gandhi rearticulated the freedom  struggle that the Congress 
m ovem ent became an all India movement. In many ways the Congress 
party has survived by being different things to different groups. A recent 
developm ent in the elections of 1989 and 1991 has been the increasing 
appeal of H indu revisionist ideology among the growing ranks of the 
urban middle classes.
Percentage of Indian population in urban areas
1941 12.8
1951 17.3
1961 18
1971 19.9
1981 23.327
In a class sense the traditional power base of the Congress party is 
being eroded, apparently because of the corruption of the secular ideal. 
As the people are increasingly coming to believe that secularism is no 
longer a viable ideology for the country's governance they will defect to 
alternative perspectives. This may well m ean a retu rn  to indigenous 
idioms such as are being articulated by the VHP, the Shiv Sena and the 
BJP.
26 K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History, p.90.
27 Frank Conolon, "Urbanisation," in The Encyclopedia of India," pp. 52, 56.
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W h ile  W este rn  id eo lo g ies  have  been  d o m in a n t since 
independence there are many ways in which Indian traditions have been 
incorporated into the W estern governm ental system. The durbar or 
audience given by im portant politicians to allow the people to appeal 
directly for assistance or patronage continues as part of political life. The 
village panchayat or council was likewise revived as an indigenous 
political tradition at the local level. The Rath Yatra of L.K. Advani and 
the attem pts of the Kar Sevaks to reclaim  the tem ple at A yodhya 
dem onstrate the effectiveness of traditional ideology as a source of 
political mobilisation. There exists tension betw een the traditional 
conservative and hierarchical social structure and an ideology which, at 
least in its rhetoric, seeks to prom ote egalitarianism  and equality of 
opportunity. These principles are built in to  the constitution. Both 
traditions have spawned a variety of particular ideologies: from H indu 
tolerance to H indu chauvinism and from Naxalite Marxism to Fabian 
Socialism.
Tribe
Peoples of tribal origin make up 7.7% of the population.28 The 
Advivasis are not divided by jatis and tend to be either Christian or 
Anim ist rather than H indu. Tribal groups are found in pockets in 
various part of the country. Some of the bigger tribal groups are the 
Gonds, Bhils, Santals, Oraons, Minas and M undas.29 For the purposes of 
our inquiry those other tribal groups inhabiting territory on the northeast 
periphery  of India (which will be discussed below), are of greater 
importance for their destabilising effect on the ability of the centre to 
control diverse elements w ithin the m ulti-ethnic society that is India. 
Their connections across the frontier to Bangladesh, Burma and China 
have given the groups of the N ortheast access to external support for 
their secessionist and autonomous desires. This subsequently influences 
India's posture and relations with its neighbours.
28 Paul Brass, The Nero Cambridge History of India, p. 179.
29 While these larger groups form roughly half of the tribal population, it is the tribal 
groups of the northeast border regions that figure more prominently in the connection 
between identity, centre periphery relations within India, and the relationship between 
internal and external conflict.
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Language
The following H indu proverb captures the diversity of language in  
India. "Every two miles the w ater do th  change and every four the 
dialect."30 The Indian Constitution recognises fourteen languages. Some 
30 to 40 percent of the population speak Hindi. The continuing efforts of 
the electorally crucial political heartland of U ttar Pradesh and the rest of 
the Hindi belt to have H indi adopted as the national language have 
encountered considerable resistance from Bengal and the South. Anti 
Hindi riots erupted in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and A ndhra Pradesh in the 
face of legislation which would have m ade Hindi the national language 
in 1965. As a result English rem ains the com prom ise language of 
governm ent.31 Judging from  a com parison  of English language 
newspaper readership, as compared with Hindi language readership, over 
the period 1960 to 1983 English has dropped from 21% to 19% while H indi 
has increased its readership from 20% to 29%.
Linguistic divisions of India
Language Speakers
(millions)
% of population
H indi 162.6 29.7
Telugu 44.8 8.1
Bengali 44.8 8.1
M arathi 42.3 7.7
Tam il 37.7 6.9
U rdu 28.6 5.2
Gujarati 25.9 4.7
Malayalam 21.9 4
Kannada 21.7 4
Oriya 19.9 3.6
Punjabi 16.5 3
Assamese 8.9 1.6
Kashm iri 2.4 .4
Sanskrit .002
Source: C. Baxter, et al, Government and Politics in South Asia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1987), p. 48. As based on the census of 1977.
30 Hindu proverb, "Peoples of South Asia/'National Geographic, December 1984.
31 Z. Khalilzad, T. George, R. Litwak and S. Chubin, Security in Southern Asia, (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 86-7.
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While dem onstrating the slight drop in the preference for English in the 
informed populace the statistics also attest to the primacy of non-English 
or Hindi vernacular language papers.32
There are at least two key levels at which languages becomes 
involved in the definition of the in group and the out group. At the 
national level there is the debate as to w hether Hindi or English should 
be used as the language of government. The Hindi speaking belt across 
the north of India staunchly supports Hindi, while a majority of the non- 
Hindi speakers prefer English as the neutral compromise language. The 
second level at which language comes into play is the state level. Each of 
the states of India has a state recognised language. According to the 1971 
Census 17% of the overall population live w ithout a state where they are 
dom inant linguistic group.33
The constituen t assem bly recom m ended that H indi and the 
Devanagri script be adopted as India’s national language and that English 
should remain for a period of fifteen years to facilitate the transition. The 
constitution, which came into effect on 26 January 1950, stated that "The 
official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagri script, [and 
that] ... for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this 
constitution, the English language shall continue to be used for all the 
official purposes of the Union ...”34 Articles 343-51 of the constitution 
m ade provisions for the use of language within and between states. The 
constituent assembly's recom m endations and constitutional provisions 
were received by the south as Hindi imperialism. An official language 
commission was established in 1956 to address the problem and affirmed 
the objective of Hindi as the national language but was unsure of the 
previously set time table for conversion. The states reorganisation 
commission led to the passage of the States' Reorganisation Act of 1956
32 Paul Brass, The Neu> Cambridge History of India, p. 145.
33 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics, (Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1989), p. 44. Assam and Tripura were recognised in the census as states while 
the other states of the northeast were not.
34 Excerpts from the constitution are drawn from L.S. Shastri, The Constitution of India, 
(Allahbad: Law Book Company, 1951), pp. 166 - 70 as referenced in R. K. Barz, "Hindi 
Since Independence," in Jim Masselos, ed., India Creating a Modern Nation, (New Delhi: 
Sterling publishers, 1990), p. 97.
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which reopened debate along linguistic lines. Rioting of Gujarati and 
Marathi speakers in Bombay state led to the bifurcation of Bombay into 
present day Gujarat and Maharashtra.
Opposition to the adoption of Hindi resulted in the passage, in May 
of 1963, of the Official Languages Act which provided for English to be 
continued as the official language in addition to Hindi. Further states 
could conduct their business in languages other than Hindi or English 
with the provision that legislation be translated into these two languages.
The 1967 am endm ent gave the non H indi speaking states an effective 
veto on the language issue. This has had the effect of sm oothing out 
m uch of the controversy at the centre-state and inter-state levels though 
the issue periodically rises though with less intensity than in the past.35
Tension over the issue of a national language remains despite the 
legislative compromise of 1963, the Official Language Act am endm ent of 
1967 and the 1973 national in tegration panels efforts to deal w ith  
linguistic differences. As a result English rem ains the com prom ise 
language of government because it is not a primary identity language.36 
This compromise is another example of a tem porary settlem ent w hich 
allows India to m uddle through w ithout a resolution of the underlying 
conflict. There are signs that the compromise is faltering. Chief M inister 
Mulayam Singh Yadav of U ttar Pradesh declared in April of 1990 that 
"Henceforth all memos, petitions, surveys, and any other official UP 
documents must be completed in Hindi."37
The local elites' success in opposition to the centre over linguistic 
determ ination of the territorial delineation of state boundaries set a 
precedent for other groups seeking concessions from the centre. The 
Bombay example made it clear that it was possible for sub-national groups 
to organise movements to obtain concessions from the centre. W hether 
this is perceived as a demonstration of the reasonableness of the centre to 
accede to group demands or as an example of how the centre can be forced 
into making concessions is im portant. Subsequent sub-national group
35 R. Barz, in India Creating a Modern Nation, p. 103.
36 Hans Raj, Indian Political System, pp. 16-25.
37 Tony Alien-Mills, "English Language Hindi Challenge," The Canberra Times,4 /1 0 /90.
strategies for seeking dem ands of the centre will be based on such 
assessm ents. The recent trend  of events indicates that the la ter 
interpretation, that the centre can be forced into making concessions, has 
become dominant. This stems from the confrontational relationship that 
has been established. If the relationship could be reconceptualised as a 
non-adversarial one, then a space w ould be created for sub-national 
groups to view the centre as not necessarily incom patible w ith their 
objectives. The desire to create a separate state is usually not the primary 
objective in itself but is seen as the best way of realising other goals. This 
will not come to pass unless the centre addresses the substantive 
dem ands of these groups. Suppressing them  through the force of arms 
alone is only a partial solution. If the underlying reasons for the sub­
national groups frustrations rem ain the m ovem ents will re-em erge 
under new leadership despite the success of the police, intelligence 
organisations or the military. This has been the case in the northeast and 
will most likely be the case in the Punjab.
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Appendix II 
Punjab and Kashmir
A ppendix  tw o p rov ides som e of the background  for the 
insurgencies in Punjab and Kashm ir. These are two complex and 
strategic regions for both India and Pakistan are central to both states 
security.
Punjab
The political process itself has been underm ined by the local rule of 
Sikh m ilitant com m anders. After form er Akali Dal leader Simranjit 
Singh Mann was released from prison his popularity was widespread. 
His call for negotiations betw een m ilitants and the centre in 1991, 
however, underm ined his popularity. This effort was rejected by a 
num ber of organisations under the control of Sohan Singh. As a result, 
Sim ranjit was forced to d istance him self from  the proposal for 
negotiations and in the process made it clear that the m ilitants, and not 
the politicians, were the leaders in Punjab.1
During the 1980s and early 1990s actual control of large parts of 
Punjab fell into the hands of some 5,000 m ilitants operating w ithin 200 
organisations who w ere under the um brella  of four key Panthic 
Committees. These were headed by Dr. Sohan Singh, Baba Gurbachan 
Singh Manochahal, Wasan Singh Zaffarwal and the Jasbir Singh Rode 
Group.2 Sohan Singh was the most powerful and is considered to be 
"able by proxy, to virtually run  the governm ent in Punjab."3 Schools 
have stopped teaching Hindi, switched to singing Shabads (Sikh religious 
hymns) rather than the national anthem, and have had students wear 
saffron turbans and black salwars; officials have changed their name 
plates to Gurmuki script and the people have begun to go to the durbars
1 Kanwar Sandhu, "Punjab: Sudden Eclipse, Man Being Marginalised," India Today, 
3/15/91,p. 70.
2 Vicky Sandhu, "The Unseen Hand That Governs Punjab," The Sunday Observer, 2/10- 
16/91.
3 Vicky Sandhu, The Unseen Hand That Governs Punjab,”
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of the local m ilitant com m ander for justice rather than Punjab court 
system. Journalists and editors publish m ilitant notices and dare not 
disobey demands to refrain from calling the m ilitants terrorists,4 while 
shop keepers respect m ilitant calls for bandhs. Smoking tobacco and 
drinking alcohol were further discouraged by the m ilitants. These 
m easures evoked negative  reactions from  the H indu  and Sikh 
comm unities alike.
The control of activity in Punjab by the Panthic Committees has 
m arginalized the more m oderate Akali Dal which had at times been 
p rep ared  to w ork w ith in  the existing political process to reach 
accommodation with the centre through pursuing an autonomous rather 
than secessionist path. The extremes of the m ilitants forced even the 
Akalis to press for a separate state of Khalistan. Some of the specific 
grievances of Sikhs are the diversion of Punjabi w ater resources, the 
return of Chandigarh to Punjab, persecution of those involved in the 
anti-Sikh riots of 1984 and other general autonomous policies.
It is generally accepted that these groups receive substantial support 
from across the border in Pakistan. The strength of the m ilitants in the 
border areas of Punjab support this.5 Much of the training in arms that 
the m ilitants receive is carried out in cam ps inside Pakistan. The 
reported 50,000 Rs per month^ pay received by arm ed m ilitants w ould 
also indicate a source of external funding. Government sources attribute 
mass attacks against H indus to "discrete Pakistan-coordinated bids to 
provoke communal c la s h e s .P a k is ta n 's  policy of supporting insurgents 
in India has continued steadily  despite  assurances received to the 
contrary. At the Male South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) Conference, Prime M inister Sharif pledged to not interfere in
4 Dozens of journalists and editors have been killed in Punjab for not complying with Sohan 
Singh s code of conduct for journalists. Shekhar Gupta, "Media: Under Duress," India 
Today, 12/31/90, p. 37 and Kanwar Sandhu, "The Press: Tight Squeeze," India Today, 
2/15/91, p. 72.
5 Shekhar Gupta, "Punjab: Dangerous Upsurge," India Today, 12/31/90, p. 29.
6 This figure seems unrealisticly high though it is here reported because a figure half as 
much would still support the proposition of outside support. Sumir Lai, "Terrorism in the 
Punjab," The Sunday Times, 2/10/91.
7 Sumir Lai, 'Terrorism in the Punjab."
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India's internal affairs. Less than two months later Pakistani cross border 
support had resumed.& Counter insurgency training received from Israel 
helped the Indian paramilitary forces regain some initiative in mid 1992.
Clearly Pakistan has sought to capitalise on the Indian state's 
weakness in Punjab but the deteriorated conditions which make fertile 
ground for such in tervention are the creation of the cynical politics 
pursued by Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. The Indian governm ent continues 
to explicitly blame Pakistan for the assistance that Pakistan gives to 
insurgents operating in Punjab. "Certain im portant terrorist leaders like 
Dr. Sohan Singh, Wasant Singh, Zafarwal, Gurbachan Singh Manochal, 
Sukhdev Singh Babbar and others are residents in and assisted by 
elements in Pakistan and are actively directing operations from across the 
border."^
In 1986, the channels of support used by Pakistan were expanded. 
Prior to this, arms were purchased by Inter-Services Intelligence through 
the Peshawar based Afghan faction of Yar Hikamat Yar Khan. In 1986 the 
ISI connection was to involve the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, the 
Directorates of Military, Navy and Air Intelligence. The Special Services 
Group and ISI have formed a "council to work in coordination to help 
the terrorists."^  The arms channel seems still to be through a Peshawar 
connection. The gunsmiths of Dara also reported that many of their arm s 
were going to Punjab and K ashm ir.^  There are now reportedly 19 camps 
in Lahore, Sailkot and Rawalpindi. 12
As the political situation w ithin Punjab deteriorated, a political 
wasteland was created in which the extrem ists found a niche.13 This
8 S.S. Banyal, "Ultras Emboldened by Sharif Support," The Hindustan Times, 2/12/91.
9 "Spokesman’s Response to Queries on Amnesty International Report of 3/26/92," India 
News, (Canberra: High Commission of India, 3/30/92), p. 1.
10Gopal Misra, "Rise in Pakistan Aid to Ultras Leads to Concern," The Sunday Mail 
,11/11/90.
11 Interviews by the author with various dealers in Dara. Reportedly many of the arms 
interdicted in 1992 are of Chinese origin.
Aditya Sinha, "Panthic Committee is Govt Stooge: Chauhan," The Business and 
Political Observer, 11/14/90.
^Mohammed Ayoob, "Dateline India: The Deepening Crisis," Foreign Policy, winter, 
1991-2, p. 174.
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Situation continues to defy solution by the centre, though in 1992 the 
m ilitary had some counter insurgency success. The m ilitary and 
paramilitary forces deployed in Punjab exceed 200,000.14 The levels of 
politically m otivated collective violence continue to grow. The police 
and security forces have been progressively and successfully targeted by 
insurgents. In Punjab in 1990-1 a total of 973 police were killed as well as 
133 of their family members. In Kashmir there were more than 2,000 
attacks on security forces reported by the governm ent which resulted in 
the death of 320 security personnel and 830 insurgents and civilians.1^
Central control was defied through arm ed resistance as the Sikh 
extrem ists occupied the Golden Tem ple in A m ritsar in 1984. This 
precipitated operation "Blue Star" on 5 June 1984 to reoccupv the temple 
and oust the ex trem ists.^  During the operation close to one thousand 
soldiers, Sikh m ilitants and pilgrim s were killed. It was fu rther a 
w atershed  because after the in c id en t the Sikh ex trem ists w ere 
increasingly fighting for an independen t K halistan and  not m ere 
autonomy. Later that year, on 31 October, resentm ent over the incident 
led to Indira G andhi’s assassination at the hands of two of her Sikh 
bodyguards. The assassination led to three days of rioting in Delhi w ith 
the result of some 3,000 Sikhs being killed. The time taken to quell the 
riots, and the lack of prosecutions of those who perpetrated the pogrom, 
have lead to widespread speculation of the Congress Party, and possibly 
even Rajiv G andhi's, involvem ent in the affair. The legacy of 
m anipulation in Punjab continued under Rajiv Gandhi w ith the failed 
Rajiv-Longawal Accord and the im position  and continuation, by 
constitutional am endm ent, of Presidential rule in the s t a t e . F u r t h e r ,
14 Janes Defence Weekly, 1/11/92, pp. 56-7.
15 "Spokesman’s Response to Queries on Amnesty International Report of 3/26/92," India 
News, (Canberra: High Commission of India, 3/30/92), p. 1.
1(1 Prior to the storming of the Golden Temple, Sikh extremists were loosely under the 
leadership of Bhindranwale. Since the storming, and Bhindranwale’s death, a profusion 
of terrorist groups have come into being. Many of the groups were dealt a serious blow by 
COIN operations in 1992-93.
17 The accord was signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the President of the Akali 
Dal Harcharan Singh on 26 January 1986. This was to be the basis of a centre-state 
accommodation which would provide for: 1. transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, 2. a tribunal 
for the settlement of river and territorial issues with other states, 3. to refer the
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the violation of the temple, has had a detrim ental effect on the armed 
forces. Alhough only two percent of the population, Sikhs constitute 22% 
of the officer corps and 10% of the other ranks. As a result of the 
storm ing of the Temple a few Sikh units m utinied. The uncertain 
loyalties of the population of Punjab complicates the border situation for 
India. In the event of another war with Pakistan, a doubt is created as to 
the disposition of the loyalty of sections of the state.
Kashmir
Throughout history Kashmir has had both the strategic misfortune 
and economic benefit of being located at the cross roads of Central Asia. 
This has led to its annexation or dom ination by various kingdoms as the 
political fortunes of the Central Asian kings changed. The area's history 
fu rther com plicates the present quandary  over the b o rder dispute 
between India and Pakistan because Kashmir, as a territorial entity, did 
not always change hands in its entirety. During partition, the H indu 
Dogra M aharaja H ari Singh, fearing the invad ing  M uslim  Pathan 
tribesmen, decided to accede to India despite the overwhelming majority 
of Muslims in Kashmir. India has defended its right to Kashmir on the 
grounds that its last Maharaja of Kashmir legally transferred control to 
India. Even this assertion is som ewhat tenuous. Accompanying the 
letter of accession was a letter from Lord M ountbatten, which seems to 
make the accession agreement contingent upon a subsequent plebiscite.
India’s pledge to hold a plebiscite to determ ine the destiny of the 
territory and India's actions in Junagadh and Hyderabad underm ine the 
legitimacy of its claim over Kashmir. In these two cases the Muslim 
Nawab of Junagadh and the Nizam of Hyderabad sought either to remain 
independent or to join with Pakistan. In both cases India decided to use
Anandapur Sahib Resolution to review, 4. inquiry into the post Indira Gandhi 
assassination atrocities against Sikhs, 5. removal of the special powers of the military in 
the Punjab and, 6. merit based entry requirements to the military. In March of 1988, an 
amendment to the Constitution was passed to allow the extension of President’s rule in 
Punjab beyond the one year allowed. President’s rule was first imposed on 11 May 1987 
during the lead up to the Haryana elections.
force to decide the issue, and to ignore the rights of the former ruler to 
make the decision on accession. In Kashmir, the accession decision was 
conveniently pro Indian so has been used as the basis of India's c la im .^  
Both India and Pakistan ultimately justified their actions with regard to 
Kashmir in the name of their national interests and core ideologies. All 
other justifications would appear to be rationalisations for domestic and 
international public relations.
In 1990 both Prime M inister Bhutto and Prime M inister Singh 
found themselves in a position that paralleled that of their predecessors' 
predicament in 1964-5. President Ayub of Pakistan wished to see relations 
between Pakistan and India im prove through negotiated settlem ents of 
the disputes between the two countries. This assertion is supported by 
the prudence which Ayub demonstrated in his decision not to exploit the 
opportunity presented by the Sino-Indian w ar of 1962. The internal 
domestic situation inside Pakistan was for Benazir in 1991, as it was for 
Ayub in 1965, pushing the realm of political debate over the Kashmir 
issue farther and farther tow ards jingoistic rhetoric and posturing. No 
Pakistani leader can afford to be perceived as soft on the Kashm ir 
question. Neither Inter Services Intelligence, the army or the populace 
would allow it.
Benazir, like Ayub, was presen ted  w ith  a dom estic political 
environm ent where she could ill afford to be outflanked on the right by 
the pro-military element. It is also generally recognised that Benazir's 
continued support for high military budgets w ithin Pakistan stemm ed 
more from her recognition of the political realities of her former position 
as Prime Minister, than from her belief in the necessity of continued high 
level military spending. At that time Bhutto's opposition liked to portray 
her as soft on India. It was imperative for her political survival for her 
to be perceived as a proponent of a strong defense and supportive of the 
frustra tions of the M uslim  b re th ren  across the b o rder in Ind ian  
controlled Kashmir.
18 Sultana Afraz, The Junagadh and the Hyderabad Case," The Round Table, 1989.
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The extent to which her control was limited was highlighted by the 
1990 border situation with India that almost led to war. By her account, 
she was informed by the CIA that the Pakistani military had developed a 
nuclear bom b and had the will and capability to use it. In a 1992 
statement Bhutto made it clear that she felt that the CIA allegations were 
true. 19 When attempting to make a political come-back in November of 
1992, Bhutto was barred from marching to the north of the country.
A sim ilar situation presented itself to the Shastri governm ent 
prior to the 1965 war. At Nehru's death on 27 May 1964, Shastri had to 
deal w ith rising right wing H indu parties and m ounting com m unal 
tensions. A combination of the riots over the disappearance of the hair of 
the prophet and the passing of articles 356 and 357 m ade the situation 
tense in Kashmir. Today comparable levels of rioting are increasingly 
arm ed and organized. The key difference is that today the Pakistani 
military will be more wary of an engagement w ith the Indian military 
than they were in 1965. They learned from the 1965 w ar that India could 
expand the front along the entire Indo-Pakistani border. It was this threat 
of an expansive war that served to diffuse the conflict.
The Pakistani Foreign Secretary, M oham m ed Shaharyar Khan, 
stated upon  his retu rn  from the April 1991 round of border talks: "We 
m ade it absolutely clear that a sustained  im provem ent in bilateral 
relations required above all a settlem ent of the Kashmir issue."20 In an 
escalation of its support for the Kashmir insurgents, Pakistan broke in 
August 1990 from the tacit agreement not to use heavy artillery in border 
skirmishes along the line of control in Kashmir. Such heavy ordnance 
has not been used since 1972.21 Despite this Pakistan refrained from 
further escalation.
The differences between Pakistan and India over Kashmir cut right 
to the core of the differing value systems of the national identities of the
19 "Bhutto Tells of Plan for N-Attack," The Sydney Morning Heraid, 12/4/92.
20 "Kashmir Said Still Main Obstacle," Reuters News Service,4/8/91.
2  ^ Balram Tabdon, "Forces Clash With Pakistani Troops in Kashmir," The Daily 
Telegraph,8 /21/90.
two countries. Pakistan is more rigidly religious than officially secular 
India. General Zia rationalized his rule through the propagation of 
religious fundam entalism . Pakistan’s raison d 'etat is grounded in the 
belief that the Muslims of South Asia should have the right to a separate 
hom eland for their faith. From its conception in the m inds of M.A. 
Jinnah and the Muslim league, Pakistan was to have included Kashmir. 
In 1933 C houdhri Rahmat Ali created the name Pakistan for the then 
proposed independent Muslim state w ith the ”k" standing for Kashmir. 
While the existence of Bangladesh would seem to reduce the validity of 
Pakistani’s claim to be the rightful heir to rule Muslim areas of the 
subcontinent, they would see this state of affairs as having been achieved 
through the m anipulation of events by the Indians. Kashmir at the time 
of partition , as it is now, com prised an overw helm ingly M uslim  
population contiguous w ith the other predom inantly M uslim areas of 
the form er territories of the British Raj.22 The fact that this area 
remained outside Pakistan at independence was an affront to the very 
reason for Pakistan's existence as defined by its founding fathers.
Similarly, Indian state values are also at stake in Kashmir. It was 
the earnest desire of M ahatma Gandhi that India should not succumb to 
the divisive and com m unalist elem ents w hich w ere pushing for a 
Muslim state separate from the Hindus. The vision of the leaders of the 
Congress m ovem ent included a secular state of Muslims and H indus 
alike. W ithout Kashmir, India will move further tow ard becoming a 
Hindu, rather than a secular, state.
Sitting at the crossroads of Central Asia, Kashmir controls strategic 
passes and the waters of the the key rivers of western India and Pakistan. 
Three of the five rivers of Punjab orig inate in, or flow through, 
K ashm ir.23 One of the few bright spots in Indo-Pakistani cooperation has 
been the division of the waters of the region. These waters are critical to 
the agriculture of both countries.
22 Ladakh is culturally and religiously quite similar to Tibet. Jammu is largely Hindu 
with Sikh and Muslim minorities.
23 Punjab means five rivers.
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